On the Failure of International Legal Policies Concerning the Forms of the Corruption Phenomenon: Between conceptual identification and the illusion of universality
This article examines the failure of international legal policies concerning the forms of the corruption phenomenon through a critical analysis of the conceptual premises underpinning contemporary “anti-corruption” conventions and regulatory frameworks. It argues that the core deficiency of these policies lies in a process of conceptual identification whereby the phenomenon of corruption is reduced to selected forms, which are subsequently elevated to the status of universal normative referents. Such reductionism generates what may be described as an illusion of universality: a regulatory construction that presumes the existence of homogeneous corruption forms across historically and culturally differentiated structures of coexistence. By abstracting corruption forms from its nation-state dimension, its embeddedness in specific legal traditions, political configurations, cultural patterns and social hierarchies, international legal policies attempt to impose standardized models of criminalization and compliance upon heterogeneous realities. The article contends that this approach does not merely produce implementation deficits, but reflects an epistemological misapprehension of the phenomenon itself. The plurality of corruption ideotypes and the differentiated profiles of homo corruptus across societies resist assimilation into universal legal templates. Consequently, international anti-corruption regimes risk transforming complex social phenomena into bureaucratically measurable categories, privileging formal conformity over substantive impact. The study concludes that any meaningful reorientation of international legal engagement must begin with a clear distinction between the phenomenon of corruption and its context-specific forms, thereby moving beyond the conceptual identification and normative universalism that underlie its persistent failures.

