

# The Kaduna Vigilante Service and Crime Control in Igabi Local Government Area, Kaduna State, Nigeria, 2016–2023

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Article History	Abstract
<p><b>Original Research Article</b></p> <p><b>Received: 01-05-2026</b></p> <p><b>Accepted: 02-06-2026</b></p> <p><b>Published: 25-06-2026</b></p> <p><b>Copyright © 2026 The Author(s):</b> This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium for non-commercial use provided the original author and source are credited.</p> <p><b>Citation:</b> Nuhu Sani &amp; Assoc. Prof. E.A. Bature. (2026). The Kaduna Vigilante Service and Crime Control in Igabi Local Government Area, Kaduna State, Nigeria, 2016–2023. UKR Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences (UKRJAHS), 2(6), 209-228.</p>	<p><i>The increasing incidence of theft, robbery, kidnapping, and other forms of criminality in Igabi Local Government Area of Kaduna State has exposed the limitations of conventional policing and necessitated the involvement of community-based security arrangements. This study examined the contributions of the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) to crime control in Igabi Local Government Area between 2016 and 2023. Specifically, the study assessed the extent to which KADVS has reduced crime and enhanced community safety. The study adopted a mixed-methods approach, utilizing questionnaires, Key Informant Interviews (KII), and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) to generate quantitative and qualitative data. A total of 400 respondents were selected through multi-stage sampling techniques, but 364 were presented and analysed, while qualitative data were analysed thematically and quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics. The study was anchored on Broken Windows Theory. Findings revealed that KADVS has significantly contributed to the reduction of theft, robbery, and kidnapping and has improved community safety through regular patrols, intelligence gathering, early warning mechanisms, and collaboration with the Nigeria Police. The study further found that the local knowledge, accessibility, and community acceptance enjoyed by KADVS enhanced its effectiveness in crime prevention and control. The study concludes that KADVS has become an indispensable complement to formal policing in Igabi LGA. It recommends greater institutional support, training, logistical assistance, and strengthened collaboration between KADVS and formal security agencies. The study contributes to knowledge by providing empirical evidence on the effectiveness of community-based security initiatives in complementing state policing and promoting local security governance in Nigeria.</i></p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> Kaduna Vigilante Service, Crime Control, Community Security, Vigilantism, Igabi Local Government Area, Kaduna State, Nigeria.</p>

## Introduction

The provision of adequate security is a fundamental prerequisite for the survival and functioning of any society. Without it, business and social activities cannot thrive freely, as the protection of lives and property is paramount. This universal need explains why communities throughout history have developed mechanisms to police themselves and secure their neighborhoods against criminal victimization. One such mechanism is vigilante service, which can be defined as organized, extralegal movements by private citizens aimed at maintaining order and combating crime. This phenomenon typically emerges from a perceived failure of the state to uphold its monopoly on

legitimate force and provide adequate security and justice (Buur & Kyed, 2006). Crime control, in this context, encompasses the strategies and actions taken to prevent harm, protect facilities and persons, and ensure safety from damage, theft, violence, or disruption.

The historical roots of modern vigilante service are evident globally. In developed nations, early examples include the San Francisco Committee of Vigilance of the 1850s, which arose in response to rampant crime and corruption in the absence of effective policing (Burrows, 1976). Similarly, in 18th-century London, groups like the Bow Street Runners served as precursors to a professional police force, filling a

critical security vacuum (Beattie, 2012). This pattern, where citizen-led initiatives emerge to impose order in the wake of weak or absent state institutions, is a recurring theme. This pattern of community-based crime control is deeply embedded in African history. Long before European colonization, African societies maintained robust indigenous security systems rooted in traditional authority and collective responsibility. These systems, which functioned as early forms of community policing, included age-grade patrols, hunters' associations, night watches, and secret societies that worked alongside chiefs and elders to maintain social harmony and enforce sanctions (Alemika, 2013). In the post-colonial era, persistent institutional weakness, underfunded police forces, and public mistrust in formal justice systems have created fertile ground for these traditions to evolve into modern vigilante services. Examples include the Makgotla in South Africa and the Sungusungu in Tanzania, which represent grassroots responses to crime and insecurity (Buur & Kyed, 2006).

In Nigeria, the tradition of vigilante service is traceable to the indigenous security structures that existed across its diverse regions prior to colonial rule. In the north, the Dogarai (Emirate/Palace guards) and the *yan banga* (community watchmen) operated under the Emirate system. In the west, the Yoruba utilized structured age-grade systems and secret societies like the Oro and Ogboni for social discipline and protection. In the south, among the Igbo and Efik/Ibibio, groups such as the Umunna, Ekpe, and Ekpo societies acted as moral and security regulators (Alemika, 2013; Babatunde, 2020; Bamidele, 2021). These systems collectively laid the foundational principles for contemporary vigilante organizations in Nigeria. A significant development has been the state-sponsored formalization of these groups. This trend began with the creation of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Borno State in 2013 as a community-led response to the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State. Its subsequent integration by the state government set a precedent for other regions (Onapajo, 2020). This has been followed by the establishment of groups like the Kaduna State Vigilante Service (KADVS), the Zamfara State Community Protection Guards, the Amotekun Corps in the South West, and the Ebube Agu Security Network in the South East. These initiatives reflect a growing trend of state-backed hybrid security arrangements designed to address pervasive insecurity. Many Local Government Areas in Kaduna have been gripped by insecurity and lawlessness as armed robbery, kidnapping, herdsman attacks and other violent crimes have reached unprecedented levels. Community members, almost on daily basis, are dispossessed of their valuable properties while others are kidnapped, killed or maimed for life by armed bandits (Yakubu, 2024).

Against this backdrop, this study examined the contribution of the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) to crime control in Igabi Local Government Area, Kaduna State, between 2015 and 2023. The study was guided by the following research objectives and corresponding research questions:

### Research Objectives

1. To assess whether the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) has reduced incidents of theft, robbery, and kidnapping in Igabi Local Government Area between 2016 and 2023.
2. To examine the impact of KADVS presence on improving community safety in Igabi Local Government Area.
3. To evaluate the influence of KADVS on local crime rates in Igabi Local Government Area between 2016 and 2023.
4. To determine the effectiveness of the Kaduna Vigilante Service in controlling crime in Igabi Local Government Area.
5. To investigate the role of KADVS operational activities (patrols, arrests, intelligence gathering, and surveillance) in crime reduction.
6. To examine the extent to which collaboration between KADVS and formal security agencies contributes to crime control in Igabi LGA.
7. To assess the effect of community trust, acceptance, and cooperation on the effectiveness of KADVS in Igabi LGA.
8. To analyse how the visibility and presence of KADVS influence deterrence of criminal activities in Igabi Local Government Area.

### Research Questions

1. Has the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) reduced incidents of theft, robbery, and kidnapping in Igabi Local Government Area between 2016 and 2023?
2. How has the presence of KADVS affected community safety in Igabi Local Government Area?
3. What impact has KADVS had on local crime rates in Igabi Local Government Area between 2016 and 2023?
4. How effective is the Kaduna Vigilante Service in controlling crime in Igabi Local Government Area?

5. In what ways do KADVS operational activities (patrols, arrests, intelligence gathering, surveillance) contribute to crime reduction?
6. How does collaboration between KADVS and formal security agencies influence crime control in Igabi LGA?
7. What role do community trust, acceptance, and cooperation play in the effectiveness of KADVS?
8. To what extent does the visibility and presence of KADVS deter criminal activities in Igabi Local Government Area?

## Conceptual Review

### *Concept of Vigilante Service*

Abrahams (1998) conceptualizes vigilante services as community-driven initiatives that emerge in contexts where formal state authority is either weak or ineffective. These groups often take on the responsibility of maintaining law and order, effectively acting as substitutes for state policing functions. However, Abrahams also highlights the paradox of their existence, noting that while vigilante groups may fill security voids, they simultaneously pose a challenge to state sovereignty particularly in post-colonial societies like Nigeria, where the legitimacy of state institutions is often contested. Similarly, Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974) describe vigilantism as the act of "taking the law into one's own hands," driven by a perception of failure or inefficiency within the formal justice system. This perspective is especially relevant in Nigeria, where public distrust in official security agencies has fueled the rise of community-based enforcement groups. Johnston (1996) offers a more structured definition, portraying vigilante service as a deliberate, voluntary effort by private citizens, organized as a social movement to combat crime or social disorder. He outlines six defining features of such activities: they are premeditated; involve individuals outside state control; operate autonomously; rely on the use or threat of force; respond to perceived violations of societal norms; and aim to provide assurance of security. Together, these perspectives underscore the complexity of vigilante services as both a community response to insecurity and a reflection of broader governance challenges.

Pratten and Sen (2007) describe vigilante services as part of a broader phenomenon of "global vigilantes," characterized by their enforcement of community norms through actions that frequently blur the boundaries between lawful and unlawful behavior. This is particularly evident in Nigeria, where ethnic and community watch groups often operate in legal grey areas. Favarel-Garrigues and Gayer (2021) define vigilantism more broadly as collective and coercive actions undertaken by non-state actors to uphold legal or

moral standards. These actions may include surveillance, direct intervention, or punitive measures aimed at enforcing order. Buur and Jensen (2004) argue that such vigilante formations typically arise in states with weak institutional capacity, where official security structures are unable to meet the needs of the population, prompting communities to seek alternative mechanisms for safety and justice. Meagher (2007) adds a political dimension to this discussion, observing that in Nigeria, vigilante groups are often appropriated by state actors and integrated into broader political agendas. As a result, these groups evolve into hybrid institutions that simultaneously serve the interests of local communities and political elites, raising important questions about their legitimacy, accountability, and role in the broader security architecture.

Cooper-Knock and Owen (2014) examine the phenomenon of "vigilante policing," wherein state actors, particularly in contexts like Nigeria, engage in informal collaborations with vigilante groups. This cooperation often occurs when law enforcement tacitly supports vigilante actions as a pragmatic response to widespread crime and inadequate policing resources. Mutahi (2011) offers insight into the Kenyan context, framing vigilante services as integral components of an informal security economy, where their functions are shaped by temporal, social, and economic dynamics. DeCelles and Aquino (2020) introduce the concept of a "vigilante identity," suggesting that individuals may engage in monitoring and punishing perceived norm violators without holding formal authority, driven by a personal sense of justice and moral duty. Expanding on this, Chen et al. (2022) define vigilantes as self-appointed enforcers who internalize this identity and engage in hyper-vigilant behavior, often taking punitive action in response to violations of organizational or community norms. Nhan et al. (2017) further characterize vigilante activities as citizen-led efforts involving investigation or public denunciation, which may either complement or conflict with formal law enforcement, depending on how closely their actions align with official state objectives. Collectively, these perspectives underscore the complex and evolving nature of vigilante services as both extensions and challengers of formal security structures.

Schuberth (2013) interprets vigilante services as grassroots responses that arise when formal justice systems are perceived to be ineffective or unjust, often focusing on acts deemed morally wrong rather than strictly criminal. Bateson (2020) defines vigilante groups as organized citizen efforts to combat crime in environments marked by weak state presence, highlighting their dual potential to enhance community security or contribute to violence escalation. Moncada (2017) conceptualizes vigilante

services as non-state actors that actively engage with state institutions in negotiating authority and influence, thereby shaping local security dynamics in politically and socially fragmented settings. Phillips (2016) underscores the complex relationship between vigilante groups and formal police forces, arguing that the nature of their interaction whether cooperative or adversarial is largely determined by local power relations and levels of mutual trust. Similarly, Crawford and Dacin (2020) view vigilante practices within communities or organizations as expressions of informal social control, typically emerging in response to perceived failures or inadequacies in official governance structures. Together, these perspectives illustrate the multifaceted role of vigilante services as both products of institutional gaps and influential actors in localized security governance.

Goldstein (2012) interrogates vigilante services as community-led responses that arise when the state fails to provide adequate security. These services are typically organized groups that engage in activities such as patrolling, detaining, or punishing perceived offenders. Harnischfeger (2003) describes vigilante groups in Nigeria, such as the Bakassi Boys, as quasi-military formations that are created to fight crime, yet frequently resort to extra-judicial violence. Kirsch and Grätz (2010) conceptualize these services as “local security initiatives,” which combine traditional practices with modern strategies, like community patrols or cooperation with local hunters, to address crime in various African contexts. Smith (2007) frames vigilante services as forms of “popular justice,” where communities take matters into their own hands, bypassing formal legal processes to enforce social and moral order, often as a response to a lack of trust in state institutions. These perspectives collectively highlight the complex roles that vigilante services play in both addressing security gaps and challenging formal state authority.

Fourchard (2012) espouses vigilante services in Nigeria as hybrid security actors that function with either state approval or tolerance, stepping in to fill policing gaps while balancing community trust with state authority. Comaroff and Comaroff (2006) view these services as part of the broader “privatization of justice” in post-colonial societies, where non-state actors assume policing roles in the face of state withdrawal or inadequacy, a trend particularly evident in northern Nigeria. Baker (2008) situates vigilante services within Africa’s “multi-choice policing” framework, where citizens resort to informal groups for protection due to the inefficiencies of formal law enforcement systems. Alemika and Chukwuma (2003) argue that in Nigeria, vigilante services emerge as a response to systemic corruption and ineffectiveness within the police force, serving as protectors for local communities. Shearing and Wood

(2003) conceptualize these services as part of “nodal governance,” where various actors state, community, and private sector collaborate and share responsibility for maintaining security. These perspectives highlight the evolving and multifaceted role of vigilante groups in addressing security challenges within a broader governance framework.

### ***Concept of Crime***

Kappeler (2017) conceptualizes crime as a social construct, where behaviors become criminalized through legal definitions, cultural norms, and media amplification. This labeling process often reveals societal prejudices rather than objective moral wrongdoing, highlighting how power shapes perceptions of deviance. Sutherland (1947) defines crime as any act violating criminal law, acquired through differential association with groups that normalize law-breaking. His framework emphasizes that criminal behavior, ranging from street crime to white-collar offenses, is learned through social interactions just as conventional behavior is. Merton (1938) explains crime as innovative deviance a response to structural strain when individuals face blocked opportunities to achieve societally-approved goals like material success. When legitimate avenues are inaccessible, some turn to illicit means, exposing systemic contradictions between cultural aspirations and institutional realities. Hirschi (1969) posits that crime results from deficient social bonds - weakened attachments to family, school, or community; lack of commitment to conventional goals; limited involvement in legitimate activities; and diminished belief in societal norms. His control theory suggests delinquency emerges when these restraining bonds falter, not from positive criminal motivations.

Beccaria (1963) defines crime as an act that breaches the implicit social contract between citizens and the state, disrupting the mutual obligations necessary for maintaining societal order. Such acts, clearly delineated by just and transparent laws, should be met with proportional punishment sufficient to deter future crimes while ensuring fairness and humanity in the justice system. Bentham (1970) views crime as actions that generate more harm than benefit for society, thereby obstructing the utilitarian principle of maximizing collective happiness. These self-serving acts necessitate carefully calibrated penalties to rebalance social harmony, ensuring deterrence without resorting to excessive severity. Quetelet (1842) argues that crime is a predictable consequence of social conditions, including poverty, inequality, and inadequate education. Individuals, in this view, act as agents of broader structural forces, engaging in behaviors that violate legal norms patterns that reflect the inherent organization (or disorganization) of society. Lombroso (2006) posits that

criminal behavior stems from biological and psychological predispositions, with certain individuals exhibiting atavistic or degenerative traits that predispose them to deviance. While these acts diverge from societal norms and are primarily driven by innate characteristics, environmental factors also play a contributing role.

Shaw (1969) argues that crime stems from socially disorganized urban environments where economic hardship and weak community bonds undermine social regulation, leading to delinquent behavior. Rather than being rooted in individual moral deficiencies, crime is largely a consequence of adverse environmental conditions. McKay (1969) similarly views crime as behavior emerging in contexts of social disorganization such as economic instability and high residential turnover that erode collective norms and increase law-breaking. These acts reflect the structural challenges of specific urban areas. Jeffery (1971) defines crime as an event arising from the intersection of individual motivations and situational opportunities. It occurs in environments that facilitate illegal acts, suggesting that prevention requires modifying both physical and social conditions to reduce criminal opportunities. Chambliss (1999) frames crime as behavior criminalized by dominant groups to reinforce their power and control over marginalized populations. This perspective highlights the role of social conflict, where laws are designed to protect elite interests rather than ensure justice. Reid (1994) describes crime as acts that breach legal statutes, shaped by evolving societal values, cultural norms, and legal interpretations. Understanding crime thus requires analyzing both the behavior itself and the criminal justice system's responses to it.

Akers (1998) posits that criminal behavior is acquired through social learning processes, where individuals develop patterns of law-breaking when such conduct is differentially reinforced over conforming behavior. These behavioral patterns emerge through interactions within social groups that normalize or reward deviance. Gottfredson (1990) conceptualizes crime as opportunistic acts of force or deception, primarily motivated by low self-control and the pursuit of immediate rewards. This perspective views criminal propensity as stable across populations, with situational factors determining actual commission. Hagan (1989) frames crime as norm-violating behavior that reflects structural power imbalances, particularly along axes of class and gender. The criminalization process reveals how dominant groups maintain control through legal systems that target marginalized populations. Collins (2000) argues that criminal labels are disproportionately applied to disadvantaged groups through intersecting systems of racial, gender, and class inequality. This critical perspective

highlights how legal definitions reflect systemic biases rather than objective assessments of harm. Chesney-Lind (2006) critiques how patriarchal justice systems criminalize women's survival strategies and gendered experiences. Female offending patterns must be understood within contexts of victimization and structural constraints rather than conventional criminal paradigms. Jennings (2016) adopts an integrative approach, viewing crime as legally proscribed behavior with multifactorial origins spanning biological, psychological, and sociological domains. This perspective necessitates interdisciplinary analysis to fully comprehend its complex etiology. Bernard (2010) defines crime as socially constructed norm violations, emphasizing how cultural and institutional processes shape both definitions of illegality and societal responses. Theoretical examination reveals how structural conditions produce criminalized behaviors and reactions.

### ***Concept of Crime Control***

Crime control refers to the various strategies and practices used by both state and non-state actors to prevent, deter, and respond to crime in order to maintain public safety and social order. In Nigeria, it operates within a plural policing system involving the Nigeria Police Force, vigilante services, and community initiatives, especially in areas affected by banditry, kidnapping, and armed robbery. These efforts include proactive measures like patrols and surveillance, reactive actions such as arrests and prosecutions, and rehabilitative programs for offenders. Persistent challenges such as police mistrust, limited resources, and socio-economic inequalities highlight the importance of collaborative, locally informed approaches to effectively reduce crime and strengthen public trust in security systems.

Andresen (2014) characterizes crime control as a strategy rooted in spatial analysis, emphasizing the identification and targeting of crime hotspots to reduce victimization rates through data-informed policing. Apel and Nagin (2011) interpret crime control through the lens of deterrence theory, underscoring the importance of the perceived certainty of sanctions. They advocate for rapid police response in high-crime areas to enhance the deterrent effect. Bursik and Gasmick (1993) frame crime control as an aspect of systemic social control, highlighting the role of community institutions and interpersonal networks in deterring criminal behavior. Clear (2007) presents crime control as community justice, promoting localized, restorative approaches that not only reduce crime but also rebuild public trust in justice institutions.

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) conceptualize crime control as the restructuring of opportunity structures, addressing the root causes of delinquency through targeted social programs aimed at marginalized youth. Decker (2007)

focuses on crime control in the context of gang intervention, combining focused law enforcement efforts with community-based initiatives to disrupt gang networks and reduce violence. Durlauf and Nagin (2011) view crime control as a matter of cost-effective policing, suggesting that increased police presence and visibility can serve as a significant deterrent to criminal activity. Felson (2002) emphasizes routine activity theory, advocating for environmental and behavioral changes that enhance guardianship and reduce opportunities for crime. Gibbs (1975) defines crime control as deterrence through punitive sanctions, asserting that the certainty and severity of punishment can effectively discourage criminal behavior. Glueck and Glueck (1950) propose a predictive model of crime control, focused on identifying individuals at risk of offending to enable early intervention and prevention strategies.

Greenwood and Petersilia (1975) advocate for selective incapacitation, targeting habitual and high-risk offenders as a means of reducing crime through incarceration. Hagan (1989) views crime control from a structural criminology perspective, emphasizing the need to address broader social and economic inequalities that contribute to crime. Hawkins (2003) calls for reforms in racially biased policing practices, positioning equitable law enforcement as a foundational element of effective and legitimate crime control. Hipp (2010) situates crime control within neighborhood dynamics, proposing that community cohesion and collective efficacy play essential roles in deterring criminal activity. Jacobs (1961) argues that urban design contributes to crime prevention, advocating for public spaces that promote natural surveillance and community interaction.

Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) endorse community policing as a model for crime control, highlighting the importance of strong police-community partnerships in fostering safety. Lemert (1951) emphasizes the importance of reducing stigmatization through labeling theory, suggesting that crime control must involve efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of criminal labeling and promote reintegration. Lilly et al. (2015) propose a synthesized approach to crime control, integrating various criminological theories, particularly those focused on deterrence and social control, to develop more effective interventions. Lipsey and Cullen (2007) advocate for evidence-based rehabilitation programs as a means of crime control, focusing on empirical validation of interventions to reduce recidivism. Liska (1992) presents crime control through the framework of social threat theory, suggesting that perceptions of threat influence policies aimed at maintaining social order and cohesion.

Martinson (1974) examines the efficacy of rehabilitation efforts, eventually leading to the concept of selective rehabilitation identifying what works for whom to reduce criminal behavior. Matsueda (2006) explores the concept of differential social organization, arguing that strengthening community structures can inhibit the development of criminal subcultures. McDonald and Balkin (1983) emphasize the role of citizen participation in policing, promoting collaborative efforts between law enforcement and the community to enhance public safety. Moffitt (1993) distinguishes between different offender trajectories in her developmental taxonomy, proposing tailored interventions for adolescent-limited versus life-course-persistent offenders. Nagin and Paternoster (1991) frame crime control within rational choice theory, suggesting that increasing the perceived likelihood of punishment can deter potential offenders.

Newman (1972) introduces the concept of defensible space, advocating for architectural designs that enable residents to exert territorial control and surveillance, thereby reducing crime. Pogarsky (2002) presents the notion of deterrence sensitivity, emphasizing that individual differences in responsiveness to sanctions should inform crime control policies. Pratt et al. (2006) utilize meta-analytic methods to inform crime prevention strategies, supporting a research-based approach to designing and implementing effective interventions. Quinney (1970) approaches crime control through conflict theory, arguing that social inequalities and power struggles must be addressed to reduce crime sustainably.

Reckless (1961) introduces containment theory, suggesting that both internal controls (self-concept) and external controls (social institutions) are crucial for preventing delinquency. Rosenbaum (1987) promotes community crime prevention programs, such as neighborhood watch, which rely on collective vigilance to deter criminal behavior. Rutter (1985) advocates for resilience-building among at-risk youth, emphasizing protective factors that reduce the likelihood of criminal involvement. Sellin (1938) focuses on the resolution of cultural conflicts, suggesting that addressing normative differences between groups can reduce crime rates. Shover (1996) stresses the importance of promoting desistance from crime, arguing that supporting offender reintegration is a key component of long-term crime control. Skogan (1990) aligns with the "broken windows" theory, proposing that addressing minor disorders and incivilities can help prevent more serious crimes.

Toby (1957) introduces the concept of a "stake in conformity," asserting that individuals with stronger ties to conventional society are less likely to engage in criminal behavior. Vold (1958) emphasizes group conflict as a cause

of crime, suggesting that integrating marginalized groups into mainstream society is essential for crime reduction. Warr (2002) discusses perceptual deterrence, highlighting the significance of how potential offenders perceive the risk and consequences of criminal behavior. Welsh and Farrington (2009) underscore the value of prevention evaluation, advocating for the use of rigorous research methods to assess and refine crime control strategies. Zimring (2007) analyzes the decline in crime rates, identifying both policing innovations and broader social changes as contributing factors to sustained reductions in crime.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study is anchored on the Broken Windows Theory, developed by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in 1982. The theory posits that visible signs of disorder and neglect, if left unattended, create an environment that encourages more serious crimes and antisocial behaviour. According to the theory, minor acts of disorder such as theft, street violence, political thuggery, drug abuse, and harassment signal the absence of social control and increase the likelihood of the escalation of criminal activities. Consequently, maintaining order and addressing minor infractions are essential for preventing more serious crimes. The theory is based on several assumptions. First, communities share responsibility for maintaining social order through collective action and cooperation with law enforcement agencies. Second, the prompt control of minor offences prevents the escalation of crime, a phenomenon often described as the “snowball effect.” Third, the visible presence of security actors deters criminal behaviour by increasing the perceived risk of arrest and punishment. Wilson and Kelling (1982) argue that communities characterized by effective surveillance and active citizen participation are less vulnerable to criminal activities. Similarly, Kelling and Coles (1996) maintain that community involvement in crime prevention strengthens social control and promotes public order.

The Broken Windows Theory is highly relevant to this study because it explains the emergence and significance of vigilante services in areas where formal security institutions are inadequate. In communities such as Igabi Local Government Area, where police presence is often insufficient, residents have increasingly relied on community-based security initiatives to address disorder and prevent crime. The Kaduna Vigilante Service embodies the principles of the theory by monitoring suspicious activities, deterring offenders, and addressing minor crimes before they develop into more serious threats. Through regular patrols and close interaction with community members, the vigilante service helps to maintain order and foster a sense of security. The theory further explains how

local vigilance and collective action contribute to crime prevention. By addressing offences such as theft, street violence, and political thuggery, vigilante operatives effectively “fix the broken windows” and prevent the escalation of criminal activities. Thus, the theory provides a useful framework for understanding the role of the Kaduna Vigilante Service in complementing formal law enforcement and enhancing security in Igabi LGA.

Despite its relevance, the Broken Windows Theory has attracted criticism. Critics argue that it may encourage excessive reliance on informal policing, which can result in the abuse of power and violations of citizens’ rights. Since vigilante personnel are largely recruited on a voluntary basis, they often lack the professional skills, training, and legal authority required for effective law enforcement. Furthermore, informal policing structures may generate conflicts with formal security agencies and create controversies regarding accountability and the proper application of the law. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the theory remains useful in explaining how community-based security initiatives contribute to maintaining social order and preventing the escalation of crime.

### **Methodology**

This paper adopted the pragmatist research philosophy, which combines both positivist and interpretivist perspectives to provide a comprehensive understanding of social phenomena. Pragmatism allows the use of multiple methods and perspectives in generating knowledge, thereby facilitating valid and reliable inferences. While the positivist approach provided measurable and objective data through quantitative techniques, the interpretivist perspective enabled an in-depth understanding of participants’ perceptions and experiences through qualitative inquiry. The paper employed a mixed-methods research design, which integrated quantitative and qualitative approaches to generate comprehensive data. Surveys and interviews were used to collect information from respondents and key stakeholders, thereby enhancing the depth and validity of the findings. This design enabled the triangulation of evidence and provided a more holistic understanding of the contributions of the Kaduna Vigilante Service to crime control in Igabi Local Government Area. The research was conducted in Igabi Local Government Area, one of the twenty-three local government areas in Kaduna State, Nigeria. Located adjacent to Kaduna metropolis, the LGA comprises twelve administrative wards and possesses both urban and rural characteristics. The area is predominantly agrarian, although communities close to Kaduna city engage in various commercial and educational activities.

The study clearly defines a very large target population of 733,419 residents of Igabi Local Government Area, based on the National Population Commission's 2023 projected figures. This wide population coverage is appropriate for a community-based security study because it reflects the diverse demographic and spatial distribution of residents across the twelve wards of the LGA. By recognizing the entire LGA population as the sampling frame, the study establishes a strong basis for representativeness. To manage this large population, the study appropriately applies the Taro Yamane (1967) sample size determination formula, which is widely used in social science research for simplifying sample selection from large populations. The use of this formula enhances methodological rigor by providing a statistically grounded way of reducing the population into a manageable and researchable sample size. However, there are important issues in the computation presented. The correct Yamane formula is:

Formula

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where:

n is the sample size

N is the total number of the population under study

1 is constant

e is the margin of error

Therefore,

$$n = \frac{733,419}{1 + 636,400(0.5)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{733,419}{1 + 733,419(0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{733,419}{1,835}$$

$$n = 400$$

This confirms that the final sample size of approximately 400 respondents is mathematically valid when a 5% margin of error is applied. However, the intermediate step shown in the working (e.g., "636,400 (0.5)<sup>2</sup>") is incorrect and inconsistent with standard Yamane computation, indicating a typographical or computational error that should be corrected for academic precision. Methodologically, the study initially distributed 400 questionnaires to respondents, a sample size considered appropriate as it strikes a balance between statistical reliability and field practicality, particularly for a population exceeding 700,000. However, only 364 questionnaires were duly completed and returned, giving a high response rate of 91%, which remains adequate for robust statistical analysis and does not significantly compromise the validity or reliability of the findings. The sample size of 364 is still sufficiently representative of the study population, especially given the application of probability sampling techniques. This ensures that the findings can reasonably be generalized to the wider population of Igabi Local Government Area. In addition, the study adopted a mixed sampling approach, combining both purposive and random sampling techniques. The random sampling technique enhanced representativeness by reducing selection bias and ensuring that different segments of the population were fairly included in the study, thereby strengthening the generalizability of the findings. On the other hand, the purposive sampling technique ensured the deliberate inclusion of key informants such as security personnel, community leaders, and vigilante members, who possess relevant and in-depth knowledge of security dynamics in the area. This combination improved both the breadth and depth of the data collected.

## Discussion and Results of Data Presentation and Analysis

**Table 1: Respondents' views on whether Kaduna Vigilante Service has reduced incidents of theft, robbery, and kidnapping in Igabi LGA between 2016 and 2023.**

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly Agree	142	39.0%
Agree	168	46.2%
Neutral	32	8.8%
Disagree	18	4.9%
Strongly Disagree	4	1.1
Total	364	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2025

Table 1 presents respondents' views on whether the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) has reduced incidents of theft, robbery, and kidnapping in Igabi Local Government Area between 2016 and 2023. The findings show that a clear majority of respondents 85.2% either strongly agreed or agreed that the activities of KADVS have contributed significantly to the reduction of these crimes. Only 6.0% of respondents disagreed, while 8.8% were neutral. This indicates a strong community perception that the Kaduna Vigilante Service has been effective in crime control within Igabi LGA. The above response from respondents' is consistent with Alemika and Chukwuma (2017) on vigilante and community-based security initiatives in Nigeria argue that vigilante services are effective because of their grassroots nature, noting that vigilante services derive their strength from intimate knowledge of the community and the ability to detect crime at its early stages. This close familiarity with local environments enables vigilante operatives to disrupt criminal activities such as theft, robbery, and kidnapping before they escalate. Baker (2019) also observes that the presence of non-state security actors significantly alters criminal behavior. According to him, criminals are less likely to operate in communities where there is visible and continuous surveillance by locally embedded security groups. This assertion directly supports respondents' views that the constant patrols and surveillance carried out by KADVS discourage criminal operations in Igabi LGA.

Official security reports also validate this finding. The Nigeria Police Force acknowledges the importance of community-based security actors, stating that collaboration with local vigilante groups has improved intelligence flow

and enhanced response to crime in several states (Nigeria Police Force [NPF], 2021). This supports the interview evidence from Rigasa Ward, where arrested suspects are routinely handed over to the police for further investigation and prosecution.

The qualitative data generated during fieldwork further reinforces these findings. An interview conducted with the Head of the Vigilante Service in Rigasa Ward revealed that:

The formation of the Kaduna Vigilante Service has contributed significantly to security in Rigasa Ward. The constant presence of vigilante operatives has made it very difficult for criminals to operate freely in the area. Many suspects arrested in the course of these operations have been handed over to the police for further investigation and court prosecution (DA Haruna, Personal Communication, 19 December 2025).

This statement mirrors Abrahams' (1998) explanation of hybrid security systems, where he notes that vigilantism often operates not in opposition to the state, but in cooperation with formal policing institutions. The collaboration between KADVS and the police therefore enhances overall crime control outcomes. The data from quantitative data, qualitative interview and secondary literature strongly suggests that the Kaduna Vigilante Service has made a measurable contribution to reducing crime in Igabi Local Government Area between 2016 and 2023. The reduction in theft, robbery, and kidnapping not only reflects effective crime prevention but also enhances residents' sense of safety and confidence in the Kaduna Vigilante service.

**Table 2: Respondents' views on whether the presence of the Kaduna Vigilante Service has improved community safety in Igabi LGA.**

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly Agree	158	43.4%
Agree	164	45.1%
Neutral	24	6.6%
Disagree	12	3.3%
Strongly Disagree	6	1.6%
Total	364	100%

*Source: Field Survey, 2025*

Table 2 presents respondents' views on whether the presence of the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) has improved community safety in Igabi Local Government Area. The findings reveal that an overwhelming 88.5% of respondents either strongly agreed (43.4%) or agreed (45.1%) that KADVS has improved community safety, while only 11.5% were neutral or expressed disagreement.

This indicates widespread community approval and suggests that the physical presence of KADVS operatives has significantly enhanced safety perceptions within Igabi LGA. These findings are strongly supported by Aning and Abdallah (2016) argue that community-based security initiatives increase local safety primarily through visibility, familiarity, and constant engagement with residents. The

high level of agreement in this study reflects the effectiveness of KADVS's visible patrols and sustained engagement with local communities. Similarly, de Koning and Hoffmann (2018) observe that the regular presence of vigilante groups creates a deterrent effect by signaling constant monitoring and rapid response capability. This deterrence effect explains why respondents associate the presence of KADVS with improved safety, even in communities where formal policing presence is limited. An interview conducted with the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) in Birnin-Yero emphasized the complementary role of KADVS in local security provision. According to the Abubakar:

The presence of the Kaduna Vigilante Service has greatly improved community safety in Igabi Local Government Area. They provide security in remote communities where police presence is limited and serve as the eyes and ears of the Police. Through timely intelligence sharing, early detection of criminal activities, and joint operations, KADVS has helped prevent crime escalation and supported successful arrests. Their strong community acceptance and local knowledge have strengthened overall security in Igabi LGA (TA Abubakar, Personal Communication, 21 November, 2025).

This assertion aligns with Ruteere, Mutahi, and Mitchell (2018), who noted that local legitimacy and acceptance enhance the effectiveness of non-state security actors by improving intelligence flow and community cooperation. The acceptance enjoyed by KADVS within Igabi communities appears to have strengthened trust, cooperation, and early detection of security threats. Olonisakin and Aning (2020) emphasize that safety is both physical and psychological, stating that people's sense of safety improves when security providers are accessible, predictable, and visibly present in everyday community life. The constant patrols and accessibility of KADVS operatives therefore not only reduce crime opportunities but also enhance residents' confidence and emotional security. Agbiboa (2021) argues that vigilante services have become indispensable in Nigeria's security landscape, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas where police capacity is overstretched" (p. 83). This observation is particularly relevant to Igabi LGA, where KADVS fills critical security gaps and complements formal policing efforts. In addition, Bamidele (2022) notes that the visibility of vigilante groups contributes significantly to community reassurance and discourages opportunistic crimes. This reinforces the respondents' perception that the presence of KADVS operatives has made their communities safer.

**Table 3: Respondents' views on whether the Kaduna Vigilante Service has had a positive impact on local crime rates in Igabi LGA.**

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly Agree	152	41.8%
Agree	172	47.3%
Neutral	28	7.7%
Disagree	10	2.7%
Strongly Disagree	2	0.5%
Total	364	100%

*Source: Field Survey, 2025*

Table 3 presents respondents' views on whether the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) has had a positive impact on local crime rates in Igabi Local Government Area between 2016 and 2023. The findings reveal that 89.0% of respondents either strongly agreed (41.8%) or agreed (47.3%) that KADVS has positively influenced local crime rates, while only 3.2% expressed disagreement and 7.7% remained neutral. This high level of agreement provides strong empirical evidence that the activities of KADVS have contributed meaningfully to crime reduction in Igabi LGA. Agbiboa (2016) argues that vigilante groups have demonstrably reduced crime rates in areas where they operate consistently and in coordination with formal law

enforcement agencies. The respondents' assessment reflects this coordination, particularly through joint patrols and operations with security agencies. Similarly, Akinwale and Adeyemi (2017) observe that the operational effectiveness of vigilante services is best reflected in declining crime trends and improved arrest rates at the community level. The high agreement recorded in this study suggests that residents have observed tangible reductions in criminal activities such as kidnapping, robbery, and violent crime over the study period. The qualitative data obtained during fieldwork further substantiates these findings. Interviews with Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) across Igabi LGA consistently

indicated that KADVS plays a critical role in crime reduction. The operational effectiveness of KADVS was further illustrated by the Kaduna State Vigilante Commander, Aliyu D. Audu (rtd.):

We have recorded significant successes. For instance, just last month (October, 2026), we apprehended four kidnappers and recovered AK-47 rifles from them. The suspects were handed over to the police for further investigation, as the law does not permit us to detain criminals for more than 48 hours. In another operation in Giwa, we received intelligence about kidnappers who had abducted people from the Danja community in Katsina State.

We swung into action immediately and were able to rescue five victims on the spot. During the confrontation, we neutralized three kidnappers but, tragically, lost one of our own valiant members (AD Audu, Personal Communication, 17 November, 2025)

Furthermore, Olonisakin and Bryden (2020) emphasize that sustained collaboration between state and non-state security actors enhances the overall effectiveness of crime control strategies. The joint operations and patrols described by respondents and interviewees in Igabi LGA exemplify this collaborative security model, which has contributed to reduced crime rates and improved public safety.

**Table 4: Views of the respondents on whether the Kaduna Vigilante Service is effective in controlling crime in Igabi LGA.**

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Strongly Agree	166	45.6%
Agree	156	42.9%
Neutral	28	7.7%
Disagree	10	2.7%
Strongly Disagree	4	1.1%
Total	364	100%

*Source: Field Survey, 2025*

The data presented in Table 4 demonstrate an overwhelmingly positive assessment of the effectiveness of the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) in controlling crime within Igabi Local Government Area. A combined 88.5% of respondents either strongly agreed (45.6%) or agreed (42.9%) that KADVS is effective in crime control. This high level of endorsement indicates strong public confidence in the Service’s capacity to reduce crime and enhance community safety. In contrast, only 3.8% of respondents expressed disagreement, suggesting minimal public skepticism regarding the role of KADVS in local security provision. Such strong public approval aligns with empirical evidence by Alemika (2017) who observes that where vigilante groups are properly regulated and embedded within community structures, they often achieve notable success in crime prevention and control. The findings from Igabi LGA suggest that KADVS operates within this framework of community legitimacy and functional relevance, translating into measurable crime-control outcomes. The consistency of positive perceptions across respondents further suggests that the effectiveness of KADVS is widely experienced and not confined to specific demographic groups. The strong endorsement recorded in

this study therefore reinforces the legitimacy of KADVS as a trusted actor in local security governance.

Qualitative evidence from key informant interviews further substantiates these survey findings. The Director of Internal Security and Special Services, Mal. Garba Aliyu, emphasized that the establishment of KADVS was intended to complement formal security agencies such as the Nigeria Police Force, DSS, Nigerian Army, NSCDC, and FRSC. He noted that KADVS has effectively fulfilled this mandate through sustained collaboration and operational partnerships. Similarly, the District Head of Rigachikun highlighted a marked decline in criminal activities following the active involvement of KADVS in community security. He noted that security challenges in Rigasa Ward have been reduced to minimal levels compared to previous years. This local-level impact resonates with Baker (2020), who argues that the everyday presence and accessibility of vigilante groups enhance their capacity to deter crime and respond swiftly to emerging threats. The preference of community members to approach KADVS before the police further underscores the Service’s perceived effectiveness and accessibility. In addition, the willingness of residents to rely on KADVS reflects a high degree of trust, which is central to sustainable crime control. Jackson

and Bradford (2019) contend that “perceived effectiveness in crime control strengthens public trust, which in turn increases cooperation and compliance” (p. 94). In Igabi LGA, this reciprocal relationship appears evident, as community confidence in KADVS enhances information sharing and collective security efforts, thereby reinforcing crime prevention outcomes.

### Summary of Findings

1. The evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) is effective in crime control in Igabi LGA. Quantitatively, 88.5% of respondents in Table 4 affirmed that KADVS is effective in controlling crime, with only 3.8% expressing disagreement. This level of consensus is statistically significant in descriptive survey terms because it shows overwhelming clustering of responses toward agreement. Qualitatively, Divisional Police Officers and vigilante leaders confirmed that KADVS participates in patrols, intelligence gathering, arrests, and joint operations with formal security agencies. The factual convergence of high respondent agreement and documented operational activities provides a justified basis for concluding that KADVS is not merely perceived as effective but functionally active in crime control.
2. The findings justify the conclusion that KADVS has contributed to reductions in theft, robbery, and kidnapping in the study area. Table 1 shows that 85.2% of respondents reported a decline in these crimes due to KADVS activities, while only 6.0% disagreed. This is important because such a high proportion of agreement reduces the likelihood that the result is due to chance or isolated perception. Qualitative evidence strengthens this by documenting real operational outcomes, including arrests of kidnappers, recovery of firearms, and disruption of criminal activities. These are concrete security outcomes that go beyond perception and indicate actual enforcement impact. Therefore, both perception-based and event-based evidence justify the conclusion that KADVS has contributed to crime reduction.
3. There is strong empirical justification for concluding that KADVS has improved community safety in Igabi LGA. In Table 2, 88.5% of respondents reported improved safety, indicating a high level of perceived security confidence across the population. This matters because perceived safety is a recognized indicator in security studies, often correlating with reduced fear of crime and increased social stability. Qualitative interviews further substantiate this by showing that constant patrols and visibility of KADVS operatives reduce fear of crime and discourage criminal movement. The factual alignment between statistical agreement and field testimony justifies the conclusion that KADVS improves both objective and perceived safety conditions.
4. The findings also justify the claim that KADVS has positively impacted overall crime rates between 2016 and 2023. Table 3 indicates that 89.0% of respondents agreed that crime rates have declined during the period under review. This is a particularly strong finding because it reflects long-term retrospective evaluation, not just immediate perception. Qualitative data supports this with documented interventions such as rescue operations, arrests of armed groups, and disruption of kidnapping networks. These are verifiable operational outcomes that align with respondent perceptions. The convergence of longitudinal perception data and recorded security operations provides a justified basis for concluding a positive impact on crime trends.
5. There is also justified evidence that community trust and inter-agency collaboration enhance the effectiveness of KADVS. Across all tables, agreement levels remain consistently above 85%, indicating strong institutional legitimacy in the eyes of the community. Qualitative findings confirm active collaboration with the Nigeria Police Force, DSS, and other agencies through intelligence sharing and suspect handover. This is operationally significant because security effectiveness increases when non-state actors are integrated into formal systems rather than operating independently. Therefore, the consistency between public trust data and institutional collaboration validates the conclusion that cooperation is a key driver of KADVS effectiveness.
6. The deterrent effect of KADVS presence is also empirically justified. Respondents consistently associate vigilante visibility with reduced criminal activity, and this is supported by qualitative accounts stating that continuous patrols make it difficult for criminals to operate undetected. This is not merely subjective; it aligns with established security theory which holds that visible guardianship increases the perceived risk of detection and therefore reduces crime opportunity. The factual consistency between respondent perceptions, field interviews, and established criminological literature justifies the conclusion that visibility of KADVS has a direct deterrent effect on crime.
7. The findings further justify that KADVS enhances intelligence gathering and rapid response capacity. Quantitative results indicating improved safety and

reduced crime indirectly reflect improved responsiveness of security structures. Qualitatively, security officials provided specific examples of timely intelligence leading to arrests and rescue operations, demonstrating functional intelligence networks. This is important because intelligence-driven policing is a core determinant of modern security effectiveness. When combined, the data justify the conclusion that KADVS strengthens early warning systems and improves response time to security threats.

8. In conclusion, the triangulated evidence provides a strong and factually supported justification that KADVS plays a significant role in crime prevention and community security in Igabi LGA between 2016 and 2023. The consistency of high quantitative agreement (above 85% across all indicators), supported by documented operational achievements and reinforced by established security literature, confirms that KADVS reduces crime, improves safety, enhances trust, and strengthens collaboration with formal security agencies. The convergence of these independent data sources makes the findings robust, reliable, and empirically defensible.

#### **The Findings and Validation of the Broken Windows Theory**

1. The findings strongly validate Wilson and Kelling's (1982) Broken Windows Theory, which argues that visible disorder, if left unchecked, leads to serious crime, while prompt intervention restores order and prevents escalation. In this study, the consistently high agreement levels, 85.2% to 89.0% across all indicators, provide empirical justification that the presence and activities of the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) are associated with reduced disorder and improved security outcomes. The strength of these percentages (with disagreement consistently below 6%) indicates a statistically dominant perception of improved order and crime control in Igabi LGA.
2. The quantitative finding that 85.2% of respondents reported reductions in theft, robbery, and kidnapping demonstrates that early security intervention is linked to reduced escalation of crime. This is consistent with Broken Windows logic, where addressing early signs of disorder prevents progression to serious offences. Qualitatively, interviews confirmed that KADVS conducts patrols, arrests suspects, and disrupts criminal gatherings before they escalate into major crimes. Specific operational evidence such as arrests of kidnappers and recovery of firearms

provides factual grounding that supports the statistical trend.

3. The finding that 88.5% of respondents reported improved community safety is significant because perceived safety is a measurable indicator of social order. Broken Windows Theory emphasizes visibility as a deterrent mechanism, and qualitative data confirms that constant patrols by KADVS create a "guarded environment" that discourages criminal behavior. Security officials reported that criminals avoid areas with regular vigilante surveillance, which provides practical justification for the high safety perception recorded in the survey data.
4. A total of 89.0% of respondents affirmed that KADVS positively influenced crime rates over the study period. This is important because it reflects long-term evaluation rather than momentary perception. Qualitative evidence supports this with documented incidents such as rescue operations, armed confrontations with kidnappers, and dismantling of criminal networks. These operational outcomes provide factual evidence that complements the survey data, showing that sustained vigilance contributes to measurable crime reduction over time.
5. The finding that 88.5% of respondents consider KADVS effective in crime control is justified by both perception and operational reality. Interviews confirm that continuous patrols, checkpoints, and surveillance make it difficult for criminals to operate freely. This aligns directly with Broken Windows Theory, which posits that visible enforcement increases the perceived risk of detection. The factual consistency between high approval ratings and documented patrol activities provides strong justification for the deterrence effect.
6. The study shows that community cooperation strengthens the effectiveness of KADVS. High agreement levels across all indicators (above 85%) suggest strong community legitimacy. Qualitative interviews confirmed that residents provide intelligence, report suspicious activity, and collaborate with vigilante operatives. This supports the Broken Windows principle that informal social control is essential for maintaining order. The factual evidence of intelligence sharing and suspect handover to police further validates this collaborative security structure.

7. The qualitative findings show that KADVS relies heavily on community intelligence, which enables rapid response to emerging threats. This is supported indirectly by the high quantitative agreement on safety and crime reduction. Specific operational examples include timely interventions that led to arrests and rescues. This provides factual justification that early detection and swift action reduce the opportunity for crime escalation, consistent with Broken Windows Theory's emphasis on immediate response to disorder.
8. The convergence of quantitative data (85%–89% agreement range), qualitative evidence (arrests, patrols, intelligence operations), and literature confirms the applicability of Broken Windows Theory in Igabi LGA. The Kaduna Vigilante Service functions as a visible enforcement mechanism that reduces disorder, deters offenders, and strengthens community order. Therefore, the study provides empirically justified evidence that visible, community-based policing not only prevents minor disorder but also reduces the likelihood of serious crimes between 2016 and 2023.

## Conclusion

The study examined the contribution of the Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) to crime control in Igabi Local Government Area, Kaduna State, between 2016 and 2023. Findings from the quantitative and qualitative data, supported by extant literature, reveal that KADVS has made a significant contribution to crime prevention and community security in the study area. Specifically, the study found that KADVS has contributed to the reduction of theft, robbery, and kidnapping, improved community safety, positively influenced local crime rates, and demonstrated considerable effectiveness in crime control. The study further established that the operational activities of KADVS, including patrols, have strengthened crime prevention efforts and enhanced public confidence in local security arrangements. Community trust, acceptance, and cooperation were also found to be critical factors underpinning the effectiveness of the Service. Similarly, the visible presence of KADVS operatives was shown to exert a deterrent effect on criminal activities by increasing the perceived risk of detection and apprehension.

The findings lend strong empirical support to the Broken Windows Theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982), which posits that prompt intervention against disorder and the visible presence of security actors prevent the escalation of crime. The activities of KADVS demonstrate that community-based security structures, when properly

organized and integrated with formal law enforcement agencies, can effectively complement state security institutions in maintaining order and reducing criminality. Overall, the study concludes that the Kaduna Vigilante Service has emerged as a critical component of local security governance in Igabi Local Government Area. Through sustained patrols, intelligence sharing, community engagement, and collaboration with formal security agencies, KADVS has significantly enhanced public safety and contributed to the maintenance of peace and order between 2016 and 2023.

## Recommendations

- i. The Kaduna State Government should strengthen the institutional and legal framework of the Kaduna Vigilante Service through improved funding, welfare packages, and regular provision of operational logistics to enhance its effectiveness.
- ii. The Kaduna Vigilante Service should intensify regular patrols, surveillance, and intelligence-gathering activities in order to sustain the gains recorded in the reduction of theft, robbery, kidnapping, and other criminal activities.
- iii. Collaboration between KADVS and formal security agencies such as the Nigeria Police Force, Department of State Services (DSS), Nigerian Army, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) should be strengthened through joint operations, intelligence sharing, and coordinated response mechanisms.
- iv. Government and security stakeholders should provide regular training and retraining programmes for KADVS personnel on modern crime prevention strategies, intelligence management, human rights, and community policing practices.
- v. Community members should be encouraged to sustain their support and cooperation with KADVS by providing timely information on suspicious activities and participating actively in community security initiatives.
- vi. The Kaduna State Government should improve the welfare and motivation of vigilante personnel through adequate remuneration, insurance coverage, compensation schemes, and provision of protective equipment to enhance morale and operational efficiency.
- vii. KADVS should expand its presence and operational coverage in underserved and vulnerable communities within Igabi LGA to

- ensure prompt response to emerging security threats.
- viii. Mechanisms for accountability, monitoring, and oversight should be strengthened to ensure professionalism, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law in the operations of KADVS.
- ix. Given the positive impact recorded in Igabi LGA, the Kaduna State Government should consider replicating and strengthening the KADVS model in other local government areas facing similar security challenges.
- x. Further studies should be undertaken to examine the long-term sustainability of community-based security initiatives and their implications for national security and local governance in Nigeria.

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## Appendix I:

### Questionnaire Guide

#### Section A: Socio-Demographic Characteristics

1. Gender
  - Male [ ]
  - Female [ ]
2. Age
  - 18–30 years [ ]
  - 31–40 years [ ]
  - 41–50 years [ ]

- 51 years and above [ ]

3. Marital Status

- Single [ ]
- Married [ ]
- Divorced [ ]
- Widowed [ ]

4. Educational Qualification

- No Formal Education [ ]
- Primary Education [ ]
- Secondary Education [ ]
- Tertiary Education [ ]

5. Occupation

- Civil Servant [ ]
- Business/Trader [ ]
- Farmer [ ]
- Artisan [ ]
- Student [ ]
- Others (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_

6. Ward of Residence \_\_\_\_\_

**Section B: Contributions of Kaduna Vigilante Service (KADVS) to Crime Control**

**Instruction:** Tick (✓) the option that best represents your opinion.

SA = Strongly Agree, A = Agree, U = Undecided, D = Disagree, SD = Strongly Disagree.

S/N	Statements	SA	A	U	D	SD
1	KADVS has reduced incidents of theft in Igabi LGA.					
2	KADVS has reduced incidents of robbery in Igabi LGA.					
3	KADVS has contributed to reducing kidnapping activities in Igabi LGA.					
4	The presence of KADVS has improved community safety.					
5	Residents feel safer because of KADVS operations.					
6	KADVS has positively influenced local crime rates.					
7	KADVS is effective in controlling crime in Igabi LGA.					
8	Regular patrols by KADVS contribute to crime reduction.					
9	Arrests carried out by KADVS help to deter criminals.					
10	Intelligence gathering by KADVS assists in preventing criminal activities.					
11	Surveillance activities undertaken by KADVS improve security.					
12	Collaboration between KADVS and the Police enhances crime control.					
13	Cooperation between KADVS and other security agencies improves security in Igabi LGA.					
14	Community members trust the activities of KADVS.					
15	Community acceptance contributes to the effectiveness of KADVS.					
16	Residents willingly cooperate with KADVS by providing information.					
17	The visibility and constant presence of KADVS deter criminal activities.					
18	Criminals are discouraged from operating in areas where KADVS operatives are visible.					
19	The activities of KADVS complement those of formal security agencies.					
20	Overall, KADVS has made significant contributions to crime control in Igabi LGA.					

**Appendix II:**  
**Interview/Key Informant Interview (KII) Guide**

**Target Respondents**

- Kaduna Vigilante Service Commanders and Operatives
- Divisional Police Officers (DPOs)
- Officials of DSS, NSCDC, and Nigerian Army
- District Heads and Ward Heads
- Community Leaders
- Religious Leaders
- Youth Leaders
- Traditional Rulers

**Section I: Background Information**

1. Name (Optional) \_\_\_\_\_
2. Designation/Position \_\_\_\_\_
3. Institution/Organization \_\_\_\_\_
4. Years of Service \_\_\_\_\_

**Section II: Interview Questions**

***Objective 1: Reduction of Theft, Robbery, and Kidnapping***

1. To what extent has the Kaduna Vigilante Service contributed to reducing incidents of theft, robbery, and kidnapping in Igabi LGA between 2016 and 2023?
2. Can you provide specific examples or cases that demonstrate these contributions?

***Objective 2: Community Safety***

3. How has the presence of KADVS influenced the safety of communities within Igabi LGA?
4. In what ways has the public perception of safety changed since the establishment of KADVS?

***Objective 3: Impact on Crime Rates***

5. What changes have you observed in crime trends in Igabi LGA since the establishment of KADVS?
6. Are there records or experiences that suggest a decline in crime rates?

***Objective 4: Effectiveness of KADVS***

7. How effective is the Kaduna Vigilante Service in controlling crime in Igabi LGA?
8. What factors account for its successes or limitations?

***Objective 5: Operational Activities***

9. How do patrols conducted by KADVS contribute to crime prevention?
10. What role does intelligence gathering play in KADVS operations?
11. How effective are surveillance activities and arrests in combating crime?
12. Can you cite instances where these activities led to successful crime prevention or arrests?

***Objective 6: Collaboration with Formal Security Agencies***

13. How does KADVS collaborate with the Police, DSS, NSCDC, Army, and other security agencies?
14. What forms of support or cooperation exist between KADVS and formal security institutions?
15. How has such collaboration improved crime control in Igabi LGA?
16. What challenges are encountered in inter-agency collaboration?

***Objective 7: Community Trust and Cooperation***

17. What level of trust do community members have in KADVS?
18. How important is community acceptance and cooperation to the effectiveness of KADVS?
19. In what ways do residents support the activities of KADVS?
20. How does community participation enhance intelligence gathering and crime prevention?

***Objective 8: Visibility and Deterrence***

21. To what extent does the visibility and presence of KADVS operatives deter criminal activities?
22. How do regular patrols and checkpoints influence the behavior of criminals?
23. Do criminals tend to avoid communities with active KADVS presence? Please explain.