The contemporary enterprise landscape is increasingly characterized by the paradoxical coexistence of executive empowerment and organizational fragility, a phenomenon herein conceptualized as the CEO’s paradox. This study investigates the structural and cognitive mechanisms underpinning this paradox by examining the influence of budgetal intelligence and sustainable enterprise architecture on financial decoupling. Drawing on Agency Theory and Institutional Theory, the research adopts a mixed-method approach, integrating empirical evidence from both developed and developing economies. Findings indicate that financial decoupling is not merely a behavioural outcome of self-interested executives but is structurally facilitated by opaque budgeting systems and fragmented enterprise architectures. Budgetal intelligence emerges as a critical moderating mechanism, transforming budgeting from a routine financial exercise into an anticipatory and ethically anchored governance instrument. Concurrently, sustainable enterprise architecture provides the structural and institutional safeguards necessary to embed accountability, align executive decisions with long-term sustainability objectives, and operationalize strategic commitments. The study concludes that resolving the CEO’s paradox requires a systemic approach, wherein intelligent budgeting and integrated enterprise architecture jointly mitigate executive discretion and enhance sustainable performance. These insights have profound implications for corporate governance, policy formulation, and leadership design in transitional and emerging economies.