This paper develops a managerial–mathematical framework for analyzing structural social transformation in systems characterized by institutional inequality. Drawing conceptual inspiration from structural analyses of exclusion such as those articulated by B. R. Ambedkar, the study constructs a formal dynamic model integrating institutional reform (law), political mobilization (collective agency), economic restructuring, and normative change. Using nonlinear dynamical systems, game theory, and systems management analytics, the model demonstrates how structural inequality persists as a stable equilibrium unless multidimensional intervention shifts system parameters beyond critical thresholds. The paper further introduces managerial policy simulations showing how coordinated strategies outperform isolated reforms. The findings contribute to complexity-based governance theory, strategic public management, and socio-mathematical policy design. 

Keywords: Structural inequality, Nonlinear systems, Governance modeling, Political agency, Constitutional reform, Managerial analytics, Dynamic equilibrium, Social transformation.