

The Impact of Change Agents on Southern Sudan History 1898 – 1973

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Citation: Dr. Daniel Thabo Nyibong Ding. (2025). The Impact of Change Agents on Southern Sudan History 1898 – 1973. UKR Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences (UKRJAHSS), Volume 1(9), 189-342.	<i>This study was to investigate the impact of Change Agents on Southern Sudan history, 1898-1973 The objectives were to collect data related to agents of change and evaluate the impact of those agents on the region and the reaction of the indigenous population to those agents. Southern Sudanese Chiefs acted as the middlemen during the Turko-Egyptian period or agents of the ivory and slave trading merchants. For this reason, some of the native chiefs have contributed negatively to the devastation of trade as the middlemen. So the native chiefs instead of being agents of change became agents of destruction. Education presents a major change agent in the South but this was left in the hands of the Christian missions employing foreign teachers and designing their own syllabi Change Agents as defined and discussed in the study include foreign role in the area coming from the north, education, commerce as a feature of the economic life, nationalism, the role of the Sudan National Governments, and the armed struggle.</i> <i>The uses of a case study Methods used were descriptive method is discovery led that describes what is occurring in a case study setting for example, events, processes and relationships, explanatory methods is theory led that explains the causes of events, processes or relationships within a setting and Quality approach is defined as empirical information about the world, not in the form of numbers. Most of the time in social science research this means words The main interest of the condominium administration which was predominantly British lay strategic position of the south. The British wanted to secures Sources of the Nile -and naturally regions leading to it and so they concluded treaties with the French and king Leopold. They needed also to secure their control of the south and they had to send armed expeditions for the first two decades of the rule. The British finally succeeded in establishing their authority in the south and imposing peace on the inhabitants and started to develop infrastructure in the area to serve their own purposes. The impact of change was experienced by very tedious work and obstructions to the government policy. The government's main aim was to maintain inter-tribal peace and security. However these military administrators defeated the southern peoples because they wanted to restore order and domestic security.</i> <i>My key findings are: In discussing declaration of Independence-19th December 1955 the pressure of Southern members of parliament led to inclusion of a phrase that a federal system of government will be considered. The Condominium and National Governments were perceived as elements of destruction to southern Sudanese tribal customs, cultures, societies, history and institutions. The Condominium government brought European civilization and Christianity and superimposed their culture that is religion, and language on Southern Sudanese. The main influence of Christianity came in the subsequent strategic influence its converts achieved through the educational qualifications and their role in administration and politics in the late condominium and Agents early independence periods. They brought major benefits such as peace and domestic security, the reduction of famine and diseases and introduction of education, medicine and technical knowledge. The main changes of the impact</i>

of condominium were in education, medicine, religion and agricultural projects. Islam entered the south through travelers, merchants and later on officials and junior administrators. So Muslim communities lived in many of the towns there was no change that took place between the condominium and the Sudanese governments in cultural and political domination. There was a neo-colonization where violence was also applicable. The military governments were major challenges than the civilian government in the northern Sudanese towards the southern Sudan. British administrators were foreigners and intruders and the Sudanese administrators were the home rulers.

Data analysis and discussion were presented in conclusion, where very interesting result was come to. The most important of these is that there was cultural and political domination by the condominium government and the Sudanese governments. Both of them brought civilized cultures to those African peoples by imposition. The first national government had to face a mutiny in August 1955 which marked the beginning of the armed struggle in the south. The policy of Islamization and Arabicization of the military regime caused resentment and discontent especially in schools. The expulsion of missionaries working in the south because of their hostile attitude towards a united Sudan led to outbreak of the guerrilla war with the appearance of Anyanya army in 1963

In conclusion, the British colonizers wanted to achieve power and prestige and import raw materials. Christianity strengthened the political and economic gains of the British colonizers perhaps to maintain their power prestige. The British defects were that they neglected the Southern Sudan economically. The Christian and Islamic religions have imposed themselves on African cultures and bore the same destructive purpose to traditional African religions. The results of Sudanization commission announced after the elections were a severe disappointment, as northerners were appointed to all senior positions in the South. Most political active southerners saw this as the beginning of northern colonization of the South. The finding has asserted that the British colonial rulers were handling crucial issue through diplomatic way. Also on the side of northern Sudanese the southern command 1955-1973 was almost manned by citizens from outside the southern Sudan. The finding has proved that southerners were prevented to enter army. Finally, evidence has indicated that the signing of Addis Ababa accord was apposite impact on both South and north and due to relative peace.

Keywords: Change agents, Southern Sudan history (1898–1973), Colonial administration and governance, Christian missionary influence, Cultural and political domination, Nationalism and armed struggle, Condominium government policies, Post-colonial transformation.

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Abbreviations:

ADC – Assistance District Commissioner
 AIM – African Inland Mission
 ALF – Azania Liberation Front
 APM – American Presbyterian Mission
 CRO – Central Records Office
 BGP – Bahr el Ghazal Province
 CDO – Closed District Ordinance
 CMS – Church Missionary Society

CS – Civil Secretary
 DC – District Commissioner
 DUP – Democratic Unionist Party
 EC – Equatorial Corps
 EP – Equatoria Province
 Equats – Equatorians
 ERP – Education; Religion and Politics
 GG – Governor – General
 Gov. – Governor

HEC – High Executive Council
 NRO – National Records Office
 NUP – National Unionist Party
 OAU – Organization of African Unity
 PDP – People's Democratic Party
 RCC – Revolutionary Command Council
 RC – Roman Catholic
 SACDNU – Sudan African Closed District National Union
 SALF – Sudan African Liberation Front
 SANU – Sudan African National Union
 SCC – Sudan Council of Churches
 SDF – Sudan Defence Force
 SF – Southern Front

SIL – Summer Institute of Linguistics
 SIM – Sudan Interior Mission
 SNR – Sudan National Records
 SSLM – Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
 SSU – Sudan Socialist Union
 SUM – Sudan United Mission
 UN – United Nations
 UNP – Upper Nile Province
 UMMA – People or National Party
 VCA – The Vicariate of Central Africa
 VFM – Verona Fathers Mission
 WCC – World Council of Churches

Preface

The Impact of Change Agents on South Sudan History 1898 – 1973 is designed for the use of scholars, students and the general readers in South Sudan, Africa and the world at large. The book is among the first to be authored by South Sudanese and to make the world understand the country after independence on 9th July 2011. It has important thrusts focusing on the historical background during the Condominium regime; the development and impact of nationalism; Sudan Government policy towards Southern Sudan; and political struggle and armed struggle that culminated in the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1973. It is indisputably acknowledged that this book was inspired by many historical developments, which led to the independence of South Sudan.

The current texts tend to emphasize knowledge about the land and people; early resistance against 'invaders'; and processes of pacification and subsequent domination by colonialists and neo-colonialists of independent Sudan. These texts examine the economy and the introduction of modernity through religion and education. The development of consciousness is part of the events that shaped the emergence of parallel nationalism in northern and southern Sudan. The texts treat policy issues and contradictions that crystallized into sustained political and armed struggle. Ideologically oriented texts tend to ignore the possibility of discovering sensitive aspects of history during patterns of socio-political development. This is true of texts on history of southern Sudan endorsed by political leaders and academics in the northern Sudan, which did not emphasize facts and realities on the ground, but distorted them. This is the book, which has brought to light the true history of South Sudan in contrast to what was promoted and disseminated by northern historians as the only way to interpret historical events in the Sudan.

This book, inspired by the current texts, emphasized also the crises generated by faulty policies, which had their roots in the competition between the Condominium partners: Britain and Egypt; and the political parties that entered into colonial shoes. The author has attempted to integrate history, geography and the economy in such a way that the materials can provide sufficient depth of knowledge to scholars, students and general readers as a tool for understanding the past of the present South Sudan. This book should serve to stimulate readers' interests in history; and encourage readers to review the situation with ultimate aim of excelling research in the field.

I acknowledge that this book leaves a temporal gap in the history that needs to be filled by historians. The book traces historical events in Southern Sudan until the signature of Addis Ababa Agreement in 1973. So many events took place during the ten years of relative tranquillity in Southern Sudan. The aftermath of the relative peace witnessed vicious cycles of violence under different regimes during the period of the liberation movement 1983 – 2005. In other words, there is a gap of more than three decades which needs to be filled by historians after this book. More work on compiling historical events needs to be done to produce knowledge during this period. Hence, this book is also an inspiration for researchers to pay attention to the events that took place after 1973. Such events are the missing link in the chronology of events that prospective historians should identify researchable areas, conduct research and publish results to ensure continuity of knowledge about South Sudan.

The book is intended to be an interpretation of the evolution of South Sudanese history after a period of distortion following independence in January 1956. It aspires to present a new framework and paradigm for reviewing the history of South Sudan that will be meaningful to scholars, students, and interested readers. The test of the book's usefulness is not whether it covers everything considered to be history. On the contrary, the test is whether it provides an encouragement to young historians of South Sudan to document events systematically with the sublime aim of enriching history literature for the future.

Finally, I am indebted to the author, Dr. Daniel Thabo, who honoured me to express my opinion about the book. This book has taught me at least as much about the history of Southern Sudan from the perspective of a South Sudanese. I am certain all readers will learn more from the book than me. The work of the author adds significantly to the quantity and quality of information, which sharpens knowledge about history of South Sudan. My expectation is that all readers will find reading the book an enriching and a rewarding experience. The book is an educational experience from which I shall benefit from for years to come. It is my sincere hope that many readers will benefit from the wealth of knowledge contained in the book.

By
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The History of the Land, its Peoples and the Development in the Southern Sudan

Bilad Al-Sudan or land of the blacks is the term used by Arab geographers to describe the lands lying south of the Sahara and north of the tropical forests in Africa¹. It can be understood from this statement that it was the land that was inhabited by the people with black skin. It extended across Africa from the Red Sea to the Atlantic between Arab and African cultures. Present day, Sudan is the biggest African country. It is the land stretching southward from the second cataract at twenty-two degrees north of Lake Albert near the equator. It extends from sand land area in the north, through a semi-desert central belt and increasing amounts of rainfall to tropical rainfall in the south. It has a vast variety of geographical and climatic characteristics. Among the physical variations that portray the Sudan geography; the most striking single characteristic of the physical landscape is the grid formed by the Nile and its tributaries. The Sudan encompasses all land around the Nile River system from Victoria Nyanza. The area of whole Sudan is roughly one million square miles; about one quarters the size of Europe. Geographically, the greater part of the country is an immense plain². In comparing northern and southern Sudan in terms of mean annual rainfall, southern Sudan enjoys a high mean annual ranging from 400mm in Renk to 1600mm on the Nile-Congo divide. As a consequence, rivers, swamps, dense forests and thick grass cover vast tracts of the region. This ecology has produced a variety of life-styles: herding cattle, agriculture or mixed farming supplemented by fishing, hunting and gathering fruits, vegetables and honey from the forest.

Population of the Sudan

Africans and Arabs inhabit the Sudan. With a variety of people, religion, language and life style which make the Sudan virtually a microcosm of the whole African continent³. The country is still open to immigration and the identities of people are complex and often overlap in confusing ways. The census of 1956 has put the populations of the Southern Sudan into 2,783,36 and the northern Sudan is being put to be 7,459,000 some 30% southerners and 70% Arabised Northerners. The population of the Sudan is now about 28,3 million; the rural inhabitants are more than urban inhabitants. By percentage,

the rural population is 66% and whereas urban population is 34%, its density is 12/ km. The Sudanese life expectancy is put at the age of 55 years. The adult illiteracy is about 59% while adult literacy is 41%.

Northern Sudanese were believers in African religions and then Christianity, they maintained their African languages. A minority of Arabic-speaking Christians was composed of the descendants of immigrants from Egypt, and Lebanon since the Turco-Egyptian conquest¹.

The region known as southern Sudan lies south of latitude 10°N. This extends as far as Kajo Kaji and Nimule on the Uganda border at latitude 4° South of Equator parallel to the northern limit run the Bahr al Ghazal and its tributary the Bahr al-Arab. This water-divide coupled with the extensive Sudd or swamps have constituted since ancient times a formidable geographical barrier, which has hindered contacts between the people of northern and southern Sudan. The southern Sudan like the rest of east Africa with which it has close cultural and ethnical affinities has witnessed population movements on a large scale during the last five or six centuries².

Southern Sudan consists now of Bahr al Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile provinces. The past provinces are called regions or states since 1901 and 1989 respectively. The area of the whole southern Sudan has been given as 387, 295 square miles. Equatoria province consists of Mongalla, Mashra al-Reg, Wau, Rumbek, Torit, Aweil and Tonj with an area of 195,025 square miles. Upper Nile Province consists of Renk, Kodok which was formerly Fashoda, Malakal, Nasir, Bor with an area of 192,270 square miles. The south is inhabited predominantly by Africans. The main group is the Nilotics (Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk) while some of the other tribes are Azande, Bari and Latuko. Each tribe has its own language, and follows a traditional religion. Most of the tribes in southern Sudan practised African beliefs, Christianity and Islam. Since, nothing is known about the southern Sudan in the centuries prior to the European exploration of central African. The expedition of the Southern Sudan that was led by Captain Salim started with the search for the source of Nile in 1839 - 1840, which has long encouraged explorers and discoverers. But none of these writers and explorers visited the Southern Sudan,

¹ Muhammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, London, 1968, p10.

² P. M Holt and M. W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, fifth edition, Pearson Education, 2000, p 3.

³ Gino Barsella, et al, *Struggling to be Heard, the Christian Voice in Independent Sudan 1956-1996*, Paulines, Nairobi-Kenya, 1998, p 11.

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "Southern Sudanese and thier Neighbors before Colonial Times": *Studies in Sudnese History*, Sudatek, Khartoum, 2003, p 102.

² Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *op-cit*, p 3.

and the condition there remained obscure to outside world¹. It was during the rise of the Funj Kingdom of Sennar in 1504-5 that information about the south began to reach outside world. The tribes of Bahr al Ghazal and Equatoria were living during the Funj period in state of anarchy and tribal warfare. The stronger prevailed over the weak. The Azande for example, were pressing northward across the Congo Nile Divide and absorbing the small tribes like the Bongo, the Kresh and the Shatt prior to Turco Egyptian rule. The Dinka tribes were also expanding in the same manner. This state of affairs was only halted by Turco Egyptian conquest of the Sudan in 1820. Muhammad Ali annexed the great Funj kingdom in 1821. Before the establishment of the Turkiyya, the payment of taxes was a widely recognized custom. After the surrender of the Funj, Ismail imposed heavy taxes throughout the Sudan and instituted brutal methods of collection. With time the demands of the government became heavier and the collection more cruel². To the Sudanese the taxes were not only hateful by tradition, but more than abominable when the revenues were not repaid in social services, but sent to Egypt or pocketed by the Egyptian officials who viewed their corruption as just compensation for their unpleasant exile in the Sudan. The discontent with this policy led many Sudanese to join the cause of Mahdi, a strong appeal to the oppressed tribesmen³. Before the coming of the Arab traders and the Egyptian administration, the tribes of the southern Sudan were mainly concerned with survival finding enough to eat and maintaining their freedom of action against the designs of outside tribes e.g. northern Sudanese. The Southern Sudan tribes have had constant and continued intertribal wars, which were however, free of any outside influence especially Bahr al Ghazal and Equatoria provinces. There were no contacts with Northern Sudan prior to Arab traders and the Egyptian rule.

Arab and African Movements and Settlement

The original inhabitants of the southern Sudan were affected by waves of immigrations of Sudanic, Nilo Hamitic and later, Nilotic origins. Yet those population movements seem to have done very little to change the frontiers between the great linguistic families such as Eastern sudanic and Central sudanic etc older inhabitants succeeded in absorbing new migrants who settled among them at least linguistically except for the Nilotics.

At the time the Prophet Muhammad was born, that the country south of Aswan consisted firstly of the Beja living

adjacent to the Red sea coast in more or less their present habitat, secondly of three kingdoms of Nubatia, al-Muqurra and Alwa whose sphere of influence was mainly confined to the Nile valley between Aswan and Sinnar on the Blue Nile. The first kingdom Nobatia (al-Maris) was eventually united to the second one, al-Muqura, thus forming the kingdom of Nubia which extended as far as al-Abwab or Kabushiyya. Dungkula was the capital. The third kingdom was known as Alwa, and Soba was its capital¹.

In the 5th and 6th century, theological disputes brought about the breakdown of Christian unity in the east and gave rise to a variety of sects of the Orthodox Melkites and the Monophysites Jacobites. These missionaries concentrated their energies on kings and nobles. The supporters of the council of Chalcedon were the majority and found in Greece and the regions around Byzantium. The opponents of the council of Chalcedon were found in Egypt².

In the sixth century AD Christian priests were sent from Constantinople by Emperor Justinian IV and his wife, Theodora, to convert the Nubians to Christianity. They met with immediate though superficial success and by the end of century the whole Nile valley from Aswan to Abyssinia was Christian. Even when Christianity and Islam penetrated into the northern Sudan during the sixth and seventh centuries respectively, they had little effect on the southern tribes., but Christian Kingdom was finally overthrown by the Arabs. The Arabs occupied Egypt, and then pushed steadily westward along the North African coast and southwards to the Sudan. In 651, this army reached Dongola and destroyed its Christian Church. The Arab subsequently concluded a peace treaty with the Nubians.

As the history of the following centuries was to show, invaders from the North were checked both by the resistance of the Nubians and by the long and difficult lines of communication from advanced bases in Egypt. In the end Christian Nubia succumbed to gradual erosion and infiltration rather than to organized military invasion¹. The northern Christian kingdom gradually disintegrated under the pressure of this Arab infiltration, and was finally overrun in about 1366². More and more Arabs settled in the northern and central areas of the Sudan, and gradually merged with and assimilated the people already there. Some of these Sudanese tribes converted into Islam but they

¹ P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *op cit* p 26

² UNP/ SCR/1.B.2.4 General policy for Southern Sudan

³ *Ibid* p 28

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "Arab migration in the Sudan" *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 1.

² Vantini, G, *Christianity in the Sudan*, Bologna, 1981, p 10.

¹ P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *Op-cit*, p 13.

² Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Sudan in Africa*, Khartoum, 1971, pp 1-20.

retained their own individuality and languages³. Christianity lingered on in some places into sixteenth century. At about the end of the fifteenth century the ancient Nubian kingdom was crumbling, Islam had almost extinguished Christianity and Arabic had become the lingua franca.

The Islamization of the peoples of the Funj sultanate was largely the work of individual holy men who settled in the country, taught the *Quran*, and endeavoured to bring social usage into conformity with the *Shari'a* Law. Some of these teachers were already active before the coming of the Funj. The Muslim missionary is shown as being primarily a teacher of the Islamic Law, the *Shari'a* and introducing Muslim usage⁴.

The Funj had moved northwards between the Blue Nile and White Nile from the Shilluk area which was originally belonging to the Funj, until they came into contact from Southern Blue Nile with a powerful Abdallab kingdom. In 1504 the Funj kingdom established a sultanate at Sennar. The Funj Sultan, Amara Dunkas, accepted Islam and established a new Islamic state with Sennar as its capital. Under him and his successors, Islamic State steadily extended. It stretched from the borders of Abyssinia in the south to Dongola in the north, and east and west from Red Sea to the frontiers of Darfur.

Southern Sudanese Ethnic Groups ***The Nilotic Tribes***

Most writers agree that the origin of the Nilo Hamites was east of the Nile, likely near the present Ethiopia border, and that of the Nilotes was west of the Nile, around Rumbek in Bahr El Ghazal.¹ The early Nilotes seem to have built their villages, on the higher flood-free ground and to have utilized the vast plains during the dry season as pasture for their cattle. They also used the dry season for fishing. They were thus a fishing and pastoral community. They also produced some durra or sorghum on the high ground. This traditional mode of existence, a product of the harsh environment, had a profound impact on their future². As semi-pastorals, controlling vast stretches of land not suitable for intensive farming, the Nilotes were now on move seasonally and periodically from the homeland in the Southern Sudan. If the plains were flooded or their pasture exhausted, they travelled to another place where plenty of good grazing existed. They moved with their cattle, the backbone of their economy and social prestige³. As a result of over-population, overstocking and for example, external

factors, the Nilotes began to expand and move into other territories. The Dinka and Nuer left first. They migrated only for a short distance. The Dinka group is probably the largest Nilotic tribe in southern Sudan. Their homeland extended from the river Sobat, the swamps of the Bahr el Jebel, and further west to the tributaries of the Bahr el Ghazal. They were a loose, confederation of tribes each bearing a distinct name. Despite intertribal hostilities and disunity, their language, religion and culture remained impervious to foreign influences. Occasionally local kinship groups would unite to undertake cattle raids.

The Nuer lived in the impassable marshes of the Sudd Swamps, defended by their renowned warriors, the Nuer, together with the Dinka, were the least diversified culturally and ethnically of Nilotes. The Luo, a major Nilotic division was to leave the homelands.

They started their southward trek slowly after the Dinka-Nuer departure. They as a speaking group consisted of a number of widely separated tribes stretching from latitude 12°N to latitude 4° south of the Equator. These tribes include the Shilluk, Anuak, Acholi, Lango and Luo (Dho Paluo), the Alur, Badama and Kenya Luo. Consequently the southern Sudan had no internal political or cultural unity. Tribe is usually defined as a group of people with a common ancestry and language, a shared cultural and historical tradition and an identifiable territory¹. Tribes are usually composed of a number of smaller local communities (eg. bands, villages or neighbour) and may be aggregated into higher order clusters called nations. A tribe is a group that regularly unites in warfare against external invaders. The tribes of Upper Nile consist of the Murle, Mabaan people, Anwak, Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk. Then the Nilotes of Upper Nile include the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Anwak. The Luo family is the largest related groups. The Luo people were and are still politically composed of a number of independent groups in past times and in the present. They had no central unit in their system in the past. Each unit felt the air of an entirely complete independence. The Luo families witnessed the most extensive migrations like the Zande and the Arabs.

The Shilluk People

They are politically the most highly organized of the Nilotics with the Reth as the local and temporal leader who has power to bless and to curse. The Shilluk is a member of Luo language family groups and the largest family in terms of population. They are found in the three provinces

³ Collins, R.O, *The Southern Sudan 1883-1889, A Struggle for Control*, New Haven and London Yale University Press, 1962, p 39.

⁴ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *the Arabs and the Sudan*, KUP, p 36.

¹ *ibid*, p 10

² Oliver, and Mathew, (eds). *The History of East Africa*, 1963, p.78.

³ Gray, R., *The Southern Sudan*, p 26.

¹ Encyclopedia Britannica, *Micropaedia* Vol. 4, p, 918.

such as Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria. The Shilluk live in villages and each village has in its midst a tomb or shrine of a departed guardian Reth (king).

These shrines are the holy places of worship like the Meroe royal tombs where people congregate to communicate and to interact with those distinguished influential and invisible members of the society. The Shilluk are relatively unified under their divine king (*Reth*). He is a spiritual and a supreme authority over all the Shilluk nation like the Avongura of the Zande nation. In other words, Reth is divine in the sense that the other spirits of departed kings congregate around the new Reth. The king acquires the power to bless and to curse. He controls the Shilluk soil and his word is final. Bworo *mac* is the Shilluk curia, which is controlled by the living king and is inherited by the incoming king. All taxes and fines are controlled. To Shilluk land is very vital and central over all and everything is that structure of values by which societies or communities determine and evaluate their material and spiritual prosperity, and their existence as collective entities, safeguard or guarantee their political and cultural well-being (existence) as separate and distinct entities. This land gives the people security, stability, morality and disciplines.¹ The Shilluk main work is predominantly agricultural economy with three principal enterprises: Crop production, animal husbandry and fishing. To some extent, the whole economic domain is still from hand to mouth, i.e. at subsistence level (locally consumed). They have control of land and tradition rights of access to land. There are many buyers and sellers in the markets for both inputs and output. No produce or consumer is able to influence price levels by individual action.²

The Anuak People

The majority of the Anuak lived over the border in Ethiopia. There was unrest amongst the Anuak along the Baro salient, many of whom fled into Ethiopia, the plains of the Sobat tributaries- the Pibor, the Akobo and the Baro - were the home land of the Anuak which they raided the Nuer tribes to the north and east. They live east of the Nuer at the foot of the Ethiopian escarpment, who depend on sheep and goats rather than cattle for subsistence. The pari were offshoot of the Anuak. They migrated many generations before to Jabal Lafon, an isolated group of hills east of Mongalla. The Pari were here soon brought under British, for Jabal Lafon was an important staging point for operations further east. By 1901, the Anuak people living on the Ethiopian side of border were raided by Nuer, which led to a modification of the Government policy.

The Nuer attempted to buy protection from the Sudan government against the depredations of their neighbours, the Anuak. In the nineteenth Century, the Nuer had repeatedly raided Anuak territory, to the point where the Anuak faced extinction. The military and politically weak position was radically changed, however, by the Anuak's acquisition of firearms from Ethiopia. Anuak revenge raids began on the Nuer.

The Luo Group

Bahr al Ghazal with its capital Wau is the homeland of several tribes. Wau is the town of the Luo group that includes Jaluo (Jurchol), Belanda Boor Wad Nyikango who went to Wau from the present Shilluk land, and Thuro (Shatt). This Luo family is found in Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile States. This Luo group is the largest group surpassing the Dinka tribes in the Southern Sudan when combined together. These established tribes are liable to somewhat little unfriendly reactionary or resistant to change¹.

The Acholi tribe

A Luo people of about a quarter of a million live in Northern Uganda and the rest in Southern Sudan or so. They live in Nimule area in the Sudan. They are related to Luo of Bahr al Ghazal, the Shilluk and Anywak. They occupied their Uganda homeland between 1500 and 1750. The Acholi of Northern Uganda are a Luo speaking group with a distinct ethnic identity, they became one of the most important Uganda tribes. The Sudanese Acholi inhabit a fertile strip of land extending from the south western slope of the Imatong Ranges, to a plains area east of the white Nile basin, overlooking the Madi area. Madi west, the Lango-Southwest, Uganda Acholi (South), Latuho (east), Lokoya-Northwest and Bari (Northwest) border them.

The Nuer People

The Nuer is cattle owning people who live in the Upper Nile province. The Nuer possessed more cattle than they required for subsistence purposes. The result was raiding other tribes for cattle. No Nuer will let any other address an order to him. They are the hardest to administer. They live in Upper Nile: Jonglei, Nasir, Bentiu and central area (west) of Malakal. They are agriculturists and cattle owners depending on the environment. Among the Nuer, persons with hereditary religion exercise authority. In the Nuer system a single dominant clan is conventionally regarded as the owner of each tribal territorial, although the territory itself is inhabited by a reflective fluid population which includes members of many non-owner descent groups that

¹ Mathew Obur Ayang. "About Unity, Federation and Peace- A Southern Perspective"- PartI, *New Horizon*, 20/3/1994.

² Gray, R., *The Southern Sudan*, p.14.

¹ Francis Mading, *The Dinka and their songs*, p 22.

significantly outnumber members of the owning clan.² They are a people of considerable strength and independence of character which combine to produce a very real sense of community and kin relationship.¹ Thus each community is associated with specific minimal lineage of the dominant clan from which the community derives both its name and its position in the tribal segmentary system. Nuer forms a homogenous nation². The Nuer has not been greatly affected by foreign influences owing to their geographical environment.³ The Nuer were the last group to submit to the Sudan government.

The Dinka Peoples

The Dinka peoples are tall, slender and fine-featured Nilotic people, living in the Republic of the Sudan, who thought to have non-Negroid (Black) elements, are among the blackest people in the world. The Dinka people are the largest group of tribes in the southern Sudan being only surpassed by the Luo family if they combined together. They are the most warlike and powerful tribe. They are subdivided into Agar, Aliab, Angai, Atwot, Bor, Malual, and OL. They form the largest single tribal confederation in the Sudan today. The Dinka and Nuer are all Trans-humane pastoralists who contrive to live by migration from those small islands of high ground. They are a congeries of tribes falling largely under the administration of Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile. The Ngok are ruled as part of Kordofan since 1935. The Dinka people therefore take themselves as the standard than the other people. They cultivate grain and eat fish, but primarily they are absorbed with their cattle. They love cattle which dominate their complete existence. All activities take place around the cattle camp, which are moved to the high ground of the savannah forest during the wet season. Groups of cattle camps will form sub tribe of larger regional units. Certain Dinka clans have hereditary ritual [powers and supply the priests, whose symbol of office is the sacred fishing spear. Cattle have significance beyond their economic value. The cattle are regarded symbols of these valued ties so that they acquire something of the sentiments in values. Cattle are also paid as compensation of homicide. They were also used in ghost-marriages. Most male names are ox names and most women's are cow names based on their colour pattern.

Nilo-Hamitic Tribes

The Nilo Hamites and the Nilotes tribes resembles one another in physical appearance and both groups share a common interest in cattle, yet they differ in language, culture and modes of living. The Nilo-Hamites of southern Sudan consisted of numerous relatively small tribes who occupied the grassy plains on both sides of the Bahr El Jebel (White Nile). From the Ethiopian border, the Nilo Hamites dispersed into three main divisions: the Northern division comprises first, the Bari, Kuku, Kakwa, Pojulu (Pajelu), Nyangara and Mondari (Mandari); secondly, the central division includes the Lotuho (Latuka) and Toposa; thirdly, the southern group, which runs into Uganda and Kenya, embrace the Nandi and the Masai.¹

The Nilo-Hamite is agriculturists whose sedentary habits and inability to resist attack have made them easy prey for alien invaders. They occupy large tracts of Equatoria and are very distinct from the stocks-Negro, Bushmen, Hunters upon whom they impinged.² The Nilo-Hamites are said to have a strong Hamitic impact, possibility from among the Sidamo of south-western Ethiopia, as a result of Galla pressure. However, it should be noted that whatever the origin of this influence or relationship between the Nilotes and the Nilo-Hamites, there is a large measure of agreement both morphological and lexical between the Nilo-Hamitic and Nilotic languages especially in basic words.

In Equatoria Province, father Angelo Vinco founded Gondokoro in 1851. It was the first mission station of the South³. It was also center of most of the mission stations, which were scattered throughout that very large province. After the Anglo Egyptian rule was established, the Sudan Government divides Equatoria region into Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria (Bahr al Jebel) and Western Equatoria. There are various tribes but most notables are Zande, Moru, Latuka, Acholi, Bari and the many others.

The Toposa Tribe

Beyond the mountains, on the plains which extend to Lake Rudolf, roam the Toposa and Turkana who shuttle back and forth between the Southern Sudan and East Africa. A large Semi-nomadic tribe. They are settled in the extreme eastern part of the Southern Sudan, along the boundaries with Ethiopia. Some are in Kenya other in Uganda. They are related to Karimojong and Turkana but less known than the Karimojong of Uganda and Turkana of Kenya. They were

² Daly, *Empire on the Nile: Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934*, p 134.

¹ Francis Mading, *Dinka and their Songs*, p 1.

² Booth, A "Forests of Upper Nile Province 1862-1950", *SNR*, Vol. XXXIII. Part II. 1952, pp 105-133.

³ Evans Pritchard, "The Nuer, Tribe and Clan" *SNR*, Vol. VXi. 1933, pp 24-36.

¹ Mohammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, pp,1-4.

² Francis Mading, *op.cit*, p 20.

³ *Ibid*, p 24.

all part of one people in ancient times before they split in search of better and larger grazing lands. There had been British relations with Toposa, a people whose history remains virtually unknown.¹

The Didinga People

Are Mountain people and therefore, less open than the Toposa people to the alien people, but more hard working and tenacious they live East of the Nile. In the hills furthest east of the Bahr al- Jabal live the Didinga and Langarim who form an Enclave of African speaking an eastern Sudanic language but not of the Nilotic branch. East of the Didinga hills on the plateau, which runs to Lake Rudolf, the Toposa, a Nilotic speaking people, graze their cattle like the Bari, the Didinga and the Longarim, the Taposa long remained beyond the reach of the Sudan government. They are farmers and do not leave all the fieldwork and house building to the women like the Toposa. The Didinga population was about 50,000 in 1925, and divided into two entirely separate groups, the group of Chukudum was on the western side of the mountains, and the group of Loudo was on the eastern side, toward Kapoeta.

The Bari Tribes

The Bari is situated in Equatoria province in Southern Sudan. They migrated from the East of the present Bari land in search of a land where their livestock could find a good grazing land. They got attracted to this place and decided to settle in it. The Bari, the largest tribe in the central district of what is used to be Mongolla Province, inhabit the swampy ground to the north and the ridges to the south of Juba extending on the west bank from the River Kaya to Simsim and on the east bank from the river Lima to Mongalla. The only ones of any historical importance are Lado or Nyarkonyi, Bilinian, where Baker fought a battle with the Bari and Sindiru, which is the home of the Bekat Limat Rainmaking clan. There are no subdivisions of the tribe with district names, a part from the fact the people north of the kit are commonly referred to as Bari *ti Lobot*, the Bari of the north, while those south of that river are called Bari *ti Loki*¹. They belonged to the Bari, the Kuku and the Nyangwara tribes and spoke more or less the same language Bari². The Bari is a Nilo-Hamitic tribe. They live along and around the White Nile. They are connected with Mundari and Dinka tribes to the North; by Acholi and Madi tribes to the South; by Lakoya, Lulubo, Nyangala, Ngulere, Lotuho, Logir, Lango, Didinga and Toposa tribes to the East and to the west, by Pajulu, Kuku,

Kakwa, Koliko, Makaraka, Mundu, Avokaya, Nyangwera and Moru tribes³. The Bari is agriculturist and pastoral people. They cultivate the flatland along the Nile. This land is fertile and therefore productive. These Bari rear many herds of cattle: cows, goats and sheep like other Nilotes. The village was the focal point of the Nilo-Hamites. Loosely divided into mutually grudge sections and clans, they have had no conceptions of tribal administrative chiefs.⁴

The most important elements were the hereditary rain making chiefs to the clan and council of elders were responsible for the affairs of the village to settle them. These people have no recognized leaders like Shilluk and Anywak. They have no leaders who are able to adopt their society to the rapid changes taking place in the world.

The Latuka Tribe

Beyond the Bahr El Jabal to the south and east near the Uganda border dwell clusters of Nilotic speaking peoples (the Latuka, the Dongororo, the Lokoya and the Lango), offshoots of early migrations which have remained isolated in their mountain fastness. Latuka and Lokoya are very important tribes who had fought vigorously to defend their borders against their enemy but they were subsequent subdued like other tribes. Without exception all the Latuka villages were destroyed. Many Latuka were killed, thousand of cattle and sheep were captured and tons of grains were secured. The Latuka are cluster of small tribes.

They speak language of the Nilotic group of the Eastern Sudanic sub-family and live much little like the Bari¹.

The Sudanic Tribes

The Sudanic tribes are inhabited in the southern-western equator of southern Sudan. They were a mixture of the original inhabitants with waves of sudanic-speaking tribes who migrated from an area to the south of Lake Chad and the river Chari through the Uele basin. The Bongo-Baka and Moru-Madi tribes were the first wave to infiltrate. This was well before the sixteenth century. They were gradually pushed northeast until some of them reached the present habitat of the Kresh (Kreish), one of their branches in the Dar Fertit area, south of Darfur. These Sudanic tribes, separated by broad belts of uninhabited bush, restored pursued a settled agricultural existence. But they were often

¹ Collins, *op-cit*, p 28.

¹ Beaton, "The Bari: Clan and Age Class Systems", *SNR Vol, XIX*, 1936.

² *Ibid.* p, 1.

³ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 167.

⁴ Gray, R., *the Southern Sudan* p, 14.

¹ *Ibid*, p 212.

exterminated by local feuds, by pressures from the Nilotic Dinka and by later waves of other Sudanic tribes².

The Azande Tribe

The Azande, which is also known as Zande, was one of the last invaders. Their forerunners had reached the Mbomu rulers towards the end of the sixteenth century. The Avongara chiefs led the Azande in the middle of the eighteenth century that had given the picture changes. The Avongara succeeded in creating the Azande Empire, a loose confederation of warlike tribes³. Under their chief Ngura and his descendants, the Avongara gained control of the Mbomu River and assimilated smaller weaker tribes like the Bongo and the Kresh, and was only halted by the establishment of the condominium administration in Bahr el Ghazal in the twentieth century⁴. The Azande, under the Avongara, formed a cohesive fighting and administrative machine, which prevailed in both war and peace. The Zande were building a great African empire in the south. Their language is related to certain western African languages (the Volta-Congo group). Zande war bands had also been spreading their empire into the area of Fertit. An elite aristocracy known as the Avongera ruled the Zande. The Zande were different from other Southern Sudanese. They were a numerous and proud people with a military history of conquest and empire. The ordinary people were made up of communities who had been conquered and absorbed. They also warred on the weaker people around them, taking many slaves whom they sold to the Jallaba, the northern traders. British rule established by defeat and death of the Zande prince Ghudwe (or Yambio) in 1905, brought an end to their triumphant progress eastwards the Nile. The Zande were clearly a strategic people.¹ They created and controlled the Zande Empire under the leadership of Gura, they established control on the M'Bomu and started to subject and assimilate the Abele and other Zande speaking groups. The secret of other success was due to their organization² they were and are still warriors and adaptable agriculturists. They were and are still living in isolated family homesteads often in dense vegetation³. They were, however, intimately linked with their Avongara chiefs both through officials (Baka) appointed to exercise authority over a small group of homesteads and also through a system in which all boys enrolled as a bodyguard for the chiefs.⁴ These boys received a uniform education,

which created an intellectual and normal homogeneity and ensued the passed assimilation of invaded people. These were elite aristocracies who owned the soil, collected taxes, decided legal disputes and declared war⁵

The Moru Tribe:

The Moru people inhabit the Southern zone of what is now Mundri country in Western Equatoria. They are agricultural people who practice a largely subsistence life style with a strong interaction between and understanding of both the agricultural and wild environments which supply their basic needs.

The population density is low and, the people are scattered throughout the territory, settling in relation to a balance between good soil, availability of water and proximately to roads and services according to priorities. At the time the Moru people were not united and there was much feuding between neighbouring communities, people feared to travel far from their homes, because of fear of those who were unfamiliar to them, and fear of the spiritual unprecedented¹

The Bongo People

They were settled at an early date in the neighbourhood or the vicinity of the Tonj River. Bongo and many smaller groups like Kresh, Golo, and Ndogo on the slopes of the southwestern Sudan, to the Kresh in the Dar Fertit south of Darfur. By the 19th century they were divided into a vast number of clans pursuing a settled agricultural existence, cut off by miles of unoccupied bush and often harassed by fierce local feuds. They are all bordered in between the Dinka on the plains and the later migrations of Sudanic invaders to their South and West parts².

Contacts between the North and the South

The first Nilotics and then Nilo-Hamites and Sudanic tribes made contacts with the peoples of northern Sudan in the middle of the seventeenth century. This unsettled history, together with the unfavourable material conditions conducive to the formation of large political scale resulted in large numbers of small tribal or Kinship's groups with the widespread divisions into Nilotics, Nilo Hamites and western Sudanic peoples. Southern Sudan is a region of the broad similarity in language, religion, culture, political institutions and mode of life. There were many reasons why these Africans could not halt this rapid penetration or

² Gray, R., *A History of the Southern Sudan 1838-1889*, p 26.

³ *Ibid*, p 24.

⁴ *Ibid*, p 10.

¹ Daly, *Empire on the Nile: Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1898-1934*, Cambridge, 1986, p, 39.

² Francis Mading, *The Dinka and their songs*, Oxford, 1973, p 1.

³ *Ibid*, p 3.

⁴ *Ibid*, p 2.

⁵ Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in the Southern Sudan*, Ithaca Press, London, 1981, pp 3-4.

¹ *Ibid*, p 12.

² *Ibid*, p 20.

face this encroachment. They had scanty technological equipment and were entirely illiterate. Further more they were ignorant of commerce and had limited social horizons and finally they had no widespread political awareness. In other words, they had no political organization. These hindrances could help to explain the hardships, conflicts and strategy that subsequently developed during the nineteenth century³.

The contacts between the Shilluk and the Funj

The Shilluk people are members of the ancestral stock of the Bito dynasty. Nyidway was a sister of Nyikango, the divine founder of the Shilluk royal line, married a chief of the Nuba the bridegroom presented Nyikango with a silver engraved stool and a mysterious object of great supernatural powers known as the mar¹. The Shilluk people of all the people in the southern Sudan were probably the best prepared to encounter the impact of the outside world. Because they were led by one divine King who could call them for any emergency and immediately respond to the call. The Shilluk raids on the southern fringes of the Funj Kingdom (1504-1821) made an impact on historical writing concerning the origins of the Funj. Bruce concluded that the Funj are Shilluk. According to different people, the Funj are mysterious cattle nomads. Whatever their origin, the Funj were a product of intermarriage of the Arabs and native people, and they ruled over a mixed population of Africans and Arabs. During this period the ruler of the Funj kingdom adopted an Arab identity. Slave raiding into the peripheral lands was originally a state activity in the Funj kingdom and the slave trade was internationally practised.²

The Funj are different people from the Shilluk according to Shilluk oral tradition. The Funj were defeated at Padit (a village adjacent to Wau Shilluk in the Shilluk territory) after which according to oral tradition they were allowed to go with their king, women and properties northwards. The Shilluk occupied the Funj land (Apuny land)³ with their strong warriors at the command of Dak Wad Nyikango. So, before 1504 the present homeland of the Shilluk was originally belonging to the Funj people. The fighting ended in driving out the Funj. The Dinka and Shilluk had effectively halted the northern expansion southwards. So the Funj could not penetrate there.

They held their position as firm as so until the Turco-Egyptian conquest of 1821-84 tipped the balance of regional power.

Egyptian forces penetrated into southern Sudan for ivory, slaves and finding the source of the Nile. They had brought in their wake northern Sudanese and European traders or merchants. The growth of their trade in the supply of slaves or resulted in increasing domestic servants throughout the Egyptian territories and northern Sudan. The political state of affairs in the south has been based on intertribal wars and absorption and assimilation of the weaker ones by the stronger men. In this context, some of Southern tribes were the agents of change. They used raid and counter raids. The independence of southern Sudan peoples was seriously undermined by a Muslim state in collaboration with the Arabic-speaking Muslim subjects.¹ The Funj Kingdom can be regarded as a product of the new Muslim society within Sudan. The Shilluk reached their present home north of Malakal in the sixteenth century where they encountered the Funj. The Funj were defeated and driven out². The Luo described the Funj as a red people. The Luo claim that the Funj were a red people may contain a bit of truth. The Shilluk raided their northern neighbours, the Funj Sultans.

Sultan Badi II Abu Dign (1614-42) attacked the Shilluk near Ilays, before undertaking his expedition against the Kingdom of Tagali in the Nuba Mountains. Badi II succeeded in driving the Shilluk back and taking some captures. However, the Shilluk continued to constitute a menace to Ilays, the crossing point for caravan routes between Sennar and Kordufan.³

Sultan Badi and Reth Dikwor (c. 1635-1650) concluded an alliance, which was kept alive by succeeding Reths (Kings) of the Shilluk some units of Shilluk soldiers seem to have served in the Funj army when campaigning in Kordufan in the middle of the seventeenth century and in the fighting against the rebellious northern provinces towards the end of the same century⁴.

The joint efforts of the Funj and the Shilluk put a stop to the Dinka expansion to the north and west. Consequently, they diverted their attention to the Ethiopian border land to the northwest. There they challenged Funj authority throughout the eighteenth century and carried their raids to

3 James Lado Loro, *the Trinity and Islamic Teaching*, Khartoum. 1994. p 23.

1 Luigi Adwok, Interview with him conducted by Daniel Thabo, in June, 2001.

2 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "Southern Sudanese and their Neighbors before Colonial Times": *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 102.

3 Luigi Adwok, *op cit*, June 2001.

1 Gray, R., *the Southern Sudan*, p. 26.

2 Luigi Adwok, Interview with him conducted by Daniel Thabo in June, 2001.

3 P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p. 24.

4 Pumphrey, M. B. "The Shilluk people ", *SNR*, Vol. 24, 1941, pp 1 - 20.

the out skirts of Sennar. Later, however, less hostile relations were developed with the Funj.

Units of Dinka fighters served with the chiefs of the southern Funj provinces and Dinka traders began to supply Sennar market with slaves¹.

The raid of the Shilluk against the Funj were more successful than those of the Dinka. The Shilluk used light canoes on fairly not navigable waters; this gave them a high degree of mobility. Before the coming of the Turco-Egyptian sailing ships and then steamers, the Shilluk had no rival in these waters, their raiding pattern was a surprise may attack by thirty or forty canoes upon villages or herds within easy reach of the river bank. If successful they would return with supplies of grain and bread. These raids were mostly dispatched independently of the Shilluk Kings, sometimes from the Shilluk base opposite Ilays. Secondly, there existed large reserves of manpower in the Shilluk heartland. From this pool of manpower, the Shilluk were able to sustain the long distance raiding, as well as ensure an alternative supply of grain and meat for their densely populated villages. In the way of these contacts with the north, a limited measure of trading emerged, usually via the Nuba Mountains.

Shilluk tradition also refers to raids against their southern neighbours the Dinka, Nuer and Annwak, and their northwest neighbours, the Nuba. Reth Dhoköth is famous for his victories over these people and for the booty he collected.²

The Shilluk believed that the spirit of their folk-leader Nyikango was reincarnated, in his Reth successors, upon whose welfare depended the fertility and success of men, cattle and crops³. Although the function of Reth in Shilluk society was religious and ritual, he was the focal point in the rudimentary administration system that evolved. The Shilluk were in control of the Nile and even taxed people crossing the river from the Island of Aba and their renowned fighters began to raid their northern neighbours.

The south and western Sudan contacts

The south and western Sudan contacts, very little is known. The Fur Sultanates 1650-1874/ 1916 owned its name to the Fur, who lived around Jebel Marra and who might originally have been connected with the tribes of western Bahr al-Ghazal. Another tradition suggests that the Fertit of Bahr al-Ghazal used to live in western Jebel Marra before they migrated to their present home. The Fur, like the Funj,

were influenced by Arab migrations, Arab arrivals settled in the northern plains of Kingdom and Darfur and continued to rear camels, later arrivals moved onwards to the rich pastures of south Kordufan and Darfur. There, because climatic conditions were not suitable for the breeding of sheep and camels, the nomadic Arabs, like the local African inhabitants, adopted cattle breeding and thus became known collectively, as the Baggara (cow owners).

It is significant to note that the nomadic Baggara were unable to acclimatize themselves beyond the Bahr al-Ghazal, Bahr al-Arab water divide. Most of the Baggara became much intermixed with the ancient African peoples of Kordufan and Darfur. To take an extreme example, the original Hawazma became so intermingled with the native stock that according to tradition, the two ethnic groups became indistinguishable¹. The cattle breeders, both the Baggara and the Nilotes did cross the barrier formed by the Bahr al-Ghazal - Bahr al-Arab water divide in search of pastures. Competition for pasture at times led to hostility between the Dinka and the Rizaykat and Missayriyya Baggara. However, in due course, they seem to have developed a system of co-existence and even exchange of produce. By the end of the eighteenth century, there is evidence of commercial contacts between the Fur Sultanate and Kordufan on the one side and southern Sudan on the other.

Traditional Religion² in the Southern Sudan

The Local deities in the Southern Sudan

In general, most of the pagans in the southern Sudan believe in the existence of a High God who is for example called *Dengdit* or *Nhialic* by the Dinka and Nuer who called Him *Deng*. The Shilluk called Him *Jwok Ayimo*. Ancient spirits. However, play a more important part in the Daily life of these tribes than the High God.

They believe that the spirit of the ancestors is incarnated in successive generations of rainmakers or spiritual chiefs, in which the function of spiritual and temporal authority may be combined. Zande culture is very poor in mythology.¹

The idea of a Supreme Being is deeply anchored in Zande mentality. The Zande is penetrated with the universal action of Mboli, the handless powers, life and death were in his hands. The Avungara had language of their own, which they kept very secret. Among the Latuka and Acholi, the rainmaker and the chief are one and the same.

1 Holt and Daly, *The history of the Sudan*, p. 58.

2 Werner, *op-cit*, pp 412-414

3 Gray, R. *op-cit*, p 12.

1 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *The Arab and the Sudan*, pp 159-179.

2 A.Adu Boachen, *General History of Africa, VII, African under colonial domination* 1880-1935, Unesco, 1985, p 514.

1 Hamilton, J.A, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Within*, p. 87.

The Southern Sudan are practising various tenets after the middle of the 19th Century. Religion is being practised by various denominations in the whole Sudan. Religious cleavages in the Sudan are almost as pronounced as ethnic difference and in terms of political impact, these ethnic divergences are certainly greater in bringing damages. Most southerners worship a variety of gods. These are known as deities who are associated with their ancestral spirits. These gods played a greater role in resistance these local religions tend to be marginalized partly because political movements in the south are based on geographic and ethnic rather on religious allegiances as it is the case in the northern Sudan. As far as religion is concerned, the majority of the people are local people.

Indigenous religions are therefore tribal religions and do not provide a basis for united action by several tribes and the influence of the rain maker or the spiritual chief is, therefore confined to his own tribe. These local gods have been influenced by Islam and Christianity, and in turn, these local deities have had an influence on the way Islam and Christianity are practiced in the Southern Sudan. Many Southern Sudanese peoples identify with more than one religion.

Southern Sudanese traditional religion was faced with the change of survival and the need to strengthen itself. The missionaries expressed an uncompromising attitude towards southern Sudanese religion. They were bent not only on converting Africans to Christianity but also to westernize their culture. Missionaries, and colonial administrators alike, preached against belief in spirits, supernatural forces and gods, witchcraft, sorcery, sacrifices and rituals, taboos and veneration of ancestors, and thus weakened the influence of southern Sudanese traditional and ritual leaders such as priests, priestesses, magicians, rainmakers and divine kings¹.

Islam is the complete way of life or civilization. It has its own system of writing, laws social regulations, taxation, education, and warfare. The Sudan government policy towards the Mahdists was a harsh extension of a general attitude towards popular Islam. The Leaders of the popular Islam continued to be seen as a threat whose power could be neutralized by revived tribalism. The spread of the Islam in the Sudan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries owed much to the missionary activities of individual holy man around some of whom religious orders developed and spread their leadership often become

hereditary. Islam fared better than traditional religion during the period of colonial rule. Wingate emphasised Britain's role as the protector of the Islam.²

The introduction of western medicine by the colonial administrators and their attack on the pagan custom also led to a weakening of the role of the traditional doctors and herbalists. All these ritual attacks against southern Sudanese religion and southern Sudanese reaction to them on the whole greatly reinvigorated southern Sudanese traditional religion by the 1930s. Traditional religion form the foundation upon which the new religion were based.

All these three religions (Christianity, Islam and Traditional Religion) have borrowed from one another in order to maintain their relevance to the southern Sudanese practitioners. The traditional religion offers an alternative perspective on universal human concerns. The missionaries, however, had a negative attitude towards the southern Sudanese religion and culture and were determined right from the start to stamp them out.

The Southern Sudan during the Turco-Egyptian Rule

From 1821-1884 the Sudan was governed by the Turco-Egyptian rule³. Egypt was a province in the Ottoman Empire ruled on behalf of the Sultan by Muhammad Ali Pasha. Muhammad Ali modernized Egypt's administration, economy and technical capacity. He developed the most powerful army in the Middle East. He then turned his attention to Sudan, for Sudan was renowned for its resources and Muhammad Ali had ambitions to conquer the Ottoman Empire for himself. Sudan, he believed, was rich in gold, copper and slaves¹. However the Sudan's gold was too little to meet Mohamed Ali's needs and its population too small to provide the slaves for his army. It was a combination of these factors which drove the Turco-Egyptian administration further south to open lands which had previously lain beyond the reach of the old Sudanese kingdoms. By 1821 a training camp was started at Aswan for black soldiers². They were instructed in Islam and trained by French military officers. Many of these soldiers saw service in Syria and the Hejaz, while others formed the permanent garrison in the Sudan. In addition to these regular troops, locally recruited irregular bands, armed and paid by their officers, were extensively used for tax collecting and the raiding of recalcitrant tribes². The majority of the Sudanese slaves, however were recruited for military used, especially in Egypt.³ By 1823, 50,000 northern Sudanese had died in defence of their country and

1 *Ibid*, p 514.

2 Daly, *Empire on the Nile* P.162

3 PM Holt, *the Mahdist State in the Sudan*, p 26.

1 *Ibid*, p 27.

2 A.B Theobald, *the Mahdia*, London, 1951, p 9.

3 M. F Shukry, *The Khedive Ismail and slavery in the Sudan*, Cario, 1937. pp. 51 -56

4Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 208

Muhammad had to control the Northern Sudan. Egypt remained in power for the following 60 years. Trade was carried on in a number of articles like grain, salt and oil, the most important being slaves and ivory. In 1834 Khartoum was made the capital of the country.

The Condition in the Southern Sudan

The main route into and through Southern Sudan was and is still the Nile route. The Southern waterways of the Bahr al Arab, Bahr al Ghazal, White Nile, and Sobat were occupied and dominated by the Dinka, Shilluk, Anuak, and Nuer, four of the largest groups of the southern Sudanese peoples. The Tribes of Bahr al Ghazal and Equatoria were living during the Funj period in a state of anarchy and tribal warfare as said earlier. This state of affairs was only stopped by the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the Southern Sudan in 1840s¹. The South Sudan came under the Turco-Egyptian administration in 1850. The whole country came part of the Turco-Egyptian that extended as far south as Lake Victoria. The south was opened up to explorers, traders and other influences. The tribes, which were disunited and unprepared to meet the new invaders with their superior arms, were not however easy to invade. The Turco-Egyptian administration encountered a series of mutually hostile economically independent small units, and took a long time to establish its authority.

One important result of the Turco-Egyptian administration was the discovery of the source of the Nile and of more information about the south. In 1838 Muhammad Ali decided to dispatch an expedition to explore the White Nile and to find out about its origin. Captain Selim was put in charge of the expedition that became part of the scramble for Africa was made in order to gain territorial colonies for military and commercial purposes². This project placed Egypt in heavy debts to many foreign powers and initiated European intervention in the affairs of Egypt and the Sudan. Southern Sudan was controlled by Egypt, but had no administration. The rapidly growing intercourse between Egypt and the Sudan to make the Europeans more and more informed of the Sudan's geographical features. The gradual penetration of government troops into the interior the geographical circles in Europe a new flow of information collected by these troops during their march³. The work of those explorers had paved the way for the extension of the Turco-Egyptian administration into many parts of the south, while the establishment of administration had helped

the work of the exploration. However, most important of all, the published works of the explorers and the establishment of a system of government had attracted the attention of traders and opened the south to outside influence.

In March 1838 a geographical exploration committee for the discovery of the White Nile sources was formed in Great Britain. The result was the discovery of the Southern Sudan areas. The southern Sudan has been a gateway into the interior of Africa since 1839 to the present day, Papyrus and other weeds were the main obstacles on the White Nile, particularly in the Sudd region. The Turco-Egyptian intention was to develop profitable trade. Merchant came from Mediterranean World, Ethiopia and Egypt. In 1843 Muhammad Ali established in the various provinces of the northern Sudan separate administrations, which were directly connected to Cairo. Massawa and Suakin were acquired in 1840 under the Governor General Ahmed Pasha Abu Widan.

The Impact of the activities of the traders

A host of traders followed Captain Selim, Turkish Officer (1839-43) into the Southern Sudan. Selim had a second expedition that reached Bor in 1840 and a third that reached Rejaf in 1843¹. The expedition of Selim had found this route which appeared to open vast trading possibilities as Equatoria was assumed to have ivory in great abundance.² some southern chiefs like those of the Zande were involved in slave trade. They obtained slaves from the tribes they had raided and sold them to traders. This condition soon, however, developed under the Turco-Egyptian regime into a profitable practice by European traders at Khartoum who employed large numbers of armed servants⁴ established station for this purpose. Many of the Arab slave traders thus depended on capital provided by European creditors⁵. Because they were used as slaves like inhabitants or the Nuba Mountains between 1838-39 and Southern Sudanese especially in Bahr al Ghazal, they contributed heavily to the promotion of the slave trade⁶. Merchants, and slave traders roamed across the Bahr al Ghazal and Equatoria, disrupting and often destroying the traditional social patterns which the indigenous African people had evolved to survive in their harsh environment.

Trade and commerce remained underdeveloped. The Southern Sudanese, unlike the West African peoples, had never experienced the impact of Trans-Saharan Trade or

¹ Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 62.A. Slavery.

² Richard Gray, *op .cit*, p 8.

³ *Ibid*, p 10.

¹ Gray, R., *the Southern Sudan*, pp 52-72.

² Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile*, London, 1980, p 10.

⁴ Harold et al, "Stamps and Posts of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan" SNR, Vol. 24, pp 100-113.

⁵ Mohammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, pp 1-4.

⁶ *Ibid*, p 12.

Sea borne commerce⁷. But slave trade in the Sudan was as old as recorded history itself. The north and the south relationship, contacts and development lay in tribal warfare. Slavery in the Sudan was followed by the tribal wars within the northern and southern communities alike. Tribes took slaves irrespective of whether they were brown or black.

The Commercial Operation

Egyptian government opened the Bahr al Ghazal and Equatorial provinces and brought relative security and unity to the Sudan. As a result, the trade assumed gigantic proportions. Traditional African products like ivory, cattle skins, gold, ostrich feathers ebony, civet and a variety of other regional products. Under the protection of the administration, Ja'ali, Dongolawi, Egyptian or Syrian merchant could establish in the southern Sudan a camp that was fortified by *zariba* (encampment) for himself, his agent and his slave soldiers of traders. Arab commercial activities were not restricted to the slave trade, which was very profitable, but including other items. Indeed in certain areas like Equatoria, the Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal, trade in slaves was inseparable from that of ivory. To finance these commercial operation and to meet local demand they imported horses, salt, cloth, copper, metal weapons, beads, mirrors trinkets and other manufactured goods. At earlier period imported goods were largely used in bartering for African products rather than being traded for money. Black slaves were imported largely to fill domestic occupations such as servants, nurses, concubines, and eunuchs and business assistants. They were also used as labourers' sailors and soldiers¹. To conclude, the Egyptian Government went to the south through military expedition. They had started and forced their way into the trade. As a result, they also enslaved Southerners and made use of ivory and other commodities. Outside the cities in the southern Sudan, they made slaves of women and children captured in war.

Slave Trade

By 1859, merchants moved inland and started the *zariba* system. *Zariba* was a large encampment from which a number of slave's traders could conduct raids into the surrounding countryside. Those captured would be kept in *Zairbas* until there was an opportunity to march them north to Khartoum and Cairo. Rumbek and Deim Zubair had originated as slaving *zaribas*.

There were a large number of small tribes living there in Bahr al Ghazal. Even before the *zaribas* were constructed, the Zande were building a great African empire in the south. They invaded smaller tribes, absorbing them into Zande Country or else they raided them repeatedly for slaves. So small tribes like the Golo, the Kresh, the Ndogo and many others found themselves threatened from the south and north.

As *zaribas* increased so did the Dongolawi soldiers. These soldiers came from Dongola or else where in the north, and thousand of them went to the south searching for work ended up settling in the *zaribas* as soldiers.¹ The European traders, who were chiefly interested in ivory, did not engage themselves in the slave trade. Their first field of activity was in Bari country. The European traders constructed *zaribas*, which were used as garrison posts and commercial centres. They also recruited large numbers of armed retainers from Arabised Northern Sudanese to help in launching attacks. Hence, the slaves were sold to meet the running cost of these *Zaribas* particularly wages of the retainers, porters, servants and other domestic requirements. Cattle were used for bartering for ivory from the Dinka and the Nuer. In the Bahr al Ghazal province the slavers power and transcendence continued to grow, until they became rivals of the government itself.

In 1865 Khedive Ismail established Fashoda as a provincial headquarters in the South for the suppression of the slave trade. Khedive Ismail established a police patrol on the Upper Nile at Fashoda and levied a heavy poll tax on the employees of the traders and an equally heavy property tax on their *zaribas* (an enclosure surrounded by thorn fencing from which slave traders operated in Southern Sudan). The Southern Sudan was hindered by the inaccessibility of the region and by shortages of staff and funds,² and poor Communication.

Slaves were held in Cairo and the best were at once recruited into Egyptian Army. Slaves trade was concentrated on the Nuba in the southern Kordofan and on the small tribes in Upper Nile between Ethiopia and Sudan in the East³. The traders were European, Egyptian, and Syrians. Ottoman subjects, and Northern Sudanese. The Greek traders appeared in first. The trade routes flourished. In the wake of the soldiers and sailors came traders and missionaries, including among them Europeans. The ivory trade grew in importance and with it trade in slaves declined.

⁷ Hill, R.L, "Rulers of the Sudan 1820-1885" SNR Vol. 32 1952, pp 85-95.

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "Arab Migration to the Sudan " *Studies in Sudanese History*, Khartoum, 2003, p 62.

¹ Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile*, p 146.

² Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p312.

³ Shukry, M.F, *the Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan 1863 - 1879* p 20.

Originally the traders would make raids against the neighbouring tribes for grain and cattle in exchange for tusks¹. The slaves were sources purchased by raiding children from a friendly tribe by whom they had taken in the normal movement of tribal raids. Henceforth adaptation to the outside world took place through a forced mingling of blood and harsh turbulent disruption². On the Upper Nile, European traders were excluded from the domination of commerce between 1863 and 1867.

The chance for Europeans to break into this closed network³ of Muslim trade only arrived with the need of entering further into the indigenous lands of southern Sudan. This penetration needed money and equipment to make more expeditions and explorations on a scale, which only Europeans could provide.

The village of Kaka, in the Shilluk territory, now became the main slave market for the White Nile. Arabs traders quickly established a *modus Vivendi* with the Shilluk village settlements to be reached from the north, was rapidly drawn into the orbit of Sudanese trade to the exclusion of the Europeans. The villagers tried to break into the Arab camps to steal the cattle. Small itinerant traders from Khartoum were already visiting the Shilluk to barter cotton goods and beads for ivory, cows and honey. The local Shilluk were already wearing cotton clothes. The Shilluk women bring eggs and beautifully branded gourds for sale, and the Arab women bring Merissa, cotton cloth harnesses, beans in plate like baskets. Groups of the Arab traders and their families, sometimes fugitives from the government, settled and formed small colonies amongst the Shilluk even as far as south as the large group of Wau.⁴

Contact with the Dinka and Nuer was restricted both by the Baggaras of seasonal migration and by the fact that the river, surrounded by shifting swamp and backed by tall Savannah grass offered only a few opportunities for trading stations.⁵ Seasonal migration and swamp regions with tall Savannah grass had possibly prevented contact with the Dinka and Nuer.

Richard Gray (p. 46) has stated that the myth of the Arab slave traders had continued to embitter relationship between north and south. At the beginning the traders and the Africans confronted each other with approximately equal balances (force). In their steamer boats the traders had an unchallenged technical superiority and social security, but on land both of them and the missionaries were entirely reliant on the co-operation of the Africans. The

traders established their own stations in the interior by bringing in large numbers of armed Arab servants and the ivory trade became reliant on widespread violence. Nyigilo, the Bari leader, had well-established connections amongst the Bari. Therefore, it was the Bari who accepted the final point in the early development of the ivory trade, and it was amongst the Bari that the missionaries established their first station. The substantial profits of the ivory trade were throughout partly dependent on gaining access of accumulated stores of ivory, the remains of elephants which had previously been hunted solely for their flesh. As the value of beads depreciated, the Bari demanded higher prices for less ivory, and at the same time the Turks became dependent on these riverain Bari to act as middlemen in the search for and purchase of further supplies¹. Mainly European big game hunters had little expected what they would find, because in those parts of the Sudan where they had spent the past years. The Turkish authority was limited to military sorties for levying taxes or putting down rebellion. The Pari the small Luo tribe who had contacts with the Anuak to the north and the Acholi to the south and as trade developed he even travelled in the direction of the Latuka to buy cattle, sheep and other objects with a few beads. The soldiers and boats crews of the early government expeditions captured or purchased the occasional woman or child, and they continued this practice under the European traders. The slaves were entirely purchased from a friendly tribe by whom they had been taken in the normal movement of tribal raids. The Arab servants settled, obtained wives and slaves from the neighbouring tribes, and established themselves as a ruling caste transcending the barriers of tribal society. The trading frontier began to create a plural society. Henceforth adaptation to the outside world took place through a forced mingling of blood and a harsh turbulent disruption. The soldiers themselves could capture slaves and do with them what they could as a substitute for pay. There was nothing in the Koran to debar a slave from owning a slave.

The traders grew ever more rapacious. At the end of every armada of boats would set out from Khartoum. These bands would make raids against the local tribes, seizing men, women and children. Sometimes they would round up vast herds of local cattle, the sole wealth of the reverie tribes. The animals would only be handed back if a chief could produce a set number of slaves so driving his to make war upon his neighbours. This meant that a curious, grudging alliance would grow up between the two parties. On the one side, Baker's people had the protection of the

¹ Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, p 12.

² Gray, R., *the Southern Sudan*, p 46.

³ Richard Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan*, p 24.

⁴ *Ibid*, P 33

⁵ *Ibid*, p 35.

¹ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church across 2000 Years* P.196.

slave traders against the hostility of the traders themselves. The traders eventually realized that Baker was willingly to give to chief European style goods. The rank and files were also impressed by Ibrahim Fawzi's new gun. However, they did not trust Baker, as an infidel and likely informer. For the first time, outsiders were watching at Khartoum trading caravan at work.⁽¹⁾ Among the Latuka tribe, one chief incited them, after a long march south and eastwards, the traders swept down on a district with which he was at war and seized more than 2,000 head of cows and sheep.⁽²⁾ These they then began to use for buying ivory and young girls, whom they would sell for the equivalent of five English pounds each when they were back in Khartoum. There were more serious human obstacles on his way. Baker had established his main garrison at Godokoro. Baker was expecting to ally with the Africans against slavery. The main tribe, the Bari, refused to submit and was treated to punitive attacks. The Bari were asked to pay tribute in form of corn and cattle to feed the Ismailia garrison. The slave traders themselves were condemned for their plunder.³ The soldiers began to learn the signals by which their hidden enemies organized themselves for an attack. It was assumed that king Leopold of the Belgian Congo that his real motives were purely philanthropic and dedicated to spreading civilization. This was what Stanley, a European explorer and Gordon imagined and expected. But the king Leopold's real intentions were colonial exploitation that were yet to be revealed. This is indeed a pointer to the motive of the British invasion and colonization of the Sudan. Outside the cities, all tribes made slaves of women and children captured in war. These people become part of the family. Almost all black soldiers in the Egyptian army were slaves, the strongest and healthiest young men captured in raids.

The government had started, and forced their way into that trade. Besides ivory and other articles, they also enslaved southerners. The traders had slaves to take along as well. They were also ready to head north, with so much ivory that 700 porters were needed to transport the tusks.

Mashra al Riqq was the port of the Belgium, King Leopold. It was the gateway to the vast swamps and plains known as the Bahr al Ghazal, which sweep monotonously south and west to the great tropical rain forest of the Congo Basin. First used as a landing place in January 1856 by the British

explorer and merchant John Petherick. Mashra al Riqq soon became the river port for the Bahr al Ghazal. It was through this port that an increasing number of traders passed through with their armed retainers, to raid the interior for ivory slaves¹. Slaves had become the staples of the southern trade in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Ivory had become less important, because it was difficult to hunt for elephants².

Bishop Knoblechar used funds from Austrian government to free slaves in Sudan, and then to educate them. Britain agreed to abolish slave trading by British citizens³. Christianity and commerce both became enemies of the slave trade, but no steps, besides those steps taken by Turco-Egyptian to stop the slave trade⁴.

Of these slave dealers, the greatest were Ahmed al-Aggad in the country south of Gondokoro, and Zubeir Rahma on the Bahr al Ghazal. The traders established their own stations in the interior by bringing in large numbers of armed Arab servants and ivory trade dependent upon widespread violence. The Arab traders could not be hurried from one tribe to next leaving behind depots full of slaves, cattle and ivory.

The communities subjected to raids counteracted in various ways in the process of this tragic drama left the South spoiled and devastated⁵. The traders had more or less settled in the Southern Sudan as pioneers determined to make their commercial fortunes by violence if necessary. They constituted the bulk of the inhabitants at the government stations even constructed their own trading posts in the interior from which they carried on an active trade in ivory and slaves. The slaves were not, of course taken from amongst the Muslim peoples¹. In the 1860s, Yambio of the Azande himself led an ambush against an Arab column to avenge an insult to his father. He remained implacably hostile to any invaders Arab, European, unlike other Azande chiefs. He regarded the Arab traders as a threat to his authority and social position. They wanted ivory and slaves, and they placed ever increasing demands on the Azande chiefs for the porters to house supplies. The Azande were the least affected by the slave traders².

The slave merchants, however, were angered. From the outset these traders, unable to find effective Southern middlemen who conducted their business, were all too

¹ Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile*, p.46.

² *Ibid.* p. 47.

³ *Ibid.* p.421.

¹ Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 1.

² Gray, R., *The Southern Sudan*, p 69.

³ EP/ SCR/ 60.A.1/ Slavery.

⁴ Hill R.L., "Rulers of the Sudan 1820-1885" SNR, Vol. 32, 1952, pp 85-95.

⁵ Gray, R., *The Southern Sudan* p 27.

¹ Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, p 9.

² Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 254.

ready to use violence, as short cut to profits, but for trade and violence become endemic when Negroid peoples refused to deliver ivory. The traders created private armies whose members were paid by their being allowed to acquire and export slaves as the prisoners captured in the course of these raids, thereafter the White Nile trade, now increasing a trade in slave fell into the hands of northern Sudanese merchants.³

Many merchants and rulers like Zubayr in the Sudan and others in Africa as well as in Europe had become wealthy by slave trading. A new trade had to be developed to replace it. In the summer of the same year several Europeans and other traders in Khartoum were making preparation to sail for the White Nile. The Governor, Abdual-Latif intervened and forced European merchants to form society and provide a company of sailors to protect them on the condition that the Government receives a third of ivory. They agreed reluctantly and the expedition left Khartoum in numbers. There was somewhat strange alliance between Angelo Vinco, the missionary, and Brun Rollet. The missionaries made efforts to preserve respect for the Southern Governor's orders.

The Europeans were welcome to do business in Egypt. In many things, they were under their own national laws, and could have their legal cases tried by European courts. Consuls represented them and these consulates had a great amount of power and influence. The European were the pioneer middlemen of world trade¹. The Europeans were able to play African against Africans. The European traders were actually perturbed by their exclusion from the Shilluk territory. There was little ivory in the country and safe in their boats, which represented a capital outlay quite beyond the means of any small itinerant traders. They stopped any to obtain a fresh supply by provisions before they pressed on to the south². It appeared that the imposition of Christianity and commerce were at last free to bring trade, Christianity and civilization to the isolated pagan tribes. By the middle 1860s and early 1870s the military and commercial network of merchants were expanded through out the south by Northern Sudanese, Turco-Egyptian officials and Europeans. In view of Southern peoples both Northern and Turco-Egyptian administrators were the

members of the Turkiyya because Southerners could not identify them.

Mohammed Ahmed Al Aqqad, the Aswan trader, held concessions along the Upper Nile for many years and terrorized the Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka and Bari. Zubayr Rahman Mansur, the Jaali merchant, ruled supreme in Bahr al Ghazal³. He had uprooted the Fertit tribe, developed and expanded the administrative centres and slave routes through Bahr al Ghazal, Darfur and Kordofan he became so powerful and conquered Darfur.⁴ In Darfur Zubair was then forced to hand over the Turkish administration. He needed Egyptian administration to the north of his territories in order to protect his trade in slaves with Egypt⁵.

The Dangolawi slave traders who arrived about the middle of the 19th century and were followed later by the Mahdist forces, created havoc in the country. It was the same guns, which conquered the Sudan, and made possible *zaribas* and armies such as Sudan had never seen before⁶.

In August 1877, the Khedive concluded with Great Britain the Slaves Trade Convention, which was to prohibit the sale or purchase of slaves in the Sudan. Charles Gordon, an European employee in the administration of Khedive Ismail, the Governor of Equatoria declared ivory a government monopoly¹, prevented the importation of arms ammunition, and broke up the private armies of slave's traders. The traders were soon driven out of business.² By 1878, Gordon began to enforce the policy of suppression of slave trader and slavery and dealt more harshly with the slave traders. These traders consequently supported the rebellions, which broke out in Darfur, Kordofan and the Bahr al Ghazal. Slave traders opposed the Turco-Egyptian administrations, merchants and soldiers (Northern Sudanese), led principally by members of the Dangala tribe. They supported the Mahdist rebellions. It must be pointed out that the Egyptian administration had brought to an end extensive slave raiding, especially in the Bahr al Ghazal, during the governor-ship of Gessi Pasha and in Equatoria during the time of Gordon. Rauf Pasha replaced Gordon as the Governor-General of Khartoum. In 1880, however, discontent among the Sudanese at Egyptian rule, though universal was unable to speak clearly and powerless³. The people had become accustomed to their lot, for they knew no better. They were divided, as they always had been, in

³ Werner, et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 165.

¹ A.I.M Ali, "A History of European Geographically Exploration of the Sudan 1820-1865" SNR LV, Khartoum, 1974, pp 93-102.

² Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 166.

³ Collins, *The Southern Sudan, 1883-1889*, p 8.

⁴ Richard Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan*, p 10.

⁵ Werner et al, *op cit*, p 166.

⁶ *Ibid*, p 320.

¹ *Ibid*, p 165.

² Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 15.

³ Hill, R.L. "Rulers of the Sudan, 1820-1885" SNR, Vol. 32, 1952, pp 113-141.

their tribal loyalties. Before they could rise in rebellion, they needed a man to lead them, a cause to unite them and a miracle to arm them⁴.

Christian Missionary Explorers

Commencing in 1846 Roman Catholics began to obtain footholds they came to convert the local inhabitants into Christianity. The early missionaries were unable to overcome some obstacles to understanding and when many of the best of them perished in the debilitating climate of the south, the cause of Christ was abandoned. The European merchants were a tough lot⁵. The commercial exploitation arising from the opening of the White Nile was left to European merchants stationed in Khartoum. Many travellers went to more accessible parts of the Southern Sudan⁶. Thomas Powell Buston, the political leader in Britain, revealed his plan of introducing the spread of the Gospel and some business skill in 1840. He considered African slavers must be given other ways of making wealth. British officials were concerned with ending slavery itself. This was gradually accepted, but many countries kept slavery for a long time. Slavery in the USA was not finally abolished until the conclusion of civil war set free individuals. The Turco-Egyptian administrator approved Christianity in modern Sudan, few years after the annexation of the Southern Sudan. Bayard Taylor, the American poet and diplomat, in 1843 ascended the White Nile River as far south as Kaka, in the Shilluk territory. Many other travellers followed him. All these travellers increased Europe's knowledge of conditions in the whole Southern region. By 1851 European traders were given permission to send private expedition up the White Nile to collect ivory and by 1858 no less than eighty boats left Khartoum for that purpose. By 1856 the British foreign office, the East Indian Company and the Royal Geographical Society, provided funds for Burton and Speke to explore East Africa. By the end of Muhammad Said's reign in 1857, the all basin of the White Nile and Upper Nile was to all intents and purposes, outside the authority of the Khartoum government. A class of traders consequently established itself throughout the Southern Sudan during the eighteenth sixties.

John Petherick (1860-1889) was British consul at the time in Khartoum. He was a mining engineer in the service of Muhammad Ali Pasha from 1845 and an ivory trader. John

Petherick and his expedition reached White Nile as far as Lake No, and then took Bahr al Ghazal to *Abu Kuka*, and preceded to the south passing through the Jur land, lastly they took the eastward route Gondokoro. In March 1862, John Petherick and his wife left Khartoum to the interior of the Southern Sudan. That expedition was financed with funds raised in Great Britain by public subscription¹. John Petherick was sure a dubious Nile trader with unclean hands².

In 1861, Miss J. A Tinne, a Dutch lady, reached Gondokoro. Miss J.A Tinne conducted expedition to Bahr al Ghazal and the Sobat River and in 1863 to the Bahr al Ghazal again. She travelled up to Bahr al Ghazal and west into the Zaire area and visited Bahr al Ghazal on the way to Khartoum.³ The result was discovery of Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria Regions.

In 1862, Speke and Grant supported by the Royal Geographical Society, reached Gondokoro where they met Samuel Baker and his wife.

Khedive Ismail came to the throne in Egypt in 1863. He appointed Samuel Baker to suppress the slave trade. His Egyptian officers resented and questioned his appointment because he is European and Christian. Baker also antagonized the Southern tribes whose confidence was necessary to defeat the slave traders.

The expedition failed to subdue the slave trade and only managed to establish a few isolated, military posts at Kaka and Fashoda because there were conspiracies, tribal warfare and raids. He was as much concerned with introducing European civilization and legitimate commerce, into the Southern Sudan by subduing its slave's trade. He failed in both undertakings. Khedive Ismail's ambition was to create, with British and French approval, a vast Empire embracing the whole north eastern quadrant of the African continent. In 1869 the Khedive Ismail suddenly realized that his authority was being flouted in the southern Sudan; while his reputation with his European creditors, on whom it was so important that he should make a good impression, was suffering from the slave-traffic that flourished there. He genuinely wished to see civilization, justice and mercy enthroned throughout his dominions¹. He therefore decided to dispatch expeditions both to the Bahr al Ghazal and to the Upper reaches of the Nile. Britain and France became increasingly interested in the region, especially with the

⁴ *Ibid* , p 96.

⁵ *Ibid*, p 62.

⁶ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 313.

¹ A.I.M. Ali, "A History of European Geographical Exploration of the Sudan 1820-1865" SNR, Vol. 24, 1974, pp 160-182.

² Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile*, p 189.

³ Gray, R., *The Southern Sudan*, p 78.

¹ Shukry, M.F, *The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan, 1863-1879*, Cairo, 1938, p 20.

completion of the Suez-Canal in 1869, because of their interests in this strategic route to India.²

Ismail sent two expeditions, one to the Bahr al Ghazal, the other up the Bahr al Jabal, to expand his dominions in the southern Sudan as well as to suppress the slave trade. Both expeditions failed to succeed in expanding his authority. Mohammed al-Hilali commandeered the Bahr al Ghazal expedition that was a dismal failure. The expedition of the Bahr al Jabal was nearly as unsuccessful. The Khedive had appointed Samuel Baker to command the expedition. The expedition failed to suppress the slave trade and only managed to establish a few isolated military posts.

In 1868, Zubeir Rahma obtained a contract from government giving him the extensive right to trade over an area of some 90,000 square miles in return for an annual rent of \$3,000 for four years; and in this domain he operated ten separate *zaribas*.¹ Zubeir Rahma was able to set up as an independent merchant. His wealth and fame continued to increase. Zubeir had become the most powerful figure in the Bahr al Ghazal. Deim Zubeir was his capital that was named after him. Agreed with the Rezeighat Arabs of Southern Darfur by which trade should be allowed to pass along the caravan route to Shakka, the chief village in their territory and thus his influence began to spread into the neighbouring province. In the following year he openly refused to pay his taxes to the government. Zubeir was no ordinary slave trader. He was himself so humane and generous that the slaves of others sought eagerly to join him. He was a warrior and administrator of remarkable talent, and above all, a mighty leader of men. In 1870, Samuel Baker was able to catch the local Turkish governor red-handed in slave dealing at Fashoda. It was not until April 1871 that Samuel Baker finally reached Gondokora, which he formally annexed to the government. Abu Sa'ud's men stirred up the surrounding tribes to attack the expedition, and Samuel Baker himself justified the natives' fears by attacking them for provisions².

War followed. Southern Sudanese were conscripted into Samuel Baker armies. These conscripted Southern Sudanese could hardly be distinguished from enslavement and the harsh methods of his administrators bore more than a superficial resemblance to those of the great slavers.

A devastating era where tribes were raided and taken from local warfare and general insecurity. By the time Baker had established his main garrison at Gondokoro. He already knew that the people he most expected to be his allies

against slavery, the Africans particularly Bari tribes, were generally his real enemy.³

Samuel Baker continued his journey south at last he reached Masindi, capital of the Unyoro Kingdom, in April 1872 proclaimed its annexation to Egypt, informed the King that he had decided to take him under his protection in the name of the Khedive, and that henceforward he would take all his ivory in exchange for manufactured goods.¹

Samuel Baker had in fact established two or three precarious military posts, roused the hostility of the natives to the government and thereby played into the hands of the slave dealers, and extended the normal rule of Egypt even further south to regions where she was incapable of exercising any authority.

It is reported that private agents conducted all financial transactions because of no regular transport of ivory received. That trade was controlled by a new ruling class of traders from Juba in a place named "Falero" and other outposts in Equatoria region. The prisoners taken in these Forays became the slaves of the merchants, who soon developed a lucrative trade in them. So profitable was that trade that great companies arose with armies of *bazangir* and many of *zaribas* scattered throughout Bahr al Ghazal and Equatoria. The merchants of these companies were in a short time the actual rulers of the districts in which they traded².

Baker did little to change the violence between the Africans and the newcomers that had been established. During the preceding decades which played an increasing role in the lives of the Southern Sudan. The Africans opposed Bakers as they had opposed traders. Khedive appointed Baker as Governor of Bahr al Ghazal in 1873. In August 1874 Baker interrupted and liberated several consignments of slaves. Baker was hated and rejected by slave dealers. The Bahr al Ghazal expedition under the command of Mohammed al-Bilali was a dismal failure. The objective of this was to suppress the slave trade. It was unsuccessful one. Muhammad al Bellali was dispatched with 1,200 men. He was instructed to compel the *zaribas* lords' to pay their arrears of rent, to establish strong administration in the Bahr al Ghazal and to secure the possession of the copper mines at Hofra El Nahas in southern Darfur for the government.

As soon as he had arrived in the province, Muhammad Bellali claimed that he had been appointed as a Governor of the Khedive, and summoned the traders to give up their *zaribas* to the government. He then tried to tempt away

² Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile*, p 209.

¹ Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile*, p 25.

² Shukry, M.F, *The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan, 1863-1879*, p 20.

³ P. M Holt, *The Mahdist state in the Sudan 1881 to 1898*. p 48

¹ *Ibid*, p 49.

² *Ibid*, p 50.

slaves to join him on the promise of freedom, and began to raid the *zaribas* of the less formidable merchants. The traders, alarmed and dismayed at this intrusion, flocked to Zubeir for guidance and leadership. The later exercised self-restraint until Bellali was defeated and later killed.¹

Gordon came to Africa as a tourist in 1873 from China. He was employed by Khedive Ismail to replace Samuel Baker². Gordon was a British officer and Christian. As a result, his appointment as a Christian with other Christians aroused the jealousy and hatred of the Egyptian officials and diminished the prestige of the Egyptian Government in the eyes of the Sudanese. Gordon managed through obstacles to suppress the slave traders in Equatoria.

He declared ivory a government monopoly. Prevented the importation of arms and ammunition and broke up the private armies of the slave traders. The traders were soon driven out of business but remained in the province to spearhead their dissatisfaction with the antislavery policy of the Khedive. Gordon was surrounded by nine European and American Christians in the employment of the Khedive Ismail, including the Italian Gessi, latter Governor of the Bahr al Ghazal; the American Chaille-long; and the German Edward Schnitzer, who practised Islam and was better known by his Muslim name Emin Pasha (Mohammed-Amin)³.

Gessi defeated the Rizayqat Baggara in 1873. Gessi joined Gordon Pasha in the Sudan in 1874 and served as his engineer in Equatoria. The Egyptian administration decided to make the best of a bad situation and officially recognized him as the Governor of the Bahr al Ghazal. This was because the administration did not have the means to defeat al-Zubayr. Zubayr marched his private army into Darfur as one of his first official duties as Governor. The Fur army was defeated at the battle of Manawashi on October 24, 1874. Zubayr assisted by government troops advanced into Darfur and was able to depose the Fur Sultan Ibrahim Muhammad Husayn. He killed Sulayman, son of Al-Zubayr Rahman al-Mansour, a Jaali merchant. He had gained complete control of the widespread chain of trading stations in the province. Discontent soon arose, however, between al Zubayr and the commander of the government troops, Ismail Pasha Ayyub, and in July 1875 al-Zubayr travelled to Cairo to demonstrate his loyalty and to win

Khedivial support for his cause¹. The Khedive had no effective control.²

The Egyptian Government seized the opportunity of placing al-Zubayr under arrest in Cairo. Darfur was securely placed under an official of the Egyptian Government, who introduced energetic measures to impose a heavy tax on the people and to subdue the slave trade.⁴ In Darfur the Italian Governor Messedaglia, suppressed the rebellion, which collapsed in July 1880 on the death of the Sultan.

In June 1879 the Khedive Ismail was deposed. Gordon finally left in 1880. He dismissed Gessi and Messedaglia. Muhammad Rauf Pasha was a weak Governor-General at Khartoum. Gessi and Messedaglia who were the ablest Governors dismissed, the bureaucracy demoralized, and the people discontented.

The declaration of al-Mahdi

On June 29, 1881, Muhammad Ahmed declared himself to be the Mahdi on the island of Aba. The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 opened the way for direct intervention by European power in the affairs of the southern Sudan and paved the way for the European commerce and religion. This objective could not be achieved because of the Mahdi's revolt, and his victory over the Turco-Egyptian armies in 1884. The southern Sudanese remained disunited, the life and tribal organization of the weaker tribes was disrupted and weakened.⁵ Because of the punitive expeditions and repressive measures taken by Turco Egyptian Government against these Southern Sudanese tribes. They rejected to accept the new administration⁶ All these were to be supplied by Mohammed Ahmed, the Mahdi. The Sudanese reasons of their discontent against the Turco-Egyptian Government in the Sudan are hereby mentioned. The Turco-Egyptians originally came to the Sudan with the conscious intention of exploiting it for slaves and gold.¹

Exploitation, in every possible way for example Slaves and ivory, remained throughout the main motive, at least to the local officials. Service in the Sudan was hated by Egyptian, and was regarded as a punishment; consequently, only the worst of officials were to be found there. Finally, too much

¹ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 365.

² Shukry, M.F. *The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan, 1863-1879*, p 23.

³ Collins, *The Southern Sudan 1883-1898, A Struggle for Control*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1962, p 17.

¹ Hill R.L., "Rulers of the Sudan 1820-1885" *SNR Vol. 32, 1952*, PP 85-95.

² Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in the Southern Sudan*, p 12.

⁴ P. M. Holt, *The Mahdist state in the Sudan*, P 28

⁵ Gray, R., *The Southern Sudan*, p 26.

⁶ Collins, *The Sudan, Link with the North*, , p 2.

¹ Rodd T. R, *Social and Diplomatic Memories 1884 - 1893*, London, Edward Arnold, 1922 p.10

emphasis was laid on expansion and not enough on consolidation.

The Sudan was difficult to control due to the lack of communications and the vast distances involved, with the addition of the far south, Darfur and the Somaliland Coastal strip, it became quite unmanageable².

The Mahdiya 1880-1898

Muhammad Ahmad was born on August 12, 1844, on the island of Labab in Dongola. His father Abd Allah was a boat builder who moved up the Nile to Karari.

The Mahdists movement appealed to the many Northern Sudanese who resided in the Bahr al Ghazal. Administrators, slave traders, merchants and soldiers, Sudanese, led principally by members of the Danagla tribe, had close family, tribal and religious ties with Mahdists long discontented with the policies of the government particularly the curtailment of the slave trade, they were easily taken over to Mahdism. To others it would mean suppression of the indigenous tribes of the Bahr al Ghazal. Egyptian control of the Sudan was slipping away in the face of a religious revolution led by al Mahdi. The modern guns had arrived into the world of the Sudanese people. As a result, it was possible for a few men armed with new weapons would be able to control large areas. Guns, which were developed in the 19th century, would shoot further, straighter and quicker.

The Mahdist revolution, 1881-1898, was intended to free the Sudan from the political and economic hegemony.

The Mahdist Forces in the Southern Sudan

The administration of Khalifa Abdullah did not bring any beneficial changes to the people of the southern Sudan. The Southern Sudan was not effectively made part of the Mahdist State. In late 1883, the Mahdi sent Karamallah, the Mahdist general with a large army to the Southern Sudan. The purpose was to take-over the south.

Lupton, an Englishman, was in the south at that time suppressing slave trade. He found himself defeated by the Mahdist forces and was compelled to surrender. The Mahdist forces began to act first as the Turks had done. They demand taxes in the form of slaves and cattle¹. In mid-February 1883 Lupton was informed that a party of Dinka who a year earlier had suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the government and had since been plotting revenge had ambushed a column of fifty Jihadiya guarding 400 slaves

carrying ivory to the steamer at the river port of the Bahr al Ghazal.² They massacred all of the *Jihadiya*, took their arms, the slaves, and the ivory and closed the strategic road to Mashra³.

Karamallah in the south met more and more resistance. In Bahr al Ghazal, those tribal leaders who tried to refuse Mahdist Faith, they were immediately dealt with or beheaded. The Dinka firmly fought Karamallah whilst still flying Mahdist flags. To them the Mahdi was a man possessed of a powerful divinity which had overthrown the Turks. They appropriated that the same divinity had to fight the invading Mahdists. Karamallah left his forces towards the Nile and Equatoria.

The Mahdists had conscripted slave soldiers who were serving in the Turco-Egyptian government (i.e the Jihadiya) into their army⁴. They became known as Jihadiya soldiers, mercenary soldiers who were confiscated from the slave traders. These conscripted slaves were recruited into the Egyptian army which constituted the greater part of the Khedive army in the Sudan and to which they should have devotion and allegiance.

The Shaygiya had largely replaced the Turkish and Albanian irregulars who had come with the army of Khedive and they were the only Sudanese tribe to become whole heartedly an instrument of the administration.¹ The soldiers, whose obedience and stability remained unquestioned until the victories of the Mahdi appeared to indicate that his victory was the cause of God. As a result it divided the hearts and consciences of the government troops, kept Egyptian administration in the Sudan.

The Mahdist victories of Shaykan appear to northern Sudanese merchants, soldiers, and officials to be a conclusive proof of the virtue of the Mahdi's cause and divine nature of the mission. The government official loyally fought to maintain the administration against the attempts by the tribe of Bahr al-Ghazal to overthrow it. To northern Sudanese in Bahr al-Ghazal it was preferable to maintain Egyptian governmental rule in the province than to hand it over to pagan, Negroid tribes. Thus, in non-Islamic Sudan, notably the Southern Sudan there was also given resistance to the rule of any outsiders and strangers (like Turks Arabs and Europeans). The Sudan security lay in the hands of the Mahdist and was isolated from the moves of any power with the means to interfere with the life giving waters of Nile. The British position in Egypt was thereby preserved, the Suez Canal secured, and the

² P. M Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan*, p 20.

¹ Slatin, R. *Fire and sword in the Sudan*, London, 1896 p57

² Collins, *The Southern Sudan 1883-1889*, p 31.

³ *Ibid*, p 24.

⁴ P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p 24.

¹ Holt P.m., *The Mahdist State in the Sudan*, Second Edition, Oxford, 1970, p 20.

seaway to India kept safe. Although the position never assumed serious proportions, the Italian threat challenged this situation. The slave trade started during Turco-Egyptian administration continued during the Mahdia. This conflict of interests was overcome by mutual antipathy to the government. This having lost the support of the Sudanese within the province, the Egyptian government had to rely on the army to maintain its position. When in the spring of 1884 the army also joined the insurgents and went over to the Mahdists, the Egyptian administration in the Bahr al Ghazal collapsed and vanished from the province. The Bahr al Ghazal was divided by Turco-Egyptian to enhance, by unjust oppressive means, their power and wealth at the expense of the tribes. Not only did they ignore the slave raiding of Danagla and Jaaliyin merchants, but even engaged in the trade.

Supported by government troops, the *nazirs* in 1880s would obtain slaves as tribute or in return for protection¹. By the end of June 1885 the Mahdist had disappeared from Equatoria, leaving behind an Egyptian administration governing only its stations along the 180 miles of river from Lake Albert to Lado, and native tribes, which are in interior, at least were free. By the end of the 19th century the Shilluk, Dinka, Bari, Latuka and Azande peoples as well as many others had been subjected to devastating raids from Mahdist garrisons established inside their countryside or along their borders. The Shatt tribe had followed Yonku's lead and openly revolted. They had allied with sections of the Dembo, the Bongo, and the Shilluk Lou and had established their war camp east of Telgauna. Mahmud Mahalawi who led the government troops defeated the tribes of western Bahr al Ghazal. The tribes were not yet prepared to submit to the government despite these two serious defeats in 1883 because the government measures were so harsh. The Dinka, like the other tribes of the Bahr al Ghazal, had good cause to revolt. During the campaigns against Sulayman, son of al-Zubayr the greater slave trader, the western Dinka tribes had suffered considerably, while in the east their unheeded demands for redress from taxes and the abuse of government officials only hardened their determination to exterminate their oppressors. Certainly conditions in the Bahr al Ghazal affected the Dinkas as well as the Njangulgule and the Shatt tribe, but the Dinka, unlike the Arabized tribes to the west, were not spurred on to rebellion by the politic-religious doctrines of the Mahdi. The Nilotes of the Bahr al Ghazal have been and still are more impervious to outside influences, whether they be

cultural, political or religious, than the other tribes of the province².

Consequently any revolt on the part of the Dinka was probably divorced from Mahdist influence and arose almost solely from grievances against the Danagla merchants and officials and the constant desire to eliminate the burdens of government from their domain.

It is true, the Dinka appeared to have allied themselves with the Mahdist against the government, but such an alliance was only the most temporary and opportunistic nature and clashes between the two were not infrequent³.

The Dinka lost a considerable number of men attempting to break through the *zariba* but withdrew at sunset to their camp on the Dembo river with the intention of containing the engagement on the following day.

While Lupton and his lieutenants were occupied suppressing the revolts of the Dinka and Negroid tribes of western Bahr al Ghazal. The Danagla and administrators were busy plotting to overthrow the government and to hand the province over to Mahdist. Similarly the Danagla and government officials were equally resentful at the intervention of European officials in their corrupt and lucrative practices and were anxious, since their positions if not their lives were at stake, not to support a lost cause. After the first of the year, 1884, Lupton advanced again into the Dinka country east of Daym al-Zubayr. He found himself opposed by coalition of Dinka tribes who gathered under the leadership of their chiefs. Lupton Bey defeated them¹.

The Mahdist annexation of Equatoria

After the official surrender of Daym al-Zubayr on April, 28, 1884 Karam Allah, the Mahdist general in the Southern Sudan, quickly established Mahdist control over the whole of Bahr al Ghazal. All the arms, ammunition, ivory and supplies of the government were confiscated and either distributed to the Ansar or sent to the Mahdi. The officials of the Egyptian administration joined the ranks of the Ansar, and the soldiers who did not escape were either reclaimed by some of the Danagla as their former slaves, or were publicly sold.

The Negroid tribes were required to pay tribute, preferably in slaves². So Karam Allah sent letters to the governor, Emin Bey, and the people of Equatoria demanding the surrender of the province and exhorting them to join the

¹ Slatin, R.C., *Fire and Sword in the Sudan*, London, Edward Arnold, 1896, p507.

² Collins, *The Southern Sudan 1883-1898*, p 29.

³ Holt, P.M., *The Mahdiya State in Sudan*, Second Edition, Oxford, 1970, p 36.

¹ Emin Bey to Dr. Schweinmfirth, August 14, 1884, *Emin Pasha to Central Africa*, p 465

² Richard Hill, *Rulers in the Sudan 1820 - 1885*, p. 85.

Mahdist. This lack of control led the officials in the Southern provinces to appropriate the government funds for personal gain, to make frequent raids on the local tribes for cattle and slaves, and to engage in the slave trade in spite of the official anti-slavery policy of the government¹. The Agar Dinka had revolted. They were encouraged by the successful rebellion of Dinka tribes in the Bahr al Ghazal and incensed at the raids made upon them by the Ma'mur of Rumbek for slaves and cattle². Agar Dinka surprised the garrison at Rumbek on July 27, 1883, massacred seventy men and officers and destroyed the station. On receiving this news, Emin Bey ordered the Ma'mur of Makaraka, Ibrahim Agha, to recapture Rumbek and quell the rebellion. Ibrahim Agha marched northward, relieved the station of Shambe, which had been besieged, and occupied Rumbek. By the end of the year the district was again under the Mahdist government control and the tribes' pacified.³ Abd Allah al-Samat, the officer of Mahdia, secured the support of the Agar Dinkas, who had rebelled against the Mahdist government in July 1883 and with them launched a fourth attack against the Amadi on December. This attack was repulsed. And also garrison sailed out from Amadi and inflicted heavy losses on the Mahdist and their Dinkas allies. Abd Allah only besieged the Amadi until the arrival of reinforcement from Wau⁴. The other principal commodity of Equatoria, slaves, was of much greater interest to the Khalifa. Private slave trading was prohibited. The traders supported by their personal slave army of *Bazingir*, establishing their own authority in the districts in which they traded and thereby creating a threat to the position and personal rule of Abd Allah without a doubt his commanders and soldiers took prisoners of war as slaves for their own use or even to make a profit. Rejaf became a colony for the deportation of convicts, and persons whose presence in Omdurman was considered dangerous by the state⁵. So attractive was the promise of loot, freedom from army requirements and in general, a free and irresponsible existence that not only Negroid tribesmen but also fugitives from the Mahdist government battalions swelled the ranks, particularly after the revolts against the Amir Karam Allah in Bahr al Ghazal. Many *Jihadiya* fled south into Equatoria, where they materially added to the power of those rulers who took them into their personal armies.

These rulers often clashed with the local tribes in their raids for slaves and ivory, but more often they worked closely with the local people in depredations against more distant

tribes. It was only the very largest and strongest tribes that were able to preserve their integrity against these marauders, who unchecked by any authority wandered throughout Equatoria hastening the disintegration of government, tribal as well as Egyptian, and creating anarchy, chaos and disorder Between Rajaf and Wadelai (ie Maggi, Kirri, Bedden etc) Mahdist expeditions went into countryside to conquer the tribes, exact tribute in ivory and slaves, and disarm the scattered remnants of the Equatoria battalions. These had largely dispersed the villages, where they joined a local ruler or set up their own miniature kingdoms supported by their guns¹. The isolation of Equatoria from the Northern Sudan seriously undermined Egyptian authority, the attempts of Emin Pasha to broaden and develop the economy. In order to reduce dependence on the export of ivory, Emin Pasha experimented with growing rice, cotton, coffee and sugar and with collecting rubber, but without dependable transportation these agricultural innovations could never develop beyond experiments. These various developments reduced the traditional economic self-sufficiency of the Africa. Africans were involved more and more in money economy conditions. In 1898, the Mahdist forces were decisively defeated by the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan. By February 1898 an Egyptian resolution was passed depreciating the prohibition against missionaries travelling to Khartoum. On 2 September 1898 the Mahdist army was terribly beaten and destroyed. Then Kitchener became a military ruler of the Sudan. The expeditions invaded the southern Sudan by river system as their predecessors.

¹ Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 64.B Trade and Cattle.

² Intelligence Report, Egypt Nos. 1-59,Cs, Archives, Khartoum.

³ Report of Emin Bey, 1885, Cairinte III, p 14/ 236, Tagebucher, 2 490-91.

⁴ Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 64.B Trade and Cattle.

⁵ Slatin, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan*, London, Eward Arnold, 1896, p 507.

¹ Collins, *The Southern Sudan 1883-1889*, p 23.

The Southern Sudanese Resistance to Foreign Control, Repression of southern Sudan and the process of Establishing Law and Order 1898 – 1940

Southern Sudanese Resistance to the British Rule

The Southern Sudanese had suffered most from the depredations of the slave traders, the Turkish – Egyptian, Mahdia and Condominium administration. The history of occupation of southern Sudan by British forces belongs to the years between the great World Wars. The British and French were at the brink of war over Fashoda. Both powers regarded Fashoda as the focal point for Nile control and therefore control of Fashoda meant control of the Nile.¹ A French expedition commanded by captain Marchand occupied Fashoda on the Upper Nile on 10 July 1898. It was only after a period of great tension between Britain and France that on 4 November the French government gave way and ordered Marchand to withdraw from Fashoda. In 19 September, 1898, the British arrived in the southern Sudan and they steamed past the Nilotes of the Upper Nile in order to secure control of the Nile headwaters and tributaries.² Fashoda crisis was borne out at the time of the European competition.

Britain had conquered the Upper Nile to control its waters. But control of the Nile and its tributaries required the imposition of the British rule throughout the Southern Sudan and upon the southern people who inhabited its swamps, grasslands and forests. British rule in Sudan was established upon the Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreement of 1899, which invested all civil and military power in a Governor-General nominated by the British government and appointed by the Khedive of Egypt. Britain's sole interest in the southern Sudan during this early period was strategic necessity in 1903. It had to occupy the south to maintain its own control of the Nile basin. In 1906, a settlement was reached with king Leopold, by which the Belgians withdrew their territorial claims. This rivalry was an important factor in determining the scope of the British involvement in that region and also French involvement in Fashoda.

Professor Collins puts it as, "British officers and administrators had gradually only turned southern Sudanese resistance into collaboration and won a measure of confidence among the people in the southern Sudan. They sometimes gave gifts, cajolery and peaceful displays of power, but sometimes, they offered their protection or

threats, and even by playing on the traditional enmities of the tribe."¹ They trekked throughout the land visiting chiefs, villages, and tribal gatherings. They were occasionally accompanied by a large and well-armed escort when respect required force². The Sudanic-speaking peoples in the central Bahr Al Ghazal and the Shilluk and Bari along the Nile were the first to capitulate to British officers and accept their authority. They no longer possessed the means to resist openly even if they had had the will. They were for the most part peaceful farmers, and had been a creative and industrious people before the arrival of the invaders.³ Southern tribes resented the British administration until late 1930s.⁴ The British used to suppress the southern Sudanese tribes because they were stubborn and disobedient. The southern submission did not come simply but after a terrible resistance of which some British officers in operation lost their lives also. This pattern of resistance and accommodation was common among politically centralized societies like the Azande, and even the Shilluk, but among the Nilotes the organization of resistance developed different forms which were the direct reflection of Nilotic society.

Beyond the Nilotic headland of the southern Sudan intertribal warfare was not a serious threat to British order. The Africans accepted and obeyed their traditional rulers, and so were readier to accept the institutions of the British. The Shilluk, Azande and Bari, for instance, never openly rebelled against the Sudan government

These tribal conflicts were frequent destructive and contributed in no small way to the weakness of the people to withstand external intrusion.⁵

They had no unity, but the reasons for resistance to external forces were distinguishably the same. Their social values were disregarded for and destroyed. They were opposed to forced labour as well as taxation irrespective of individual wealth and without provision of equivalent return in social services, forced reduction of the power of traditional rulers, confiscation of property and the limitation of individual and group freedom, so cherished.¹

1 Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers, the Southern Sudan 1898 – 1918*, New Haven and London, Yale, 1971, p 28.

2 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 113.

1 Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, pp 162 - 163.

2 *Ibid*, p 163.

3 *Sudan Gazettes*, 1899 - 1934, p 8

4 *Anglo-Egyptian Sudan handbook series* 1. the Bahr al Ghazal province, Khartoum, 1911 P 5

5 EP/ SCR/ General Administrative Policy 1937-1957

1 UNP/ SCR/ 1.B.2.A General Policy for Southern Sudan.

Shilluk Resistance

The Shilluk were relatively unified under their divine king or Reth. The organization of resistance was depended upon both organization of the society itself and its relationship with neighbouring peoples rather than any arbitrary categories such as primarily and secondary resistance. The Shilluk Reth is not traditionally endowed with absolute political powers. He is a divine personage central to Shilluk society. The problem came when British insisted that the Reth should command. This inevitably complicated efforts to rule indirectly.

In September 1898 Jackson, H.W was the first administrator at Fashoda. The personal influence of officials was the key to winning first the respect, then the trust and cooperation of the people. Reth Kur Nyidhok of the Shilluk was installed with Jackson's support ².

Nuer Resistance

Nuer resistance grew out of a tradition of inter-tribal warfare pre-dating the coming of the Sudan government. In a clear way the British were to the Nuer no difference from the Turco-Egyptians, the Europeans and the Mahdists who had preceded them up the Nile, none of whom had been able to administer the Nuer in even the loosest sense. When the British first contracted the Nuer in 1819, they attempted to win the submission of tribal chiefs. Dengkur and Diu were the Nuer prophets. Their main political function had been to lead cattle raids against neighbouring tribes. The initially poor response of Nuer Chiefs to the British calling to acknowledge the government authority was interpreted as shyness or the result of vivid memories of previous foreigners. The government therefore tried to walk softly and leave the Nuer to themselves. In the southern Sudan, resistance was led by the Nuer people. Those Nuer people living in the lands adjacent to the river Sobat and the White Nile. The Nuer, under British were able to cope with their own affairs. These administrators did not have effective control over them. They had refused to recognize the supremacy of the Sudan government and sustained hostility towards it. The Nuer had two most important leaders who were especially active in this respect. They were Dengkur who died in 1906 and Diu who also died in 1907. And in 1914, Dawi Diu, Nuer leader, attacked a government post. This implies that Nuer activism never died. In spite of the numerous indiscriminate punitive measures, the Nuer resistance continued to gain importance until it broke out in

the popular and widespread Nuer revolt of 1927.⁽¹⁾ In 1915 the two major central Nuer tribes (Lau and Gaweir)⁽²⁾ had constituted an offensive alliance which accounted itself at war not only with the Dinka but with the government.⁽³⁾ The Lau and Gaweir were fighting the Dinka as well as the government. In the decade from 1910 to 1920, southern resistance had not only become more frequent and more widespread, but the scale on which it took place had ominously begun to transcend the normal units of concerted action the great peoples, and sometimes even to cross tribal frontier.

In 1919 and 1920 the whole of the Eastern Nuer joined their Gaajak, section in resistance to punitive expeditions intended to deter the Gaajak from raiding the Burun people to the north and east of Gaajak. This group who joined in was Jikainy. The southern governors meeting in 1922, proposed that the administration of the south should be left in the hands of native authorities and to be supervised by British.

In 1921, H.C. Jackson, the first British officials, was to meet the prophet Guek, younger son of Nyangdeng and Jackson thought that Guek quite harmless and much maligned, but his brief encounter could not overcome suspicion or check ignorance, while soon became synonymous with subversion. Everywhere the British governors at Malakal, Mongalla, and Wau looked in 1921 they were threatened to their control by situation.

Thus, the military administrator in the Southern Sudan was left to rule his district in splendid isolation left largely to themselves, they remained unexposed to the influence of a changing world experienced by the civilian administrators in the north Sudan, while their military training and local knowledge contributed to their paternal and frequently despotic attitudes towards their subjects.⁽¹⁾ Captain V.H. Hergusson had formerly served with the west African regiment and later the Egyptian army in the Equatorial battalion. He was transferred as a district commissioner of the Nuer west of the Bahr Al Ghazal and was murdered in 1927 by a Nuer during the uprising.⁽²⁾ The Nuer prophets had a big role to play. This Nuer settlement was imposed by the British authorities. They played an instrumental role

2 Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 330.

(1) Adu Boachen, *General History of Africa VII*, p 81.

(2) Kingdon F.D, "The Western Nuer Patrol 1927-1928" *SNR Vol. xxvi Part One* 1945, pp 171-178.

(3) Sanderson and Sanderson, *op-cit*, p 111.

(1) Mongalla/ 1960/ *Events in Upper Nile province- chronological Alphabetical Index to Sudan intelligence Report and Sudan monthly Record for 1894 to the end of 1936*.

(2) D.H. Johnson, "Colonial Policy and Prophets: The Nuer Settlement 1929-1930" *Journal of Anthropological Society of Oxford*, 1979, Vol. ten No One, pp 60-75.

in a peaceful accommodation of the Nuer units with the condominium rule⁽³⁾.

C.A Willis, the governor of Upper Nile Province, sought to gain support from the British administration in Khartoum during 1927-1928 to initiate hostilities against the Nuer, whom he saw as obstacles to development plans⁽⁴⁾. Johnson argues that administrative commitment to customary law among the Nuer wavered under the British rule. Its value was first briefly appreciated as a means of obtaining the effective submission of the people to the government authority¹. By the last decade of Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan the administration of law had become the main function of Nuer administration, and reforms in the legal procedure meant reforms in the administrative infrastructure.

The Occupation of the Bahr al-Ghazal

The first work of the British government was to send expedition to Bahr al-Ghazal. Major Malcolm Peake led an expedition of about 350 men to Bahr al-Ghazal in 1900. They reached Mashra al-Riqq on 12th December, whence the campaign to occupy the region was launched. Swift progress was made in occupying the territory to the south. Within a few months Wau, Tonj, Shambe, Rumbek, and Daym al-Zubayr had been occupied. Wau was established as an administrative headquarters, and contacts made with the Azande principalities to the south-west. Most of the small tribes of the region were eager to escape the Azande hammer to the south and the Dinka anvil to the north, and they welcomed the British as possible saviours². More importantly the most powerful peoples, the Dinka, Nuer, and Azande, remained aloof and unaccommodating. Southern Sudanese cooperated with the British and accommodated themselves to British rule for a host of reasons, for example, Zande Shillik and Bari, many of whom were neither progressive nor anti-African, but rooted in the tradition of their people. The Bongo, Jur and Ndogo chiefs around Wau welcomed Colonel Sparkes in order to escape from their subservience to the Dinka, much as Tofa of Porto Novo tried to use the French to check the dominance of Dahomey.

Dinka Resistance

In 1901 there was no open opposition to the first Government expedition. The resistance was due to attitude of the British among the Dinka. The Bahr Al Ghazal police meanwhile began patrolling in Wau and Tonj and along the

road to Meshra al Rek to keep the telegraph line open. In 1904 Comyn, the British official, in Daym al-Zubayr heralded tax collecting, all the more unpopular because of the different conditions prevailing in the neighbouring central district. Local Chiefs were therefore forced to do road work in place of paying taxes. The Government won the loyalty of the Central district Peoples such as the Golo, Bongo, and Ndonggo, west and north of the town.

In 1909 a garrison was stationed at Nyamlall on the Lol River to act as a buffer (Defence wall) between the Dinka and their Arab neighbours to the north. A new road was constructed from Nyamlall to Wau through previously unadministered territory, causing resentment among the local Dinka Clans. Ajaakir emerged as a leader and revolted against the government. Consequently, many Dinka clans soon joined in. As the government prepared to launch an expedition, Ajaakir surrendered. A fine was levied, but he was unable to collect fines. As a result, there was open hostility. A government patrol marched through the district and the villages were burnt and cattle taken. In 1918 the government troops reoccupied Nyamlall, and order was restored. Many of the leading Dinka chiefs openly displayed their discontent and were making clear preparations for war. J.W. Sagar, governor of Kordofan, was ready to send a company of mounted infantry down to the Bahr Al Arab to help wheatley, the governor, with Arianhdit, (the Dinka prophet) and to frustrate his influence, which was now appearing among the Ngok Dinka of Kordofan. By 1918 the governor of the Bahr Al Ghazal at Wau could claim no control over the Dinka from Nyamlall in the west of Meshra er Rek in the east. Captain, W. Owen, commandant at Nyamlall, predicted that Arianhdit, the Dinka prophet would strike in great force to gain an initial success in which the whole Dinka would probably rise. In 1922, Arianhdit, Dinka prophet, was defeated by the British government. In 1936, Bol Yol, Arianhdit was allowed after detention of Rumbek to return to Onyom Malkwaich, east of Aweil, where he lived with his Shilluk wife and family. The Dinka still remained convinced of his powers. He was removed to Tonj and did not return to Aweil until 1938, after the leading Dinka chief had petitioned for his return and vouched for his good behaviour¹. Here he lived out his life quietly on a government allowance. Both Maffery and Symes, governors-generals, believed that decentralizations would keep out the young intelligentsia and the religious men. The shock of 1924 and the consequent rush towards indirect

(3) O.Digernes, "Appearance and Reality in the Southern Sudan. A Study in the Administration of Nuer 1900-1930" *University of Bergen Norway* 1978, M.A History, p 3.

(4) Douglass H. Johnson, "C.A. Willis and the cult of Deng: A Falsification of Ethnographic Record" *Journal of African History*, Vol. 12, pp 131-250.

1 Douglass, H. Johnson, "Judicial Regulation and an Administrative Control: Customary Law in the Nuer, 1898-1954" *Journal of African History*, Vol. 27 No One, 1986, pp 59-70.

2 *Ibid*, p 312.

1 Francis Deng, *The Dinka and their songs*, p 13.

rule had isolated the politically active educated class. The British settlement of the crisis had removed the Egyptian factor from Sudan politics, further obviating the necessity to the government of the educated class's allegiance.

In 1929, Akot a new Dinka station was opened in Bahr Al Ghazal, west of Lau. They co-operated with the British and accommodated themselves to British rule with the possible exception of the diviners and the cult leaders, the southern Sudan resisters made no attempt to reorder their societies⁽¹⁾.

In January 1902, the Agar Dinka rose in rebellion after having been ordered to return cattle taken by the Agar during a raid on another Dinka section. They had a long history of opposing foreign rule. They were led by Myang Mathiang. They ambushed a government supporting and killed its Commander and the rest. In March 1902, Wingate paid a visit to the Southern Sudan and stated that his main concern was government defences that were so weak as to constitute thereby to provocation of the revolt. Small forces of Sudanese soldiers were led by Captain W. H Hunter into Agar country. They defeated the Agar Dinka and their property and villages were completely destroyed. The Agar country was wrecked. Myang Mathiang, their leader, was killed in July 1902. The government forces were victorious and the Agar country was left a trail of devastation and famine

The Atwot Dinka had defied the British ever since they had arrived at Mongalla in 1900. They lived on the Lau River in the vicinity of Yirol and were as much Nuer as Dinka, speaking Nuer and practising Nuer customs. They had been led in their resistance to British authority by leading men, Awo, Ashwol and Dio Alam, who were supported by Dinka diviners (*tiit*).⁽²⁾ The government demanded road clearing in 1909. For this reason, the Atwot people destroyed rest houses and made attacks on patrols and finally they made open rebellion under the leadership of Ashwol. All the Atwot clans joined the revolt. In January 1910, the government launched a punitive expedition on the Atwot people. In February the Atwot country was traversed. Large numbers of cattle were confiscated and many of the Atwot People were captured. Their leader, Ashwol, surrendered. In 1917 Dio Alam came forward to lead the Atwot against the government. By the spring of 1918, he was openly boasting in the cattle camps, what was indeed true, that the government had no authority over the Atwot, their herds or their lands. The acting governor at Mongalla, C.S. Northcote, the governor had acted swiftly to crush Dio Alam. In March 1918 over 400 British officers and

Sudanese troops (Blacks and Arabs) swept through the Dinka lands west of the Nile, and throughout April mounted infantry with machine-guns scoured Atwotland, destroying hundreds of villages and capturing thousands of cattle.³ Therefore, the British patrols swept through the land unchecked. The Atwot stood only to defend their cattle or attacked government troops to recapture their cattle. These countless skirmishes were small, bloody affairs in which the Atwot were consistently defeated, but the British officer was murdered and many Sudanese troops lost their lives as well. By the end of April, the Atwot capitulated. Dio Alam, the leader of Atwot surrendered a month later. Atwot resistance was over, leaving behind more than 300 dead, hundred of villages destroyed, and thousands of cattle, sheep and goats seized.¹ The devastation inflicted by the Atwot patrol might have suppressed open hostility, but the loss of cattle, villages and friends could not be forgotten or left un-avenged.

In the spring of 1921, patrols were again sent north of Wau to receive the submission of Dinka chiefs, but the northern Bahr Al Ghazal continued to erupt from time to time, with sporadic outbursts against an alien government that refused to go away. Some Dinka leaders endured somehow and satisfied the administrators.² Others rebelled a few simply surrendered, but the sense of insecurity remained it was pervasive. While increasing training Sudanese, as civil servants, to manage settled areas and towns. This Sudan government policy of indirect rule was explicitly confirmed in 1921 in the report of the Milner mission ironically. Indirect rule was recognized from the beginning that the large towns were too detribalized for a system to succeed which depended upon regularizing and extending the traditional authority of tribal chiefs or sheikhs. In theory, it was the whole Sudan, which suffered most of the policy of indirect rule.³

The uprising was the most serious of the early condominium. At the end of October 1919, the revolt broke out because of government exactions. The Egyptian mamur had forced the Aliab Dinka to work without pay. In 1919, the government official of Bahr Al Ghazal province was killed by the Aliab Dinka. In December 1929 there had been a rising of the Aliab Dinka. They revolted against the British government. The Mandari and Bor Dinka also joined in the rebellion. On the 8 December 1919, the government forces were completely defeated by the Aliab and their Commanders were killed. Those tribes dispatched a strong patrol through their country. The uniformity in the

(1) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 25.

(2) File No/ 8.A.3/2 Notes on Western District and Tribes.

3 EP/ SCR/ 1.A.7 General Administrative Policy 1937-1957.

1 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 7.

2 Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 1.C. Administrative Policy for Southern Sudan 1930-1956.

3 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 27.

nature of southern Sudanese resistance to British rule was produced partly by the conservative character of southern Sudanese societies and the deep traditional divisions between them.

Moreover the British never imposed heavy pressure on these societies or seriously challenged the traditional economic methods.¹ The southern Sudanese resistance had little influence on the British government in London because it was very far from the scene and they had no interest. Muslims troops in the Bahr Al Ghazal left the province². By 1930 resistance in the south Sudan was crushed into sullen submission and was followed by a period of almost complete isolation from the north. It was not the Sudd, and generally difficult terrain which imposed the isolation. It was the outcome of official decisions.³

In the north along the Bahr Al Arab, the British failed to check the traditional hostility. East of the Nile, whether on the plains of the Upper Pibor, the banks of the Sobat, or in the hills and mountains of Torit, the best government could accomplish, and not without British losses, was to contain the tribes. There was little prospect of control.

Zande Resistance

In 1904, British forces marched into the Zande country. But request was refused because of the unsettled countryside.⁴ In 1905, chief Oku of Yambio district was arbitrarily appointed. He was not from the ruling Avungara class, though he was a Zande. At the time Oku protested and openly stated that his following was small that he could not maintain his position if the troops were withdrawn.⁵ In 1906, Yango at Maridi, a Zande, was made a paramount chief. He owed his present power to the government. Zande country, the powerful chief Yambio was determined never again to submit to alien rule⁶. Murad Ibrahim, was the Kreish rebel chief in 1912, against the condominium administration. They never really submitted to the protection of British rule. The reason for the early occupation of the Azande kingdom was to frustrate Belgians designs in the region. To the west of Wau lay the principedom of Azande. They for over a hundred years, had been expanding east and north, subjugating, and in many cases assimilating, weaker peoples. The strength of these states lay in their centralization of political power and their

military might, their weakness was a propensity to internecine warfare that could be and was exploited by the European who were themselves enlisted by one Azande ruler against another¹. Tambura was appointed in 1905 and sought British support in order to keep control of his non-Azande followers and to strengthen his position against his rivals. Collaboration was the price of British support, but this collaboration was more in the tradition of Azande society. Tembura was attempting to preserve a traditional way of life and maintain his customer authority just as were resisters. The resistance there after of the Azande princes was insignificant, and most submitted without a struggle². Neither the collaborators nor the resisters were ever consistent. Those who cooperated with the British frequently became the resisters. Those who initially opposed the imposition of British rule then ended by accommodating themselves to the new order and worked with British as loyally as the original collaborators. Thus Azande Chiefs like Basungada, Gangura and, of course, Tembura, or even the great Dinka prophets Ariendhit, acknowledge British over rule because it served their purposes to do so. The resistance was with some positive results for the Africans. They were frequently able to derive future advantages in their relations and understanding with British officials. In this sense, those who resisted the establishment of British rule were just as revolutionary as the southern Sudanese resisters of control by the Northern Sudanese later³. All the Azande Chiefs regarded the British intrusion in relation to their own internal rivalries. Yambio resisted the British because of their alliance with his rival Tembura. Tembura and other Avongara Chiefs had collaborated with the British administrators.

but when their authority was eroded by the British insistence on change within Azande society, they resisted. Even the cult leaders and diviners, who were in other areas of the southern Sudan sought to change the political system restricted themselves to the region to opposing only the British and made little effort to restructure their society⁴. In 1903 British led forces in the southern Sudan and received such a defeat in the Zande Land. The resistance was carried out by the Azande in their country against the British government. The Avungara chief manipulated and plotted against the demand of the officials of the Sudan

1 Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, pp 133 - 34.

2 Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 135.

3 File No/ 5.A.3 Nuer Settlement 1929-1930.

4 *Ibid*, p 291.

5 *Ibid*, p 162.

6 Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p 30.

1 Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, p 139.

2 Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 332.

3 *Ibid*, p 331.

4 *Ibid*, p 330

government. Major P.M. King Larken was the British administrator among the Azande.¹

Bari Resistance

The Bari were exposed to the full impact of the commercial and technical superiority of the traders. Like that of the Shilluk, the Bari's resistance against the slavers, the Sudan government troops and the Mahdist efforts were heroic but uncoordinated and by the time the British arrived. The Bari were a bitter people. Their open resistance was possible reaction. In alliance with local tribes or frequently on their own, traders would carry out systemic raids to collect ivory. In the beginning, however, principles gave way to common sense. The southern Sudan was a vast land, its people many. Each society would have much to do before coming into competition with another. In 1918 the headquarters of British operations in the southern Sudan was located at Mongalla. By 1918 British officials had failed to resolve the paradox of administration in the southern Sudan. Those inspectors and governors, who measured their practice against the policy readily admitted irreconcilable differences, but few, perhaps fortunately, ever really worried about the matter. Their object was to maintain order and to collect taxes; little ideology was required for either of these tasks.² At the end of 1919 after twenty years of the British presence, the very centre of administration on the Bahr Al Jabel at Mongalla was threatened. This compelled the provincial administration at Mongalla to locate an alternative site down stream for Rejaf district headquarters. Other considerations were political and military.³

In 1929 Rejaf district headquarters was established in Juba which was designed as province headquarters, and the transfer of the province headquarters was effected in 1930. By 1929 even the Sudanese Ma'murs, DCS etc had become, in the eyes of southern governors, a fifth wheel to the coach; and they recommended his complete elimination. In 1929 and 1930 the whole gold in the southern Sudan was systematically surveyed by the Nile Congo divide syndicate in the Khors. In 1930s during the following war years neither colonial government nor Christian missions had resources to extend throughout the country the educational, medical and other service which they had already provided in adjacent areas. The village communities, which were or are politically organized had or have habits and

assumptions, which guided the selection of questions for public or authoritative decision..⁽¹⁾

Latuka Resistance

The British soldiers who went to the southern Sudan to rule were characterized by a self-confidence that had carried Britain to the ends of the earth besides the superiority of the British arms or British technology. The British came and the southern Sudanese reacted to their rule in countless ways. Some collaborated and others had unyielding resistance. In 1899, Colonel Macdonald penetrated to the Latuka country and made friends with their chiefs. They were governed by a sultan head chief named Amara. His capital was Logguren which was the residence of the queen mother, the Latuka were described as having been very friendly to Europeans on several occasions. The Latuka of the Lafite Mountains rallied behind their rain makers and vigorously defended the land. All the Latuka villages were destroyed and many of them were killed and property taken such as cattle, sheep and tons of grain were captured. As a result the Latuka people surrendered.

By 1912, the forces of the Sudan government were using Light Mountain artillery against the Latuka with devastating effect.⁽²⁾ The Latuka district resisted, the Latuka district had been pacified. Each of its hill had resisted in turn and each had been beaten into submission by the mobile mountain artillery, ⁽³⁾.

In 1912 the Sudan and Uganda government agreed in principle to rectify the frontier, and on January 18. 1913, a Sudan-Uganda boundary commission left Nimule to examine ground in detail and submit recommendation on January, 1914 the exchange of territory was consummated with minor adjustment the present boundary between the Sudan and Uganda remains that of the commission.⁽⁴⁾ The southern Enclave went to Uganda, the populous mountain region east of the Bahr Al Jabal became part of the Sudan. In the past the Uganda government had made no pretence of administering these people. The Sudan authorities were not inclined to begin what Uganda had refused to do, but to keep open the lines of communication between the Sudan and Uganda by establishing Torit post, the fifth company of the Equatorial battalion arrived on the Konyeti river on April 17, was contemplated beyond Torit, but this soon proved an illusion. In order to secure their position at Torit, the British authority soon found themselves marching into

1 EP/ SCR/ 1.B.2 General Administrative Policy: Zande District 1941-1943.

2 Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 173.

3 *Ibid*, p 120.

(1) Mongalla /SCR /1.A.1 General Administration Policy-General Rulings 1910-1928.

(2) Rev. Michele Rostato, *My Forty Years in Africa*, p 146.

(3) Mongalla/ SCR/ 1.A.1 General Administrative Policy 1910-1928.

(4) Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 76.A.1.3 Boundary Commission and Boundary Protocol 1922-1924.

the mountains to suppress revolts by the rugged hill people.¹

In the course of 1914 Equatorians were posted to the new territories, moreover they replaced the XII Sudanese Battalion in the former Lado Enclave. Before the end of 1914, the Lokaya tribe in Torit district had come out in open residence. They cut telegraph lines and ambushed small forces on the road. The Lokaya tribe was crushed in a single campaign early in 1915. The leader of Lokaya, Jada, had surrendered and carriers were now supplied and the rest houses constructed.

By the end of 1915, the making of the road had generated Latuka resistance similar to that of the Lokaya, but much more tenacious, it was not finally broken until September 1918. The Lokaya and the Latuka were bludgeoned into submission by sheer firepower, including the use of artillery on a scale unprecedented in the southern Sudan. The Latuka and their neighbours first refused demands from the government for taxes and carriers and then began to attack those villages which had acknowledged the government for taxes. The final decision to march against them was precipitated by their assaults on the Torit-Uganda roads, followed by open defiance of the government. In January 1916 two punitive patrols moved through the mountains.

Those villages that capitulated were spurred most, however, refused to surrender, and a few guns acquired from Ethiopian poachers to stand off over three hundred troops from the Equatorial battalion equipped with artillery.²

In 1917 when Latuka villages near the triangle hill of Lafon defied the government, they were razed down and their inhabitants forced to submit. Pacification and security of the Latuka district was completed in 1918. Each tribe resisted and had been beaten into submission by British firepower³. The British were superior with their artillery.

In 1927 there was a disastrous famine, the Latuka being particularly hard hit. Extensive relief measures were necessary the cost of which was at least Ls 10,000. The present Torit road was largely constructed at this time.

Toposa and Didinga Resistance

The greatest threat to order east of the Bahr al-Jabal came from raids by poachers from Ethiopia and African cattlemen, Didinga, Toposa and Turkana people of eastern equatoria. The Sudan government was forced to occupy and administer the Didinga in order to protect the Latuka, than to occupy and administer the Toposa in order to defend the Didinga, and finally they marched all the way to the

shores of Lake Rudolf to guard the Toposa from Turkana raiders¹. Communications were the key to the British occupation of the southern Sudan. The first task had been to open the rivers, the second was to traverse the land. In the early 1905 this process of resistance was extended eastward to the Didinga and the Toposa, who persisted in raiding the administrative area.² But the subjugation of these mountain peoples was at once followed by comparatively close and careful administration and not by the hesitation, ambiguities half-measures and sheer neglect which were so productive of prolonged conflict elsewhere in the southern Sudan, and above all in the Nilotic regions. Moreover, administration was accompanied by a missionary presence on a large scale enough to demonstrate hiding aspects of alien domination.

Moreover, British ideas of humanity and justice insisted upon the limitation of many practices which the chiefs employed to retain power. Thus the administrative demands of the conquerors undermined traditional pre-rogatives and reduced the chiefs to servants of the government rather than leaders of their people. The authority of the chiefs was diminished to that which the administration through ignorance or opportunism permitted them to keep at the convenience of the government. Those who refused to cooperate were broken. Those who abused their position were sacked. Their successors were chosen by the government to carry out the government's will, and their selection frequently did not correspond to custom or tradition. Consequently, their influence and prestige and their power was circumscribed by the intervention of the administration.

Chiefs were deposed and their successors were appointed according to the government's choice. The reasons for such deposition ranged from incompetence to insubordination to personality clashes with British Inspectors. The authority and prestige of the chief was undermined by threat of deposition and by the intervention of the British Inspector into domestic tribal affairs⁽¹⁾.

The Security and the establishment of law and order

The Sudan government was to establish order in the southern Sudan by the introduction of effective administration to curtail internal violence and intertribal warfare and to suppress resistance against that administration. The British conquest, occupation and administration of the southern Sudan was founded on the

1 Collins, *Land beyond the Rivers*, p. 226.

2 *Ibid*, p 225.

3 *Ibid*, p 220.

1 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 227.

2 E.P/ SCR/ General Administrative Policy 1937-1957.

(1) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 166.

twin pillars of technical and organizational superiority.⁽²⁾ The greatest achievement of the British rulers of the south during this period was the relative peace they imposed on the region. Those British inspectors and governors' objective was to maintain peace and order and to collect taxes. This implies that the year 1918 brought no change in this reality. The priority of the government in the southern Sudan was to extend and secure its river communications. In October 1898 Kitchener sent major Malcolm Peake to survey the Bahr al-Ghazal and the Bahr al-Jabal. Peake ascended first the Bahr al-Ghazal until blocked by the sudd, returned to the Sobat. Then he steamed to the Bahr al-Jabal which was found to be blocked at its mouth. Penetration of the far south by river was therefore impossible. Clearly administration could not even be considered without access, nor, more importantly, could British territorial claims be enforced. Early survey was undertaken in the valleys of the Sobat and its tributaries. In September 1898 major Maxse led expedition up the Sobat and about 80 miles up the Pibor, while a second steamer explored the Baro. Maxse reported that the inhabitants were terrified and fled at the steamer's approach. Similar reactions were encountered by major Hill Smith in the vicinity of the new government post at Nasir on the the Sobat. The Nuer were by no means friendly to the British, they had not shown any other feeling than one of fear and anger at the British coming⁽³⁾. Conflict among the groups was more difficult to resolve than conflicting groups within them. No government could claim to rule if it could not secure order or provide protection for its subjects. Divide and rule policy was the work of the British administrators who were the military rulers in the southern Sudan. The British administrators had tried to build roads in order to facilitate missionary activities. This was the vision of the colonizers be they the British administrators and the northern Sudanese administrators. They developed infrastructure to serve their rather narrow exploitative purposes. Indirect rule, in theory, was inexpensive and needed few trained men. It would isolate the south from the dangerous and unpredictable nationalist's currents then appearing in the North¹. The Sudan government policy in the southern Sudan was to build up a self-contained racial or tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirement of equity and good government permit upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and tenets.⁽¹⁾ By 1908 the direct administration of the country was firmly

established regular steamer services were operating on the White Nile.⁽²⁾ At the beginning of 1910 the first change of importance was made in the system under which the Sudan was governed.⁽³⁾ The colonial administration began its efforts to fix the boundaries between these cultural groups in 1910 of restored the southern portion of the Duk ridge to the Dinka at that time.⁽⁴⁾ By March 1910 Rev. Shaw afternoon class at Malek had risen 45 pupils and the more advanced were reading and writing in Dinka. After 1910, the continued existence of the southern mission was never again in doubt. Shaw had been given thanks due to his uncompromising stand. In 1911, it had been recognised that Dinka missionaries must do Christianizing among the Dinka. By 1912 the teaching of literacy and of crafts had progressed sufficiently for Shaw to ask for a hand printing press and a loan. By the summer of 1913 Wingate had decided to change the military strength south of Fashoda; and by January 1914 the first operational company of the Equatoria corps was able to take over from the XII Sudanese battalion at Yambio.

Upper Nile province was a curious region. Away from the river, its Nilotic inhabitants were for the most part quite uninfluenced by Islam ⁽¹⁾. Malakal became the province capital in 1914. It attracted a large resident northern population and became, more markedly than Mongalla or even Wau, a northern colony in the southern Sudan. ⁽²⁾

By 1917 Equatoria troops had taken over from Northern Sudanese in Mongalla province, and Sunday was proclaimed the Sabbath day. Muslim troops in the Bahr Al Ghazal left the province in 1926. The mission had interfered into Shilluk local politics. They pressed their own choice in 1917 when the Shilluk decided on a new Reth to be selected. The Shilluk two candidates were Choti wad Ajang and Papiti wad Yor. The missionary favoured Choti wad Ajang, while the government favoured Papiti wad Yor. Clearly, the administration could not tolerate such meddling, which Bishop Geyer was hard pressed to explain away, and the missionary was reprimanded.⁽³⁾ There gradually relations improved between the missionaries and the Shilluk. But it did completely put an end to hostility. In December 1919 the Shilluk at Agodo actually attacked the mission stations and drove off its members.

The southern Sudan was perceived as a continuing resistance to alien invaders, beginning with their appearance in the middle of the nineteenth century and

(2) *Ibid*, p 327.

(3) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 136.

(1) EP/SCR, I-C-I.

(2) Douglass H. Johnson, *op.cit*, P 20

(3) Duncan, *The Sudan*, p 10.

(4) Scott Wayne, *Egypt and the Sudan*, p 266.

(1) Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 79.

(3) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 298.

continuing to the present. Southern Sudanese particularly the Shilluk co-operated with the British and accommodated themselves to British rule for a host of reasons, many of which were rooted in the traditions of their people. But they were neither progressive nor anti Africa. The Reth of the Shilluk, Padiet, collaborated because his position rested on British support against potential rivals.⁽⁴⁾

By 1918 British officials had failed to resolve this indirect administrative rule in the south. The British had to break the tribal leaders. This was to establish uncontested control and also to stop intertribal warfare on both. By 1918, there were fewer chiefs who could be described as traditional leaders, while the power of those hereditary rulers who had survived had been rendered increasingly ineffective by the demands of the government to conform to British standards of peace, humanity and justice.⁽¹⁾

The military administrators were isolated and ruled their districts without any interference. As a result they were not influenced by a changing world experience. They were so harsh to their subjects in the southern Sudan. Ideas of the proper governance of subject people were being rethought and restarted in the commitment to govern the Empire⁽²⁾. There were new ideas about how to rule subject peoples and the proper relations between ruler and ruled. These principles pivoted on the devolution of authority to indigenous rulers through whom the British would administer. This was called indirect rule. All matters of administration began to pass through the civil secretary's office.⁽³⁾

Native administration was the policy of enforcing in the out districts to tribal and territorial chiefs, Sheikhs and Meks.⁽⁴⁾ The answer from the south was meagre. Except for the Reth of the Shilluk, the governor of the Upper Nile had yet to use a chief to settle disputes; their role was to collect taxes. The Reth of the Shilluk had never completely surrendered his customary judicial functions to the British. Relations were bad between the Shilluk and missionaries. There was a constant complaint against the mission intervening in the Shilluk affairs. The Closed Districts Ordinance, introduced in the 1920s, was designed to facilitate the final abolition of the internal slave trade and to halt the spread of Islam into non-Islamic districts. The area of Upper Nile Province from Renk to the north was especially excluded, because of the establishment of economic interest of the northern merchants in the area. The access of the northern merchants

to other districts of the southern Sudan was controlled through the granting of licences. The Closed Districts Ordinance did nothing to stimulate a southern Sudanese commercial class to balance the influence of the trading companies based on in the northern Sudan.

The pressure on resources meant that there was less available for the northern Padang Dinka. The missionary society was started in 1922 at Melut. It was Sudan United Mission. New missionaries arrived in 1923, enabling them to open a new school at Paloich. They brought teachers from church missionary society at Malek. In 1923, Ditwök in Fashoda area situated north of Kodok a new station was opened. In 1925, Yoinyang was opened. Yoinyang in Bentiu area was the first Catholic station among the Nuer.

On January 17, 1925, a Sudanese Defence Force was established to replace the Egyptians army units in the north. The Egyptian army was evacuated from Sudan in order to establish an independent security force. The handful of British officers and administrators south of Malakal did not enjoy a sense of stability.⁽¹⁾

In 1927 Equatoria corps were posted to Upper Nile province despite the vigorous protests of the Civil Secretary, H.A. MacMicheal, who could not believe that it was possible for these troops to remain stationed at Malakal for any length of time without becoming partly Islamized and the result, would be that on their return to the south they would spread Islam.⁽²⁾ Percy Caricit, a British District commissioner, tried to govern the Nuer before and after the so-called Nuer settlement in 1929. In 1930 the British government undertook a number of punitive military operations including the development of the royal air force, on the Nuer as a means to command obedience from them. This was followed by peaceful penetration, being described as the usual imperial policy after cessation of hostile punitive military operations against indigenous population. With aim of establishing some form of an orderly administration or rather a system of indirect rule in Nuer land. It was not until 1930 that the administration was confident enough to assert that the Sudan was pacified. Even so, rumbles of insurrection and violent tribal squabbles continued.

The Opening of the river

The first task was therefore placed on cutting a channel through the sudd to open a path to the south. Sudd clearing

(4) Sanderson and Sanderson, *op cit*, p 337.

(1) Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 3.

(2) *Ibid*, p 2.

(3) *File No/ 1.C.1 Southern Policy Vol. I.*

(4) *File No/ 8.A.2 Various Administrative Problems in Barh al Ghazal.*

(1) *Mongalla-Events in Upper Nile Province Sudan Intelligence Reports and Sudan Monthly Records from 1894 to the end of 1936.*

(2) Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 456.

expedition to the Bahr al-Jabal was set on in 1899. This was approved and in December set out under Peake. Lord Cromer approved funds to clear the Sudd and a large expedition under the command of major Malcolm Peake Bey toiled in the swamps to clear a channel south.¹ He discovered a passage through the lagoons besides the river to the open water beyond the swamps. But he failed to cut through all the Sudd obstruction on the Bahr Al Jabel. A way to the south had been found.²

The expedition was ill-planned and poorly equipped and depended for its labour on 800 Mahdist prisoners³. The work of clearing the sudd was back-breaking and tedious. By March 1900 82, miles of river had been opened, and in April a passage through the swamps was discovered, by passing, the sudd of main channel. Sudden clearing was also undertaken in the Bahr al-Ghazal system. The Bahr al-Ghazal itself was from 1898 clear of obstructions almost as far as Mashra al-Riqq, but the Jur River required the sudd. Clearing was necessary therefore to ensure the passage of river traffic to the heart land. These British had to clear the rivers of Sudd and thus open the interior to large numbers of British who could now be transported up the Nile to the Bahr Al Ghazal and Equatoria.⁴ The British came, and the Africans reacted to their rule in countless ways, ranging from out right collaboration to unyielding resistance. In any case the southern Sudanese were not simply objects or victims of process set in motion outside Africa. The British officials had no knowledge of tribal law and custom acquired through limited experience and incompetent interpreter. They really knew little of the people or their ways at this time. British common sense was neither beneficent nor effective in the southern Sudan. It undercut the position of the traditional authorities and customary practices, replacing them with alien officials whose standards were ill suited and foreign. This manner of governing did not suddenly change because of peace in Europe.⁵

The Pacification

The government was concerned with law and order. They were concerned with the pacification of a war torn land. The pacification was the order of the day for those military Administrators.

The government adopted an administrative policy of devolution for the entire country, whereby tribal leaders who, under the guidance of British officials, regulated their

internal affairs according to their own customary law administered rural areas.

Pacification of the southern provinces was obstructed by the inaccessibility of region and by shortages of staff and funds. Communications were poor. The obstruction of the Sudd had to be cleared. Added vegetation, which rendered the rivers impassable, was the barrier. In the southern Sudan, it had taken some time for colonial official to realize they could justify their presence in the colonies only in so far as they established good order and fair administrative machinery and secured the social and economic development and political progress of the people concerned. In some colonies, ignorance, prejudice, customs and tenet had accounted for much backwardness, which could not be cured merely by economic conditions.¹ Despite improved river navigation, however, the Sudan government was able only gradually to bring the vast region and its heterogeneous inhabitants under control.

Military Posts were established and manned by northern soldiers under British officers, but beyond these posts the process of pacification was to continue well into 1920s.² Military patrols as a mean of bringing the hinterland under control were abandoned only gradually, when it was realised that these alienated as well as subdued, and were in any case expensive and without last results.

In the southern Sudan pacification was the work of decades. The British soldiers were concerned with care and maintenance. Thus government was unable to provide the men and money needed to advance from periodic military patrols to civil administration.

Establishment of a Sudan post

In 1900, there was an establishment of a Sudan post at Kiro which was found to have been in the territory of the Lado Enclave. As a result it was removed to Mongalla. In 1900, the pacification and occupation of the Equatorial Sudan began in December of that year. In 1903 a much vast channel was forced through the Sudd, which facilitated navigation. The agricultural peoples of the south were among the first to be pacified by virtue of their accessibility and their limited ability to avoid government patrols. They were also among the first to be cooped into the colonial security system when the old Sudanese units were replaced with territorial units. Both the Equatorial corps (which replaced the Sudanese battalions in the south in 1918) and the police were largely recruited from the Zande, Moru,

1 Collins, *King Leopold, England and the Upper Nile*, P 60.

2 *Ibid*, p 56.

3 *Ibid*, p 136.

4 Daly, *Op-cit*, p 24.

5 File No /1.A.1 General Administrative Policy 1910-1928.

1 Ep/File 1.A.7-CS/2.A.4Exact from East Africa and Rhodesia dated 26th June 1945 by Mr. Creach Jones on Dependent Territories.

2 Holt and. Daly, *The History of the Sudan*, P 120.

Madi, Lotuko of Equatoria, and the Jur of Bahr al-Ghazal. The final pacification of the Nuer and Dinka of Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces was accompanied largely by the Equatorial corps (with substantial assistance from northern army units in the case of the Nuer¹. The police who replaced the army in rural outposts throughout the south were also mainly recruited from Equatoria. Very few pastoralists were recruited into either service throughout the condominium period, so the southern security forces remained not presented five of the whole of the south.² Principally Greek and northern Sudanese merchants who followed the British occupation forces in Sudan carried out trade in the southern Sudan. They were amenable and likable people who flattered the British officials in the south and provided for their needs as the Arab merchants did not, moreover, they had sufficient capital to shock European goods, to the everlasting gratitude of a haggard British Inspectors far away from the fondly remembered comforts of Victorian England. By and large the Greeks were honest, and realizing that their future depended on favourable relations with the British, they did not shamelessly exploit the southerners. The largest concentration of merchants was at Wau, where in 1910 fifteen Greek merchants were actively trading half of them had built permanent brick or stone stores with galvanized roofs. A prosperous Greek merchant might take as much as £.250 a month from his commercial transactions³.

The Establishment of British Administration in Southern Sudan

From its inception, modern colonial policy has been a constitutional affair. European imperialism had reached its height in 1898. Northern Sudan and southern Sudan are separated zones. Each zone was to be separated and to have a different policy to suit its particular characteristics⁴.

In the southern Sudan British Administrators were military rulers and Bog Barons. They were mainly concerned with pacification, which took many years. Between 1898 and 1902, the British began the process of establishing the colonial entity as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan ruled by Britain using Egyptian and Sudanese national as local administrators under the policy of indirect rule⁽¹⁾ On 12 December 1900, the Sudanese troops under British officers landed at Mushra ar Ragg to start the invasion and settlement in the southern Sudan undoubtedly the Anglo-Egyptian administration in the northern Sudan would have extended its authority to the south in the future, but the

necessity of countering King Leopold's claims to the southern Sudan with visible settlement precipitated the invasion and conditioned as character. In the end the invasion of the southern Sudan which was populated by African proved a more formidable task than opposing forces of the Congo free state. Many southerners were determined to resist this intrusion of the British Administration. Many years passed, many men died and much money spent before African resistance had ended and British administrator was imposed throughout the land. The Southern Sudanese resisted Baker as they had resisted the traders and although their resistance was no more successful in driving Baker away than it had been in eliminating the slaves, a tradition of resistance to other control was growing within those societies which would condition their response to the imposition of authority in the future.⁽²⁾

By 1901, Bahr Al Ghazal was established as a province and its headquarters was at Wau. The province was occupied in 1901 by colonel Sparkes. For a long time the British administrative officer has functioned as the father of the people. The British had come to Bahr al Ghazal, Equatoria and the Upper Nile to conquer, to secure and to control, and this required that African leaders give up their independent powers. Moreover, British idea of humanity and justice insisted upon the limitation of many practices, which the chief employed to retain power⁽³⁾ These provinces namely Upper Nile province, Bahr Al Ghazal and Equatoria would be difficult and above all very expensive to administer.⁽⁴⁾

The whole river since formed part of the Upper Nile province until 1906. Soldiers, police, jihadiyya and the chief named by the colonial government were the first Africans in the Sudan who adopted foreign clothes. They had to wear a uniform to distinguish themselves from the rest. They realized that clothes, besides being ornamental and a sign of distinction, were also useful in defending themselves from the cold and from insects. Hence second reason for the use of clothes was improved hygiene. The British officers working among the shilluk, Nuer, Dinka and Zanda became conversant in the languages. In 1910, with the death of king Leopold, the Belgian occupation of the Lado Enclave was terminated and the country absorbed into Mongalla province. Moreover, its administration by the Sudan raised in an acute form of certain problems of southern policy upon which Wingate hitherto expressed

1 CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.B Sudan Political Intelligence Summary.

2 CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.A.5 Future of Native Administration in Mongalla.

3 CIVSEC/ SCR/ Class 1 Box 43 piece 320 Trade and Finance.

4 Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, p 114.

(1) Mongalla /SCR/ 46.A Mission-General Rulings and Policy

(2) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 287.

(3)) *Ibid*, p 205.

(4) Sanderson G.N, "The European Powers and the Sudan in the later in Nineteenth Century" *SNR*, Vol. 39, 1958, p 12.

either to Islam or to Arabic language. The official language of administration had, of course, been French.

The Introduction of Christianity

In 1846 Pope Gregory XVI established the Apostolic Vicariate of Central Africa to convert Negroes to Christianity. Missionary stations were opened in the Southern region. In 1847 the American Consul obtained the first permission for the central mission to work in Sudan from the Egyptian Government.¹

By February 1848 the missionaries arrived at Khartoum. Khartoum was not then a large city (its population numbered about 15,000). Bishop Ignaz Knoblecher travelled to Gondokoro in 1849. He went back to Khartoum on 7th March 1856 together with Angelo Vinco and Emmanuelle Pedemonte. There were in existence some treaties providing for the recognition by other European powers of these areas of influences, or their boundary. In 1900, the first Catholic mission was opened at Lul, in Shilluk country. The government of the entire southern Sudan was centered at Fashoda until 1901, when the Bahr Al Ghazal was formed as a province, with its headquarters at Wau. The first party of four missionaries reached Dolieb Hill on March 28, 1902. These were the American Presbyterians. In 1902 pioneers were delegated to the administration of Fashoda, to delineate the exact boundaries of the Catholic station at Lul.

The missions were warned that their tenure of sites and permission to operate were alike dependent upon the approval of the government.

The missionary was not allowed to engage in trade. At any rate, this government approval could be withdrawn without notice, if the presence of the mission leads to disorder or if the government considers that the country had become too unsettled for missionary work.⁽¹⁾ Rev. A. Shaw stated that "I am glad that you consider the Sudan government's policy of mission spheres is a good one where it has been enforced, with the provision that it must eventually elapse when Christianity can be said to have permeated the population of southern provinces".⁽²⁾ A Mission sphere could not be elapsed when Christianity had already permeated the population of the southern provinces. Cromer found among the Americans Presbyterian a style missionary works which admirably fitted the role, which he had allocated to the missions in the southern Sudan. He had proclaimed that their role, in 1902, was to serve, by means adapted to their

special religious persuasion, the secular and educational policy of government.⁽³⁾ This role was known as practical Yankee know-how.⁽⁴⁾

Spheres of Influence of Christian Denominations

The government issued regulations governing missionary work in the Sudan. No station was to be allowed in any area north of the 10 parallel that was 'recognized by the government as Moslem.'⁽⁵⁾ South of that line, spheres were allotted. In 1902, the sphere of influence was established which was aimed at avoiding friction among missionary societies. The Catholic was allowed to operate their activities in the Bahr Al Ghazal province. The areas mark for included any territory along the West bank of the White Nile as far as north as their state at Lul, in the Shilluk territory in Upper Nile province. It was abandoned in 1935 because Christianity spread in the south. Moreover, Wingate had been shocked by the feuding between mission representatives during an interview in 1903. From the time of the British occupation of Yambio in 1904 the inspectors had settled so many cases themselves that the sultans and sheikhs were beginning to lose all administrative powers and authority over their subjects. Each missionary society could enter the other area freely.

In 1905 the Sudan government published the first ordinance on the mission spheres of influence; the Sudan was divided into spheres where missionary societies would have exclusive influence. The sphere system was largely Wingate's work. He hoped to avoid a repetition of the violent religious struggles that had divided Uganda so deeply in the early years of the British presence. Their failure to reach agreement convinced him that separate spheres and long distances between rival stations were necessary to avoid unnecessary compromising and friction.⁽¹⁾

The southern Sudan was divided into the system of spheres of influence where each was given an area to operate in it. Mission sphere was drawn up not only to prevent competition among missionaries, but also to ensure that the dilatoriness of the Church Missionary Society would not result in the occupation of the whole region by none British missionaries.

In 1905 division, most of the Bahr al Ghazal was allotted to the Catholics; the Americans were assigned the Upper Nile province east of the Bahr al Ghazal and north of 7 degrees 30 inches, while the remainder of the south was assigned to

1 Ibid, p. 14

(1) Mongalla /SCR/ 1.A.1 General Administrative policy- General Rulings 1910-1928

(2) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, P 301.

(3) File No/ 1.B.2. General Administrative Policy 193-1957, General Rulings-Colonial Administration.

(4) Sanderson and Sanderson, *op-cit*, p, 42.

(5) EP/SCR/ 17.J.2 Education in Southern Sudan.

(1) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 293.

British missionary societies [BMS]. Missionaries were not permitted to act as intermediaries between natives and the government. Trading, in any form, was forbidden. Missions could not own land. Certainly the spheres were drawn up not only to prevent competing among missionaries but also to eliminate the spread of the Islam⁽²⁾. Christian missionaries were prohibited to operate in certain areas.

Boulnois, governor of Wau, seriously took the development and improvement of his province. In the year 1907, a son of chief Rikita entered the mission school at Wau, the school was approved and encouraged by Boulnois, the governor. Chief and sub-chief near Kayango were invited to send seven boys each.⁽³⁾ In 1906 there was a severe famine. Bishop Geyer has the main credit for the development of the missions in southern Sudan till 1913. Bishop Geyer opened personally the mission stations of Kayango and Mobili in Bahr Al Ghazal and Omac in northern Uganda. Mission sphere could not be elapsed when Christianity had not spread in the south. When it had not permeated into the south as the mission spheres system would continue to meet the object in order to avoid friction. This is determinable on breach of the conditions of the lease or in the event of government withdrawing the authority to promote missionary work. They had seriously taken their role as a civilizing influence; and had helped to win the confidence of the southern people for the new regime by teaching southerners the elements of general sense, good behavior and obedience to government authority there after.⁽¹⁾

During a tour of the Upper Nile in 1903 Cromer wrote to London that the British should not, on purely humanitarian grounds, lose sight of the main British and Egyptian interest in that region, which was that both banks of the Nile, from Albert Nyanza to the sea, should be in British or Anglo-Egyptian hands: The good government of the wild tribes of the interior, and even of the possession of districts which may be economically productive area, relatively speaking, considerations of minor importance.⁽²⁾

In 1903, Boulnois, the governor of Bahr Al Ghazal province, opened a school at Wau. He had problems, which he thought that sensible missionaries might help him to solve. This school was for the sons of soldiers and civilians of his province. When government funds were requested to support the school, Wingate became alarmed and directed Bishop F.X. Geyer of the Catholic Missionary Society to

take over this training centre, to combat Islam⁽³⁾, and to teach English, Christianity and manual skill at no cost to the government, Geyer could not refuse such a challenge. He made preparations to establish a mission at Wau but was hampered by numerous delays and frustrations. Governor Boulnois was pre-occupied with the Yambio patrol and then his death further prolonged a transfer.

On September 11, 1903 Fr. F.X Geyer was appointed to succeed Roveggion. The missionary monopoly in the south became clear from the start of 1904, when the Catholics began quickly to expand their work under Geyer's vigorous leadership. Bishop Geyer started immediately to extend his task. Early in 1904 situation in Boulnois's province in terms of the military and administrative condition was not an easy one. The Rek Dinka were hardly ruled at all, and increasingly isolated and even hostile. In 1904, Tonga mission was opened.⁽¹⁾ "The closing of Tonga district from 1916 to 1920 had no great quantitative loss: In 1915 Tonga had only eleven pupils.

By 1905, Wingate had developed original grudging toleration into a careful encouragement. He now wanted not less, but more missionary activity of the right kind. This implies that the Wau troops activity was not the right activity wanted by Wingate. The existing missionary activity was the wrong kind. Wingate encouraged the Catholics to whose activities he was pleased. In 1905 a school at Wau to be taken over by the Catholic mission, acting actually as an agent of the government and under Wingate's personal supervision.⁽²⁾ This development was of major significance for the future education in the southern Sudan.

In 1906, the very year in which the society began work in the southern Sudan, no new missionaries could be sent out unless special contributions were given for outfit, passage, and year and a half maintenance.⁽³⁾ On January 18, 1906 Gwynne, an archdeacon of Anglican Church missionary society at the head of a party of six missionaries landed at Bor. Between 1906 and 1918 there were many challenges to the work of the church missionary society. There were several and varied reasons. They had inadequate resources to fill the adding mission filed in the world in general and the southern Sudan in particular. As a result, these crises were for both the Upper Nile and Great Britain.

At Malek, a Dinka village, no converts were made, and the discouraging results brought a resolution to remove the mission to Uganda. On January 18, Malek was reached.

(2) Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, p.252.

(3) *Ibid*, p 14.

(1) Duncan, *The Sudan*, p 201.

(2) Daly, *Empire on the Nile* pp, 133 - 34.

(3) *Ibid*, p 286.

(1) UNP/ SCR/ 1.B.2.4 *General Policy for the Southern Sudan*.

(2) UNP/ SCR/ 5.A.3/1 *History Notes and Instructions*.

(3) *Ibid*, p, 301.

Gwynne rushed south to investigate, and he began to perceive that perhaps the mission station was ill conceived and inappropriately staffed. First, there were Dinka near Bor, which surprised and discouraged several in the group who had come out to the Sudan from populous working-class parishes.⁽⁴⁾ L. H. Gwynne was bishop of Egypt and Sudan. He founded the missionary station at Malek 1905. He journeyed to southern Sudan, especially in Bahr Al Ghazal 1908.

They made no attempt to demonstrate to the Dinka what good Christians could do. Moreover, the Dinka were certain of the superiority of their own way of living and remained unconvinced by verbal administrators. Despite these failures, however, Gwynne urged the missionaries to continue their efforts in a better-directed and controlled program.⁽¹⁾ Missionary societies found their way in and laid the foundation of many Christian communities in the Nuba Mountains and the south. Meanwhile, the missionaries themselves departed. The staffs were reduced to two men who clung tenaciously to their Christian outpost on the Upper Nile. They too were soon defeated ⁽²⁾.

Early in 1907 the outlook at Bor appeared so hopeless that some of the missionaries advocated abandoning the station and moving to Uganda. Dr Llioyd, missionary doctor of Anglican Church began to build a model station and to organize a reading in class for his Dinka helpers. In March 1908 he returned to Khartoum too ill to carry on his medical work. The mission was left in the hands of Mr. Shaw. He was alone in Bor Malek. ⁽³⁾

By 1908 the direct administration was established in the south. This included hard work, productively and manual and trading skills which were integral and indispensable parts. These created the moral condition in which the Christian character can progress. They *could* not have disagreed more. The missionaries demanded independent powers. The dispute was never completely resolved and it seriously compromised the society's work on the Upper Nile.⁽⁴⁾ The Southerners were not permitted to travel to the Northern Sudan as well as the Northerners were not even permitted to travel to Egypt for any long period. The government's religious policy was challenged, both as regards missionary activities and with regard to Islam in the Sudan.

The Sudan government policy in the Sudan was to build up a self-contained racial or tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and tenets.¹ The Sudanese were fanatical Muslims who would strongly object to Christian effort to convert them, and any such reaction would endanger both government and the missionaries.²

Among the Shilluk, the Reth was openly antagonistic to the missionaries at Lul and castigated those who attended the mission school. The missionaries among the Shilluk had made several appeals to the government to intervene on their behalf for, having no means to intimidate the Shilluk, they depended increasingly on the moral support of the government. The Shilluk are one group of the Nilotic peoples. They were deemed most suited to indirect rule. By the time the southern policy was adopted the Reth had lost much his prestige and was seen as an instrument of the government. In 1925 an annual meeting of Shilluk elders was begun under official auspices, and steps were taken to enhance the Reth's prestige by constituting the authority of his court.

Shilluk resistance was attributed to the wrong approach by the Catholic missionaries who considered them as a wilder people than the inhabitants of the Bahr Al Ghazal.³ The Shilluk have more interest than the inhabitants of the Bahr Al Ghazal in missionary work that evinced little more interest to⁴. The Catholics had established themselves in the south with remarkable speed and efficiency. The Sudan government was less helpful to the Catholics other than the CMS. Wingate was the Sudan government who was helpful to the church missionary society because it fits the role⁵.

On October, 28, 1908, Rev. Shaw returned to re-open Malek station. Shaw was worth all those who had come with him. October 1908 marks the real beginning of effective Church Missionary society work in the southern Sudan.

In 1909, when Gwynne visited Malek, he was so impressed by the improvement that he called the expansion into the Twic Dinka country to the north and the Lado Enclave to the south.

(4) CS/ CSR/File No/ 46.A. Missions- General Rruling and Policy

(1) .M Jennings-Brandly April 3, 1907. "Note on Missionary" the Jennings Brandly Papers see Collins, *Land Beyond Rivers*, P 303.

(2) Ewan D.M. (1987), "A Catholic Sudan Dream Mission, Reality Rome" SNR, Vol. No. 1: 1997, p 3

(3) Mongalla /SCR/ 46.A. Mission-General Rulings and Policy.

(4) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 18.

1 File No. CS 1 – C - 1.

2 Rev. Michele Rostato, *My Forty Years in Africa*, Italy, 1985, p 70.

3 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 10.

4 *Ibid*, p 40.

5 Collins, *Op-cit* p 291.

Rev. Dr Heasty compiled a working Shilluk vocabulary of some 2,000 words. By 1909 there were a few pupils at Dolieb Hill who were learning to read and write in English as well as in Shilluk. The main educational emphasis was put on the craft and industrial training, which had so pleased Cromer. There was more to this emphasis than a policy of making the African useful. Therefore, they were determined to transmit the full rich content through American Protestant Christianity.⁽¹⁾ There were in March 1908, Nuer ever-increasing numbers flocked to the outpatient clinic. In 1911 a cement-block hospital was constructed with little display, moderate evangelism, and the magic of modern medicine, the Presbyterian soon became, in the opinion of British officials an example to both Anglicans and Roman Catholics.⁽²⁾

Suspicion and ignorance prevented effective work during the Presbyterian trips up the Sobat and Pibor in their medical work overcome initial hostility.⁽³⁾

In 1909, only Ls 477 had been contributed specifically by the committee of the CMS for the Gordon memorial mission in the southern Sudan and CMS, with an accumulated deficit of nearly Ls 36,000, evidently had no intention of subsidizing from other funds, a mission for which it still had little enthusiasm. Missionary work would allow the development of the south along lines peculiar to it influenced by British and Christian ideals and safe from Muslim penetration.

British administrators and Christian missionaries shared an interest in the success of indirect rule.⁽⁴⁾

Christianity had succeeded in converting the southern tribes to European Civilization. Missionaries are open and less puritanical like the Mahdist time; Geyer and his mission areas worked in the Bahr Al Ghazal where Muslims were known and Islamic influence widespread.

They deeply feared its effects. The three principal agents for the propagation of Islam in the southern Sudan were the northern Sudanese troops, the traders, and the Arabic language. Soldiers and traders came and went; Arabic did not, the Christian missionaries regarded each soldier as a Muslim missionary whose religious and cultural practices were readily imitated.

The Europeans came and found tribal society in the Bahr Al Ghazal and Equatoria badly weakened and in some areas totally, disintegrated and unable to resist, with but a few

exceptions the Anglo-Egyptian occupation of the southern Sudan was accepted peacefully. The tribes had been oppressed for many years as such they became suspicious of any new invader. Since then Western Europe resolved to circumvent the Muslim world and control the eastern trade, the source of Muslim economic prosperity. Two religions were, and still are inherently competitive, in their particular doctrines, although basically united in their monotheistic belief.⁽¹⁾

The Portuguese monarchs were also inspired in their drive to the east by the Christian ideal of their universal church, which comparable to that of Islam, seeks to convert all human kind to its cause. The competition has, on occasion, resulted in conflict.⁽²⁾

The modest progress that both Islam and Christianity had achieved in the south was halted during the turmoil of the Mahdiya. Both Christianity and Islam adopted conflict, but in practice Christianity had an equally unpardonable or unforgivable record in the major Trans-Atlantic slave trade. Each tribe remained a closed society, considered surrounding groups as enemies. Also they were not in control with more advanced cultures, not even with those of North Africa. The tropical climate, the abundance of cattle and game and the virgin land reduced their needs for food, wardrobe, and housing and naturally reduced the need for new techniques.⁽³⁾ Wingate wanted to build up a Christian African population in the southern Sudan as a counter weight to the Muslims population of the north, a bulwark against the spread of Islam into Equatoria Africa

Security as much as religious predilection shaped Wingate's missionary decision. The parent committee was given report January 1911 by Shaw that Wingate had officially granted permission to enter the enclave throughout 1911 a proposal to take up the work was discussed among different Protestant missionary societies to set up a untied Protestant missionary society in the Sudan. The Rev. H. Karl W. Kumm, was to lead this organization the thought of this rapid enemy of Islam preaching in the Sudan terrified British officials.¹ The Catholic entered the newly pacified region in 1919; CMS followed in 1920.

In 1920 a station was established among the Bari at Juba, the regional capital, on the west of the Bahr al Jabel. By 1920 Torit became an important centre of the Catholic Church because of its central location among the peoples

(1) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 299.

(2) File No/ 1.C. General Policy for Southern Sudan.

(3) Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*. p, 34.

(4) Holt, and Daly, *The History of the Sudan*, p, 152.

(1) Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *The Arabs and the Sudan* p, 9.

(2) Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *The Role of Religion*, p208.

(3) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 308.

1 Geyer to Wingate, February 14, 1913, Mongolla 1/5/1930

the Verona fathers wanted to reach. During World War I the British had struggled to suppress the Lakoya tribe and then the Latuka, in order to secure the important road to Uganda which passed through Torit. For the Catholic also, from its foundation in 1920, it became a strategic centre from which new initiatives were made in Acholi land, in Lokoro and to Kapoeta in the east. The main mission was to the growing town of Torit, and to the Latuka people who lived around it.²

A new political entity was created which brought the southern Sudan into larger, world context. There were the beginnings of interaction between European and African cultures. There the missionaries were vitally caught up in a clash of their own civilization with that of the Africans. Out of this conflict were to come the beginnings of modernization. The direct rule was pursued as well as indirect rule through tribal leaders of the southern communities. The British were the ruling elite in the southern Sudan in particular and the whole Sudan in general.

In 1921 a second Zande station was established at Maridi; and also at Lui in the same year. By 1921, Yambio had become the centre of a flourishing network of bush schools. The southern governors had not been eager about the idea of introducing advisory council for their province.³ By 1921 there were some forty boys on the roll at Yei. The decision of 1922 formally to recognize and to subsidize the missions as the sole instrument of southern education had been taken, as usual, on pragmatic grounds in the light of local circumstances. After the war Rejaf was founded in 1919 as the first station in Mongalla province from Uganda.

This was followed by Torit and Loa in 1920, Nagichot in 1924 abandoned in 1927 when it ceased to be a government station.⁽¹⁾

In 1927 the prefecture Apostolic of the Bahr al Ghazal was created for Mongalla. Four new stations were founded by the Verona fathers in this period at Raja, in western district, Bahr Al Ghazal in 1932; at Nyamlel among the north-western Dinka in 1934; at Jebel Lafon (Lokoro) among the Parri in 1935, and at Nalingero among the Toposa of eastern Equatoria in 1935. In fact a dual strategy had been pursued by while the government largely left to the tribes the conduct of their own affairs.⁽²⁾ In 1935, Symes, stated that the least developed regions would be confined strictly to a simple care and maintenance basis the dominant of those unhappy few parts of the country which are capable of

increased wealth production.⁽³⁾ It was now significant to Geyer for two reasons; first, to defend his command in the far south; secondly, to gain a tactical advantage in the struggle for the Enclave by planting a station immediately adjacent to it. British had occupied Bahr Al Ghazal and Upper Nile areas in competition with Belgium and France and local resistance was carried out by Azande, Dinka and Nuer groups as well as Arab merchants. As a result the British administration was established in these areas. Also Christian mission was re-established there, events in the 1930s made it increasingly difficulty for the Italian missionaries in Sudan. The Italian invasion of Ethiopian in 1935 made the British authorities anxious about the security of their border with Ethiopia. In Europe war became increasingly likely, with British facing an alliance of Germany and Austria. There was a strong desire both to take revenge for this action and to protect eastern Sudan from the possible security threat posed by the presence of Italian missionaries not far from the border. The Akobo mission, in 1937, had been started and the Anuak showed openness to education. By 1938 the situation had hardly improved whereas in 1932 there was 190 southern clerks and artisans employed, in 1938 there were 206. In 1938 the mission of the Shilluk was taken over by the Mill Hill missionaries, on request of the foreign office in London as a reprisal for the expulsion of British missionaries from Ethiopia by the Italian government. On August 11, 1938 the Upper Nile was established and autonomous mission under the name of Kodok.

By 1940 the policy of isolation had achieved great success. Muslim influence was almost completely eliminated from the south and the three southern provinces became to all intents and purposes, a separate unit, closed district to northern Sudanese and widely open to the British, Greeks and missionaries of all nations like America, France and Holland.

Anti-Muslim Action

Generally speaking, the Sudan government feared the Islamic influence in the south and also the Arab in the north. Missionaries were instructed to respect tribal sanctions and to utilize existing custom. Equally watchful the government turned aside Christian missionaries from the Muslim north to the pagan south.⁽¹⁾

The adoption of Indirect Rule had an even greater significance in the Southern Sudan than the North. Boulnois, Governor of Bahr al-Ghazal, had began

2 Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 278.

3 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, P19

(1) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 26.

(2) E.P/ SCR/ General Administrative Policy 1937-1957.

(3) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 114.

(1) Daly, *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1934-1956)*, Cambridge, Britain, 1991, p 3.

a school at Wau for children of soldiers and officials, with an Egyptian official as master. By November 1904, 29 boys were enrolled and taught in Arabic by a Muslim. But 29 boys, all professed Islam and most spoke Arabic, so that Wingate's apprehension appear misplaced. At the end of 1904 Bishop Geyer was to take over the school, and was allowed to establish a station at Wau. The Wau industrial school was the first in the south to receive government support, and successfully provided vocational training to increasing the number of boys. In 1905 the school had 47 pupils and from 1905-1906 received an annual subvention and occasional special grants from the government. By 1905, no dangerous Muslim backlash in the south had developed and from Wingate's point of view the missions had behaved well⁽²⁾. There were southern Sudanese Muslims in the south among the Fertit, Bari and others.

Their number was about 22,500-23,000 out of 3,000,000 southern Sudanese in the south.

Wingate did believe in English an easier language to learn than Arabic. Moreover, the education department of the Sudan government had no objections.⁽¹⁾ Perhaps, the education department was established by the British officials to execute the Sudan government avowed policy.

In 1906 a separate academic class was established. By 1911 this academic class had 24 pupils. Schools established at Tonga, Kayango and Lul had by 1911 some 49 students among them. By 1907 there was talk of giving up Malek mission station and moving to Uganda. By October 1908 work at Malek had recommenced, and reading between 20 and 30 boys, some practical instruction and small dispensary were all underway. By 1910 the school had 45 pupils.

In June 1910, the Lado Enclave was completely transferred to Sudan administration.

In December 1910, there was intention to assimilate the Lado Enclave linguistically to the rest of the south. Geyer consulted Gwynne and Shaw on this problem. Wingate had no wish to see the enclave adopt either Arabic as the Lingua Franca it has become in some localities, or Islam, the influence of which was clearly growing. They promoted English language as a second

language and Lingua Franca in the south.⁽²⁾ English was agreed upon as the Lingua Franca of the southern Sudan but not Arabic.

By 1913 the Catholic schools had an overall enrolment of about one hundred. The American missionaries added no new station until 1913, at Nasir. By 1918 their school had no more than 20 pupils. There was some instruction in reading and writing in Shilluk and English was given at these schools.⁽³⁾

Geyer felt that as long as government business was transacted in Arabic, there was no point in his continuing to teach English either at Wau or anywhere else. He even suggested that he might change his policy in the mission. Proper Schools were established and Sudanese Arabic taught instead of English. Shaw was shocked, and protested that Arabic in any form would bring in a strong influence for Islam. Geyer accepted the policy but he insisted that the southern governors should encourage the appointment of English-speaking natives. He insisted that Arabic should be used in the southern Sudan.

The Southern Governors' meeting in 1922 proposed leaving administration in the hands of native authorities ... under British supervision. Under the provision of the Passport and Permits Ordinance of 1922, the South was classified as closed districts resulting in the progressive exclusion of northern trader and the limitation of Southerner travelling to the North to find work.⁽¹⁾

Beginning in 1922 chief's courts was established under the guidance of British officials. It was also realized that in some places like Wau itself, Arabic was so commonly used that the local language had almost been completely excluded. It was considered that special concessions might be necessary in these places. In the field of formal education, the government had encouraged missionaries to study southern languages and to use these as the vehicles for initial education. As a second language they had been encouraged to teach English rather than Arabic.⁽²⁾ The spread of Arabic and Islam was checked, even northern Sudanese traditional names and address was frowned upon and discouraged. English and the indigenous languages of the south were promoted and correspondingly encouraged. Later, in 1928 a

(2) *B.al.G/ SCR 1.C.1 Southern Policy.*

(1) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p34.

(2) *Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 36.C Intelligence Reports Province Monthly 1923-1930*

(3) Collins, *op-cit*, p 34.

(1) Daly, *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1934-1956)*, P. 4.

(2) Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 24.

conference held in Equatoria selected English and local Languages and Arabic was excluded.⁽³⁾ By April 1928, when the Rejaf language conference met under Mathew's chairmanship, he had evidently ceased to press the adoption of Arabic. In August, Bishop Gwynne demanded not only the removal of mission troops but also the dismissal of Egyptian Mamurs and the encouragement of British trading companies. The backwardness of the southern tribes was an impediment to the rapid integration of the two regions (Bahr Al Ghazal and Mongalla).

The Closed District Ordinance was the policy of isolation of two parts of the Sudan-south and north. Southern policy was designed to isolate North from South in full scale adoption.⁽⁴⁾

The Northern Sudanese were not allowed to travel to Egypt for any long period. Also the southern Sudanese were not permitted to go to North. The town of Raga itself was re-sited well away from its mosque and former Muslim quarters; and resettlement on the old site was forbidden. This was MacMichael policy in 1929 - 30.

The Sudan was divided into fourteen provinces, each governed by a military officer with considerable powers, on the principle of indirect rule, that is, ruling through the local chiefs, who were often placed in office and supported by the governor. The British made the office of chief hereditary which tended to cause discontent.⁽¹⁾

This policy continued unchecked until the outbreak of the Second World War. In 1922 the Passports and Permit Ordinance was promulgated imposing severe restrictions on free movement of people across south-north borders⁽²⁾. Northern Sudanese were prohibited for residing in the south except by official permission, similarly, free movements of southerners to the north was restricted⁽³⁾. Passports and permits ordinance of 1922 were provided. The south was declared as a closed district resulting in the progressive isolation of northern traders and the limitation of southerners travelling to the north to look for work. In 1922 the title inspector was officially changed to that of district commissioner to be

more in keeping with administrators who ruled rather than officials who inspected.

In 1930 a system of first class and second judges was created reviving the system where province courts had been presided over by the first class judges. All the senior posts were until 1936, occupied by British and other foreign civil servants. From this year the Sudanese began to hold senior post.⁽⁴⁾ In January 1930, Khartoum had decided to declare all out war on northern influences in the south. The first general education conference for the whole south was held in Mongalla province. So Mr Parr replaced Nalder (in 1936 left the country) but delayed until 1937 where council and some of their functions got transferred to the civil secretary's office which Symes now portrayed as similar to a general secretariat to government.⁽⁵⁾ These parts were amalgamated from January 1st, 1936 and became Equatoria province and Yirol district of the Upper Nile was later added from January 1st, 1937. In 1936 Mongalla and the Bahr Al Ghazal incorporated, and parts of Upper Nile province were detached, to form a massive Equatoria province with its headquarters at Juba.

In January 1937, Martin Parr, the new governor of Equatoria was fully exposed to the degree to which care and maintenance had been imposed on the south. It was mostly to save money that Symes, Governor General, had amalgamated the Mongalla and Bahr Al Ghazal. In reality, in both north and south, the Sudan government used indirect rule to justify practices adopted for a variety of unrelated reasons-where, by the early 1930s, administrative issue was little more than care and maintenance; tribal authority could be useful in keeping down costs.

Symes, Governor-General, recognized officially what had developed in fact, a clear distinction between the rural and urban Sudanese the political, social and economic development.¹ Area had been reduced to a more transit station for Italian imports and exports, Gambila never recovered. Personal relations across national lines were open to misinterpretation ingratiating or patronizing as climbing or going native. For the political service which was the post assigned to second

(3) EP/SCR/1.A.5.

(4) Sanderson and Sanderson, *E R P*, p 85.

(1) Mohammed Ibrahim al-Nur, "The Role of the Native Courts in the Administration of Justice in the Sudan" *The Making of the Sudanese State in the Proceeding of the Durham Sudan Historical Records Vol. 1*, PP 78-85.

(2) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 30.

(3) UNP/ SCR/ 1.B.2.A. *General Policy for the Southern Sudan*.

(4) Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question*, London, February, 1951, p 106.

(5) Everett M. Rogers et al, *Modernization Among Peasants*, New York, 1969, p 12.

1 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 45.

officers, retired and contracted. These assigned personnel are British officials.²

The political service was the status, which posed a particular problem inherent in colonial rule. Other officials had more opportunity to meet Sudanese socially, but such cases might reveal even more clearly contradictions thrown up in the colonial encounter³.

British officials often had no Sudanese colleagues of equal rank, so that even limited social relation could be stilted, forced and official in all but name. The British made no union with the Sudanese by marriage. The British forces were clearly on the defensive against the beleaguered Italians isolated in western Ethiopia far from Addis Ababa, which was equally remote from Rome⁴. Indeed the fighting ended in the summer of 1941 several thousand Nilotes and men in Yei and Juba districts were recruited in 1941 and 1942 to build and maintain the north-south road from Aba to Jebelein as part of the Africa line communications.

The mass of southern Sudan remained largely unaffected.¹

The administration, resistance and repression of the southern Sudanese 1898 – 1940 by the British administrators who were the professional soldiers were not different from the Turks and the Mahdists in their treatment of the southern Sudanese tribes. The government had used force in order to make the southern Sudanese accept their ruler².

The Dinka and the Nuer, however, frequently rose against the administration to rid themselves of alien authority and unwanted impositions.³ Like the British administrators, the missionaries were the beginnings of the colonial experience that was an outgrowth of the 19th century. These first decades saw the introduction and the gathering of those elements, which were to shape the future of the southern Sudan.

To many southerners, therefore the Turco-Egyptian rule, the slave trade, the Mahdist forces and the Anglo-Egyptian activities in the southern Sudan were not

received submissively but they were resisted by the southern peoples, though with uneven results. By 1940 the policy of seclusion had achieved great success. The Southern Sudanese were suppressed and repressed and firm administration had been established on them.

² *Ibid*, p 69.

³ *File No/ 1.B General Administrative Policy 1937-1957.*

⁴ *File No/ 97.A Belgian Congo File 1902-1904.*

¹ *File No/ 1.A.3 Government Officials and Politics.*

² *Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 36.C Intelligence Reports Province Monthly 1923-1930.*

³ *Ibid*, p 5.

The Economic Impact of Trade on the Southern Peoples 1901-1945

Commercial Activities in the Southern Sudan

Britain and Egypt during much of the Mahdiya had successfully managed to limit the Sudan's access to external markets and very little of the Sudanese standard exports, gum Arabic, slaves, ivory, tamarind, and animal skins reached the outside world. With the re-conquest, international commerce was resumed along with the return of Middle Eastern and European trading companies. Much of that early revival was in the hands of well-financed Greek, Syrian, (Lebanese) and American merchants; northern Sudanese merchants also participated in this revival of both the internal and external trade. In the south Greek and Syrian traders were encouraged to work than the northern Sudan traders type who were discouraged and permits were decreased unobtrusively but progressively. The government aimed at giving permits to the Jallaba whose works in the south were purely commercial and pursued in a legitimate manner. Jallaba trade was limited in the towns or established routes.⁽¹⁾

Among most of the pastoralist societies of the central clay plains and swamp area of Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal, cattle were extracted as tribute, not primarily for their economic value, but as a practical demonstration of the government authority and as an obligation sign of submission by the pastoralist peoples. In the southern Sudan, the cattle especially cows were and are still everything to the tribes, meat, milk, blood, a dowry in exchange for a wife or wives; and a sign of power⁽²⁾. As a change of diet, instead of the cup of sorghum, they each received a small heap of sweet potatoes. At the beginning of the colonial era that colonies were created in Africa when the sovereignty of various territories was actually taken over by European powers. In this sense, the commercial trading posts, was just of colonialism proper. Egypt's incapacity became Europe's opportunity, and European interest and activity in the southern Sudan rapidly developed. Before the Condominium Government, the economy of the Sudan was based upon slave labour. Several centuries before 1898 a market economy had been in existence in some parts of Sudan. The economic developments before 1898 in fact had a considerable effect, social as well as economic on the society. The

condominium agreement had prohibited the slave trade and slavery. The Sudan government's policy towards slavery had come to reflect the economic and potential political consequences of this limitation. At time of the re-conquest, a slave repression department was officially established for the purpose of ending the slave trade. T. M Hargey¹ discusses the conflicting policies and attitudes of the British administration in the first forty years of the condominium government especially the contradictions between the Egyptian controlled slavery repression department and Sudanese government. National economic concerns dictated a mild tolerance of the large communities of southern slaves in the north⁽¹⁾. Some slaves came from Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains into the north.

In 1904 the Sudan Government had declared its combination of eventually substituting for slavery a system of paid labour.⁽²⁾ The primary concern of the colonial powers was and is still to use Africa for the development of Europe exporting from Africa towards the north raw materials to be processed in their factories. They have had to build a network of railways in Africa so that they could transport the minerals and the agricultural commodities now being produced. But they were meant to stimulate general economic development to the point where the traditional barter gave way to a monetary system. Various developments reduced the traditional economic self-sufficiency in their southern Sudan. The Southern Sudanese were involved more and more in money economy and so they were affected by world economic conditions. These problems could be solved only by long term capital investment⁽³⁾. Different developments lessened the traditional economic self-sufficiency of the African. The African did not simply work to feed self and family. The aim was economic internal-sufficiency with a long-term export trade⁽⁴⁾. Everywhere the slave trade bred antagonism, aggression and attitudes of inferiority/superiority among the indigenous peoples⁽⁵⁾. The Slave trade contributed to more ethnic conflict merely by enhancing the development of the state: the creation of the professional armed force, with associated improvements in administrative competence, reinforced the appetite and need for exploitations. This is relevant to the Sudan at the

(1) Delligiocoma, *The History of the Catholic Church*, p 14.

(2) UNP/ SCR/ 1.B.2.A. *General Policy for Southern Sudan*.

(1) T. Hargey. *The Suppression of Slavery in the Sudan*, 1898-1938, Ph.D thesis, Oxford, University 1

(2) Bahr al.Ghazal/ SCR/ 37.A.1 *Labour*.

(3) CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.C.14.1 *Economic Development in the Southern Sudan*.

(4) UNP/ SCR/ 12.A.1 *Economic Development of Upper Nile Province*.

(5) *Ibid*.

present. Economic development in general suffered; social services, especially education and health, were underfunded; a few towns and riverain agricultural areas continued to modernize.⁽¹⁾

The southern Sudan was denied the development by British Administration. This was denied because of erroneous conclusions based on insufficient investigation. Cotton cultivation in the form of development had been forced upon southerners for ideological rather than strictly economic reasons, as part of a process of educating ignorant southerners in the need for money⁽²⁾. The British in the southern Sudan employed native rule as an excuse to preserve southern Sudanese tribes in a sort of primitive state. Badal argues that favourable conditions exist in some parts of the south to demonstrate early and real experiments in development projects. A vast region was entrusted with a simple care and maintenance basis. Symes, Governor General 1933-1940 so sarcastically dismissed care and maintenance as misleading. Mongalla and the Bahr al Ghazal were amalgamated to form Equatoria as he pressed ahead with economies in southern administration. So he also convened periodic conferences to discuss southern development. In April 1936, there was a plan mooted to expand cotton production in Zande land.

The appearance of change in the economic share resulted in part from structural change in the government policy. The economics, cultures, and other interests of the peoples who lived in the south continued to be of no importance to Britain at that time. British had failed to establish significant link between the world economy and the southern Sudan⁽³⁾. This was due in large part to environmental and human geographical problems that could be solved only by long term capital investment, well beyond the means of any colonial government in Africa.⁽⁴⁾ Thus the effect of Europe's economic impact was two folds: to entangle the African in a world-wide money economy and to subordinate them, directly or indirectly to the white man who was everywhere the boss⁽⁵⁾.

Collins argues that the remoteness of the area and its lack of economic infrastructure and wage economy, prevented

private investment. During the 1930s, British officials aimed at promoting development by means of government intervention, but quarrelled about feasibility of cotton and coffee as potential cash crops⁽¹⁾.

Othwonh Dak gave no credit to the British administration nor to the different previous national governments with their chauvinistic policies⁽²⁾. He also gave no credit to the British administration for its role as colonial power, while accusing and exposing different national government for exacerbating the southern problem⁽³⁾. The British administration neglected the southern Sudan in terms of economic and social services and it is now the least developed in the Sudan. Crop production and cattle raising were until 1940s the main economic activities in this region. These British administrators in the Sudan denied the existence of these economic potentials and alleged that southern Sudan was a poor region and it was unworthy of economic investment.⁽⁴⁾

The patrols were clear to many administrators, but the constraints on the government activity during the world war one, and the continued demands of the army during that same time, inhibited the development of a more comprehensive administrative system throughout the south up to the 1920s. The economic impact of the Second World War on the Sudan was greater and more pervasive than the effects of the 1914-18 war had been. Economic situations in the Sudan had an impact on the war effects. It gave the region-needed recuperation. The government's main sources of revenue were therefore very vulnerable to general economic activity, especially export market. Poor grain harvests meant not only lower collection of leading to but lower freight returns.

A decrease in the people's disposable income meant decreased revenue from customs duties and consumption taxes.

Southern policy appears to have allowed the rulers in Khartoum to forget the region and proceed with the work that increased them, while in the south the Bog Barons, a sterile cadre of soldier administrators, continued to rule over a petrified political and economic system⁽¹⁾. As

(1) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p.84.

(2) Upper Nile Annuals 1898-1948.

(3) J. Tosh, "The Economy of the Southern Sudan under the British 1898-1955" *Journal of Imperial commonwealth History* 9(3), 1981, pp 275-288.

(4) Robertson, J, *Transition in Africa: from Direct Rule to Independence*, London, 1974, p 34.

(5) UNP/ SCR/ 1.B.2.4 *General Policy for Southern Sudan*.

(1) Collins, R.O. "Pounds and Piasters: The Beginning s of Economic Development in the Southern Sudan" *North-East African Studies* 5(1), 1983, pp 39-65.

(2) Othwonh Dak. *Southern Sudan: The Primacy of Social Economic Development*, Khartoum, Ministry for Southern Affairs, Juba, 1971, p 22.

(3) Othwonh Dak. *Southern Sudan Economic Development 1945-1972*, Khartoum, Ministry for Southern Affairs, 1972, p 14.

(4) Abraham Matoc Dhal, *The Colonial Economy and the Underdevelopment of the Southern Sudan, 1899-1989*, Khartoum, 1997. p 6.

(1) UNP/ SCR/ 5.A.3/1 *History Notes and Instructions*.

elsewhere, steps taken to control the wartime economy became foundations for economic and social policy after the war, with effects felt along after independence.⁽²⁾ The closing of slave market in the area under Ottoman or British control was another factor in the decline of the slave trade⁽³⁾. Economic communities of the Southern Sudan, which depend on forest for their livelihood, share a different economic reality than the urban dwellers. Also within each economic community there are often different class levels, which must be understood, and taken into account.⁽⁴⁾ Development especially of Agriculture, was hindered by a chronic labour shortage. Agriculture production was seen to be adversely affected by the high wages paid to casual labourers at Government construction sites, since cultivators left the land.⁽⁵⁾ Aside from its impact on the overall labour supply, slavery was a matter of little moment to Wingate, Slatin, and the Central Government. It occupied little of their time and became an issue mainly because of outside intervention. The moral side of the matter was not pertinent.⁽⁶⁾

The Slave dealers in the Funj Region and Upper Nile Province

The trade across Ethiopian border was particularly dangerous and difficult task to control because of connivance or outright participation of the authorities there and the uncooperative attitude of local people on both sides of a long border. In 1908 twenty suspected slave traders were arrested in Blue Nile Province, but a lack of admissible evidence resulted in only two convictions. The government's fear of the political effects of the sudden curtailment of the domestic slavery, and the economic consequences of such action, meant that eradication of the institution would be gradual and instances of slave trading, especially along the Ethiopian border continued well into the 1920s.

In 1912 an Ethiopian provincial Governor actually invaded the Upper Nile Province at the head of a large force and carried off almost 200 Nuer between 1909 and 1913 some 3000 such victims were apparently sold into slavery. The Uduk people had become very important as grain producers in the region. But they were not traders in an entrepreneurial sense, and did not produce for trade as such. They were suspicious of merchants and of the commercial

way of life. Their economic attitudes hindered the appearance of trading and the entrepreneur in their own society, and restricted trade relation with outsiders to a necessary minimum. Money that was Sudanese currency of pound and piasters, played a negligible part in their lives.⁽¹⁾

Not only did cattle taken in tribute or fines enter the livestock trade, but also ivory accounted for some 10% of the Sudan's export before world war one. Royalties collected on ivory sales and exports went mainly to the central rather than the provincial governments. Southern Sudanese received little direct benefit from the legal ivory trade. It was only by dealing directly with traders whom the Sudan government considered illegal-Ethiopian and Swahili merchant and poachers that they derived any profit from ivory hunted in their territory.⁽²⁾ Internal disputes were at last halted when the Anuaks were forced to acknowledge Ethiopian rule in the early 1930s⁽³⁾. During the first thirty years of the condominium period not only did different merchants benefit from the increased prospects for trade throughout the country, but religious leaders and tribal notables in the northern Sudan benefited from an administrative system, which allowed them to accumulate the rights to labour and land, and which by the granting of government contracts gave them a stake in the new political economy of the country.⁽⁴⁾

The same pattern in the north did not happen in the southern Sudan, where commerce continued to be in the hands of Greek, Syrian, Armenian and northern merchants. There were the people who later invested in large-scale production of grain and cash crops such as cotton and tobacco. In the northern Sudan those peoples who benefited most during the condominium were found in the Nile valley. Many parts of the northern Sudan, both Muslims and non-Muslims suffered from economic neglect. In the southern Sudan there was also uneven development.

Inequalities between Northern and Southern Sudan, 1901-1920s.

As a group, however, less developed nations are more dependent on foreign trade in terms of its share in national income than are the very highly developed countries. Governments possess many instruments of commercial policy, such as tariff, import quotas, and export subsidies,

(2) UNP/ SCR/ 12.A.1. *Economic Development of Upper Nile Province.*

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) Heino Apel and Anne Camozzi, *Adult Environmental Education.* No. 47/ 1996, p 36.

(5) Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 37.A.1. *Labour.*

(6) Richard Hall *op-cit* p.21.

(1) Wendy James, Kwanim PA, *The Making of the Uduk People,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p 82.

(2) Daly, MW, *Economic Development in Southern Sudan 1899-1940,* Cambridge, 1986 p.16.

(3) Bahru Zwide, 1990. Twixt Sirdar and Emperor: The Anuak in Ethio-Sudanese Relations 1902-1935, *North-East African Studies* 12(1) pp 79-93

(4)) Douglass H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars,* p. 35.

to manipulate their trade position vis-a-vis the rest of the world. When the governments developed, a nation would pursue the restrictive economic policies designed to deal with purely domestic issues like inflation or unemployment. These policies can have profound negative effects on the economies of poor nations.⁽¹⁾

Governments often serve to reinforce the unequal distribution of resources and gains from trade resulting from differences in sizes and economic power. There is no super agency or world government to protect and promote the interest of weaker parties (the Least Developed Countries ie LDCs) in such international affairs⁽²⁾

The opening up of the southern Sudan was of some importance to this commercial revival. Thus, from the foundation of the condominium rule the central government not only sanctioned but also participated in the exploitation of its southern periphery, in an adaptation of the old Sudanic pattern⁽³⁾.

The area of Upper Nile province from Renk to the north was opened from the closed Districts ordinance, because of the established economic interests of northern merchants there. That was introduced in the 1920s.

The access of merchants to other districts of the south was controlled through granting licenses, and while Greek and Syrian Christians were generally favoured in the issuing of these licenses a number of northern Sudanese traders also continued to trade, especially in Upper Nile province, and sometimes throughout Muslim southern Sudanese agents.⁽¹⁾

Prior to World War Two economic development was concentrated in the northern Sudan, especially in the Gezira scheme, which enabled the Sudan to enter the international cotton trade. No similar schemes were attempted in the south until after the war, and then very hurriedly and with unsatisfactory results⁽²⁾. By the time the Sudan was set on its path to independence, there were far greater disparities between the development of the northern and southern parts of the country as a whole than there had been at the end of the Mahdiyya. The southern Sudanese lagged far behind many of the northern Sudanese in education, economic development, and involvement in the government and administration of the country. In consequence they lacked any real or potential voice in the direction of the country's affairs. The South was unable to pay itself and faced the

difficulty of financing itself except attachment to the north.⁽³⁾

Unequal Development within the Southern Sudan Itself

There were, of course, disparities of development within the north as well as within south. In the north those peoples who benefited most during the condominium government were found in the central Nile valley. Their grip on the levers of power within the Sudan continued throughout the post-Independence period, so much so that the term *jallaba*, which originally meant a petty merchant, is now applied by southerners as a general term descriptive of the people of the central Nile valley.

This was to be the basis of internal disparities which continue to affect southern Sudanese politics. Disparities in the distribution of educational institutions also affected the recruitment of southerners into the lower ranks of the civil service. All the clerical staff in Bahr al-Ghazal province by 1947 came from the catholic schools in Raga and Wau. The Dinka majority was not well represented. Most of the few Dinka anywhere in the south who had access to education came from Bor district, where the CMS had a school at Malek.

As the local economy of Bor has always been precarious, because of its susceptibility to floods, many Bor school children found greater opportunity in government service far earlier than other Dinka or Nuer pastoralists. This helps to explain the appearance of Bor Dinka domination in the 1970s when the products of Malek took their places in administrations and politics. Their numbers were still small relative to the growing need for trained southerners in the clerical and technical services in the 1940s and many of these posts were filled by Equatorians even in Upper Nile⁽¹⁾. The unequal distribution of educational facilities throughout the south and the uneven incorporation of educated persons within the structures of Native Administrative decisions taken by British officials either in Khartoum or the provinces. The British in the 1940s commonly characterized the Nilotic Dinka and Nuer conservative and backward, and the peoples of western Equatorial particularly the Azande and the peoples of Yei River District as progressive and advanced. Because agriculture received priority attention for development, especially in the late 1940s, the agricultural areas benefited most from government intervention. Even though the

⁽¹⁾ Michael P Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World*, fourth edition, Longman, London, 1989, p 374.

⁽²⁾ Daly, M.W, "Economic Development in Southern Sudan 1899-1940" *The Role of Southern Sudanese People in the Building of Modern Sudan*, (Juba, 1986) p, 79.

⁽³⁾ CIVSEC/ SCR/ Class 1 Box 44 piece 329 *Upper Nile Annuals 1898-1948*.

⁽¹⁾ CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.A.5 *Future of Native Administration in Mongalla*.

⁽²⁾ Michael P Todaro, *op. cit*, p 370.

⁽³⁾ Johnson D.H. *British Documents on the end of Empire*, Series B Sudan, volume II, 1942-1956. P. 9.

⁽¹⁾ CIVSEC/ SCR/ Class 1 Box 44 piece 329 *Upper Nile Annuals 1898-1948*.

Zande scheme (the most ambitious development scheme in the south during the condominium period) was badly conceived and ill executed, farmers in western Equatoria did benefit from the introduction of a variety of new crops over the years. Even if commercial links with the northern Sudan remained tenuous, much of Equatoria was linked with the flourishing formal and informal economies of the Congo and Uganda first across the border. These links only served to emphasize the overall potential of the south and its uneven, arguably misdirected, development.

The Budget as from the Beginning of the Century 1900-1946

Budget is the plan of allocating scarce financial resources over period of time. It refers to a blueprint or plan of expected revenues and expenditure, with variations of form in relation to its use for business, person, family or government. The Budget is a spending authorization request made by the spending agent to the controlling agent⁽²⁾.

In May 1901 a new set of regulations was signed by Wingate and Gorst, who was the financial adviser to the Egyptian ministry of finance.⁽³⁾

The Sudan was forbidden to impose any new taxes or to increase existing ones. No new appointments affecting the budget were allowed during the financial year. These regulations were in fact stricter than the ones they superseded. Supervision was removed from the Egyptian council of ministers entrusted to the Egyptian ministry of finance. In reality, it was executed by the British financial adviser. During the First World War the Sudan's financial independence was increased by a boom in exports⁽¹⁾. The Sudan government's difficulty in absorbing the loss of Egyptian help was both fiscal and political: its main obligation was the large Gezira debt, payment of which went entirely to British Bondholders, while Britain itself contributed nothing to the Sudan government. The Gezira was a millstone round the Sudan neck.⁽²⁾

Revenue and expenditure increased respectively from £E 150,888 and £E 331,918 in 1900 to £E 654,149 and £E 1,614,007 in 1913 when the annual Egyptian subvention ended. By that time Egypt had advanced £E 5,353,215 to cover the Sudan's budget deficits⁽³⁾. The Egyptian contribution to the Sudanese budget amounted to £ 2.8 million for the period from 1899 to 1916 while the Egypt loans to Sudan totaled grants to 5.4 million for the period

from 1900 to 1910. The Egyptian grants and loans were called for because taxes were light in the Sudan⁽⁴⁾. The First World War itself had little impact on Sudan. When the Turkish government called for a Jihad in Sudan against the British, the sultanate of Darfur was quickly suppressed. Yet the effects of the war did reach Sudan. During war, technology develops rapidly and through his new technology, Sudan began to enter the modern world. These changes also had an impact on Sudan's economy, agricultural production in particular improved greatly. A system only uneasily is accommodating economic development and its attendant dangers to detribalization, individualism and political as well as economic competition. Virtual neglect of development had been easy to justify by the need to retrench. Symes emphasized the importance of economic development as the engine for social and political advance. There was little progress in his time. The government revenue in the Sudan as a whole increased from £E 1,857,856 in 1916 to £E 4,425,340 in 1920. Price inflation was offset by rapid rise to weight scales, and demand for luxury goods evidenced a general prosperity. Finance was limited, it had to come from the north and development of social services and economic progress there had necessarily to have first call on the slender resource of government. The British Financial Adviser had always in fact approved the Budget. This was the situation up to 1922 and the fact that the Sudan was "a reserved point" meant the

previous practice must continue. In 1926 Egyptian politicians raised the question of financial control again. Sir Stewart Symes wanted to save money that led him to amalgamate the regions of Mongalla and Bahr al-Ghazal into one Equatorial province 1936. During the condominium period, fears have been expressed that too close contact with the north will lead to exploitation and domination of the south by the north.

The southern semi-educated and clerical classes are keen for motives of self-interest, better pay and prospects etc to come into the same administrative system as the north. They are inclined to blame the Sudan government for the backwardness of the south. The primary need however was a stable agricultural and pastoral programmes freed from the impediments of starvation, need, bad nutrition and above all disease in its much forms⁽¹⁾. There was considerable dissatisfaction with the failure of the central government to fulfil its financial obligations to the southern

(2) *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, Tavistock Publication 1958, Great Britain, 1964, p 61.

(3) Gabriel R. Warburg, "Egypt and the Sudan", *Studies in History and Politics*, Frank Cass, Great Britain, 1985, p 20.

(1) *Ibid*, p 21.

(2) Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, p 85.

(3) Bahr al Ghazal /SCR/ 20.B.1 Finance Budget 1931 - 1958.

(4) *Ibid*.

(1) UNP/ SCR/ 12.A.1. *Economic Development of Upper Nile Province*.

region. During the life time of the first Sudan government, the region received an annual average of only 23.2% of the central government allocation grant for the special development budget. Few development programmes ever really got underway⁽²⁾. The economic stringency was financially concentrated in the Gezira scheme after the war. There was no development to the people of the south.

The negative economic impact was that the government provided inadequate infrastructure that was clearly meant to promote the interests of Britain more than those of Sudanese. However, the greatest indictment against British colonialization in the Sudan was its total neglect of the southern Sudan economically and socially. This neglect had contributed to the southern problems in the Sudan. As always, the northern towns and Gezira took the greatest share of resources,

Symes aimed at keeping care and maintenance in the vast impoverished hinterlands.⁽¹⁾ However, "in the 1930s the world-wide depression caused cotton process to fall badly and there was locust invasions and drought, which made it a time of great distress for every man in Sudan."⁽²⁾

In 1933 the revenue was £E 43,000 and the direct expenditure £E 125,000, but the real costs were more in the neighbourhood of £E 250,000⁽³⁾. One thinks that this enormous disparity was the result of southern policy (separate development) which had resulted in economic isolation rather development.⁽⁴⁾ This was the situation in the southern Sudan Symes had a clear policy for the southern Sudan. He wanted first to reduce the financial burden of the south on the Sudan budget by cutting out non-essential services where possible. He also wanted to organize ultimately the three southern provinces into a single semi-independent administration based probably on Malakal. Thirdly, he wanted to see that all administrative reshuffling could produce was care and maintenance, not economic growth development. The affirmation of southern policy in 1930 was followed by the economic crisis, which precluded expenditure in non-productive regions such as the south.

In 1937 revenue was £E 86,000 less than estimated, but a budget surplus of over £ E 290,000 was still realised, and over £ E 500,000 was paid into the general reserves. During the Second World War Sudanese tribesmen benefited from

a great increase in foreign demand for meat, skins and hides. Dura, the staple food grain, had doubled in price from 1939 to 1945 and the 1948 price was triple that of 1946⁽⁵⁾. The Second World War, like the First World War, was a boom period for the Sudan economic generally. The value import rose from £ E 8,060,849 in 1941 to £ E 41,966,091 in 1951. In the same period exports increase in value from £ E 8,895,157 to £ E 62,177,529, largely owing to the profitability of cotton. Budget surpluses allowed greater attention to development, and special development budget of £E 13,750,000 was adopted for the period 1946 - 1951. For the 1951 - 1956 period a second development budget of £ E 34,000,000 was adopted and concentrated on experimenting with improving the overall economic productivity of the south.⁽¹⁾

Annual government revenue increased steadily throughout the war years, from £ E 3,772,771 in 1939 to £ E 6,369,741 in 1945. Remaining surpluses were paid into the government's general Reserve Fund, from which, however, various projects continued to be financed on a recurrent basis. The Fund grew from about £E 2.43 million at the end of 1939 to only £E 3.14 million at end of 1945, while, however, expanding over £E 1.9 million. In 1941 the government budgeted for a deficit of about £ E 573,000 but realized surplus, even after additional expenditures, of some £E 332,000.

In 1946 revenue stood at about £ E 8.3 million, expenditure at £ E 7.85 million in 1946 the central government's surplus was about £ E 439,000 or 5 percentage of the total revenue.⁽²⁾ As promised in 1946, action was taken to consolidated pay scales in the government services. Training lagged behind. In 1948 southerners were allowed take the civil services examination and only seventeen of them passed that examination. In the southern Sudan, new policy called for social and economic development as a condition for political equality, but as before the required resources were not provided.⁽³⁾

Taxation and Transportation

The clearest effects have been in the introduction of taxation and in the prohibition of feud, warfare and welfare. Most heads of families have taken part in feuding and have killed men in the traditional way. The most common was

(2) Douglass H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* p 42

(1) Daly, *The Empire on the Nile*. P.114.

(2) Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, Paulines, Nairobi-Kenya, 2000 p. 265.

(3) CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.C.14.1 *Economic Development in the Southern Sudan*.

(4) Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*: p. 237.

(5) CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.C.14.1 *Economic Development in the Southern Sudan*.

(1) Civsec / class2 Box 3 piece 10 *Intelligence General 1925 - 1946*

(2) Bahr al ghazal / SCR / 20.b.2 *Finance Budget, Sudan Government 1936 to 1940*.

(3) Bahr al-Ghazal/ SC.1934-A.1 *Slavery 1923.60 /R*

the levying of a head tax compelling the African to work in order to earn the money to pay the tax.⁽⁴⁾

A cardinal principal of economic policy was light taxation. A herd tax levied on nomads was replaced as 1901 with an annual tribute paid by a tribe as a whole. Revenue from all these sources was minimized by the difficulties of assessment and collection. Property taxes, market dues and tolls were also introduced. The major burden of taxation fell inevitably on the settled agricultural population.⁽⁵⁾ Revenue was derived from property tax, local fees, a rebate of central government revenue collected locally, and special grants-in-aid. Tax rates required central government approval when provinces assumed this power. A local government services was established and training courses were devised, but sudanization and economic expansion worsened an already serious shortage of personnel. In the south, road clearance and motor transport were essential, and road construction remained a principal object of forced labour in lieu of taxes. In 1935 the landline along the Bahr al-Zaraf, originally strung in 1908, was replaced by wireless service. Malakal and Juba started in 1936-1937. Military aircraft were used against Ali Dinar in 1916 and recalcitrant southerners in the 1920s.

Transportation improved dramatically with the introduction of motor cars and lorries which were stronger and cheaper. The government built roads, while radio was developed in late 1930s. Commercial aeroplanes in 1930s flew up and down the Nile. The British were concerned mainly with leprosy, cerebral spinal meningitis, yaws and syphilis to mention only few of the sources of Sudan and Africa.⁽¹⁾ Development had been very selective to areas of higher potentials accelerating regional disparity and population concentration had increased. Backwardness was and is still taking place merely by improved economic conditions. These peoples should be educated as the whole community in order to appreciate social improvement if the benefits of the higher standards are to be fully enjoyed.⁽²⁾ In 1934 almost 15,000 passengers were carried along these southern routes annually; in 1938 over 28,000. In 1938 a flow of the Nile at Rejaf was designated a main intermediate stopping place to serve Juba, where a railway was also under construction. As with some other services, air transport was first and foremost a tool of government and like them it expanded rapidly during and after the second world's war. Trade surpluses were achieved in 1932 (the first since 1917,

1934, 1936 and 1937).⁽³⁾ Great expansion of wireless facilities was undertaken from 1940, because of the war

Crop Production and Cattle Raising

The crop production and cattle raising are still the main economic activities in the Southern Region. The missionaries introduced tomatoes, potatoes, sweet potatoes, corn wheat, cotton, fruit trees and other plants that they thought would be useful. Main crops were millets and sorghums, legumes and root crops such as potatoes and cassava.⁽¹⁾ Livestock were and are kept, mainly cattle and goats, with some sheep, and of course fowl. In general the formal residential groups are economically self-supporting as regards foodstuffs. However, men often selling goods have to maintain regular markets and supplies for meat, usually they order homesteads to supply meat in turn. Traditionally there was little exchange of these materials, and men had no need to go far from their own neighbourhood for economic reasons.⁽²⁾ Domestic livestock are ultimately the property of the lineage. These animals should not be killed merely for meat. A greedy elder is accused of sacrificing fat beasts merely to satisfy his desire for meat. Cattle that have been slaughtered for foods contribute to fulfilling substance needs but do not add to grazing area requirements. The southern tribes, especially the Nuer, have a number of means of protecting grain shortages. Crop failures are characteristically localized and additional supplies can be obtained from kinsmen whose crops have fared better, or by trading cattle for grain with unrelated neighbouring peoples including the Dinka. Alternatively, sheep, goats, oxen and infertile cows may be slaughtered to compensate for reduced grain consumption. Game wild animals, wild fruits, seeds and roots are also more fully utilized when grain is in short supply. Cattle products are, in many respects, the most critical components of the Nuer diet. They provide nearly the milk and meat that constitutes the main sources of protein and the second important source of calories in the total diet.⁽³⁾ The Nuer clans had migrated into Nasir during the second half of the nineteenth century, absorbing other ethnic groups, especially Dinka. In Nuer area, they lived alongside the Anuak who had been pushed out of their lands along the Ethiopia borders by the insecurity that prevailed there. When in 1909, the British administrative officers proposed an annual tax in cattle from the Nuer around, they received an uncompromising reply.⁽⁴⁾

(4) Stawrianos, L.S, *The World Since 1500. A Global History*, Fourth Edition, USA, 1982.

(5) Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile*, p. 138.

(1) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p. 265.

(2) Raymond C. Kelly, *The Nuer Conquest; the Structure and Development of an Expansionist System*, Michigan, 1985, p.98.

(3) *Ibid* p 92.

(1) CS| SCR| 17.A.2| 6 *Education in the Southern Sudan*.

(2) Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile* p. 186.

(3) *Ibid*, p. 94.

(4) Daly, *Imperial Sudan* p. 91

With the Dinka initially reluctant to sell their cattle, the nucleus for a herd had come from Khartoum and Uganda or as gifts from British officials.⁽¹⁾

Few Dinka men cared to lower themselves as servants to foreigners and those who did were motivated by needs of the time. The higher of regular and dependable meat consumption among the Dinka would reduce their dependence on milk. This milk is a daily source of protein. Also it would allow the Dinka to satisfy cattle per capita. Thus, the Dinka herd management strategy and hence require significantly more grazing land than Dinka practice would permit the Dinka to attain higher human densities than the Nuer at any given ratio of cattle to dry season grazing land.⁽²⁾ The larger the group the more able it is to maintain its rights in land and reasons against others, the wider is the elder's domestic authority and the higher his status and that of his lineage.⁽³⁾ The chiefs' courts throughout the southern Sudan were amalgamated into larger units and endowed with greater powers. They were empowered by the Southern Sudan Closed District Ordinance Modernization meant the more efficient operation of the administration rather than economic growth or raising the standard of living of the southern Sudanese. The British were rulers first and developers second. They believed in capitalism but limited the activities of capitalists. They would never have to legate exploitative practices in the southern Sudan for the profit of their fellow countrymen, and their restrictions upon private trading firms more closely resembled modern state socialism than Victorian liberation council. In fact their attitudes toward trade and development in the Sudan was paternalistic springing more from interest in the people they served than from any political or economic theory. British administrators in the Sudan, military and civil alike came largely from country families whose traditions were rooted in the English countryside⁽⁴⁾. Trades were not a part of their traditions nor did they have any direct or indirect associations with the British companies, which had profited from Africa. The paternalism of the crazy, not the incentives of the urban merchants, guided their actions. Duty, responsibility, benevolent always came before profits whether in the Gezira or the Bahr al-Ghazal. In the end the southern Sudanese were perhaps the least exploited of subject peoples and the least modernised⁽¹⁾. Trade and development in the southern Sudan was thus confined to small experiments begun by the inspector for the welfare of

his people, which he regarded as beneficial for his tenants most projects were agricultural, began by the inspector without prompting from Khartoum and for which he received little financial support⁽²⁾.

The object was to make the southern Sudan self-sufficient by improving the reliability of their subsistence agriculture. But other people who were unselfish to regards for or devotion to the welfare of others was not the sole basis for southern development. Although they never would have denied food to starving Africans, the officials resented having to increase their deficits for supplies that could have been produced locally.

Getting the Dinka to take up the hoe was by no means an easy task. One of the most imaginative inspectors, Borton Bey, the British explorer, issued seeds of durra to be grown by selected Dinka at Bor. After the harvest each man was to repay twice the amount received. If the year were favourable, he was to sell any over his own requirements to the government at a fair price. But four months later when the fine came to prepare additional ground, most of the Dinka began to grumble, "saying that birds eat durra while they are growing"⁽³⁾

He also imported losses of durra and brought banana from Gondokoro to the Bahr al-Jabal. Islands where they flourished, to the delight of the Bari inhabitants. Bari peanut cultivation steadily expanded in the sandy soil where the inhabitants cultivated the crop under Borton was the exception not the rule. Few other inspectors had the time or the inclination to foster development schemes. H.R Headlann was always keen about growing cotton at Rumbek. L.D Spencer at Maridi had made experiment for making banana flour and planting maize. Others added in similar schemes, from planting the seeds of the African mahogany to exploring for rubber. Generally, these well-intentioned but amateur agricultural projects had little impact. They arose more from a curiosity and interest in tropical plants than from any desire to modernize. Most inspectors had no illusions about the effectiveness of their personal projects.

They agreed that "no great advance can be made in the south completely without more private enterprise and capital neither of which appear to be forthcoming apart from roads and railways very little money has been spent."⁽¹⁾

Private traders

(1) Gray, *op, cit* p. 35.

(2) Raymond C. Kelly, *The Nuer Conquest*; p. 151.

(3) Werner et-al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p.237.

(4) CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.B Sudan Political Intelligence Summary.

(1) Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 20.

(2) CIVSEC/ SCR/ Class 1 Box 43 piece 320 Trade and Finance.

(3) Mongalla Intelligence Report, March 1904 No Volume III 2/12.

(1) CIVSEC/ SCR/ Class 1 Box 44 piece 329 Upper Nile Annuals 1898-1948.

Private enterprise in the southern Sudan meant trade. J.W, Johnston threw in his lot with the Sudan Government. He was an unsympathetic character. No one had believed more fervently in the economic potential of the southern Sudan than he. No one had work more assiduously for the opportunity to exploit it, Wingate and his subordinates knew Johnston. He hunted up seriously the male violent Leopold.

Beside he was British and determined. Anyone who had been rebuffed so often by so many people deserved a concession for perseverance if for no other reason. On June 1-1911, Johnston's company, the Kordofan Trading Company was granted the exclusive right to collect wild rubber for fourteen years over six million acres within a twenty mile radius around Tonj, Kyango, Raffile, Zungumbia, Khaojali, Mangango, Yambio and Tambrura. After nearly twenty years, Johnston was at last trading legally on the Upper Nile. This was generous and exceptional concession importantly, it had been granted on false assumptions. The Belgian had long before discovered that "the quantity of rubber power was only small and the cost of transport precluded its being exported at a profit."⁽²⁾

A.F. Brown, the agricultural expert, had questioned the importance of rubber in the Bahr al-Ghazal Rubber was plentiful in the southern Sudan. Although the Kordofan trading company continued the search, its operations were the economy of the provinces negligible.

Collins wrote that "Using rubber, copper and gum were neither sufficiently concentrated nor accessible enough to be profitably development." The mines of Hufrat an-Nahas had long been famous. Perhaps too famous suitable the richer deposits had already been exploited by the time colonel Sparkes reached them in 1903. All Sparkes found were immense quantities of silicate and carbonate but not sulphate of copper. By themselves the mines at Hufrat an-Nahas might have been successfully worked had not their isolation and poor quality rendered development unlikely⁽¹⁾.

In the Shilluk country the Zaraf valley and along the Bahr al-Arab grew large clusters of gum trees largely ignored by the Africans though the Arabs of Kordofan had gathered gum in the days of the Turco-Egyptian period. At the beginning of the condominium the inspectors and Governors had urged the Dinka and Shilluk to collect the gum. They refused until they discovered that they could pay their herd tax in gum, for which they had no use, rather than cattle for which they did. In 1909 one 10,000 pounds of gum had been brought into Kodok, formerly Fashoda,

and the Zaraf Nuer, enticed by the high prices, also began to bring in additional quantities⁽²⁾. When touring through new territory inspectors invariably reported on the suitability of the soil for cotton cultivation, but except for Headlam's experiments at Rumbek little was done to encourage its cultivation. Cotton had long been grown through Zandeland where a rough sacking they used for loincloths were manufactured. With the arrived of the British, however, cotton cloth was obtained more cheaply from Greek and Arab merchants who followed, and the Azande cotton cultivation remained haphazard until after the Second World War. In Dar-Fartit the Feroze and Mandala cultivated cotton, but like the Azande, they stopped with the importation of cheap cloth⁽³⁾.

The British generally disliked the northern Sudanese merchants because they had been important men during the Turkiya and had supported the Mahdists in the south. They were for the most part jallaba, which they sought to augment by grossly exploiting the Africans. The Greeks were trading in goods such as slaves, hashish, immature ivory, and were a continual source of trouble to the Inspectors who tried to get rid of them at every opportunity. The northern Sudanese merchants were unlike the Greeks. There were, of course, individual exceptions, usually tajir (tiyjar) who were honest and reliable merchants with substantial capital. But British officials all agreed that the Arab merchants were a curse, doing more harm than good in the southern Sudan.

By 1925 there were about 25 Arab Merchants at Wau and half that at Mongalla⁽¹⁾.

In 1912 a group of promoters, obtained a concession to cut papyrus from 357,000 acres of Sudd, a thousand square miles of which was granted to the Sudd Fuel (Suddite) company ltd. In the spring of 1913 a site was chosen on Lake No for a suddite factory. The company was at first besets by labour problems. The highest level of trade was reached in 1913 when the enormous amount of 125 tons of ivory, worth £E 113, 236 were exported.

The Trade in Ivory, Ostrich Feathers and Wild Animal

The trade in ostrich feathers was much less important. Demand depended on European fashion, and primitive hunting of the birds rather than farming them, limited supply. Wild animal product continued during the condominium to provide a source of government revenue. Chiefs among these were ivory and ostrich feathers. Rhinoceros horn was also traded. In 1901 a bounty of 10% (raised to 25% in 1902) of the value of goods evading

(2) Jackson Bey, *Report on Maridi District, 1910*, Mongalla 1/5/37.

(1) *Ibid* p 12.

(2) E.P/ SCR/ 1.A.5 *Future of Native Administration in Mongalla*.

(3) CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.C.14.1 *Economic Development in the Southern Sudan*.

(1) EP/ 1.9.47 Mongalla No 2. *Mongalla province summary*.

royalty payment was offered to informers, and a ban was put on female and immature ivory, but regulation were still impossible to enforce effectively.⁽²⁾

In 1903 the ivory was made a government monopoly in Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile, but in 1904 most of the south was opened to traders to permits because government had been evaded. The communities subjected to these actions reacted in their different ways and reaction brought its counter-reaction. In the process of this tragic drama the seeds of bitterness, violence and resistance were sown.⁽³⁾

Ivory was more profitable than rubber. To derive revenue and control the killing of elephants the Sudan government declared it a monopoly policy. Except for Dar-Fartit and the region west of Lake Rudolf the elephant population held its own against the wasteful method of killing usually burning the grass, employed by the Africans. It was estimated that three thousand elephants were destroyed annually in the Bahr al-Ghazal as a like number in Mongalla.⁽⁴⁾ Although all the ivory was to be sold to the government at a fixed price, much of it was traded over the watershed in the Congo where the Africans could get rifles and powder in the exchange commodities in which the Sudan government refused to trade. Nevertheless ivory consistently accounted for a third of the revenues of the Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla provinces during this period and was the single most important money earner for the government in the southern Sudan⁽¹⁾. To obtain slaves, as well as cattle, which were indispensable for bartering for ivory, the traders allied themselves with hostile tribal groups, and promoted raiding. The real profits of the ivory trade went to those who advanced the capital, and to the middle men of north.

The Gum Arabic of Sennar, Kordufan and Northern Upper Nile area was one of the most valuable exports of the Sudan. During the development of the ivory trade slaves continued to be the most profitable export from the Sudan, but the opening of the White Nile had little influence on this slave trade.⁽²⁾ The traders were Europeans, Egyptians, Syrians, other Ottoman subjects and northern Sudanese. They came first to obtain ivory by bartering with local people but soon established their own private armies through the Upper Nile, Bahr al Ghazal and Equatoria, and obtained ivory and slaves for export to the north through a combination of trade, raiding and tribute paid by subjugated peoples.

The private armies needed others to serve and comfort them, and so the merchant companies increased their raids for slaves, livestock and food crops. It was only in 1909 that the value of cattle, sheep, goats and untanned hides together exceeded that of ivory for the first times. The Nilotes were about to abandon their cattle to cut papyrus, but the company hoped to overcome this obstacle by utilizing machinery and importing northern Sudanese. This might have worked hard not the outbreak of the war ruined the company, which declared bankruptcy in 1915. No one else has ever since taken up the concession. The export result of 1915 were therefore not only pleasing but surprising. Export increasing by 54% over 1914 and by 14% over the best previous year (1911) to stand at £E 577,991. Demand for meat far exceeded expectation, the cotton crop was disposed of through the Sudan plantation syndicate and the British cotton, groaning Association, the gum trade decreased by only 750 tons from 1914, largely because of greater purchases from Britain³.

The trade in animal by-products thrived. In 1917 the Sudan government agreed with the authority in Egypt to reserve its entire exportable surplus of food for Egypt, and to increase that surplus as rapidly as possible, so great were the demands of the forces stationed there. A resources board was established in the Sudan to control food supplies in the Sudan. Before these years, there were no trade surpluses except 1917. In the south, poor communication and inadequate distribution, diversion of labour to war-related tasks and official unconcern exacerbated the usual shortages. In 1917-1918 some 170,000 tons of grain, 65,000 heads of cattle, and 347,000 sheep were exported to Egypt to the value of £E 3,775,000. The Sudan had increased its food production by about 100% in two years.¹ Despite the hesitant beginning of modernization, the southern Sudan, after twenty years of British occupation, had not regained the level of economic prosperity. The export of ivory does not seem to have been greater than Emin Pasha's time. The herds of cattle were certainly smaller in 1918 than forty years before⁽²⁾.

Cotton had been cultivated and spun into cloth throughout the Condominium rule.⁽³⁾

The British occupation may have checked economic decline in the southern Sudan, but by the 1918 it had not recovered the lost ground. As a whole, the south remained on the periphery of central government thinking throughout

(2) CIVSEC/ SCR/ Class 1 Box 43 piece 322 Trade.

(3) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*. p 104.

(4) Bahr al-Ghazal Handbook Dec. 1911 p 64.

(1) Bahr al-Ghazal Handbook Dec. 1911 p 64.

(2) Gray, *op-cit*, pp 28-29.

3 UNP/ SCR/ 5.A.3/1 History Notes and Instructions.

(1) Sudan Government, Annual Budget 1900 - 1956, Khartoum 1956 p 8.

(2) Richard Hall, *Lovers on the Nile*, p 180.

(3) CIVSEC/ SCR/ 1.B Sudan Political Intelligence Summary.

the condominium period. As southern Sudanese remained reluctant to volunteer for military service in 1920s, conscription continued to be forced, and prisoners and war captivity were regularly funneled into the army. The south proved an inadequate reservoir, both because of its low population density and the reluctance of its people to be conscripted. Eventually territorial units recruited for local service replaced the old Egyptian army units throughout the country, a process completed only in the 1920s⁽⁴⁾.

Government prestige required the seizure of cattle by force whenever the payment of tribute was resisted⁽⁵⁾. The reasons for the south's long period of pacification is thus to be found as much, or perhaps more in government policies than in southern Sudanese truculence. There was no separate discussion of the economic powers of the new regional government, or of national development policy as it applied to the south.

Famine Conditions in the South 1940-1943

In 1940 famine conditions were reported around Renk, where people were living entirely on roots. But it was in Equatoria, especially among the Nilotic population that shortages were worst. June 1941 was lean and full of hardship for the Dinka. In Moru district shortages were acute; among the Jur a state very much like famine existed; great numbers of Dinka migrated south through Mvolo to Maridi and Amadi in search of food. Again, in late 1942 Moru and western districts were on the verge of famine. The 1942-3 drought brought evidence of real wants, especially in Torit and Juba, Yei and Yirol. In June 1943 there were general released 64 tones of grain to the Madi and Acholi after definite signs of under-nourishment.

The apparent normality of famine was fault ultimately of government policy. To be certain, shortages, even starvation, were endemic to the south because of poor techniques, inadequate shortage underdeveloped trade and difficult communications. In the late forties the government exported Dura from the south while importing it for soldiers' ratio and arbitrarily fixed prices which drove local producers out of the market. During the war even government reports expressed concern about what effect conscription of thousands of the fittest southerners would have on food production.

It was reportedly edited that 6,000 men employed in war work instead of on cultivation.⁽¹⁾ The entire surplus of southern provinces was simply destroyed because it would cost too much to transport to market.⁽²⁾ Contradicting the

idea that southerners could not innovate, Myers, J.G stressed the widespread distribution and cultivation of cassava, maize, sweet potatoes and groundnuts, all originally non-African plants. But, in the words of a later survey, yields were not only the criterion of suitability or success: political considerations in trade; sugar cane and tobacco, which grow wild, are both subject to restrictions.⁽³⁾ The tribalizing aspects of Lord Lugard in Nigeria, who had formulated the traditional tribal structure and employing the methods of Indirect Rule, still dominated official practice in the remote west and the south while more progressive methods associated with Cameroon and framed by Gillian and Newbold took hold elsewhere.

Before the war the British had no general colonial policy: variety of imperial administration was a source of proof, evidence of liberality and adaptability. Thus the Sudan government was forced to spread constructional advance to keep Sudanese support, the only moral justification for British rule. On the other hand, historic tribal, regional and especially sectarian difference, combined with the elite nature of Sudanese politics, allowed the government to divide and rule, encouraged both co-domino to interfere directly in local politics and ultimately prevented, with disastrous consequences, emergence of strong, secular nationalist movement. Little was done to encourage development in the south, although small steps taken during the war had important results later.

Azande Proposed Schemes 1939-1945

The war provided an excuse for negligence, as had the depression before it. At war's time communications had stopped and there was also starvation occurring due to the drought. The development could not happen because the available money could be used on war expenses.

In 1939 J.D Tothill, the director of agriculture and forests, proposed development and animal resources for internal and export markets, and new attempts at growing cotton as a cash crop. The war intervened, but in late 1943 Tothill presented a new, far-reaching plan, an experiment in the social emergence of indigenous races in remote regions, to affect the complete social emergence and the social and economic stability of the Zande of south-west Equatoria. In the south the war increased the government's demand for workers: monthly reports were regular of famine and forced labour⁽¹⁾. The young men had moved away from the rural areas and leaving those who are economically inactive, there will be backlash. Because those who are

(4) CIVSEC/ SCR/ Class 1 Box 44 piece 329 Upper Nile Annuals 1898-1948.

(5) CIVSEC/ SCR/ Class 1 Box 43 piece 320 Trade and Finance.

(1) Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p.184.

(2) *Ibid.* p. 185.

(3) *Ibid.* p. 186.

(1) *Ibid.* p. 93

economically active have moved away, nobody is left to work in agriculture.⁽²⁾

Therefore, the miserable lever of economic development had left rural populations with no need for cash and thus no reason to accept paid work. The government supplied by demanding taxes payable in labour. The war effort increased road building and maintenance and more military recruitment, which caused a continual labour shortage.

There was contradiction between keeping out northern influences while forcing labour for wages and taxes. The outsiders have spoiled the land of the south especially the Turks, Arabs and Europeans. Economic development was severely restricted and commerce remained in the hands of Greeks, Syrians, British companies as well as the northern Sudanese merchants and Khartoum based companies. The British may have halted regional exploitation, but the inequalities of regional development increased. The 19th century of the economic impact of trade up to 1945 is an

exploration for the whole southern Sudan. The examination of the period has been surveyed/contemplated. The introductions of taxation and in the prohibition of feud and welfare had been the most obvious effects. Uneven economic development, famine, drought and war had played an important role in the economic impact on trade internally or externally. Local economic markets had been ignored or neglected by the Europeans during the colonial rule. The economic impact of trade from 1901 to 1945 in the southern Sudan can be seen in terms of British administrators, Arab traders and European Merchants. They economically exploited the South Sudan because the south continued to be subsided from the north. The southern Sudanese are behind the northern Sudanese educationally, socially, economically and politically. Wise rulers and politicians who wish to prosper have always to foresee and either prevent or prepare for social and economic impacts.

(2) UNP/ SCR/ 12.A.1. *Economic Development in Upper Nile Province.*

Christian and Islamic Teachers

The spread of Christianity and its impact on the south

The Catholic Church had been attracted to the Southern Sudan by the virgin field, which had suddenly been opened in Equatorial Africa. The Catholics wanted to reach there first before Islam or even the Protestant. They wanted to seek converts among the negroid beyond the sudd region. The missionaries were permitted to seek converts in south of Fashoda. The Catholic did not hesitate. A Roman Catholic station was opened at Lul on the White Nile among the Shilluk in 1900.

The Catholics were soon followed up the river by the Presbyterians. The selection of Doleib Hill was suspected by British officials. They were at first as suspicious of the Presbyterians as of the church missionary. While the Catholics had, from the first, rushed to the southern Sudan. They did not have interest in missionary work in the north. In fact, the Church Missionary Society openly regard missionaries in the south as but a temporary obstacle to operations in the north. The Presbyterians did not easily overcome the suspicions of "Some men in big positions... unfriendly to Protestant missions", "Just when the Roman Catholics were pushing a head where the Americans had been denied", Cromer granted permission in February 1902 to occupy Doleib Hill.³

The religions in the southern Sudan at end of the condominium period was roughly as follows: In the rural areas customary law prevailed, supposedly supported by traditional religion, with only a few individual Muslims or Christians settled outside their home villages. Muslim communities were confined mainly to the towns and administrative centres, where the Sudan penal and criminal codes were applied, and Shari'a a rose mainly in family matters. There were small Christian communities centred a round the main mission station, some in the towns, and some in the rural areas.

In the southern Sudan foreigners had monopolized the missionary work. It was considered as the threat being practiced by these foreigners. It became clear from the beginning of 1904, when the Catholics began rapidly to expand their work under Geyer's vigorous leadership. There was no hope of raising more money for southern education.

The condominium administration did not initially welcome the Christian missionary societies who applied to return to the Sudan¹. It was a result of diplomatic and political pressure, the missionaries were allowed freedom of action in the south and certain concessions were made to them in the North.

Because of fear of the possible spread of Islam in Southern Sudan and, eventually in Central Africa, Missionary Societies and government alike agreed that Islamic influence should be excluded as soon as possible from the Southern Sudan.²

Not only did administrators discourage southern societies from borrowing their northern Sudanese neighbours customs, they also tried to interdict the limitation or adoption of Islamic customs and laws.

Native administration thus encouraged indigenous religious diversity in the southern Sudan by enforcing no law and promoting local languages, while in the northern Sudan religious policy encouraged the tendency towards a greater uniformity of practice among Muslims.

The army [and some of the police] remained largely Muslims until the Sudanese battalions were replaced in the 1920s by southern Sudanese recruited locally.

Communities of Muslim ex-servicemen and their families continued to live in the civilian quarters of government centres, where they were often involved in commerce and trade.

They too, were subject to Sharia in the regulation of the family affairs. In so far as Native Administration attended to maintain a clear division between rural Areas and the towns,

its influence on rural communities remained limited¹.

The Impact of Christianity and Islam on the Southern Sudan

During the condominium period the two elements (freedom of action and certain concessions) of the Sudan future drifted apart. This tendency was reinforced further by southern elite that graduated from Christian missionary schools which came to uphold Christianity and the English Language as their modern symbols of identity. Initially the British were more concerned with conquest and pacification. When the economic projects were started in

3 Ried F. Shields, *Behind the Garden of Allah* (Philadelphia, 1937) p 108.

1 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2/6 Education in Southern Sudan

2 Hugh Goddard, "Some Reflections on Christian and Islamic Political thought" *Islam and Christianity vol. 1 No 1* June, 1990, pp 20-28

1 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 208.

the decade prior to Sudan independence it was too late to bridge the tragic gap that separated the two regions².

The missionaries found the Southern Sudan secured by the soldiers who had preceded them. Moreover, they failed to create, in these early years, a class of accommodators prepared to cooperate with the alien administration. The missionaries had virtually no impact on the societies or the administrators of the southern Sudan before the First World War. They were even unable to supply sufficient numbers of artisans to meet the modest requirements of the government. The efforts of Christian mission in the Upper Nile came late, made little progress, and developed slowly.

Many regarded Christianity as a superior religion, but the British in the Sudan were not deeply religious men. The assistance which was rendered to them by the British administrators acting in their official capacity was motivated more by the desperate need of the government for educated Sudanese staff and a certain sympathy for fellow White European in Black Africa than by their interest in the propagation in Christianity.

Gwynne was appointed as archdeacon of the Sudan in 1905 and Bishop in Khartoum in 1908. This was a triumph for Wingate's influence. He, as an archdeacon, could appreciate the Government's religious policy when a missionary he could not. On January 18, 1906, Gwynne at the head of a party of six missionaries landed at Bor

The CMS faced financial difficulties throughout the whole period.¹

The missionaries at Malek demanded independent powers. The dispute was never completely resolved on October 28, Shaw was convinced the Christianizing among the Anuak must be done by Dinka missionaries. Malek Dinak failed and a station was closed. The missionaries did not give up hope of reaching Khartoum. On December 13, 1898, the General committee agreed to open a mission at Fashoda.

Cromer had opened the southern Sudan to Christianity for administrative convenience. He expected the missionaries would work without demands upon the Government's slender resources.²

The first Catholic mission had been opened at Lul in Shilluk country in 1900. Roverggo died. Bishop F.X Geyer arrived and improved relations between the Catholics missionaries and the Government. Geyer had greater resources than Roverggo had possessed, on February 15,

1904 Bishop Geyer arrived at Wau to establish station. He had established Kayango and Mbili.

Geyer has purposely established both stations among unspoiled Africans outside of Wau which he regarded as a hotbed of Islam with its Muslim troops and traders. He established a station at Attigo in 1904. In February 1905 at Wau, he had established a schools to train craftsmen, carpenters, bricklayers and masons.

By 1904 Geyer had wanted to accompany British forces into the Zande country, but his request had been refused because of the unsettled countryside.

By 1906 Zandeland had been secured, and Geyer was marching south from Wau. He reached Tambura.

The Southern Sudanese reaction to the Catholic missionaries ranges from complex indifference to outright hostility. Among the Shilluk, the Reth was openly antagonistic to the missionaries at Lul and castigated those who attended the mission school.

At Mongala the missionaries were told to go to Bor. At Malek, No converts were made, and the discouraging results brought a resolution to remove the mission to Uganda.¹

In 1922 the Southern Policy and Closed District Ordinance were imposed to check Islamic and Arabic influences. Northern Sudan concerns specially in the Religion matters continued to rise.² On June 20 1924 the imam of Khartoum mosques attacked the Sudan government for allowing Christian missionaries societies to propagate their faith in the south. In 1942 the Graduates congress demanded, among other requests, the abolition of subsidies paid to missionaries education³.

In 1947 they requested the civil secretary to permit them to send out Islamic missionaries to the south. To justify their demand they reminded the government that the principle of religious freedom was embodied in the United Nation Charter⁴

Until the late 1940s the principle of the separation of religion from the state, under which the British ruled the country, seems to have been widely accepted by the Muslim Sudanese leaders⁵. Following the end of World War Two, a new religious element entered Sudanese national politics, and the introduction from Egypt of a Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brothers [later to become the National Islamic

2 *Ibid*, p 212.

1 Church Missionary Society, Annual Report 1901 - 1902. p 3.

2 *Ibid*, p 3.

1 Church Missionary Society Annual Report 1901 -1902 p 4.

2 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 208.

3 *Ibid*, p 213.

4 *Ibid*, p 214.

5 Douglass H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 35.

Front], with its advocacy of a theocratic state, was indicative of this change. The sectarian nature of northern Sudanese political parties meant that the mobilization of votes in the north was conducted essentially along line of religious affiliation. This is one reason why Islamization of the south has been a constant policy of all governments dominated by the sectarian parties [National Unionist Party Democratic Unionist Party, Umma Party, National Islamic Front]. In the 1950s Islamization and Arabicization were presented as necessary policies to create national unity.

On August 16, 1955 Parliament unanimously agreed to carryout the arrangements for self-determination, and on August 29 a resolution was passed for the holding of a direct plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the Sudanese this decision, however, was quickly negated when the political parties realized that the organization of the plebiscite in the country as vast and diversified as the Sudan with its largely illiterate population, in the south especially, would create many problems and solve non. Moreover, it would be virtually impossible to conduct a plebiscite in the south since the mutiny of 1955 had caused a collapse in the security and administrative system. There were fears, too, that Egyptian interference on the side of those who continued to support union might lead to a new breakdown of security and order.¹

On December 19 the resolution concerning the plebiscite was reserved. Parliament unanimously agreed that the Sudan should be an independent sovereign state. Egypt and Britain were informed, and both accepted the declaration. On December 31 a joint session of the two houses of parliament agreed upon a transitional constitution based on the modification of the self-government statute. On the 1st January 1956, the Independent Republic of the Sudan came into existence.

The southerners learned an alien cultural identity such as European civilization and language and in 1955 there was armed rebellion.

A religious divide² was imposed by the Sudan Government on the country. It was not in inspiration or intention, religious, within the structure of the Turko-Egyptian Empire. Muslims among the indigenous population benefited more than non-Muslims and Muslim subjects

could pass on their losses to non-Muslims on the peripheries³. As southern Sudanese remained reluctant to volunteer for military service conscription continued to be forced. Religion, local perceptions of race and social status, economic exploitation, and colonial and post-colonial interventions are all elements in the Sudan's current civil wars⁴.

As far as religion is concerned, the majority of the people are believers in African religion. By 1955 estimates were made and the number of non-pagans was as follows:

(a) Southern Muslims-	22,500 - 23,000
(b) Southern Protestants-	25,000 - 30,000
(c) Southern Roman Catholics-	180,000 - 200,000
(d) African beliefs-	The majority (Probably all the rest is not known)
Total	227,500 - 253,000

This represents about one tenth of the population¹. There missionaries (Christian) are still active propagating their faiths and they are available in all the three Southern regions. Islamic and Christian teachers are seekers after God. In non-violence regions, they would claim the same respect from themselves of their pride to be followers of Christ and Muhammad². Religion calls Christian and Muslim teachers to live in harmony with all and particularly with the Muslim believers who share the same faith in one God. The Christian teacher has to discover the presence of the gospel values in the non-Christian religions in the traditional African religions and Islam³.

The Role of Christian missionaries

The Christians themselves would have realized that they very much lack adequate preaching catechists and Christian formation. There is a lack of proper organized and diversified catechists to cater for the Christian formation adapted to all different ages and social groups found there. Many of the catechists need further training in order to cope with the catechetical needs of the population. The Christian teachers committed themselves in a special way to the work of evangelization and Christian formation by announcing the good news to non-Christians and Christians alike⁴.

1 Mohammed Omer Basher, *Southern Sudan. Background to Conflict* p 25

2 Douglass H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 20.

3 *Ibid*, p 5.

4 *Ibid*, p 6.

1 Sudan Government, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Southern Sudan Disturbances* Khartoum 1956, p 6.

2 James Davidson, Hunter Os Guineas (eds), *Articles of Faith, Articles of Peace, the Religious Liberty Clauses and the American Public Philosophy*, 1990, p 42.

3 Ali Mazrui, "African Islam and comprehensive Religion, Revivalism and Expansion" *Islam in Africa*, Ibadan, 1993, p 8.

4 Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 355.

During the condominium period, the new doctrine of equality of all men was a turning point in the lives of people. In general, Christianity appealed to children, boys and girls as well as the young men and women in their teens and early twenties.

No distinction was made between Christians and non-Christians in the formulation and application of the various ordinances and rules for governing the colonial society. The Christian societies were allowed to establish both schools and Churches in Southern Sudan. Finally the Southern policy was initiated to check the massive entry of Northerners into the Southern Sudan. The Sudan government stated its responsibility to ensure tolerance between various creeds. It also reaffirmed its determination to establish freedom of religious teaching and to ensure that religious feeling was not aggravated by political ends.

The mission of Christianity is to re-establish peace, to promote justice and to defend human dignity and rights. Western missionaries brought a new culture as well as a religion. Christian missionaries shared in this purpose. They had put in the minds of African their God. They brought into existence a moral community on which to build the political regime. This has negative impact on the traditional religion by adopting alien religion.

The role of missionary in the Sudan in 1902 was to serve by means adapted to their special religious persuasion, the secular and educational policy of the government⁽¹⁾.

The role of the missionaries, however marked by petty failures and personal defeats, however determined by events, was nonetheless an element in the process of modernization.⁽²⁾ A missionary presence and benevolent European supervision might do much to keep important chiefs in the frame of mind⁽³⁾. Kayango, a local notable in Bahr Al Ghazal, was one of the more powerful and sophisticated local notables. Those who refused to co-operate were broken. Those who abused their position were sacked. Their successors were chosen by the government to carry out the task in government control areas.

Indeed, Sudan government were convinced that the missionaries, Protestant and especially Catholic, did little to instil the virtues and habits necessary to withstand Islamic influence. Most Christians, evangelists and others deal with Christianity and their traditional rites, and find little difficulty in reconciling the beliefs belonging to each, as

they are significant in different situations. Christians are like the Jurists who performed the Islamic function with mystic meditation. Thus, most Christian still participated and believed in the efficacy of sacrifices to the deities and the ancestors, and also the Muslim do practice sacrifices to their gods.

Between 1906 and 1918 the challenges to the work of the missionary society in the southern Sudan were many and varied. The efforts in the southern Sudan were weak because they had inadequate resources to fill the expanding mission field in the world in general and the southern Sudan in particular.

The missionaries and the colonial power adopted a hostile attitude towards certain religious practices and tried to build them up, while at the same time suppressing some cults¹. Southern Sudanese remained unconverted to colonial rule and defied missionaries condemnation of their traditional ways by simply continuing to hold on traditional beliefs and practising essential rites either openly or in secret. Southern Sudanese use their religion as a weapon to resist colonial rule and its threat to their values and often relied on magic and the intervention of their ancestors and gods in their fight against oppressive colonial rule². Nuer religion involves distinctive kind of piety dominated by a strong sense of dependence on God and confidence in him rather than in any human powers or endeavors.³ The Nuer tribe believed in their prophets or gods. In the religious hierarchy, god is farthest removed; other supernatural spirits are nearer to man and are symbolized by emblems, which are more commonly encountered. Nearest to man are the dead, whose spiritual existence proximity, and physical presence are evidenced by their progeny.⁴ Polygamy was the ideal African life, it was a blessing, not an evil. For faith, or change of any kind, in traditional society hardly ever goes from child to parent, from the young to mature. Faith or change comes from parent to child. Even though chiefs were supporters of education and sent their children to schools, they held back their most promising sons. They feared that their most gifted sons would learn the Christian teaching on marriage and refuse to marry more than one wife, to the detriment of the clan as a whole. At this time, there was not the wide acceptance of

⁽¹⁾ Douglass H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p13.

⁽²⁾ Mongalla/ SCR/ 46.A Mission General Rulings and Policy.

⁽³⁾ Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 28.

¹ E.E Evans Pritchard, 'A Nuer Religion' *SNR volume 37*, 1956, pp, 21-43.

² *Ibid*, p 23.

³ *Ibid*, p 28

⁴ *Ibid*, p 44.

Christianity, which was found among the Ndogo or Moru, or Zande. It was still the religion of school children⁵.

The Catholics also developed a magazine called Messenger. The Messenger in its reporting policy showed that the Catholic Church was becoming much more sensitive to Sudanese cultures and values.

In the Messenger the Shilluk writers discussed their traditional beliefs about the Reth, comparing it with their belief in Jesus, as God coming human flesh. Bari writers reported that they were using the title "Mor" for Jesus. Changes were also needed in attitude to African beliefs and customs, the missionaries had produced some notable scholars of Sudanese language and culture, but there was a generally negative attitude to the spiritual value of religious tradition: Father Arthur Nebel considered polygamy immoral. He opposed revenge, which was part of the routine of the Southern people's life and communal relationship. He also condemned the destructive spiritual power of the *tiit*, the *Dinka divine*. Nevertheless, Father Arthur Nebel held that Dinka have remnants of the true divine religion, though much distorted. Religious specialists, who acknowledged that their power came from *Nhialic* were invested to help celebrated festivals like Christmas. Therefore there was no full-scale attack on all the *kujurs* and superstitions of the Dinka¹.

The European ideal of monogamous marriage was accepted as part of an expected public image of the section of westernized elite. It exists side by side under the law with the institution of polygamy among the urban and rural masses. Africans had answered to these attacks in many ways. In the first place, those who remained unconverted opposed colonial rule and defied missionaries condemnation of their traditional ways by simply continuing to hold on to traditional beliefs and practising essential rites either openly or in secret². But for those who converted to Christianity and whose beliefs and attitudes were strongly influenced by the new dispensation, resistance was expressed by taking some of the traditional beliefs along with them into new faith, and this resulted in a blending of ideas³. The main influence of Christianity came, but in the subsequent strategic influence its converts achieved through their educational qualification and their role in administration and politics in the late condominium and early independence periods.

The Beginning of an Islamic Education

⁵ Mongalla/ SCR/ 56.A Religion-Questions of Policy.

¹ CS| SCR| 17 A.2 | 6 Education in the Southern Sudan.

² Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 224.

³ Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 56.C Intelligence Reports Province Monthly 1923-1930.

The first two religious orders introduced in the Sudan were the Shadhiliya in the fifteenth century (about 1445) and the Qadiriyya in the sixteenth century

Both orders had their local representatives or Khalifas and through them acquired great influence in the Sudanese society during the early period of the Funj Kingdom.¹

One local religious order which acquired great prominence and importance was the Majdhubiya (a derivation of the Shadhiliya) founded by Hamid ibn Magdhub (or Magadhib) whom Burikhardt has described as having considerable influence in Al Damer. These holymen found a fertile soil among the sendintaries in the Sudan and easily won the hearts of the intellectually backward masses with their devotional fervour and miracle mongering, whilst many of their successors, how all Sudanese, became influential guardians of the Funj Kings and princes not only in spiritual but political affairs as well. At the same time the common people sought their intercession, not only with God but with their rulers as well, for they were a means which the opinion of e masses could be expressed. During their life they enjoyed royal favour and the adoration of the people, and after their death they became intercessors with God and their tombs places of pilgrimages. Abboud regime decided that the south must learn unity, and the enemies of unity must be removed. Behind those enemies were the Christian missionaries. Without them, southern demands would fade. Those committed to Islamization believed in the way that they could make a permanent revolution in the south through Islamic education. Abboud regime stepped up the policy of national integration asd the only way to promote unity. It embraced cancelling cultural practices that impede cultural uniformity and encouraged the spread of Islamic education and the promotion of Arabic as a national language.

This big drive for an Islamic education began in October 1966. In his address to the constituent assembly, the Primer Minister Sadiq al Mahdi stated "The dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one, and its overpowering expressions is Arabic, and this nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival"² The same attitude was manifested forcefully and comprehensively by Dr. Hasan al Turabi, the leader of Islamic Charter front (ICF) The national committee for the constitution had posed a question whether the Sudan should be ruled by an Islamic or secular constitution. The northern political parties such

¹ Mohammed Omer Basher, *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p 45.

² Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *The role of Religion*, p 215.

as the Umma, DUP, and the ICF, appeased after 1965 to the endorsement of Islamic constitution. The primary exception was the communist party whose stand was closer to that of the Southerners.

The southern political parties, the Sudan African National Union (SANU), the Sudan African Liberation Front and Independent Southern Personalities called for the complete separation between state and religion i.e. Islam. At the opening Nimairi's government had the support of the communist party and was opposed by the National Front such as the umma party, the DUP, and the ICF. Nimairi bought and succeeded in achieving a national reconciliation with them. The leaders of the ICF were appointed to political and executive positions. Dr. Hasan al Turabi headed the national committee entrusted with the revision of Sudanese laws in accordance with the *Shari'a*. They developed their own Islamic missionary and relief organizations which were destined to play an important role in rural areas. They were following the imitating Christian church practice. The ICF had relied on Islam as a source of ideology and inspiration. Such an inclination prompted the ICF to campaign strongly for the Islamization of the state and society, its endeavours were rewarded in September 1983 when Nimairi proclaimed the enactment of Sharia (or September Laws).¹ In November 1965 a speech in Omdurman by a Sudanese communist in

which Islam was ridiculed aroused demonstrations by the Muslim Brothers, who demanded that the communist party be banned. A resolution to this effect was passed by a huge majority in parliament, and on 24 November the constitutions was amended to outlaw communism.

The Muslim Brothers advocated a theocratic Islamic state that has discriminated against southerners politically and constitutionally². The main contribution orders, however, is their missionaries activity³. This activity is often joined with political activity.

The Role and Impact of Islamic Education

The role of The Prophet Muhammad was to convey the Quran as was from Allah, to interpret it, and to practice it fully. His interpretations and practices produced what is known as the traditions of Muhammad. They are considered the second source of Islam and must be in complete harmony with the first source, namely the Quran.

One of the main objectives of Islam is to emancipate the mind from superstitions and uncertainties and the soul from sin and corruption, the conscience from oppression and fear, and even the body from disorder and degeneration¹. The movement which Islam has enjoyed high support includes men to realize these endeavours, constant spiritual observations, binding regulations. When man follows this course, religiously, he cannot fail to reach his ultimate goal of freedom and emancipation². Religious policy in the south differed markedly from that pursued in the Muslim north³. Islam had made considerable advances before the arrival of the colonial power. In Bahr al Ghazal Islam and Christianity were the religions acceptable by condominium rule. Islamic names superseded local names and inhabitants adopted Muslim dress, customs, beliefs, ways of life and the Arabic language besides their own tongue. This western district [Raga], the stronghold of the Islamic faith, became entirely Islamized and up to this time Islam prevails despite colonial attempts to control it. Islamization also occurred among the Azande and Nilotes adjacent Muslim settlements, but not on a large scale in the core, northern and western parts of the province.

Other agents of Islamization were Muslim traders who reached Bahr al Ghazal from the west. These include the mixed Muslim population of Furanjs, Jallabas, Nuba, etc who came to work the copper mines of Hufrat al Nahas in the early 19th century. Islamization was peaceful on the basis of marriage, friendship and mutual co-operation.

A Muslim under *Sharia* is the guardian of a Christian and a non-believers. It is a legitimate love for the Sudanese solidarity to which is God's providence.

The northern Islamic parties are based on their true love for their religion 'Islam' and are blind, prejudiced and passionate to Christianity in the Sudan and so are Christian Parties wherever they are, especially in Europe. It is incumbent on Muslim to respect Christianity and Judaism. In practice some politicians do not adhere to this. This binds and exaggerate loyalty to one 'Islam' subjects communities rights, freedom, justice and dignity, and also incompatible with the prospect of the Bible and mind of Jesus Christ.

Islamic leaders in the northern Sudan insisted that Sudan is one. This is very much misleading since they don't provide the basis for the cry for unity, harmony or interest between the semi-Arab northern Islamic parties and the Christians in

¹ Abdullahi Ahmed An -Narin, "A Christian and Muslims Relations in the Sudan", *The Vatican, Islam and Middle East*, New York, 1987, p 269.

² W. Montgomery Watt et al, "Islam and Christianity Today 1986" *The Middle East Journal* vol. 30 No 1, 1983, p 105.

³ Ali Mazrui, *Op-Cit*, p 6.

¹ *Ibid*, p 8.

² The Synod on 23 November, 1991, p 21.

³ Trimingham, J. "Islam in the Sudan" *SNR*, 1950, Vol. 31, pp 149-189.

the Sudan. Islam teaches that, in the sight of God all men are equal, but they are not necessarily identical. There are differences of abilities, potentials, ambitions, wealth and so on. Yet none of these differences can itself establish a status of superiority of one man or race to another⁽¹⁾.

In the north, Islam controlled the lives and habits of the people. Furthermore in the north, Sharia Law governed personal behavior.⁽²⁾ In the Kadis (Judge) there were men learned in interpreting and if necessary, enforcing it: The people were used to a body of law. In the south tribal custom differed from one people to another. No single code of behaviour was recognized⁽³⁾.

Other agents of Islamization in the province were the southern Mahdists armies when these returned to their homes from the north after 1898, they persuaded some of their tribesmen or relatives to become Muslims⁽⁴⁾. Muslim soldiers who made up the forces which occupied Bahr al Ghazal played an important role in the spread of both Arabic and Islam among the local population. Most of them were southern Sudanese who were taken to the northern Sudan during slave trade days, Turkiya and Mahdiya.

In the towns they mixed with Muslims, soldiers, traders, exiled Egyptian and Sudanese officials, and started to build mosques and Quranic schools.⁽⁵⁾ Islamic teachers and practice were widespread in every town or station in the province as a result of the Muslim presence. What was more important was that Arabic language and Islam are two faces of one and the same coin, going hand in hand and cannot be divorced. Islam continued to be embraced in Wau town by a number of people and Arabic remained a vernacular of communication. At the end of 1904 the government fearing the spread of Islam stopped reading, writing and arithmetic in Arabic in southern schools, the Christian missionary education policy was that if a native wishes to read he must first be baptized¹. He instructed his followers to learn Quran and study his own teachings. Islam has made it the duty of every Muslim to seek learning in order to be informed about his faith and spiritual rites².

In these schools teachers of Christian religion, would of course be government officials³. These government officials would have to be given permit [license] by the

respective denominational authority. Religious instruction was in situation to be given to only pupils other than a registered adherent and it was not to be used for proselytization to any faith⁴. The literacy societies began in the Sudan to flourish in the late 1920s and early 1930s in many of the big towns. The Khalwa continued to constitute for a wider public, particularly in rural areas where the government could not afford to establish fully-fledged elementary schools. In 1934 the efficiency run by Khalwas which were already in receipt of Government subsidies, where converted into three years elementary schools or sub-grade schools. After 1939, the sub-grade schools became a permanent feature of the system of elementary education. This development weakened the Khalwas as an institution. Efficient Khalwas were up-graded to sub-grade schools, inefficient ones were deprived to Government subsidies. The better qualified Faki were absorbed in the cadre of sub-grade school teachers, and the general public. Finding a more attractive alternative in the elementary and sub-grade schools, withdrew their financial support from the Khalwas. By 1935 Sayyid Abdel Rahim had more adherent among educated and political minded young men.⁵

The first intermediate school for girls was opened in 1938 and the first secondary school in 1948. With the development of girls education, traditional Sudanese society became increasingly susceptible to western influence. The strongest influence remained that of the traditional educational institutes. The Khalwas and the Massid – or its successor the Mahad al – Ilmi.

The only other educational institutions developed were the Khalwa or Quranic schools.¹

By 1944 New bold declared that approved policy of the government is to act upon the fact that people of the southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid and that our obvious duty to them therefore is to push ahead as far as one can see with the economic and educational development so that those people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future whether their lot be eventually cast with the northern Sudan or with East African or partly with each. The government policy of a united Sudan was endorsed at the Juba Conference in June 1947, which was attended by British officials, Southern and

(1) The Synod on 23.11.1991 *Archdiocese of Khartoum-Sudan*, p 1.

(2) *Ibid*, p 5

(3) Damazo Dut Majok, "British Religious and Education Policy, the Case of Bahr al Ghazal" Muhammad Omer Beshir, *Southern Sudan Regionalism and Religion*, Graduate College Publications No. 10 University of Khartoum, p 224.

(4) Hugh Goddard, "Some Reflections on Christian and Islamic Political thought" *Islam Christian* vol. 1 No 1 June 1990, pp 20-28.

(5) Hugh Goddard, *Op-cit*, p 24.

1 Daly, *The Empire on the Nile*, p 250.

2 Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 326

3 The Nibblock, *Class and Power in Sudan Dynamics of Sudanese Politics 1956-1969*, the Macmillan Press 1987, p 50.

4 CS\ S.CR/ 17.A.2/6 *Education in Southern Sudan*

5 Trimingham, J.S., *Islam in the Sudan*, OUP, 1945 p 10

1 Mohammed Omer Basher, *Educational Development in the Sudan*, Oxford, 1969 p 24.

Northern Sudanese representatives. Then the Southerners agreed to send delegates to the proposed Legislative Assembly of the United Sudan. It was not until 1949 that the Central Government surrendered Southern policy.

In 1950 the Government abandoned its conventional southern policy and introduced the teaching of Arabic in all Sudanese Schools above Elementary level. In 1952, even Christian religious instruction at Melut was being given in Arabic. In the riverain region of the Upper Nile province teaching Islam as a subject was begun and in practice made no provision for Christian religious instruction. Missionaries themselves were often excluded from the teaching of religion as a school subject by the rejection of the ministry of education to appoint expatriate teachers; while Sudanese catechists were rejected as lacking the necessary educational qualifications for appointment.⁴ In 1954 and International Commission on Secondary Education recommended that the missionary schools be taken over by the government and that Arabic, not English should be universal language of instruction in the Southern Sudan. With the establishment of the department of religious affairs in 1955 a more detailed reform programme was adopted ³.

In 1956 the commission of inquiry on the southern Sudan disturbance estimated the Christian community in the southern Sudan of between 205-203,000, was distributed as follows 180,000-200,000 Catholics and 25,000-30,000 Protestants, yet the total number of Christians despite 55 years of freedom to proselytize in the south. Subsequently, in February 1957 the government of Abdallah Khalil had announced its intention of nationalizing the missionary schools, and these were integrated into a national educational system. The Abboud regime took stronger steps. The gradual progress of arabicization and Islamization, to which the policy of condominium had served as partial barrier, were to be hastened. Six intermediate Islamic institutes were opened, mosques were constructed and subsidised. Missions were prohibited from opening new schools and the day of rest was changed from Sunday to Friday. Missionaries, going on leave, were denied re-entry to the Sudan. Religious activities of missionaries outside Church were prohibited¹. The progressive denial of missionary access to schools by the Abboud regime and the elimination of missionary influence were accompanied by an attempt to transform the schools into positive instruments of Islamization. The objectives of

the policy of the regime went beyond that of national integration through religious unity. The religious instruction then became exclusively, Islamic and was compulsory. The way to those committed to Islamization believed that they could make a permanent revolution in the south by education. So two major changes in southern education were introduced.

Village Christian schools were replaced with suq [market places] schools in the south. These new schools were opened in market places and taught in Arabic. There were Islamic teachings, unless the parents or sometimes the students-inside should accept that they must have Christian instruction.

A more Muslim pattern was also introduced, with Arabic required as an essential to education. The way into Arabic classes was to learn first the Khalwas, a school in which students memorized the Quran. The policy of Arabicization had been going on since 1949, but now radical measures were taken in 1957, the taking over by the government of all missions schools in the south. Nationalization of the missionary schools was only the first act of a wide plan of Islamization that foresaw the following tactical steps; compulsory teaching of Arabic and suppression of local languages, encouragement of marriages between local people and Muslim, discouragement of Muslims to the collaboration of communists in the plan. A few years later the religious teachers association was founded in Khartoum 1957. This led to nationalisation of all the schools in Southern Sudan. Primarily as religious organization, it aroused political feelings. Children in the association's schools began each day chanting, Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, and Sudan is my country¹.

In 1960 the Council of Ministers' Resolutions emphasized that Islamic religious education should, besides its religious aspects, prepare competent individuals able to compete with others in order to get a decent living. It also supported the endeavour of the department of religious affairs to bridge the gap between secular and religious education in the north. The recognition of Islamic religion by the ministry of education as a compulsory examinable subject in the school certificate helped to narrow the gap between the two systems². In 1962 the Missionary Societies Act, had attempted to regulate, by means of a system of licences, the activities of the Missionary Societies in the Sudan, was crude device to allow unlimited interference with missionaries.

4 *Ibid*, p 20

3 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, 'Interaction Between Traditional and National Education in the Sudan' *Studies in Sudanese History*, 2003, p 103.

1 W. Montgomery Watt et al, "Islam and Christianity Today 1986" *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 30, No. 1, 1983, pp 203-245.

1 Muhammad Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan, Background to the Conflict*, p 77.

2 Trimminghan, J. "Islam in the Sudan". *SNR*, Vol. 31, pp 149-189.

The foreshadows in this Act was classified on 22 February 1964 when the government ordered the expulsion of all foreign missionaries engaged in the Southern Sudan³. A secondary institute was opened in Juba in 1960-1965. Chiefs were converted into Islam, which became mainly characteristic of Equatoria. The chiefs of Maridi district were asked to become Muslim. Chief Jambo, the Moru, had even before thus decided that the future lay with Islam.

Some chiefs were interested in Islam and predicated exactly that the future lay with Islam as it is today. The religious teachers either Islamic or Christian were preaching in their own tenets. Missionary education had made a major contribution to Sudanese national life and its preparation for responsibilities for nationhood both in the north and south. Even the man who led Sudan independence, Ismail al Azahri, had been at one time a teacher at Comboni College. Many others now coming to prominence as Sudan approached independence had been educated in Comboni College or other mission schools. Many of their emigrants too had been educated in missionaries' schools.

In the south the missionaries had provided almost all education, though this had never reached beyond the intermediate level.

Southern leadership had little education, and less experience. It was no wonder that the small group of political leaders proved vulnerable to the manipulation and persuasion of northern politicians. Religion is a private matter of human being each man or woman and his or her god. Western missionaries brought a new culture as well as a new religion. The religious teachers or communities have to take responsibility for studying the situation for the right of power. Decision-making processes should be in the hands of responsible persons who are just and sensitive to the effective use of power. It is recommendable that the governments in helping to reduce tensions and conflicts between religious communities may play the positive and creative role. Muslims and Christians should make a conscious effort to seek each other's assistance to defend their common interest and to work together in the service of their neighbours and Allah¹

Islam and Christianity have contributed much to the development of human societies, notably in the form of

ethical values². Muslim and Christian religious leaders have shared cells in the prisons in the Sudan³

Islamic teacher's duty is to seek the company of the poor and good to orphans⁴. The best Muslim home is one where an orphan is well treated, and the worst is where an orphan is ill-treated⁵.

Another duty is to give advice to every Muslim and strive to cause joy to enter his heart for the prophet, until he wants for his brother [Muslim] what he wants for himself.

And he said the dearest act in the eyes of God is to cause joy to enter the heart of a Muslim, or to relieve it from some distress, or pay visit to the sick⁵.

These religious teachers have to take part in the funerals. The object in attending funerals is to perform the duty of the Muslims, and show consideration for funds. They also need to visit tombs, and the object in this is to pray for them, show consideration, and open the heart. The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim he shall not do him wrong or let wrong be done to him.

These Islamic teachers have to greet every Muslim with peace be upon you, before speaking and shake hands while greeting. Peace is not only a process; it is an ideal, an end in itself². To cut down the influence of Egyptian officials, the Sudanese were discouraged from travelling to Egypt for any length of time³. The bitterest criticism however was directed against the government's religious policy, both as regards missionary activities and with regard to Islam in the Sudan. The bitter experience, instead of opening the eyes of the Sudanese rulers in the capital city, blinded them entirely. But there are situations in Africa when even indigenous culture fails to reduce religious divisions between Christians and Muslims. This is particularly so when religious difference, coincide with ethnic and linguistic divisions⁴. The religious differences between north and south has simply reinforced other historical, cultural and racial features, when Christianity and Islam sharpen such other differences, religion itself can be divisive in black Africa. The missionaries have imposed on Africa the western culture its rites, music and art. They came to Africa to obey the command of Jesus. ‘

Go and preach the gospel to all peoples', and thus they fulfilled their work. Thus, they created an African church

3 Mongalla/ SCR/ 56.A Religion-questions of policy.

1 CS/ SCR/17.A.2/6 Education in Southern Sudan.

2 W. Montgomery Watt et al, Op-Cit, p 206.

3 Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 356.

4 Ahmed Von Denffer, *Dialogue Between Christians and Muslims, Part Three, Statements and Resolutions*, the Islamic Foundation 1989, p 20.

5 John Alden Williams, *Themes of Islamic Civilization*, California Press, London 1971, p 25.

1 *Arab Studies Quarterly* volume 19, number 3, summer 1997.

2 Rev. Michele Rostato, *My Forty Years in Africa*, p.56.

3 W. Montgomery Watt et al, (1986), "Islam and Christianity Today" *The Middle East Journal* vol. 30 No 1 Winter 1983, pp 66-80.

with African pastors, and at the same time made their contribution to civil development. Most schools of thought during the condominium in the whole World believed that cultures enrich themselves by borrowing from and initiating models from abroad. Each needs one another in order to survive. Modern means of communication, too, expose all the peoples to the ideological influences of other peoples.

All the church is missionary and the evangelizing task is a fundamental duty of all people of Allah and as in the case of Islam. Traders and missionaries henceforth occupied a role, and the British presence in the southern Sudan was almost exclusively a matter of imperial strategy.

The educational policy of the British government was to instruct the inhabitants in their own language and English as the Lingua Franca instead of Arabic. Thus, Islam and so Arabic were excluded, since the chief considered sending of some boys to missionary schools a kind of human tax. They only sent some adopted sons, orphans, outcasts, refugees or slave boys to schools with the beliefs that boys would not return to them and as would not worry them very much as they were not their legitimate sons. A belief must prevail by administration of its own truth and not by repression of other tenets. These two religions should be allowed to compete on equal footing. The ministry of education agreed that Christian should be taught their religion without imposing examinations on them. As a result of the impact on Muslims of Christian educational institutes, the government feared that many of the young might become alienated from the faith of Islam for this reason. The ministry of education issued several decrees regulating the ethnical teaching of religion to students according to their religious background. There were no schools, as much for preparing teachers¹.

The objectives of this Islamic policy went beyond that of national integration through religious uniformity². The techniques used in the attempt to produce a Muslim southern intelligentsia were therefore at least lacking in fitness and at worst disastrously counter productive. Religious instrument then became exclusively Islamic and was compulsory. Boys who persisted in remaining Christians were forbidden to visit mission stations and were severely punished if they disobeyed. At the supplementary level Khalwas [Quranic schools] were set up, where possible village schools were converted into Khalwas³. The religious Islamic and Christian teachers should be given

equal opportunities to Christianize and Islamize the tribes of the southern Sudan as well as the whole Sudan.

In short it has deprived them of their fundamental human rights as free citizens of this country who are entitled to live a decent life as any other citizens of the Sudan.

It should be pointed out that the Arabicization policy was started and reduced to the status of English from a school subject like history and geography.

After more than a century, many missionaries served the interests of the colonial powers. The Muslims have felt reluctant to co-operate with the Christians whom they have fought as agents of their oppressors¹. The southern view is that the use of force could not be possible. The nature and scope of African belief is that they believed in many gods and ancestral spirits. They believed in life after the death in the hope that the dead relatives still communicated with them.

Islam in Eastern Africa was hurt by the image of the Arab slave trade-especially when that image was exploited by Europe-Christian propaganda during western colonization, colonial schools in eastern Africa dramatized the Arab role in the slave trade. East Africans emerging from colonial and missionary schools learned far more about the Arab slave trade, and far less about the trans-Atlantic flow, than did young colonial West Africans. Islam in eastern Africa therefore suffered more from anti Arabism than did Islam in the west.

Ordinary Christians were in no sense directly involved in the distances harassed and molested², and some were forced under threat of death to recite the Muslim confession on faith³. By culture it means the accumulated wisdom and religion into which Sudanese are born, by which south and north are shaped and find their identity as Christians and Muslims.

The role of religious teachers in the southern Sudan was to colonize and convert the local people into Christianity and Islam. These religious men are called upon to offer fresh motivation and fresh guidance to the growing expectations and changing aspiration of human beings in society. These religious teachers should achieve and maintain peace between them, since not only national unity, but also regional stability is both advanced when the various religious communities live together in peace and harmony. They should witness together the religious and moral

1 Muhammad Solihim, 'Copts and Muslims in Egypt' *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. 2, New York, 1987, the Islamic Foundation 1991/1411 A.H.

2 Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 367.

3 *Ibid*, p 368.

1 Ahmed Von Debeffer, *Dialogue Between Christians and Muslims, Part II, Statements and Resolutions*, p 21.

2 Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 367.

3 *Third World Quarterly: volume 10 No. 2 April 1988*.

perspective that respects the dignity and worth of all human beings in the face of dehumanizing forces. They ought to unite together to strengthen the moral conscience of national endeavour affirming those aspects of nation building which operate for common good, and in obedience to god's will, calling attention to those aspects which are harmful or oppressive. They promote together a human appreciation of the cultural achievements of all the diverse communities, which make up the society valuing those worthy achievements as the common property of the whole nation and the humanity. The heavy military presence in both Christian and Muslims areas of the south continues to foster fears, tensions, anger and incidents of violence directed particularly against the voiceless poor disciple of some military personnel. It is also the very policy of stationing large number of soldiers in civilian areas which would take on the character of being under military occupation.

The Role of Religion and State (-Muslim Brothers).

State and Islam

In many African states religious groups have joined the political opposition to the government and religious division have been related to claims for particular political rights. Muslim opposition has been a continuing difficulty in the Sudan. The political threat to national unity in the Sudan is increased by the affinities of their Muslim populations for Muslims of neighbouring states.

Nor has Christianity succeeded as unifying forces. Protestant-Catholic rivalry long contributed to disunity among all Christian tribes in the southern Sudan.¹

A few more serious threats to national unity than these have been the tribal cults. All these cults have reinforced factions that are not interested in the goals of the secular states and have handicapped secular leaders in their efforts to establish state unity. Although in these cases religion has been a divisive factor, it has in others promoted unity through a leader with religious sanction. Particularly important is the cult figure, who uses or has used the tribal cult as a springboard for his development.

Arabization was accompanied by a process of Islamization and groups of religious teachers-ulamas- probably entered the Sudan with the Arab tribes. The Sudan thus became in the sixteenth century part of the Arab - Muslim world.

It had developed contacts with Egypt, Arabia, North Africa, the Middle East and the rest of the Ottoman Empire⁶. It was during the rule of the Funj that the boundaries of Islam were pushed as far back as latitude 13°N. The ulama and holy

families were the major agents of Islamization and thus were able to establish their hold over society.²

The chief function for the ulama was to transmit and propagate the religion and culture of Islam. They had also acquired political and economic powers. Under the rule of the Funj, religious orders were introduced from Hajaz.

The Muslim Brothers Organization was founded in the Sudan in 1944 mainly among the students of the University of Khartoum. Its influence in Sudanese politics, especially among the students grew after 1956. The organization was an extension of the Muslim Brothers organization of Egypt led by Hasan al Banna. The teachings of the Muslim Brothers Organization in both Egypt and the Sudan was based on the teachings and practices of Islam. They advocated the revival of Muslim society, the establishment of an Islamic state in each of the Muslim countries, and the unity of the Muslim World; they explicitly rejected non-Muslim ideologies, especially communism, and were strongly hostile to the Soviet Union. Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime dissolved their organization in 1954. They became active enemies of Gamal Abdel Nasser. They were also hostile to the military regime of General Aboud in the Sudan. When it was overthrown in 1964 the organization again became active in Sudanese politics especially among the students of the University of Khartoum. Opposition of the Sudan communist party and the Nasser regime in Egypt became the main occupation of the Organization after 1964. In 1965 the Muslim Brothers organization was replaced by a new organization (the Islamic Charter Front - ICF) which followed the same politics and teachings.

For many devout souls the conquest of self by the ascetic life offered an alternative Jihad to the conquest of the world. To the sufi not only is there no God but Allah, but there is nothing but Allah. But sufism in practice is away of life. The way of purification about the Islamic world and organized their followers and adherents into orders which came to be called Tariqas. These Tariqas were not intended to replace the formal religious organizations but were regarded as centres for the higher development of the spiritual life under the guidance of one endowed with special gifts. Tariqa is an organization of religiously minded people united by common faith in virtue as same particular teachers and practicing a common ritual of prayer and devotion, the basic idea underlying the Tariqa.

The Muslim Brothers was founded in 1928 in Egypt. The Brotherhood called on Egyptians to eject Britain from their country and to replace Egypt's Napoleonic legal court with

1 Mohammed Omer Basher, *Revolution and Nationalism*, p 45

2 *Ibid*, p 45

6 *Ibid*, p 44.

Sharia. From there it spread to Sudan, Kuwait, Palestine, Lebanon and elsewhere.¹

As one country after another freed itself from colonialism, Brotherhood continued to agitate for a return to Sharia. The Brotherhood remains a militant organization with a fundamentalist Islamic ideology. It was suppressed in Egypt after the 1952 revolution.² Colonel Nasser's ousting of the personally popular Neguib in November 1954 caused disenchantment in the Sudan, as did the suppression of Nasser of both the Egyptian communists and the Muslim Brotherhood, organization to which young Sudanese especially were attracted. Dr. Hassan al Turabi was leader of the Islamic Charter (ICF), then a lecturer in the University of Khartoum, where much of the active support for the movement was to be founded.

The Sudan as a whole has in recent years been ruled as a theocratic Muslim state. Since the beginning of Anglo-Egyptian rule until the 1940s, the principle of separating religion from the state was kept by the British rulers. This idea was widely accepted by Muslim Sudanese leaders. The Muslim Brothers wanted to unite spiritual with temporal rule and it was accepted by their followers. It was a perceptive observation. Northern sectarian political parties mobilized votes in the northern Sudan along lines of their religious affiliation. This is one reason why Islamization of the south has been a consistent policy of all governments dominated by the National Unionist Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Umma Party and National Islamic Front. In the 1950s Islamization and Arabization were presented as necessary policies to create national unity. By the 1960s an Islamic state was advocated by the major parties. This Islamic state would have denied full legal and political rights to non-Muslims.

As a result it was opposed by southerners, some liberal and radical northerners of the marginalised areas of the north. Parliamentary government in 1965-69 was dominated by series of coalition governments.

The leading was the Umma Party, but they were divided. Splits within both parties made these coalitions unstable. There were strong challenges to the main parties from independent groups in some parts of eastern and western Sudan. The governance of men is part of divine dispensation and for the purpose of this Government.

Religion is the word of God or Allah, and is regarded as holy, sacred, spiritual or divine. Religion is commonly regarded as consisting of a person's relation to God or to gods or spirits. Worship is probably the most basic element

of religion, but moral conduct, right belief and participation in religious institutions are generally also constituent elements of the religious life as practical by believers and worshippers and as commanded by religious pages and scriptures.¹

The divine law is intended to assure the happiness of all members of the community. This requires everyone to profess belief in the basic principles of religion as enunciated in the Quran, the hadith and the consensus of the learned and to perform all obligatory acts of worship.²

The civil law, as a professional conduct, has thus tended to become more theoretical and consistent in its propositions and terminology that the judge made common law, which has tended for its parts, to be closer to life and perhaps more detailed. Islam is a state and a religion was one of its slogans. No constitution but the Quran was another. Islam was a complete system covering every aspect of life. Islam is a Sharia as the straight path and Sudanese would not be fully Muslim until they lived in a state committed to enforcing it. The resiliency of the Brotherhood is the major theme in their history of Sudan since independence. The Sudan gained independence on first January 1956. The post-independence government declared that Sudan was an Arab state, which should propose the policies of Arabization and Islam like many other nations, which gained independence. By the 1960s, however, the positions of the major parties had evolved to advocacy of an Islamic state. As this would have denied full legal and political rights to non-Muslims. It was opposed by southerners, people from some various marginalised areas of the north, and some liberal and radical northerners.

Parliamentary government in 1965-69 was dominated by a series of coalition governments. There were strong challenges to the main parties from independent groups in some parts of eastern or western Sudan.

The parties' own internal weakness, the insecurity of their hold on power were challenges they faced from non-sectarian parties in the remoter regions, made them less willing to compromise on the issue of religion, this being the only appeal which justified their contention for power. This was aimed at securing parliamentary support against Sadiq's rivals in his own party. Sadiq's religious policy was uncompromising in its commitment to conversion of the south to Islam. Sadiq's most liberal statement was a public appeal to the pope to agree with him to convert all southern Sudanese into believers, whether Muslims or Christians. Spreading to Muslim audiences outside of the Sudan,

1 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 224

2 Holt, P.M, and Daly, M.W, *A History of the Sudan from the Coming of the Islam to the Present Day*, pp 151 - 152.

1 Otter Rethimunnon, *Encyclopedia Britannica 9, Micropaedia*, p 995.

2 Britannica, *Macropaedia Knowledge in Depth 22 Islam Life*, p 29.

however, Sadiq was no record as declaring that the southern Sudan must be converted to Islam. He too, supported the draft for an Islamic constitution.

As early as 1956, in a memorandum addressed to the constituent Assembly by Shaykh Hasan Mudathir, the head of the Muslim division of the judiciary argued that: "In an Islamic country like the Sudan, the social organization of which it has been built upon Arabic customs and Islamic ways and of which the majority are Muslim, it is essential that the general principles of such a country should be derived from the principles of Islam... and in accordance with Islamic ideals, out of which such a community has been adopted"¹. The Islamic fundamentalist are Muslims who aspire to reestablish an Islamic power in an Islamic frame of reference in an international systems which is new highly secularized and highly pluralistic. Islamic Fundamentalism is a reaction to cultural alienation which was imposed on Muslim societies by colonization and a response to the failure of secular leadership in the Muslim world².

With reference to Islamic constitution, the Umma party (Ansar or followers of the Mahdi), the Democratic Unionist party called for development of Islamic parliamentary republic based on the *Shar'ia* as its main source of legislation. They called for a more fundamental functions for the Islam than prevailed under the colonial era.

The communists (anti imperialist front) and the Republican Bothers (an intellectual pressure group) objected to the idea of the Islamic constitution. The Southerners also rejected an Islamic constitution. They wanted a secular system. Under an Islamic constitution, the southerners expected to be treated as second class citizens, deprived of doing public offices like that of the head of the state and the chief Judiciary. They also contended that the impositions of Islamic law would mean a return to the detestable days of slavery. Therefore, they threatened to secede and join one of the neighboring states. Finally they decided to boycott the deliberations of the national committee if Christianity was not recognized as a state religion on a par excellence with Islam.

1 Francis M. Deng, *Dynamics of Identification. A Basis of National Integration in the Sudan*, KUP, Khartoum, 1973, p 22.

2 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *The role of Religion*, p 210

Definition, Objectives and Purposes of Education

The establishment of the condominium administration of Egypt and Great Britain noted the beginning of the practical impact of western ideas and concepts based on secular and missionary education in the Sudan. Before the Condominium, formal education in the Northern Sudan was concerned with almost entirely with religious studies.

Education is "the organized preparation of the young persons in schools and colleges for both their personal development and their subsequent social and economic roles in the society"¹.

Oxford Dictionary defines education as "the process of training and instruction which is designed to give knowledge and develop skills"².

Education is "the social process or means by which a community, society or a nation has traditional aspects of its culture which is considered as fundamental and vital for its own stability and survival³ through which knowledge can be transferred to people with the aim of contributing to and enhancing on what they already know. Helping them to be equipped with the necessary knowledge develop themselves and their communities. Again another definition of education is given by Rogers, an Educationalist, in which he says "education is a planned process of learning undertaken by the intent, the sort of thing that commonly goes on in classrooms and that involves some who are teachers some who are taught"⁴. The importance of education as an agent for stimulating the growth and the development of the individual and the community makes it a benefit that should be accessible to all. Because of this people always hear different people from different societies at different times talk about the right to education as a basic human right. However, the right to education is always related to the issue of the obligation.

Education is the teaching or training of people especially in schools etc to improve their knowledge and develop their skills: Primary, Secondary, Higher and Adult Education. ¹

The aim of education had to be the training of students in skills, reading and writing to serve native administration.² It aims at making the student a better member of the tribe so that he could adapt to changing conditions within the context of his own familiar society.³ Education was used as the way to inculcate western values in the minds of those people whose duties were to obediently serve the occupying power. The goal of the Christian missionaries was to introduce trained teachers to all central educational bases where native teachers were available. It was aimed at elevating of the bush schools to acknowledgeable educational level and the start of a simple educational system for females.

The purpose of education in the Sudan was to provide artisans or junior staff to fill junior posts for the use of the state⁴. Through education as well as Christianity, the governments had to impose their culture. The catholic missionaries took up the takes of training artisans in return for preaching Christianity, which ended secular education in the Southern Sudan until after the second world war they were allowed to proselytize in English because they were willing to provide the educational requirements of the government in the South at their own expense while the British officials could plead lack of resources; forget education in the South, and turn to more important matters.

Education is of three types. Formal education takes place in institutions called schools, its participants are usually young people who have not yet begun their working lives. The non formal education is any organized systematic educational activities carried on outside the framework of formal system to provide selected types of learning for particular adults and children. Non formal education is a flexible programme offered on spare time. It is close to work and the life of the learners. It is meant to fill the gap and treat the justice of the distribution of the educational opportunities¹. The informal education is "a long life process by which every person acquires and accumulates knowledge, skills, attitudes and insights from daily life experience and exposure to the environment². It takes place outside any institutional framework or organised

1 *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. (7) 1995, p 97.

2 *The Illustrated Oxford Dictionary*, 1998, p 242.

3 *Colliers Grolier's Encyclopedia*. p 380

4 Rogers L. *Teaching Adults OUP*, England, 1986, p 9.

1 *Church Missionary Society, Annual Report*, 1901 - 1902, p 5

2 *Ibid*, p 6

3 Mongalla/SCR/17.J.2 *Minutes of the Educational Conference of Mongalla Province April 1932*.

4 EP/SCR/ 17.J.2 *Education in Southern Sudan*.

1 Alawia Ibrahim Faraq, *The Role of Adult Continuing Education in Human Rights* with special emphasis on equal education opportunities among the pastoral hawzma nomadic people in some selected areas of Kordufan, Ph.D Thesis, Khartoum, January 2004, p 29.

2 Donald R. Snodgrass, 1992.

programme. People learn many important things at home, job and in the general community. The government intended to super impose their culture that is, religion and language, on Southern Sudanese.

The State of Education in both the North and the South. Education in the North

The first systematic type of education started in the Sudan hundreds of years ago, The Khalwa developed as an educational institution. It was essentially for boys and was available in most places in the Sudan. There was not in the south a tradition of education, a local equivalent to the Khalwa or a religious impetus to literacy. This first type was carried out through the Islamic religious education in Khalwas. Beside, teaching the Muslims literacy and numeracy skills were provided as a basic institution for boys, which was generally recognised and welcomed by the Sudanese society⁽¹⁾. Even girls got chances in this religious education. The government was faced by the existence of hundreds of Khalwas⁽²⁾ all over the Sudan. It was feared as likely to stimulated religious zeal and fanaticism like that of the Mahdist. Khalwa is a place strict seclusion and retreat for mystical meditation, in the Islamic world and also it became a place for worship. There are two forms of education: formal education and informal education, traditional education and Khalwa as well as African beliefs. The term Faki is loosely used to me a Jurist or a Mystic or both in one and the some person. The Faki is a holy man in the Islamic world. The Faki had a distinctive and important role in Sudanese society and politics, some of them, especially the local heads of sufi orders, possessed considerable political influence. Holy men received estimates and supported the sultanate of the keira with religions teachers and notables and Fakis were exempt from taxation, in order to gain their support for the government policy.

By 1900 James Currie laid down the educational policy that the government was to follow in the Northern Sudan for the next twenty years. The educational requirements of the country were "the creation of a native artisan class, diffusion amongst the masses of the people of education efficient to enable tem to understand the merest elements of the machinery of government; and the creation of a small native administration class who will ultimately fill many minor posts.

The first government primary school was establish in Omdurman in 1900, with funds from the Gordon College

endorsement, and another was opened in Khartoum in 1901. In 1906 primary schools were opened a Berber and Wad Medani. By 1903 there were already 600 boys in primary schools and by 1914 the enrollment had risen to only 783, because the government tried to match student numbers to its estimate of the country's needs. Students had to pay fees in these schools. The primary school course lasted four years. At the age of 12 then students enter the school. The subjects taught include Arabic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Geography and History... etc.

Yet James Currie, the then director of education, who formulated the government educational policy in 1901. He initiated that Southern policy, while the ultimate objective in both the Arabicized north and the southern and pagan divisions of the country had been to devise an educational system that would assist native populations morally and materially to benefit by the changed condition of the civilized government. The methods and agencies employed had been widely separated.¹

The Sudan government up to 1920 had put less money into educational institution in the south. The missionaries had a monopoly of education of the complete exclusion of Muslim and had the government moral support and were exempt from taxes, offered free land "allotment" to them belong the credit for laying the foundations of the educational system that would be constructed later. They were sent to the south primarily to convert or even educate, but simply to be kept out of the north. They were tolerated, but they were not partners of government.

To justify neglect of the south, the Sudan government declared it unready for exposure to the forces, which come from the northern Sudanese.

The south would be closed to outsiders and was allowed to develop along indigenous lines. ¹

Education was left in the hands of Christian missionaries in the South. Education was neglected. Southern Sudan was entrusted to European missionaries as a result, during this period of development; there was a wide degree of cooperation between Sudan government and the missions. The government encouraged the establishment of new missions, and education became the most favored missionary method of evangelization.

The Southern Sudanese were uninterested² In missionary education with few exceptions because they did not know

3 UNESCO, 1981.

4 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 140.

1 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, 'Southern Sudan and Neighbors before the Colonial Era'. *Studies in Sudanese history*, p 66.

1 Daly, *Imperial Sudan; Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1934-1956*, PP 6-7.

2 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2/6 Education in Southern Sudan.

the benefits of the education. Many chiefs opposed sending their sons to mission schools. A few chiefs were openly hostile because they thought that their children would forget their cultures, norms, values and tradition.

The educational policy of the Sudan government in the south was left to the missionaries in the twentieth century. The Muslims were ready to help, but they were prevented to do so. The dearth of resources was the main factor for leaving the education of the southern Sudanese to those prepared to provide schools and teachers without charge to the government. But it was not lack of money alone but also lack of staff resulted in a Christian missionary monopoly on education. The missionaries were the recognized media of education in Southern Sudan. Elementary instruction in religion and the three 'RS' was being imparted through a series of more or less deprived of vernacular for the purpose of education. The numbers of native teachers available was manifestly inadequate. Further instruction was being given in English-often of the pidgin type was imparted by Italian teachers.³ This had facilitated the supply of local clerks for administrative and other purpose. But the limited demand of clerks, lack of funds and uncertainly as to what may eventually become a lingua franca of the region, each and all counsel the utmost caution in the provision of more intermediate or secondary schools.⁴ In February 1904 Currie declined to grant the miniscule [small] sum of thirty piaster a month to pay a teacher, on the grounds that he knew nothing about the school, he was unable to inspect it.

The Government Educational Policy Towards the South

In the southern Sudan educational development took an entirely different course, reflecting the different conditions the British found there and the priority of their religious and administrative policies⁷¹. Christian's missionaries were in favour of establishing schools since education was and goes hand with evangelization.

Cromer did open the southern Sudan to Christianity by training people in Christianity and civilization. He expected the missionaries to train literate clerks and artisans to staff. To Cromer civilization meant education. His educational objective was to pay special attention to some form of industrial and agricultural instruction. Missionary societies argued that the Sudan government policy was a betrayal of the religious aspirations of General Gordon and

in contrast to the principle of neutrality between religion approved by the British government⁸.

They also requested that the opportunity to replant Christian education was inconsistent with the welfare of the 'southerners'. A member of the House of Commons proposed that it was incumbent on Christian England to promote missionary activities in the Sudan⁹. The archbishop of Canterbury echoed the same argument. Under these pressures the Sudan government acquiesced and missionary societies were given a freehand in the area south of latitude 10N. The whole region was divided into spheres of influence among the different Christian denominations. In addition to that Sudan government and the missionary societies agreed to get rid of Islamic influences as soon as possible, and that the later groups would provide the ultimate antidote to Islamic propaganda.

There was not in the South a tradition of education similar to the North. It was to the South that missionaries had to turn their attention in the Sudan. The Catholics accepted the restriction to the South and set to work vigorously to establish themselves. On 13 December 1900, the first station was founded at Lul, near Fashoda and thereafter set up at Attigi (Tonga).

The efficient, well planned station at Lul was joined in 1903 by three religious sisters, and some instructors of the local Shilluk begun.¹

The American Presbyterian mission began work in the South in 1902. They occupied Doleib Hill in March 1902. They quickly established a working station, learned the Shilluk language, and gained a degree of trust through their skilled medical work. Some teaching was undertaken, and by 1905 a few boys were being instructed in crafts and in reading and writing Shilluk. In 1905 Canadian Methodists approached Owen, the Sudan Agent in Cairo, for permission to work in the Bahr al Ghazal. They were rejected because they were considered as the horrible fanatical canting kind of missionary and undesirable. Having struggled so long to establish itself in the Sudan, the Christian missionary society was slow to begin work in the North. This was because of the financial limitations that beset the organization. Between 1906 and 1918 the challenges to the work of the CMS in the Southern Sudan were many and varied. They lacked the resources that is why they were inadequate to fill the expanding mission field in the world in general and the Southern Sudan in

3 Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, p 250.

4 EP/SCR/17.A.2, *Education Problems in Sudan*.

1 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2/6 *Education in Southern Sudan*.

8 Muhammad Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, London Khartoum 1968, pp 13-14.

9 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Role of Religion in North-South Conflict, with Especial Reference to Islam" *Studies in Sudanese History*, pp 207-229.

1 *Church Missionary Society, Annual Report*, 1901 - 1902, p 2

particular the educational policy in the Sudan was left to the missionaries because of lack of resources and were prepared to provide schools and teachers without charge of the government. As a result, they were able to monopolize education.²

From 1898 and 1920, work began in Sudan and there were four missionary society in operation such as Roman Catholic Church, Church Missionary Societies, American Presbyterians, and Sudan United Mission

Catholic Schools

All the missions in the southern Sudan attempted in some way-through education, industrial mission, and medical care, agriculture and so on to proclaim the gospel in a way. The Catholic Missionaries had entered the Sudan during the Turkiya. In 1842 a Catholic Church and school had a brief existence at Khartoum and in 1846, the Vicariate of central Africa was established. The Catholics were mostly Italians and Austrians of background, while Protestants were mainly lower 'middle class Britons and Americans' of a fundamentalist outlook, single-minded and earnest. British officials, from Cromer down, were almost to a man Anglicans, and almost as overwhelmingly pragmatists. The Protestants were treated little better.¹ The British element, both military and civilian, in the condominium rule was always numerically weak. In 1871 Charles Gordon as Governor of Equatoria, requested Christian Missionaries to operate in his province.

The educational policy of the catholic mission was civilization through learning and work, meant to prepare the way to the Christian religion². The catholic missionaries believed that education should be designed for the propagation of Christianity.

The Roman Catholic accepted the restriction and set to work vigorously to establish them. They set out for the south on 13th December 1900. They used a steamer, their first station was founded at Lul, near Fashoda and another was immediately thereafter set up at Attiga [Tonga].

The Verona Fathers started in February 11th 1901. Three religious sisters joined the efficient, well-planned station at Lul in 1903, and some instruction of the local Shilluk was begun.

Problems were encountered in winning the confidence of Shilluk and British officials, neither of whom welcomed the

priest. Jackson, the first commandant at Fashoda, held that converting the blacks to Christianity would 'ruin' them.³

In 1904 Governor Boulnois opened a school at Wau in Bahr al Ghazal for the sons of soldiers and any sons of civilians who wished to attend. In 1904 bishop Geyer⁴ went to Wau at the invitation of the Governor, Boulnois Bey, and quickly established stations at chief Kayango's village and at Mbili.

Boulnois Bey had already started a school at Wau in 1903 for the sons of soldiers and officials, with an Egyptian official as master.

There were, by November 1904, 29 boys enrolled, taught in Arabic by a Muslim. But of these all professed Islam and most spoke 'Arabic', so that Wingate's apprehensions seem misplaced by not observing the fact that Arabic had already spread in the south.

Bishop Geyer was asked at the end of 1904 to take over the school, and was permitted to establish a station at Wau.¹ In 1905 the Wau School had 47 pupils, which in 1905-6 received an annual subvention and occasional special grants from the government. In 1906 a separate, academic class was established. This academic school by 1911 had 24 pupils. Schools established at Tonga, Kayanga and Lul had by 1911 some 49 students among them.²

Boulnois applied to James Currie, the Director of Education, for a small sum to support the school. The funds were denied because James Currie was sufficiently acute to perceive that education in the southern Sudan posed large and difficult and, until the government has as a whole decided what its general policy was going to be. It was far better to do nothing.³ He was prepared to grant Boulnois £E10 for 'experimental purpose' but made it quite clear that he was not at all keen in propagating Islam in non Islamic countries.⁴

Wingate did prefer to leave all that in the hands of the missionaries. That was his position as the government.

Despite this decision, they took the work of training artisans in return for preaching Christianity. Wingate regarded this as an equitable arrangement. Meanwhile, the school was never begun. When Boulnois Bey died, his successors were hardly encouraged by Wingate's attitude. As for the Muslim children, they could attend, with the consent of their parents, the technical school operated by the missionaries.

2 *Ibid*, p 3

1 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2/6 *Education in Southern Sudan*.

2 *Ibid*, p 200.

3 EP/ SCR/ 17.A.2 *Educational Problem of the Sudan*.

4 EP/ SCR/ 46.A *Missions*.

1 *Church Missionary Society, Annual Report, 1901 - 1902*. p 8

2 Daly, *The Empire on the Nile*, p 252.

3 Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p 317.

4 EP/SCR/17.A.2 *Education Problems in Sudan*.

Western Education and ideas were offered in schools as an integral part of very mission station⁵ Many chiefs resisted sending their sons to mission school. With the exception of the sons of some of the Azande chiefs, the students who attended the mission schools, both catholic and Protestant, were invariably the outcasts and misfits of southern Sudanese society-orphans, refugees and the abandoned.⁶

The British officials constantly encouraged chiefs to send their sons to the missionary schools and in some instances employed outright intimidation. There were suspicions and doubts about the effectiveness of the Italian missionaries of the Verona Fathers in teaching to Africans. The missionaries expressed these suspicions and doubts.

The officials believed that education should be designed to fulfill the needs of the alien administration¹ David Oyler, a missionary expert, in the language and customs of the Shilluk organized in 1909 classes at various times for different groups: woman, girls and workers². His mission was to master language and preach the gospel within the local culture.³ The way to win the Shilluk, he believed, was through the mature Shilluk, not the children. By 1913 the Catholic schools had an overall enrolment of about one hundred. The Roman Catholic who felt most the impact of the world war most compared with missionaries. Nevertheless there was a strong feeling in the British and Italian communities that the missionaries should be expelled. The station at Lul and Tonga temporary shut down⁴. Recruitment for pupils had ceased the raising of the Bahr al Ghazal from the status of a prefecture (which it became in 1914) to a vicariate apostolic in 1917 eased restrictions there.

So the industrial school did ever more advanced work and the academic course offered a curriculum including English, Arabic, Mathematics, Geography and History over four years in 1910. Some boys were given a further one-year intermediate course. In 1919 the Verona Fathers established a mission at Gondokoro, which was later moved to Rejaf East where they began an elementary school and a course for training artisans. It was estimated that by 1920 about 300 students were enrolled in catholic schools.

Stations were opened also at Loa in Madi country in 1921 Torit in 1920, in Acholi country in 1923 and briefly, among the Didinga at Nagichot. The Tonga station, closed since 1916, was re-opened in 1920 and another Shilluk station was established at Detwok in 1925. In Zandeland a station

was founded at Yubu in 1923. In 1924, Wau School was founded. Between 1920 and 1925 the number of schools in the South increased from 15 to 27, while the number of pupils rose from about 500 to 700. In 1923, Detwok was opened by German speaking missionaries who had been entrusted to Upper Nile by Bishop Geyer. The missionaries were not able to return from the Wartime internment in Alexandria until 1923. Italian missionaries kept Lul in the measure. Tonga however, was closed then when the mission split; the Germans left and went South Africa. All these changes meant that there was little forward progress in the catholic missions in Upper Nile. The Catholic first missionaries in Dinka was at Kwajok and Nuer country was started at Yoynyang.¹ In 1925, Yoynyang was also opened, it is just a few miles from Bentiu on the north bank of the Bahr al Arab and was the first Catholic station among the Nuer.

In 1930 Roman Catholic began a normal school to train teachers at Torit², the first school in the southern Sudan. This is actually, true that certain individuals were interested in spreading the gospel to the ends of the earth by preaching and teaching it. It began as movements of the spiritual individuals and in special groups. But it was wrong to try to impose their religion on the local inhabitants by repressive and persuasive measures.

Schools of the British Protestants

The Church Missionary Society had established Gordon Memorial Mission, dedicated to evangelizing the Sudanese, which functioned for a season at Suakin in 1890. In 1898, even before the fall of Omdurman, the CMS approached the Residency for permission to enter the Sudan. The CMS station near Bor had been the scene of internal wrangling over evangelization policy. A brief experience of interaction among the Dinka was a failure, and by 1907 there was talk of giving up and moving to Uganda. This Wingate countered by threatening to dispose of their sphere. At Malek, a new station was established, but disease took its toll and in 1908 the one remaining missionary went on leave. Bishop Gwynne himself accused the CMS of great folly and was unhappy in the way the society had ignored his pleas. The schools of the British Protestant, CMS had failed in their work when they were compared with those of the Catholics³. At Malek, the society started an unpromising view in the field of education and they started late. Each mission was in effect

5 EP/SCR/ 17.J.2 Education in Southern Sudan.

6 *Ibid*, p 199.

1 Church Missionary Society, Annual Report, 1901 - 1902. p 10

2 Daly, *The Empire on the Nile*, p, 254.

3 *Ibid*, p 258.

4 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2/6 Education in Southern Sudan.

1 Nasr al-Hag Ali, "Educational Problems in the Sudan" SNR, vol. 41, 1960, p 66.

2 EP/ SCR/ 46.A Missions.

3 Church Missionary Society, Annual Report. 1901- 1902. p 4

a school, but the core of instruction remained more religious than technical to the perpetual annoyance of the British district commissioners⁴. By October 1908 work at Malek had commenced, and a reading class of between 20 and 30 boys, some practice instruction and small dispensaries were all underway. By 1910 the school had 45 pupils. Expansion of Protestant Education by contrast was slow.

In February 1913 the Church Missionary Society was able finally to establish itself near Yambio. During the World War I the CMS finally enrolled in different southern schools quite number of students. Of the quality of the education that had been received, little is known¹.

But missionaries insisted that unless the provincial Governors encouraged the employment of English speaking natives, it was a waste of time to teach English. Wingate refuted the charges of supporting missionaries, repeating that the missionaries held the future in their own hands. Indeed officials were convinced that the missionaries, Protestant and especially, Catholic, did little to instill the virtue and habits necessary to withstand Islamic influence². The conduct of all members of the protestants had been remarkably discreet Stack, Willis and Bonham Carter, therefore recommended that all German and Austrian members of the mission be withdrawn from the stations at Dilling in Nuba mountains, and Tonga and Lul in the Upper Nile Province.

The committee was divided as to the disposal of the missionaries at other stations: Stack and Willis thought that all should go, Bonham Carter said that they should be allowed to stay. Only Dilling, Lul and Tonga were evacuated³.

In 1916, after a report by the British Foreign Office, Wingate restricted Australian missionaries⁴. The CMS opened a station at Yei in 1917⁵. (By 1917 there were already about 60 enrolled in the CMS school at Yambio. After the First World War the first station CMS Mongalla province was Rejaf founded in 1919 from Uganda. Torit and Loa in 1920, Nagicot in 1924 (abandoned when the place ceased to be a government station in 1927) followed this Lerus in 1925 and Isoke and Okaru in 1926 and 1929 Toposa in 1934⁶. The educational efforts of the CMS in the

Wingate years were dismal, constricted by dearth of money and they contributed financially

In 1920, a boarding school for boys was opened at Juba. In 1920, the southern Governors recommended that the department of education should appoint an inspector and paid by the Sudan government to reside in the south to assist and supervise teachers. In response the chief inspector of schools chose the Bahr al Ghazal and upper Nile in 1920¹. E.R.J Hussey, the chief inspector of school favored two provinces of upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal. His concept of education for the southern Sudan was limited to character building in schools organized on Boy Scout lines².

In the south there was therefore still little confidence that the people are being equipped to stand up for themselves as socially and economically equal to their partners in the north. This policy is accepted by a few northerners, whom they observe being given more and more control of the reins of government³.

Education during the 1920s and 1930s was higher on the colonial agenda in Africa. In 1921-24, the Phelps Stocks commission was sent by the Foreign Office to study education in Africa, and given practical guidelines by Christian groups. That was why they paid a visit to the Sudan. They traveled all over Africa. They found colonial governments who were giving at most 4 per cent of their budgets to education⁴. Government should set a standard for education and should help finance it In education, the experience that the knowledge of language and culture to be effective noted by missions⁵. The basic aim was to improve African rural life through teaching African Language to develop itself. The missionaries utilized the platform to keep the memory of the Arab slave trade alive⁶. The Church Missionary Society was able to open only two new stations between 1921 and 1929, at Lui and Maridi. The Opari station was abandoned in 1921, and that at Malek was maintained only with great difficulty. Maridi had to close between 1924 and 1927 of lack of staff. It was stated that no direct or in any way conclusive evidence had been found to indicate that any member of the mission had contravened the condition under which they were allowed to remain in the country. In 1940, the CMS School at Lui was a small boarding school housed in a few grasses here.

4 File No. 17. J. 18, *Colonial Office Educational Commission*, 1937. p 5

1 UNP/File No. I.A.I.

2 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2/6 *Education in Southern Sudan*

3 *Church Missionary Society, Annual Report*, 1901 - 1902. p 1

4 *Ibid*, p. 5.

5 EP/ SCR/ 17.J.2 *Education in Southern Sudan*

6 UNP/File No.I.A.I *Province Handbook*

1 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 202.

2 *Ibid*, p 200.

3 Douglas H. Johnson, *British Documents on the end of Empire* series B. vol. 5, Sudan part I 1942-1950, p 39.

4 EP/SCR/1.A.3

5 *Church Missionary, Annual Report*, 1901- 1902. p 8

6 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Interaction between traditional and Western Education in Sudan*, pp 111 - 130

The mission subventions increased from £E13,850 in 1941 to £E26, 650 in 1946. In the south percent allocated was steadily declined.

The American Presbyterian Schools

The American Presbyterians established a working station, learned the Shilluk language, and gained a degree of trust through their skilled medical work¹⁰. Some teaching was undertaken, and by 1905 a few boys were being instructed in crafts and reading and writing in Shilluk Language².

In 1906, the Mission Association, the annual business and spiritual assembly of the mission, the Sudan government of Wingate ordered that Arabic should not be used in Doleib Hill. Arabic was the first language in use in Doleib Hill before other languages Missionaries also tried to limit Arabic by preventing use of Arabic dress. Doleib Hill mission, as early 1906, decided to stop using Arabic for teaching the Shilluk. There was a definite policy of spreading the Word of the Gospel. Shilluk families who were willing not only to work for the mission but also to send their children for religious instruction were invited to live in huts in the mission compound and were provided with clothes and rations³. There were, by February 1905, five boys of the 'Shilluk' were receiving instruction. There was however still strong resistance to academic education. Shilluk children were warned by their parents to have nothing to do wrong, which they considered as the work of the evil one⁴. The American missionaries did not add a new station until 1913, at Nasir. Doleib Hill began as an industrial mission. It aimed at teaching Shilluk how to work and make profit in the present world. Industrial mission was a common concept in those days and almost every mission included it in their programme.

Thus Christian missionaries in the Southern Sudan became the only education institutions. Therefore they were the only source for the government to find skilled labour and the only vehicle through which the southerners could acquire the education for a life other than the customary working of the land or grazing of stock. But industrial mission was successful as a strategy for training Shilluk in the Doleib Hill environment. By 1918 the American mission had no more than 20 pupils. Some instruction was given in reading and writing in Shilluk and English. There has been in Southern policy as early as 1919 a British

design for the eventual Independence of the South from the North

By 1921 the Americans had but 112 boys undergoing academic training at Doleib Hill, and the educational work began at Nasir in 1916 had made little progress.¹¹ In 1922 Governor A.C Willis of Upper Nile persuaded the Reth of the Shilluk and the chiefs to collect 30 boys for each one of three school: Lul, Tonga and Detwok of the mission-a total of 90 new boys. The 90 students quickly melted because no payment was made to any student for any work. Bishop Sylvester, responsible for Upper Nile, gave a new order². This was to give no payment to any student at all. Dinka prophet revolted and was suppressed. His revolt was properly put down after the suppression of this movement; the British authorities asked Verona fathers to extend their work from Wau northward among the Dinka. However, the people of Kwajok were asked to bring their children to school. British officers urged the chiefs to start with their own children. So convincing others to send their children, education became very popular among the Bahr al Ghazal Dinka people in the years after the Second World War³.

In 1922 S. Hillelson, then a lecturer of Gordon College was sent to visit the south so that he could report on education in Mongalla, he disapproved of much that he saw there. He recommended continuing dependence on the missionaries, but with greater government control over the locations of schools, the numbers of students, the curriculum, and the appointment of teachers, preferably Arabic speaking Christians. He further recommended government subsidies and the appointment of an inspector of education for the south.

Dr. Alfred Heasty, American Presbyterian Missionary, advocated boys' education. He prepared the teachers to do their own job when he was away on duty or leave. In 1925, Alfred Heasty returned to the United States and he left teachers behind who would take full responsibility.

La Amoloker, a Shilluk of Doleib Hill, developed as a good teacher. In Nasir, school also began and developed well. Nasir likely had the best school in Upper Nile. The school also reached out to Anuak children and occasional Murle as well. It gained the confidence of the government administration, who sent Annual and Murle boys from Akobo and Pibor for schooling. The Nasir school system not only had some village schools, but planted an out-

10 Church Missionary, *Annual Report*, 1901- 1902. p 8

2 Daly, *Empire on the Nile, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1898-1934*, Cambridge, 1986, p 252.

3 Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan 1898-1964*, Ithaca, press, London and Khartoum, 1981, p 37.

4 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, pp 90-91.

11 Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*. P. 237

2 *Ibid*, p 307.

3 Sanderson, L " Educational Development in Southern Sudan 1900-1948" *SNR* vol.43, 1962 P 105.

school at Akobo among the Dinka. This was under the direction of Joel Gilo, two years before the mission was opened there¹. The American mission was very slow to extend in the south due to large over expenditures, the missions of the Presbyterian church had annually reductions from 1926-1936. Since 1926 the missions had received modest resources to provide trained southerners for government offices. Eventually in 1926 the mission schools were subsidized by the government; the theory was that they should give education to all regardless of religion, but in practice the Southern Sudanese had to become Christian to gain any education at all².

Sudan United Mission Schools

The Sudan United Mission [SUM] and CMS in Paloich, at Malek and at Nuba Mountains used to pay their students in order to persuade them to attend schools. Thus the government and the missions had laid the ground for the development of modern education in the southern Sudan.

The British officials were interested in language culture. More important, Mongalesses or pidgin, Arabic used in the south was a 'Vile Jargon' incapable of writing unintelligible to the greater world of Arabic learning and useless as a means of communication³.

In 1930 a major decision had been taken that determined the development of education in the southern Sudan for the remaining years of the condominium and to provide the educational counterpart called 'Southern policy'. The details were embodied in a 1930 memorandum that included the replacement of northern Sudanese personnel by southerners and the use of English in communication. With the adoption of these policies the seeds of the north-south conflict were sown and the basis for separating the two regions was laid⁴.

The 'Southern policy' was an extension of the principles of native administration to the three southern provinces.

Beyond that there was also fear to the political consequences of the spread of Islam into non-Muslim areas.

The advent of the depression virtually stopped the growth for schools and teaching of students in education¹. Between 1930 and 1938, the number of boys elementary vernacular schools increased only from 29 to 34, with a average students population of some 2,700, while the subventions

averaged £8,700 annually or approximately 8.5 percent of the average annual expenditure of the education during these years². The majority of British officials serving in the south between 1930 and 1946 including the provincial Governors also saw service in the north³. The training was usually for two years, post-elementary education's. This mission finally agreed with Cox to take over the Sudan United Mission school at Malut and to establish up to four other schools among the northern Dinka and among the Maban and the Uduk on the Ethiopian frontier.

In 1939 the missionary society took over Malut and also established its own stations among the northern Dinka; at Abiayat for the Paloich and at Bangjang, not far south of Renk [the frontier of Islam in the region] for the northern most Dinka tribe, the Abialang⁴. In August 1940, however, disaster struck when Italian aviators bombed the station at Doro, killing two missionaries including the mission doctor, and wounding others. The station was then evacuated by government order, and reoccupation was not permitted until April 1941⁵. Meanwhile, Malut School had been reopened in August 1941 with 40 boys, and by September 1942 there was a beginner class at Bangjang. In 1942 the mission received a grant of 500 for its Dinka schools. Relations with the government improved. In 1943 the roll of Malut School was almost halved, when the chiefs failed to bring forth any new boys.

Inspector For Education

J.W Crowfoot, Assistant Director of education, was pressurized by the central government to satisfy close cooperation, supervision or even financial subsidies whereby they could train southerners to perform these elementary clerical clerks. In 1926 he soon to retire as director of education visited Mongalla and the Bahr al-Ghazal.

He proposed the appointment of a government educational officer for each sphere, who would inspect the schools and their personnel, recommend future advances and most importantly supervised teacher training. He also proposed establishing advisory committee in each province, representing the government and the missionaries, to exercise general supervision over educational work. In April 1924 Hussey, Assistant Director of Education went south once more to report on how best to accomplish the objective. In 1924, Hussey memorandum stated that

1 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2/6 Education in Southern Sudan.

2 O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret War in the Sudan*, London, 1977, p 28.

3 CS/SCR/ 17.A.2/6 Education in Southern Sudan.

4 *Education in the Northern Sudan*, Khartoum 1934

1 UNP/ SCR/ 1.B.2 A General Policy for the Southern Sudan.

2 EP/SCR/17.A.2/6 Education Progress and Policy in Southern Sudan, 1932.

3 UNP/ SCR/ 5.A.1/3 History Notes and Instructions.

4 Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in the Southern Sudan 1899-1964*, p 240.

5 Ministry of Education, *Annual Reports of the Education Department*, 1928 - 1957/ 58

English should now become the language of the educated southerner, the government openly proclaiming English as the official language. It stated that the government should provide direct official subsidies to the missions for education. The combination of the Closed District System Indirect and Education Policy encouraged and increased the differentiation of North from South, which had already existed. Thus Southern policy entailed both the progressive separation of the South and the fostering particulars within it. As in the North, the aim of policy was the cessation or reversal of trends toward homogeneity¹. On the one hand, this would continue the policy of leaving education to the missions, but on the other hand would permit the government to intervene to raise the very poor standards of missionary education.²

At MacMicheal's direction, in the spring of 1925 he had begun to prepare a plan for the government to get control of southern education through financial support and supervision of the missions. In 1926 he became the civil secretary. He shared this view. In August 1928 he wrote a memorandum on Arabic and the southern Sudan that was in effect a manifesto for the as-yet unnamed southern policy. Arguments favouring the spread of Arabic were superficially attractive but ultimately spurious, he claimed. Far better for all would be development of local vernacular, and officials who were conversant in them. In 1929, Sir John Maffey the Governor-General, MacMichael and J.G Mathew looked to a future decreasing dependence on the missionaries. They decided to introduce the government schools into educational developments of the southern Sudan as the only solution. In 1929 MacMichael argued against the spread of Arabic into southern Sudan on intellectual grounds, for it meant the spread of Arab thought, Arab culture and Arab religion. He argued that Islam had reached a stage of worldwide stagnation. Arab culture in the south was associated with slavery and the spread of Islamic fanaticism would endanger security.

An assistant director for education, to be resident at Juba, was appointed to supervise educational development. The inspector for education of the south was appointed in 1926 having financed a government school in the Italian catholic sphere, the government that found similar aids in the form of subsidy for the CMS intermediate school at Juba.

J.G. Mathew, the director of education and health, had exhorted the DCS to use all their influence and persuasive

powers to get southern chiefs and parents to send their children to school despite the official reservations concerning the quality of mission education. The British officials in the Sudan were not hostile to education. They wanted to train subjects to serve loyally and conscientiously.

In Upper Nile, both Renk and Malakal, schools were maintained that were 'northern' where Arabic was the system of school in the northern Sudan.¹ A.C. Willis, the new Governor, arrived at Malakal in 1926. The Italian missionaries had their two schools at Lul and Tonga, insisted that compulsion be employed to enforce attendance and the missions proscription of Shilluk customs, dancing dress, hairdressing-practiced by the students.² In fact, Shilluk education was only given its real impetus by the four years of famine at the beginning of the 1930s, when any Shilluk youth could find a good square meal for the price of God and literacy. The school at Melut was a failure and had only one part-time Shilluk student. The main fault lie in type of man engaged in the work.³

A school at Malakal that had been begun by H.C. Jackson, deputy Governor-General, ultimately proved a quite failure. Moreover, E.R Hussey did not foresee much future in technical training. Since there had been no development after twenty years of the British presence in the south, it is useless to fill the country with trained artisans, from schools if there is no opportunity to practice their skills.

In the south the missions had failed to establish any system beyond some two dozen elementary, vernacular schools where the curriculum was predominantly evangelism.

Education for the south was discussed on March 13th 1926, in a meeting that was convened at Juba among other matters. The Juba meeting was the most significant milestone in the history of education in the southern Sudan during the condominium rule. The Sudan government had accepted the principles of financial and supervisory responsibilities for education in 1926-27.

The missionaries were able to pay small salaries for teachers. They were like the government that could maximize their educational struggle to satisfy the needs of the administration, while providing opportunity to proselytize Christianity in the south, which was the primary purpose of the missionaries.¹

1 David R. Morrison Derek Swatman, "Education and Politics in Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 16, March, 1978, No. 1, PP 108-170.

2 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 202.

1 Ministry of Education, *Annual Report of the Education Department*, 1928 - 1957/ 58. p 6

2 *Ibid*, p 8

3 *Ibid*, p 10

1 Sanderson, L. "A Survey of Material Available for the Study of Education Development in the Modern Sudan, 1900-1963" *SNR*, vol. XLIV Double No. 1, Khartoum, 1963, pp 102-143.

Thus, the missionaries constantly urged the Governors not to raise the salaries of government workers in excess of the southern Sudanese mission teachers.² To do so would disrupt the Church monopoly and introduce competition between the school and government official. Those British officials who did advocate the increase in usage were continuously checked by the necessity to link government wages to the scales for teachers in the missionaries. Thus the scale of work became chained to the lowest common denomination.³ These British officials did not see contradiction in seeking to institute a system of education that was practical knowing the power of education the men of the political service were acutely conscious that it requires careful thinking and feeling.

An equally important element of that policy was Southern education, which had always been the province of the various missionary societies. From 1926 grants-in-aid were made to Southern schools. The impact of government grants was one factor in educational expansion, others were an apparently increasing desire of southerners for the education available, and growing realization that education could lead to employment. Education was one aspect of that policy; language and religion were also important. Indeed the government had adopted its educational aims largely as a means by which to cut off northern Muslim and Arab influence in the south, as a precondition for undisturbed Native Administration.

Language for Education 1927-1948

The language is the agent or medium by which men and women communicate their thoughts to one another

John Maffey, Governor General, was having an urgent priority in 1927 that, was more and better education for the south. Southern education had been supplemented by government institutions. This took place under the condominium that it had been in the hands of foreign missionaries.

The missionary schools, in 1927, were subsidized and, after the second world war they were supplemented by government institutions¹.

In 1927, the first government inspectors of southern education were appointed. Two inspectors of education were appointed in 1927 and 1928, but systematic grants-in-aid to elementary schools did not commence until 1929. The government sent educational inspectors there.

Education conferences were established for mission and government education's to implement the policy of cooperation. These educational conferences were mostly held at Rejaf.² Language and education were obviously closely tied. All this led to the second Rejaf conference called the language conference. Rejaf Intermediate School was founded but later moved to Okaru. This led to the selection of six languages to be employed instruction an appropriately textbooks were as a result prepared. The six language groups that were designated included Bari, Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka, Latuka and Azande. Its purpose was that most educated southerners saw education as a means of getting a government job or to reach a higher level of education. Education in English opened opportunities for the future for southern Sudanese.

The meeting signaled better cooperation between government and missions. Technical schools were classified into sub-grade, elementary, primary or intermediate, agricultural or industrial.³ By the late 1920s there was finally both general agreement on the desirability of checking Arabicization and the political will to attempt this.

At the Rejaf language conference the government recorded its decision against Arabic as a *Lingua Franc*. Mathew, the director of education and health, viewed the standard of Arabic in south as in any case very low, and he and others evinced a distaste for it quite beyond political objections. It was wrong to adopt a language which was neither that of the ruling or the ruled, Mathew decided. It was a horrible jargon: he would not inflict on the region. English was used as second language after the vernacular.

Governor Wheatley was determined to use English as the official language in the Bahr al Ghazal despite the fact that Arabic was generally spoken in Wau.

If English were superimposed on the vernacular languages, Arabic would wither and die out.¹ In fact nothing has taken place. By 1928 the American mission finally agreed to ask for subsidies. In Upper Nile, the Verona Fathers always paid their students come to school. By 1930 there were 32 and in the same period intermediate schools using English increased from one, with 35 students to three, with 177. Dr. A.C. Tucker of University College, London, was appointed in 1928 as linguistic expert on a preparation of textbook committee. He worked in the southern Sudan on the preparation of text from 1929 to 1931.

2 Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 238.

3 *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle-East and North Africa*, 1988, p 415.

1 Mongalla/ SCR/ 1.A.1 *General Administrative Policy 1910-1928*.

2 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2/6 *Education in Southern Sudan*.

3 EP/ SCR/ 17.A.2 *Educational Problems in the Sudan*.

1 J.G. Mathew, 'Arabic and the Southern Sudan, June 24, 1928', *Lord Lloyd to Henderson*, 1929, p 6.

General Conference of Education

Mr. Hunter, resident inspector for southern provinces, made several attempts to make the Mongalla annual meeting more representatives of the entire south but it was not until 1933 that the first educational conferences for the whole of the south took place. In the same period, the British administrators redefined their southern policy or separating the north from the south. Education in the southern Sudan was not sufficiently worthy to see. Too little, too late, too confused-literature education in the southern Sudan had no impact in the Wingate era.² In 1932, Mr. R.K. Winter became director of education. He made further attempts to integrate missionary educational work more closely into the general policy of the government. Mr. Winter's policy was to concentrate on vernacular schools continuing to limit intermediate education to government and professional requirement. In his vision of the internal future of the southern Sudan-utilitarian and economical the mission monopoly of education, so warmly sustained and praised by the director of education, who succeeded Mathew in 1932. Symes was the Governor-General by that time. In 1932, intermediate education was the highest form in the south and there was no secondary school in the southern Sudan. The school could be identified with the tribe.

The missionaries claimed that agricultural, manual work and religion should be taught in the vernacular and consequently secular subject would be harmless. They brought teachers from Malek, but they could only get students if the government officers put pressure on chiefs to send children. The British believed that the Sudan united mission [SUM] did not organize or supervise their schools properly.

In 1933, the first general conference of education was held for the whole south.¹ There was now only one educational inspector for the whole south, resident at Lainya on the Yei road some 70 miles from Juba.² Thus in 1933, the government looked at the mission schools to fit the ordinary individual into his environment. Education that encouraged the recipient to cease his social unit was wrong. Thus the pace of education had to be restricted to the pace of material development.

In 1935, the Italians invaded Ethiopia. This had altered the balance of power in Africa, and the Egyptians became restless at the continuing presence of British troops in

Sudanese capital, Khartoum. In 1936, following the Italian invasion, it became very clear that they could soon be compelled to leave Ethiopia. So Dr. Tom Lambie sought a new field in Sudan. Dr. Lambie had good relation with the British authorities in Sudan, so he had been making the negotiations.³

By 1936 Symes, Governor-General, like Maffey, had retreated from his plans for development envisaged when he first arrived at the place two years before in 1934⁴. Sudan had now been put on a care and maintenance basis, of which the objective was to spend as little money as possible in the force of an annual operating deficit £E 250,000.⁵

Schools would cost money he had no intention of spending in the Bog Baron (ex-soldiers of political service).

Christopher W.M.Cox, the new director of education in the Sudan, recommended the employment of trained European teachers to all pivoted educational post.

They should be mostly British and should be provided with staff of trained missionary educationalists. The government should provide money for buildings and equipment and provisions. Greater supervision would of course, be needed and would require a third inspector of education for the south. No longer were there any appeals to make a better tribesman or fears of the half-educated man. 1946 did not achieve the goals envisaged by Cox. This was, indeed given the exigencies of war, the educational development was not achieved.

As the war prevented the recruitment of British to train southern teachers or the sending of Italian missionaries to London for language and teacher training educational development centered on increasing grants-in-aid, girls education and the contradictions inherent in the concept of group languages.¹

By 1937, the Sudan government policy was committed to education, the Sudan Interior Mission had no hospitals, no boarding schools and only few elementary schools.

They did stress literacy, and they taught people how to read. Centralization of education control serves integration, orderly procedure, the inform appreciation of standards and innovation from the top. It allows for distribution of resources across settings between the poor and the rich and the backwards and advanced²

2 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 200.

1 File No. 17.J. 17. *Educational Conferences, Meetings and Courses*, 1927 - 1933

2 EP/1/9/47, *Mongalla Province Summary*.

3 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 231.

4 *Ibid*, p 230.

5 *Ibid*, p 232.

1 EP/ SCR/ 17.A.3 *William Report 1936 on Education*.

² *International Encyclopedia of education*, p 5110.

De la Warr Educational Commission

The De la war report of 1937 included recommendations for education in the southern Sudan. It recommended the development of education within the existing system but expressed the view that mission teachers should be trained at the London institute of education or should follow the diploma course in education established by a recognized institute.³ The commission concluded that the disappointing results of southern education had been due to lack of sufficient trained educators, lack of organization and planning and the absence of a common language for vernacular education.⁴

The CMS lacked funds to increase their numbers of trained teachers. The commission recommended too that there should be an intermediate school in Upper Nile province and a full secondary school in the south.

In 1938, the Mill Hill Fathers under a British superior, the Italian Apostolic prefect in the Bahr al Jabal were introduced into Upper Nile province [UNP] after high level

negotiations between London and the Vatican. They lacked the long experience of the Verona fathers with Nilotics. The Shilluk disliked new faces of anyone. They were suspicious with the Verona fathers, this led to the suspicious aloofness with which they had greeted the Verona fathers a generation earlier.

In 1939, the mission at Akot had experienced a revival, which brought in many more adults. The annual report of the resident inspector of education outlines a plan to improve the training of teachers and for general expansion. More teachers were to be trained for elementary vernacular schools. Syllabus was to be revised to conform to more uniform plan.

An educational commission¹ was to visit the CMS to make recommendations.² Although the war slowed down these plans, nevertheless these efforts led to higher educational standards and gave southern boys better chances of eventually obtaining missionary education. Boy's education continued to expand as the following table shows

Grade	No. of schools in 1928	Attendance in 1928	No. of schools in 1948	Attendance in 1948
Elementary	27	1,420	45	5,328
Secondary	3 ³	130	3	359

Girl's Education all over the South:

The arrival at Wau of five religious sisters in 1912 allowed the beginning of girl's education in the Bahr al Ghazal.⁴ Girl's education was the most difficult work because parents were reluctant to send girls to school, and as a result it lagged behind boys education by ten or twenty years. In 1932 over 850 boys were being educated in the elementary schools. There were three trade schools, the CMS, Loka school and the catholic schools at Wau and Torit.⁵

There were two Catholic teacher-training centers at Mupoi and Torit. In 1932 there were 263 bush schools attended by 7,500 children. From 1931 to 1938 there was little or no encouragement of education in the Upper Nile, the least developed of the three southern provinces.¹

He warned that in the pursuit of low-paid, educated clerks, the government was unwilling directing mission education toward producing semi-educated, detribalized natives who would look upon employment as a right education guaranteed by government. No longer was the department of education concerned with shaping education into each tribal structure so that the educated tribesman would be better and more useful member of the tribe.² A similar situation existed in Wau and Juba. But in 1932 the fear of education too much, and Winter, Director of Education and Health, sought to shape educational policy in the southern Sudan in order to blend education more with the policy of native administration of the sixth educational conference held at Juba in April 1932. In 1933, a school was built for girls at Dolieb Hill.

3 EP/ SCR/ 17.D.5 Girls intermediate- General Reports.

4 S.G. *Reports of the De La Commission of 1937.*

1 Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 17.A.1 *Mission and Education, 1928-1956.*

2 Revised plan for education in the Southern Provinces.

3 CS/SCR/ 17.A.2/6 *Education in southern Sudan.*

4 File No. 17. D. 5. *Girls' Education - General Reports, 1940 - 1953.*

5 *Ministry of Education, Annual Reports, 1928 - 1957/ 58*

1 Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 17.A.1 *Mission and Education, 1928-1956.*

2 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p. 229.

This was after Elsie Grove, the inspector of Opari district, visited Doleib Hill. She decided to accept the challenge, girls were unthinkable for the inhabitants, who were only just beginning to accept the education of their boys. So Elsie Grove turned from girls education to female education. She taught health and hygiene. She left the girls school building and taught under trees, eventually forming a large network of classes avidly. There was no formal examination. The Sudan government's experiment of education in the southern Sudan had ended in an incalculable failure from which it looks another decade to recover. By 1933 there were intermediate schools, the CMS school at Loka and the Roman Catholic School at Okaru in Mongalla province and the Bussere Roman Catholic School in Bahr al Ghazal. There were 33 boys' elementary schools with a total attendance of 2,613 students and 11 girl's schools.³

The expansion of girl's education was lower owing to the disinclination of parents to send their daughters to school. The proposal was adopted of schools for girls where there was a minimum of 10 boarders. The government then provided a grant of 30 per annum for a girl's school. If the minimum of 10 girls were attending the boy's school a grant of 20 was allocated some boy's elementary schools.⁴

The number of Verona fathers in mission schools increased and two Roman catholic teachers training schools were opened at Kator and Mupoi for girls during this period.¹

The American Presbyterian mission girl's schools at Nasir and Doleib Hill were for Nuer and Shilluk girls respectively. At Nasir some girls had previously attended the boy's school. Eight girls were reported to be studying in this school in 1930.²

In 1939 sir Douglas Newbold became the civil secretary. He wanted further expansion of education for girls and boys in the south.³ Child welfare was being stressed, in 1945 the school developed into a day school of four classes with an attendance of from 22 to 77 girls. Some of the pupils of the school trained as teachers. The southern Sudanese now had to good citizens as well. In

1945, there was a general review of southern policy by the British government.

By 1948 the number of girls elementary schools in the south had increased by 26. Arabic was first started at the Atar secondary school 1948 and was introduced in 1949 to a small class of southern employees at Juba.

A New Intermediate School in Upper Nile

In 1944, a new intermediate school was inaugurated for Upper Nile. This was the beginning of Atar School. However, in 1944, there was no boarding at Atar, so the school started in the old government administration station of Abwong. It was on the Sobat and in the American mission sphere, so it became a mission centre.

The central theme of the new policy for the south was to prepare the southern to stand up for themselves as equal partners with the northerners in the Sudan for the future. Education and economic development were the twin instruments to achieve this objective⁴. The educational proposal for the south were basically recommended by Cox eighteen months before closer cooperation of the mission schools.⁵ Thus, under the supervision of the education department in Khartoum, the mission would lengthen and deepen the curriculum. Girls education was specifically to be improved; two denominational teachers' training centres, one Catholic, one Protestant, would be established; and the government itself would operate a government intermediate school in the Upper Nile province, and elementary school among the Dinka, and agriculture centre at Yambio, and vocational centre at Juba. The number of British educational specialists would increase from 4 to 15.¹

The decision in December 1946 by John Willy Robertson, the civil secretary was, to advocate a policy of the union of the north and the south. This was the recognition of Arabic and its teaching in southern schools. When the southern Sudanese representative at Juba conference affirmed this policy in June 1947, another major step taken towards the government intervention which Cox had proposed close to four years before in 1943. It would not be in the interests of the

3 Sanderson L, 'Educational Development in the Southern Sudan, 1900-1948' SNR, vol. 43, pp 106-32.

4 EP/SCR/ 17.D.5 Girls Intermediate- General Reports.

1 Sanderson L. 'Educational Development in the Southern Sudan' , SNR, Vol.43, pp 106-32.

2 EP/SCR/46.A Sudan Mission Association minutes of 1930 by courtesy of miss V. Pillow, American Presbyterian Mission Library-Khartoum.

3 Sanderson L. *op-cit*, pp 106-32.

4 *Education in Northern Sudan, Khartoum 1934* .

5 CS/ SCR/ 17.A.2./6 Education in Southern Sudan.

1 Revised Plan for Education in the Southern Provinces.

southerners to try and revert the gradual spread of Arabic; to do so would alienate Sudanese, northerners and southerner alike.

But in 1947 new buildings were constructed at Lunjini, a site a mile from the Lui station for CMS on the Juba road. It was difficult to encourage the Moru people to send their girls to school. In 1947 the technical schools were re-organized as four-year post-elementary schools. But Torit and Loka failed to overcome their weaknesses in staffing and organization, and in 1950 the minister of education found much the same faults as Williams six years earlier.

Post Intermediate School in the South

In 1947 the first intake completed the four-year course and in the following year the school developed a first-year secondary class, pending the opening of the government secondary school which had by now been planned at Rumbek. Secondary education in the southern Sudan was started in 1948². In that year Khor Atar had 173 boys in the intermediate school proper [including 29 in the secondary class]; and 205 boys in its elementary section.³ In the early 1950 Khor Atar was not merely an efficiently organized educational machine but a lively and stimulating place with an authentic 'school' atmosphere and very respective academic standards. The government elementary school at Tonj was equally successful. By 1948 it had 129 boys and had begun fifth year work. By 1948 the elementary school had become a standard four-year elementary school, and its management had been transferred to the American Presbyterians.⁴ While the missionaries and the teacher in the government schools at Atar and Rumbek struggle against with the introduction of Arabic and changing of the syllabus to conform more closely to that used in the north, there was a growing sense of desperation among British officials over the dearth of qualified southerners available for the rapid Sudanization of the Sudan political and civil services by the northern Sudanese. The Rumbek Secondary School and only just begun its first three year course in 1948, and it was after that, a trickle

of southerners began to enter Khartoum university college. Village teacher training centres operated by the mission societies were to be brought up to strength, while two new government village teacher training centres were to be opened at Malakal and Tonj. Two additional boys' elementary teacher training centres were to be by 1955, 150 new village schools and 37 new boys' elementary schools.¹ The spread of all forms of education, including special methods of enlightenment now being tried, such as the sending of southern schoolboys on tours of the north. The appointment by the ministry of education of a senior northern Sudanese to work especially for the improvement of mutual relations through clubs and other social activities, encouragement of the scouts movement. The teaching of Arabic, is thus the prerequisite for increasing southern capabilities to win from the north social consideration as equals²

At the official opening of the Legislative Assembly on the 23rd 1948, thirteen southerners took their places besides fellow members from the north to share in the central government of the country.³ The newly constituted provinces, councils had elected them to the assembly. The conditions of service of classified government staff have been amended to enable southerners to attain the same classifications as northern Sudan many of the educated southerners reveal an instability of character and proneness to alcoholic excess which is a little disturbing.

Up to 1920, educational development in the southern Sudan was in the hands of the missionary societies. They provided schools and teachers without the charge of the government. There were three types of schools such as bush schools, elementary and intermediate. In 1937, the government took serious concern of the educational development in the southern Sudan. In 1947 Khor Atar School started a first year secondary school and in 1948 it had begun in the southern Sudan. In 1949 Atar secondary school was transferred to Rumbek from Khor Atar in Upper Nile Province.

2 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 245.

3 Sanderson and Sanderson *Education, Religion and Politics in the Southern Sudan 1899-1964*, p 262.

4 *Ibid*, p 263.

1 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 245.

2 UNP/ SCR/ 17.D.4 Education Expansion.

3 Legislative Assembly, Weekly digest of proceedings 1948 - 1952.

The Beginning and Uprising of the Sudanese Cadets

On 7 May 1905 the Khartoum Military School¹² was opened with an initial enrolment of fourteen cadets and provided the army with the cadets of commissioned officers¹³. In 1909 the school's establishment was increased from 30 cadets to 40, and in 1914 to 50. Cadets were chosen from the best families in the Sudan and from sons of old officers and soldiers. Those who attended the Cairo military school had absorbed the ideas of their Egyptian colleagues. Up to 1924 the graduates of military school were really the backbone of the nationalistic elite for whom Egyptian nationalism set the example.

The upbringing of the Sudanese cadets was the best way, and most loyal military formation in the Sudan¹⁴. The cadets were trained to replace the Egyptian officers who were undesirable by the British administration because they conspired against the Sudan Government. The Sudanese rebellion of the military cadets in the mid twenties was therefore a real disappointment to the British. They sympathized with the Egyptian troops and against the Government. The cadets of Khartoum military school demonstrated precisely because they saw their positions in 1924 were threatened by the condominium administrators. As a result of this, the political prisoners and cadets were imprisoned in Khartoum North. But the cadets had failed a crucial test: they were considered the most loyal military formation in the Sudan and the heart of future army without the Egyptian officers. They had shown themselves unreliable. This change of policy was a result of the active political involvement of the Egyptian officers and troops in the Sudan. Ali Abd al-Latif, was enrolled in the military school where he won the Governor-General's medal as most efficient cadet. He emerged as the leading figure in the political turmoil. In 1922 Ali Abd al-Latif was arrested and imprisoned for submitting to the *Hadara Newspaper* an article calling for self-determination for the Sudanese. He was tried and sentenced to three years in prison. By then the British administration realised that was facing an armed revolution involving the officers, cadets, and soldiers. The British Government authorized the Governor-General to remove Egyptian officers and troops involved in the mutiny or political activity from the Sudan.

In 1923, after his release from prison, Ali Abd al-Latif and Ubayd Hajj al-Amin founded with some other graduates of

the military college the White Nile League organization. They were dissatisfied with the meagre impact of the League of Sudan Union that aimed at the unity of the Nile Valley under Egyptian rule and free from British Imperialism. Union with Egypt was to win Egyptian support and the Sudan government's intention. It was voiced by small band of young and not influential *effendis* (officials). Following the emergence of the first Sudanese nationalist movement over the years 1919-1924, in which the Young *Effendiyya* class and some young Southern Sudanese army officers who had lost their tribal roots participated. They played a prominent role in politics. Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General, believed that the growth of a Sudanese Nationalist idea would have as its focus the removal of Egyptians from the administration. Stack now saw the Sudanese anti-British sentiment as beginning of a Sudanese Nationalist Movement that presented the Sudan Government with an opportunity as well as a sound reason for attempting to get rid of the Egyptians¹. Eventually the League increased its membership to 150 members, a notable element among its members were the detribalised southerners, though they seem to have been by no means a dominant one. On 3 July Ali Abd al-Latif was arrested after sending a telegram to the British Prime Minister, protesting against Britain's policy toward Egypt. By then, however the anti-British campaign had gained its momentum. In any case, Ali Abd al-Latif remained in close contact with colleagues in prison². It should be noted, however, that Ali Abd al-Latif and other southern officers had no contact with the south.

In 1924 the signs of dissatisfaction appeared in the Sudanese battalions. The British were now suspicious of Egyptian officers and men serving in the Sudan. Contact between Egyptians and Sudanese was seen as threat. In July Willis, Director of Intelligence, had noted that the British were suspicious of political activities of some Sudanese officers. Some officers were suspected to have joined the White Flag League Organization.

Sudan Defense Force

Sudan Defense Force (SDF) was formed from the Sudanese units. They were placed under the Governor-General who would resign his post as Sirder of the Egyptian army. The new force would take an oath of loyalty to the king of England according to the scheme agreed to in negotiation

¹² EP/SCR/1.B.1

¹³ Collins, R.O and Herzog, R (1961), "Early British Administration in the Southern Sudan". *Journal of African History*, XI pp 119-35.

¹⁴ *Ibid* p. 120

¹ Girma Negash, "Sudanese Politics" *African Today*, vol. 27, 1980, pp 55-56

² Daly, *op.cit* p 272

between the Sudan administration and the British government. The Sudan Defense Force came into being on January 17, 1925, organized on an area basis. The country was divided into six areas each with its special corps and a highly mobile force resulted which had the characteristics of a powerful military police rather than a regular army¹.

Prior to 1925 the strength of the Sudanese troops in the Egyptian army was about 13,000 men, with 106 British officers and 233 Sudanese officers. After 1925 the reduction of the S.D.F started, and by the end of 1936 the force had attained, then reinforcement could follow. Sudan was divided into military areas. The Sudanese battalion was formed into a Sudanese Defence Force². This event was led by British officer who decided after much discussion. The organization and distribution of the Sudan Defence Force remained basically unchanged until the mid 1930s. It was organized along the lines of the Egyptian army.

From 1925 the Sudan government army was organized separately in the north and the south. In the north they were primarily civilian police force and thus remained under provincial courts. The beginning of a modern civilian police force was designed to fight crime rather than to deal with organized opposition to the government. The Force established in 1926 was 127 British officers, 188 Sudanese officers and 7,963 Sudanese in the ranks. In 1926 the police establishment was roughly 3,000 men as foot police, NCOS and men in mounted police. At the district level police were responsible to District Commissioners.

Between 1924 and 1930 the British element in government departments grew by 54 per cent and in the provinces by 30 per cent. According to the *Ewart Commission Report* ¹ on political agitation submitted to Foreign Office in 1925,

The British officials were basically opposed to religious political movements. Political groups were starting to create around the major religious sects. They (Northern Sudanese) had been working in the government, especially since the expulsion of Egyptians in 1924-25.

After 1940, it was placed under British war office control, and thereafter and until the end of the war rapid expansion took place until the SDF had attained the strength of some 25,000 local troops.

After the war, the British had decided that the SDF should revert to its original role of internal security, and started the process of demobilizations until the strength of the force

fell to 7,750 in 1947. In 1948 the authorities decided to reopen the military college and to accept candidates who completed their secondary education. After the withdrawal of the Egyptian army, the Khartoum Military School was closed down². It was reopened in 1935 when the Government started to expand the Sudan Defence Force. The British Government accepted the point of view of Sudan administration declaring that the British Government would not allow military and civilian officers and officials to conspire against the Sudan Government. This meant that the condominium agreement might be ended and a British trusteeship imposed on the Sudan.

The Sudan Government accepted the recommendation of 1920 Milner commission which confirmed and underlined that the administration of the Sudan should be left as far as possible in the hands of native authorities. These were of tribal and other traditional leaders and small cadre of native officials in Government service. In 1920 the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, suggested that the cost should be borne by Egypt as payment "for the water she enjoys". He concluded that the hidden motive which British interests demand was the complete political and military independence of the Sudan from the Egypt. In other words, the British objective was not only to eliminate Egyptian involvement in the Sudan, but also to ensure that Egypt should bear the cost of such a failure¹. The League of Sudan Union was constituted in 1920. Its objectives were to have the Sudan for the Sudanese and also the continued separation of the Sudan from Egypt and a continuation of British guidance. One of the founders of this society was Abdulla Khalil (the army officer who became the Prime Minister in 1958). Its activities were confined largely to cultural events. The league eventually turned to more openly political activities. Its circulars took a decidedly anti British position as in the early 1920s, when an embryonic nationalist movement had looked to Egypt to threaten British rule. In the 1920s a pan-Arabist form of nationalism, associated with Egyptian nationalism and proposing unity of the Nile valley, was advocated by a small group of Sudanese intellectuals, mainly associated with the Egyptian army in the Sudan. Many were not, in fact, Arabs but descendants of Sudanese slave soldiers. They were culturally completely arabicized.²

The root of Sudanese nationalist movement

The root of Sudanese nationalist movement may be traced back to the first world war, but most clearly discernible in

¹ Mohammed Omer Beshir, op.cit p. 28.

² *Ibid*, p. 40.

¹ File No. 36. G.23 *Political Agitation in the Sudan 1924 - 1925*

² Daly, M.W, *Empire on the Nile*, p 272

¹ Douglass, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* p. 50.

² File No. I.A. 7, General Administrative policy 1937 - 1957.

the literacy societies which had sprang up during the war. External stimulus played an important part in shaping that movement, the actions of the Condominium in 1924. The belief that increased Egyptian influence would affect the political development in the Sudan presented such as more important points. The latent Sudanese nationalism was an important point against the Egyptian points because Sudanese remembered the shocking mal-administration and exploitation of the Turkiya. The Sudanese nationalist movement never achieved a mass following and in fact was divided within itself about whether to follow a purely Sudanese nationalism or a broader pan - Arab nationalism. It can be argued that it never fully followed suit either.

The British had distrusted Egyptians for a long period of time. That was strengthened by the testimony of leading Sudanese officers like Ali Abd Al-Latif. Consequently, a development that seemed to make not only getting rid of the Egyptian, but also crushing the nationalist notion. In 1924 the British encountered at first annoying but soon alarming outbreak of secular opposition. It was essential that the government won the support of the traditional elite against this new force. The embryonic

Sudanese nationalist movement was condemned as imitative, a weak cutting from Egyptians growth¹⁵.

Muddathir Abdel Rahim argues that British policy was passive until after the 1919 Egyptian revolution. The aim of the Sudan Government¹⁶ policy was to secure colonial interests.

After 1924, the field was dominated by collaborationist politics because they made alliance with the British officials, and moderate graduates reverted to defensive passivity in the face of British reaction. New political thought was taken care of by the Arabs, Arabic and Muslim roots of northern Sudanese culture.

The British authorities had second thoughts and started looking for more reliable allies among the traditional tribal leadership³. In doing so, this young class of Sudanese nationalist was alienated by the British, whose sole sin had been the quest for a greater share in the government leading ultimately to self-determination.

Evacuation of the Egyptian Army

The Egyptian Revolution of 1919 and the subsequent negotiations reinforced Britain's strategic interest in the Sudan. The revolution came as a shock to British officials

in both Egypt and the Sudan, and necessitated changes in Anglo Egyptians relations. It was considered imperative to minimize Egyptian participation in the Sudan's administration and indeed to remove from the Sudan as many as possible of the Egyptians serving there. To do this effectively, however, would necessitate the replacement of Egyptian Army units with an all - Sudanese force, which would involve costs which the Sudan government was unable to incur and which Britain refused to assume. As early 1919 Wingate and Stack had argued, without conviction, that a future Sudanese nationalism might show itself as primarily anti Egyptian.

The evacuation of Egyptian military and civilian officials naturally gave rise to hopes and expectation among educated Sudanese that new opportunities would result. This

was because posts were evacuated by the Egyptians¹⁷. Almost all avenues to employment and promotion that had formerly been open to Sudanese so that they remained to be controlled by the northerners. By 1925 there were no Egyptian teachers left in government schools, a total of only 118 Egyptian had been deported, that is less than 3% of the Egyptian in Sudan government employment. All Egyptians were expelled and forbidden to re-enter and this measure continued until the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. The Treaty of 1936, which was concluded between Egypt and Britain sharply, provoked the steadily growing national consciousness in northern Sudan¹⁸.

Educated Northern Sudanese resented the fact that this treaty of 1936 had been concluded without any reference to the Sudanese themselves. The Egyptians were rejected to have equal partners in the government of the Sudan with the British. At the time of the signature of the treaty a large and increasing body of Sudanese was already in public service.³ The 1936 treaty had come about through the circumstances of impending world crisis. The treaty was a firm legal basis for the British position in both Egypt and the Sudan.

In 1930 the Southern policy was introduced under which the Southern Sudan was a separate development controlled under military regime. Meanwhile the Government depended on educated northerners to fill junior posts. There were two events of importance in the history of the Sudan. These were the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the formation of the graduates congress in 1938. At the time of the signature of the treaty a large and increasing body of

¹⁵ Daly, M.W, *British Administration and the Northern Sudan, 1917-1924*, Leiden, 1980, p 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p, 4

³ Gabriel R. Warburg, "Egypt and the Sudan" *Studies in History and Politics*, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. Great Britain 1985, pp16-17.

¹⁷ M.O.Beshir, *The Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p 20.

¹⁸ Bakheit, G.M.A, *British Administration and Sudanese Nationalism, 1919-1939*, Cambridge PhD, 1963, p 10.

³ Sir Gawaim Bill, "The Growth of Sudanese Nationalism , Devolution and the Road to Independence" *The Making of the Sudanese State* Vol. 1 1991 PP . 147 - 156.

Sudanese was already in the public service. It stipulated that British and Egyptian applicants for government posts would only be appointed in cases where Sudanese candidates lacked the necessary qualifications. To the Sudanese this was satisfactory and welcome development. But less satisfactory for informed Sudanese opinion was the fact that important decisions affecting the future of their country had been taken and embodied in the treaty without their consultation with Sudanese representatives. Criticism of the way in which the treaty had been reached resulted in the formation of the graduates congress. Its members consisted of intermediate of higher educational level,¹⁹ nearly all of whom were government officials. Its secretary was Ismail al Azhari. Within a very few years there were to emerge out of the congress, a number of Sudanese political parties.

It was for the Sudanese to show the "High Contracting Parties" that the Sudan was no longer a silent body. Therefore its future could not be shaped without reference to its own wishes. The concrete idea of a general meeting of graduates (of post-elementary) to elect a permanent body to represent the educated Sudanese was mooted in the summer of 1937.

The idea soon captured on and in February 1938 the graduates' congress was borne.² Sayyid Abd al Rahman al-Mahdi portrayed himself as the natural patron of the educated class. This aroused concern with the Government which encouraged secularist tendencies among the graduates, culminating in establishment of the graduates' general congress in 1938.³ The British regarded the Sudanese middle class and potential leaders with suspicion.

The Impact of all Northern Sudanese Political Parties on the Southern Sudan

The Graduate Congress Activities

Ibrahim Ahmed, then Chairman of the Graduate Congress presented a note to the Governor-General in 1942 containing demands, agreed upon by the various factions of the congress for the following: the establishment of a free democratic Government in union with Egypt and in alliance with Great Britain.

The appointment of a joint commission to draw up a scheme for transferring the government to the Sudanese in the shortest time possible. But the Nationalists in the Congress were never able to develop a truly political party. They depended on religious patrons and sectarian voting

which have dominated Sudanese electoral politics up to the present day.

The politics of the centre were once again dominated by affiliations; they had based their position on kinship's in the 19th century. Those political parties (communists and The Republican Members) who had not been part of those original ones were largely denied a voice in national affairs. The Sudan was much more directly involved in the Second World War than it had been in the First World War, because Italy was an enemy power of the allied forces on Sudanese-Ethiopian border. Afterwards an army of British, Indian occupied Kassala and Sudanese troops, under General Patt, invaded Eritrea and won the decisive battle of Keren on 15 March 1941.

On 3 April 1942, the Congress Executive Committee sent to the government a memorandum of twelve demands. The right to be safeguarded by guarantees, assuming full liberty of expression. In connection therewith as well as guarantees assuring the Sudanese the right of determining their natural rights with Egypt in a special agreement between the Egyptian and Sudanese nations.¹ Northern Sudanese had considered the British to have carried out a tendency toward the separation of the north from the south.

In September 1942 Newbold presented a note in form of a memorandum to the Governor-General's Council. He called for extending town councils, consideration of advisory provincial councils in the north, study of a central advisory council for the Northern Sudan, review of progress in dilution, and other reforms impetus for creating province councils came from a need to provide delegates for a central advisory councils. The local government (Province councils) ordinance was approval on 16 March 1943 and in 1944 province councils were formed in Kassala, Darfur, Northern, Blue Nile and Kordofan provinces. All were strictly advisory and had no budgets.² Their members were nominated by local councils or the mudir. Under terms of the advisory councils ordinance, promulgated in September 1943, an Advisory council of the Northern Sudan was established.

Representation was limited to the north because of the south's backwardness and suitable delegates (provision was made, however, for either a separate southern council or an Advisory council for the whole country later)¹. The Southern Sudan had not been inclusive in the Advisory council because southerners have not reached a standard of education, which would sanction them to represent their

¹⁹ Holt and Daly, *The History of the Sudan*, p 225.

² Duncan, J.S.R, *The Sudan, A Record of Achievement*, Edinburgh and London, 1953. pp.188-189.

³ Daly, M.W. *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934-1956* Cambridge, 1991, p 39.

¹ Holt, P.M and Daly, M.W, *The History of the Sudan* p 146.

² Daly, *Imperial Sudan*. p 50.

¹ *Advisory Council of the Northern Sudan* 1943, Khartoum 1944, p 30.

compatriots in such a council.² The three southern provinces were not represented in the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan created in 1944. The southern Sudan was not included in an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan on the score of the lack of adequate representatives. The Governor-General would appoint three members from each of the province councils or where these did not yet exist, among local government authorities; two members from the Sudan chamber of commerce and eight members at large. Allowance was made for honourable members to accommodate the two Sayyids (Abd al Rahman Al Mahdi and Ali Mirghani). The council would meet at least twice a year, and was purely advisory.

The administrative conference in the northern Sudan recommended to develop the Advisory Council into a more authorisation and responsible body, with power of making laws and to some extent, of controlling the work of administration³.

The Ashiqqa Party

In 1943, the Ashiqqa party under al-Azhari emerged as the first genuine political party in the Sudan, favouring union with Egypt. The Unionist party formulated in 1944 a policy under Ismail al-Azhari, which aimed at the establishment of a free and democratic Sudanese government. They wanted the termination of the condominium by peaceful means.

In 1944 it gained the tacit support of Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, the head of the Khatmiyya order. His dynastic history was so closely bound with that of Egyptian influence in the Sudan.

He was naturally disturbed at the rapid rise of his rival, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi¹.

The Ashiqqa blood brothers party demanded the establishment of a democratic Sudanese government in union with Egypt.

During 1944 the Congress had come under the sway of the wider ambit of the first real political party with a definite policy in the Sudan. In April 1945, Huddleston, Governor-General stated that southern Sudan's continuing for a time as a condominium or as sort of colony of the Northern Sudan the international situation at the end of 1945 required a change of policy.² In 1945 all unionists within the congress agreed to the goal of a democratic Sudanese

Government in union with Egypt under the Egyptian crown. The Sudan constitution emphasised a desire to encompass all who favoured the Sudan for the Sudanese. Relations between the Ashiqqa, which dominated unionists and Umma, which dominated Independents thereupon broke down. The Second World War ended in 1945 it was the most devastating war in history of the world.³ The war touched Sudan only on border areas.⁴ The World was now dominated by the new super-powers- the United States of America and the Soviet Union. When the war ended, the high days of imperialism had been over. When the condominium governments were preparing to negotiate on the revision on the 1936 treaty, the Graduate Congress received another political spur.

In February 1945 the second political party in the Sudan was constituted. It was labelled as the Umma, which means the nation or peoples' party. In 1945, the Umma Party had gained control of the Graduate Congress Organization. Sayyid Ali Mirghani feared Sayyid Abdal-Rahman would succeed in establishing, with British support, a Mahdist monarch in the Sudan.⁵ Its objectives were that the Sudan should be for Sudanese.

It was aimed at working for the independence of the Sudan¹. It had the support of most of the political parties particularly al-Ansar or Sayyid Abdal-Rahman al-Mahdi.²

Choice of a United Sudan

In 1945, the Sudan Government declared its policy towards the South of Sudan as follows: 'only economic and educational development that the southern Sudanese could be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot is eventually cast with the northern Sudan or with east Africa or partly with each.'³ Since then there had been an economic and educational developments in the south and it had commenced to be clear that the Southern Sudan, by its history and by the accidents of geography, river and transport and so forth, must move to the North rather than Uganda or the Congo.'

James Robertson, the Civil Secretary, believed that their policy regarding these areas should be restated as follows: 'The policy of the Sudan government regarding the Southern Sudan was to act upon the facts that the peoples of Southern Sudan were distinctly African and Negroid, but geography and economics combined to render the Southern

2 Bahr al-Ghazal/ SCR/ 1.C. *Administrative Policy for Southern Sudan 1930-1956*

3 *Advisory Council of the Northern Sudan 1943* Khartoum, 1944, p 40.

1 *Ibid*, p 38

2 James Robertson, *Transition in Africa*, London, 1979, p 103.

3 *Ibid*, p 102.

4 Daly, *op.cit*, p 233.

5 EP/ SCR/ 1.A.3 *Government Officials and Politics-Conduct Rules*.

1 *Ibid*, p. 8

2 Holt and Daly, *The History of the Sudan*, p 146.

3 Fabunmi, I.A, *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956*, London 1960, p 331.

Sudanese inextricably bound for future development to the Middle East and Arabs of the northern Sudan and therefore to ensure that they shall by educational policy and economic developments be equipped to take their place as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future'. Too, in education, southerners must look to Gordon College for post-Secondary schooling and Arabic should be taught in the Southern Sudan from the intermediate level upwards.

Distinctions in pay and condition of employment had shown an attempt at economics separation and other differences were more and more anomalous as the Southern Sudan's isolation broke down.

The British Policy towards the Southern Sudan should be publicly re-defined as aiming to ensure that Southern peoples by educational policy in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future. One of the allegations was that the Southern Sudan was rich and full of minerals, and the British were sitting on them.¹ The Sudan Government had made discrimination against southerners by paying them low salaries and they did not intend to bring southerners to the same level of the north that is why the South is still lagging behind the North in every thing. It was the intention of the British to separate the South from the North. The people of the South looked forward to the day when they would be able to join with the north in a free, united and independent Sudan.

In 1946, the Governor-General set-up a Sudan administrative conference in the Northern Sudan. A Southern administrative conference was rejected by northern Sudanese because the southern Sudanese had not reached the level of education required. A Sudan Administrative Conference of 1946 has not only brought a new interest to education and administration in the southern Sudan, but it gave additional impetus to economic development. All northern parties would countenance partition without exceptions. The political relationship between the North and the South had to be determined before the concept of regionalism could have any political meaning².

In November 1946 for example, the southern Sudanese staff at Maridi laid their case before Vivian Marwood, Governor of Equatoria³. They wanted the same prospects and chances as the Northern Sudanese. As a group, they were becoming

politically conscious and more vocal. The year 1946 in December, changed all that. In the South inflation, expectation and the growing realisation of common interests among the educated southerners suddenly turned discontent into anger.⁴ The "Egyptians Crown" which had to be abandoned in 1946 as a result of Sudanese Protests against the creation of a unified state in which Sudanese and Egyptians would enjoy equal status. This unity may be achieved by all means peaceful or otherwise. Egyptian government failed to see in such reorganization a plot to conceal the Nile card further to Britain's imperial sleeve.⁵ In the Sudan was also the political leader too of the colonial government. He abandoned the southern policy in 1946. He wanted Sudan to remain united. The Southern policy was abandoned as a consequence of external pressure.

The Juba Conference of 1947

The Southern Sudan welfare committee (SSWC) was founded in 1946 among educated southern Sudanese leading and spreading the 1947 strike in the Southern Sudan. Unskilled worker in Juba began the strike in October over increased costs for dura and the (SSWC) widened demands the strike spread across the Southern Sudan during the next two week¹s.

James Robertson, the Civil Secretary, called the 1947 Juba Conference. This was intended to get some Sudanese opinion, At Juba Conference, Robertson, and three governors namely Marwood, Kingston, Owen; Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile respectively and two other Khartoum officials represented the Sudan government. The northern representatives were Ibrahim Bedri, Dr. Habib Abdallah, Shaykh Surur Mohammed Ramli, Hassan, Ahmed Osman, and Mohammed Salih Shingetti. The southern representatives were Buth Diu, Lueth Ajak, Edwad Odhok from Upper Nile Province. From Equatoria came two missionaries, and an officer, five officials and six chiefs. Marwood, the Governor of Equatoria said: "We took on in 1947 a policy whose sole condition of success was the continuance of British administration, in the south at all events."² The Southern Sudanese felt, however, that this could not come about until such when they were on the same footing with the north. There should not be a fixed period on self-determinations.³ Chief Lolik Lado expressed the hope that the new generations of Northern Sudanese were domesticated, meaning civilised and humane. They were unlike their predecessors. In that he meant that they

1 James Robertson, *Transition in Africa*, p. 145.

2 *Ibid*, p 143.

3 *Ibid*, p. 142

4 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 236.

5 Robertson, *Transition in Africa*, p107.

¹ P. Garretson, 1986. "The Southern Sudan Welfare Committee and 1947 Strike in the Southern Sudan" *North-East Africa Studies*, 8 (23): 118-191.

² Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 237.

³ Ep/SCR/1.A.1.

could be observed from their behaviours before a final decision on a union was made.

The Sudan, though a vast country in area, is small in wealth and population, and if the Sudan is ever really to become self-governing and self-dependence it must not be divided up into small weak units. Many northern Sudanese believed that the sooner southern and northern Sudanese come together and work together the sooner they would begin to coalesce and cooperate in the advancement of their country. They hoped that the southern Sudanese should be included in the future assembly so that the process of unification would be hastened. I am confident that their recommendations are based on the very highest motives, and think they do not seek opportunities of exploiting backward tribes in the south ¹

James Robertson stressed that urgency was the essence of the problem that: "We no longer have time to aim at the ideal" we must aim at doing what is the best for the southern peoples in the pressing circumstances. The British administrators were divided in their views. Some considered a change of policy as selling out innocent southerners to northern politicians. This was the view expressed by the old-fashioned Bog Barons (Ex-officers of the British administrations) who were British Agents. They were political service Assistant district Commissioners who were ex-officers recruited on contract, posted their district on arrival and rarely transferred.² These men knew little of any government policies and rule their districts as seem to them best. They gradually became known as Bog Barons and did an essential job in the early days. The Bog Barons were gradually superseded by political services personnel who had enjoyed northern experience, but the condition continued to make the man as the Southern District Commissioners continued to be an independent individual because his circumstances demanded it.

James Robertson did not accept the opinion. Pragmatists including, even some southern District Commissioners (DCs) considered it the best for the southern peoples in the pressing condition.³

Owen the Governor of Equatoria stated that the southerners will probably feel that "we are altogether deserting them if and when we declare the independence of the Sudan. They may think that we are handing them over to the north without any safeguards whatsoever. Against that

background Independence does not look so acceptable, superficially, as union."⁴ The Northern Sudanese and the Egyptians had blamed the Sudan government openly for the situation in the South.⁵

Opposition from Egyptians and northern Sudanese focused not only on the Closed District Ordinance, but also on such aspects of policy as the exclusion of south from the Advisory Council and the refusal to allow the council even to discuss matters concerning the South. Further criticism was directed at the teaching of and official use of English and local vernacular languages in preference to Arabic; the sending of students for higher education to Uganda rather than to the Gordon Memorial College, Khartoum; and above all the absence of Muslim missionary societies in an area where Christian propagation was encouraged.

At the Juba Conference, Robertson believed that the recommendations of the northern Sudanese were done in good faith, but he was afraid of their exploitation of the southern tribes by the northern Sudanese. The southern chiefs and government workers were assembled to encounter a group of leading northern politicians. The question was: Do the southern Sudanese wish to join this council or should they have their own council first. Robertson looked upon the Conference solely as a means of finding out the capacities of the southerners, and it was therefore quite inaccurate for some people to say later that at the Juba Conference the southerners agreed to meet with the northerners in the legislative Assembly and the executive council. In fact, a few of the chiefs still remained in the same mind that it would be best to begin with a separate advisory council for the south, and then possibly after some years to join the North and come into the full legislative Assembly, but all the southern educated members were now in favour of going in at once.¹ The South is underdeveloped and rural, and its peoples are less Europeanized or Arabicized, and they are more natural in their disposition towards southern policy ². The Sudan Governments intended to leave the matter of race, custom and tradition, language and outlook die by itself, through education and civilisation. They hope for more safeguards to be added. The meeting discussed the matter of the day, and the southerners wanted their own council³. They agreed to set up their advisory council in the southern Sudan

1 Fabunmi, I.A, *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956*, London 1960, p 332.

2 Robertson on the proceeding of Juba Conference on Political Developments, p 8..

3 EP/SCR/ 1.A.7 *General Administrative Policy 1937-1957*.

4 UNP/ SCR/ 1.B.2.A *General Policy for Southern Sudan*.

5 Abu Hasabu, Afaf Abdel Majid, *Factional Conflict in the Sudanese Nationalist Movement 1918-1948*, Khartoum, 1985, p 21.

1 Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 368

2 Werner et al, *Op-cit*, p 365

3 Robertson on the proceeding of Juba Conference on Political Developments, p 10.

but in link with the Northern Sudan.⁴ That was heralded by Equatoria and Bahr al Ghazal southern tribe of October 1947. It emerged in the petition presented by Upper Nile province's southern staff that was particularly noticeable during the trouble at Rumbek Secondary School last November when Zande, Dinka and Acholi acted in sympathetic cohesion against what they thought an affront by Northern staff.¹ Southerners changed their minds about separate development in 1947 and this was the result of the discussion. They would join the central legislative council in the northern Sudan. The Sudanese parties clearly insisted that any new consultative body to replace the advisory Council for the northern Sudan should represent the whole Sudan. There were protests from the north about southern backwardness. The British did not refuse to accept the idea because it would confirm the suspicion. Thus James Robertson was able to seek the best way to act upon the change in the direction already decided. This posed difficulties. James Robertson hoped that the Sudan's future might lie in self-government in an Arab union, although this implied a change of government for the southern Sudan because of the changing conditions in the politics.

All Bog Barons agreed with the change of the Government attitude. But this attitude was only used for the early years of the British rule. Sudan Government policy according to James Robertson must command the support of Northern Sudanese and relieve distress or the doubts of British officials. He advocated that a policy should be worked out by patriotic and reasonable Sudanese, Northern and Southern alike.² He similarly added that plan for better communications between the southern Sudan and East Africa had come to nothing. None of the northern Sudanese parties had clearly expressed their views publicly or privately, for the first time the southerners particularly the educated, experienced not only blatant discrimination, but the worst cultural and political domination of sense of dangers.³ Perhaps for the first time political interest aroused throughout Equatoria province. The sense of insecurity led to a demand for a representative meeting of southerners to discuss attitude towards the recent events. The Southern Sudanese felt that they were being carried by events without being able to voice their opinion. They were no longer content to have their welfare entirely in outside hands.⁴ And for the first time a northern Sudanese group publicly reacted against the southern Sudan exclusion from these important and crucial discussions. The northern Sudanese spoke up

for the entire south as a conscious political body. General agreement was often contingent upon safeguards, trusteeship, or some other arrangement, which would in practice have kept British officials in control indefinitely. Several conclusions were clear from the Conference proceedings. Southerners were suspicious. "The educated men among southerners were given money to silence their arguments. They were and are still willing to risk something for their personal use. It was said, Sayyid Shingeti had worked amongst them and spoiled their minds advocating a united Sudan.¹ It was assumed that some Northern Sudanese had brought a huge sum of money from Khartoum". This assumption could be supported by the first Session discussions where all southerners rejected the unity. The second day came with change of opinion that some of them were ready to join the new legislative Assembly with the Northern Sudanese. The Sudanese are determined and they themselves will, at some times or other, decide their own future.²

It was nonetheless recognised by the Sudan Government that the ideal safeguard would be maintenance of a British controlled administration with British governors and District Commissioners. In the event, all safeguards were whittled away under pressure from northern politicians and Anglo-Egyptian negotiators.

In 1947 it were not only the people of the Southern Sudan who needed to be put in touch with reality, but also their rulers'.³ The southerners were bullied and persuaded by the Sudan government to come into legislative council with, the Northerners. Northern Sudanese were the most natural guardians of the southern Sudan, to develop it. The southerners dropped even their demand for safeguards in the north. James Robertson agreed and that brought an end to the proposed southern council. The choice was not simple. The northerners were convinced that the problem of separating southern Sudan and northern Sudan were seen as British policies.

As a result, this would help missionary propaganda. On the 27 January 1947, the Egyptian government notified the British government that they had broken off negotiation for a revision of the 1936 treaty.

It should be noted that the treaty between Egypt and Britain was concluded in 1936 without the knowledge of the Sudanese themselves. When it was disclosed in 1947 because of the Juba Conference which was discussing the

4 EP/ SCR/ 1.A.7 General Administrative Policy 1937-1957 General rulings -Colonial Administration

1 Upper Nile Annuals 1894-1946.

2 UNP/ SCR/ 1.A.2 Sudanization Report on Administration.

3 EP/SCR/ 1.A.5/ 1.

4 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 237.

1 UNP/ SCR/ 5.A.1/3 History Notes and Instructions.

2 EP/SCR/1.B.1.

3 Douglass H. Johnson, *The British Document on the end of Empire*, Series B Vol 5 Sudan Part 1 1940-1950, Part 2 1946-1955, p 285.

question of the united Sudan as a result of the Sudanese protests for their request of self-government and self-determination.¹ Sudanese politicians went to Lake Success in the U.S.A. and four advisers from the Sudan government similarly attended. This event again caused anxiety in the Sudan, but after a few weeks of fruitless discussion the border issue was dropped. No further crisis was to take place in the international sphere till October 1951.²

As Mr. Philemon Majok put it, "Children must drink milk before they eat Kisra, so the southerners must first study self-government before participating in governing."³ Sayyid Shingeti argued that the West Indies were populated by Africans who had been enslaved in the past by the British but with the growth of public opinion the British had come to realise the evils of the slave trade. Sayyid Shingeti added the northerners had no evil intentions towards the Southern Sudan.

They had put up the money for the Zande scheme and if they had bad feelings they would not have put money for that project. Still the money was obtained from the Northern Sudanese. Taxpayer, a practice which continues until the present. It was the northern Sudanese treasury who raised money for the Zande scheme. "There should be no settlement by Northern Sudanese on land in the southern Sudan without permission.

There must be safeguards. There must be no interference from the northern Sudan in local government in the southern Sudan; there should be a law to prevent a northerner calling a southerner slave⁴".

The chairman of Juba Conference deplored the tendency to regard any suggestion that Southern problems should be treated in a different manner from those in the Northern Sudan. This would be a conspiracy to divide Northern Sudan from Southern Sudan.

Dr. Habib Abdallah wanted to have some delay in setting up the Legislative Assembly and that if in the meanwhile real progress could be made with the advancement of local government and local councils, southerners might feel that a suitable form of representation could be worked out by them in which they could have confidence.

The Independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 sent a signal to all countries living under colonialism; there were demands for Sudanese Independence as well¹. "No decision

could be made by the Conference, since members had received no mandate from their people. Robertson stated that, 'I took the only decision resulting from the Conference. I decided that I could, after what I had seen of the southerners who attended, endorsed the recommendation of the Administrative Conference and ask the Governor-General in-Council to accept its proposal that the new legislative Assembly should be representative of the whole Sudan.'²

Sidqi Bevin Protocol

Unexpectedly, agreement was achieved when Sidki Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt and Mr. Ernest Bevin, Britain's Foreign Secretary, met in October 1946. The agreement became known as the Sudan Protocol. Its objectives were to ensure the well-being of the Sudanese and secondly to ensure the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-government and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future of the Sudan. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, saw a possibility of securing Britain's Near Eastern defence through a new spirit of co-operation with the Peoples of the region. In April 1946 the Cairo Embassy of Britain had prepared the Condominium to Sudanese self Government and self determination. The condominium agreement was endorsed by Sidgi Bevin. He was publicly committed to explicit recognition of Egyptian sovereignty for self-government and self-determination for the Sudan. Bevin therefore supplied Stansgate, who was the British Foreign Secretary in Alexandria, with a new draft protocol stating merely the two parties' agreement to disagree³. An Anglo Egyptian Commission to monitor Sudanese Progress towards self government was offered. Subsequent draft was substantially changed. The Sudan protocol emerged in mid October. Bevin insisted that the Egyptian Government publicly recognise no limit on the future choice of the Sudanese. On the 9 December Bevin resigned. After 1946 the Sudan Government assumed greater independence of action, affecting not only its dealings with Cairo and London but also its relations with the Sudanese political factions⁴. In the wake of Sidgi Bevin protocol Khartoum launched a counter attack. The Southern Sudanese wanted to learn under the

1 EP/ SCR/ 1.B.2 General Administrative Policy Zande District 1941-1945.

2 Bahr al Ghazal / SCR/ 1.C Administrative Policy for Southern Sudan 1930-1956.

3 Duncan, *The Sudan*, p 203.

4 Werner, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 365.

1 Ibid.

2 EP/ SCR/ 1.C., *Advisory Council for Northern Sudan 1943-1948*.

3 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 147.

4 Abu Hasabu, Afaf Abdel Majid, *Factional Conflict in the Sudanese Nationalist Movement, 1918-1948*, Khartoum, 1985, p 30

British administrators until they would be able to get an understanding. At this time, northerners would be or were not competent to understand the needs of southerners. The impact of Bevin protocol on southern Sudan led to the change of the policy in 1946 for United Sudan. In 1946 – 1947 the U. S. A used its influence to support the British position in Egypt. For the Sudan Government the events of 1946 - 7 were a profound shock, which ended an age of innocence. Sudanese reaction both anticipated and eventual, was a factor in the talks leading to the Sidqi Bevin protocol.

Constitutional Development

Constitutional steps were taken and tied up with government's new policy of Robertson. He was the only member whose ideas about administration commanded attention outside the Sudan. He had tried, with mixed results to influence Sudanese political thinking and was the only Sudan Government official to take part in the increasing British debate in the 1930s and 1940s about colonialism. Newbold was trusted by the Sudanese nationalists even after collision with them and Robertson. The northern politicians professed to be delighted to spend this government money and to be determined to continue to subsidize their fellow-nationals of the south after they have achieved self-government and independence. The Governor-General brought out strongly in the administrative conference the fear of the southerners that led to the establishment of Legislative Assembly and the Sudan would mean like handing southerners over to the rule of northern Sudanese, whom they suspected, and with the historical background had every reason to suspect. The Governor said, "We shall then be in a dilemma; either to continue to have the split in the political parties, which weakens the Sudan's voice in all the matter, and plays into the hand of Egypt or to risk the estrangement of the tribal and southern elements from ourselves and from the more politically conscious urban elements¹. Many of us would feel we were letting down those who rely on us if we took the second course independence."² No party here, except the Ashiqqa³ want union with Egypt; some of them still hope that by using the Egyptians they may get the British out; but by-and-large there is now among the politically

conscious people, a real feeling of Sudanese nationalism, and this applies to all except the Ashiqqa.

The Umma people fear most of all the growth of Egyptian propaganda in the Sudan. In 1947 the Southern Sudan would obtain more attention from these far away places than it had since Kitchener's launching at Fashoda in 1898.

The Sudan administration conference recommended that the Southern Sudan should send representatives to the new Legislative Assembly. Indeed, in 1948, with promulgation of the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly Ordinance, the long series of concessions began by which safeguards were abandoned which the Barons believed essential to save the South. These conditional devices would have been useless without steps taken towards training Southerners and self-Government.

The Sudan Government did too little. In this respect promised in 1946, action was taken to consolidate pay scales in the Government service¹. There were the most visible reasons for its establishment. Henderson, the foreign secretary, said this statement. It is now understood that they wanted the Sudan to remain one for the reason that it was small in resources and personnel must not be split into inadequate units. The main consideration was that the Sudan was small weak population at that time, and if the Sudan was ever actually to become self-governed and self-dependent it must not be divided up into small weak units.² They hoped and today hope that by including southern Sudanese in the future Assembly, the process of unification would be hastened. The Northern Sudanese decision-makers do not accept democratic principles of the ethnic nation with the diversity of cultures and beliefs.

These people could not be governed on the religious basis of a single religion being imposed on them. They should accept secular and democratic systems, which are acceptable to all of them.³

In 1948 the legislative assembly was set up for the whole Sudan. It was a preliminary step towards a national parliament. It was a Governor-General who retained veto power over all legislation. The assembly was to choose

1 James Robertson, *op.cit*, p.28.

2 Tim Niblock, *Class and Power in Sudan, the Dynamic of the Sudanese Politics 1898-1985*, the Macmillan Press, 1987, p 216.

3 Bahr al Ghazal / SCR/ 1.C Administrative Policy for Southern Sudan 1930-1956.

1 Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 261.

2 Bahr al Ghazal /SCR /class 2, Box 3 Piece 30 Intelligence General 1925-1946.

3 UNP/ SCR/ 1.B.2.A General Policy for Southern Sudan.

one of its members as a leader. It had 13 representatives of the Southern Sudan, and their presence has its origin in the government's general deliberations of 1946, when the difficult question of the future of the Southern Sudan came under review and it was decided, after a conference, that future policy should be that of fusion with the Northern Sudan and that all barriers should be removed which might render that combination in any way difficult. Elections were held for a legislative Assembly during 1948, but the Ashiqqa boycotted them¹. There were disturbances in Omdurman, and Azhari was arrested. The legislative Assembly was formally opened on the 15th December 1948, and consisted of 75 elected members and a small number of nominated one. Of these 76 were Northerners². An executive council was found to govern the country in what was to be an interim period. The executive council was responsible for initiating and preparing Government Legislation. More political parties began to appear, but all were northern in composition and aims.³

The three southern province councils which were established in 1948 continued to be useful advisory bodies and they have also done much to widen the horizon of the tribal leaders and chiefs. They have not yet, however, been confronted with any political issue.⁴ The provincial councils never became the centre of political life in the South. Indeed, the southerners paid little attention to the provincial councils. Thus, the political awareness of the southerners really took place in the political committees of the administrative towns of the Sudan.

These committees were really social gatherings dominated by talk and little organization⁵. The expansion of local government is perhaps most promising and important method of introducing southerners to public service and affairs, and in this sphere considerable progress had been made in 1949.

In 1949 the National Front of Sudanese Liberation was formed in the Sudan, which stood for dominion status under Egyptian suzerainty, but in 1952 it faded out. A National Front was formed from all the political groups

which took part in the resistance against the Sudan Government.

In August 1949, the National Front was formed and promptly commanded the support of a large body of the Khatmiya order¹. Therefore, a body of educated Sudanese national front was formed.² Others were not educated to the same level. These Sudanese sincerely believed that the Sudan's future must lay under a constitution. Abdallah Khalil who had always been represented as the steadying figure in the Umma Party had signed this time for the constitution.

Southern members of the Legislative Assembly had little faith in neither the utterances of their northern colleagues nor hope of being received on equal terms. There was no actual resistance to government policy in this respect, but neither were the giving warning signs such as to give confidence that a high standard in Arabic would be widely sought or easily acquired. Everywhere there was the fear that it would interfere with English, which was the language the boys were keener to learn.³

Policy of Cultural Integration of the North and South

In 1950, a policy of culture integration of the North and South was also established by a decision of the Executive Council and the Legislative Assembly. This economic, social and cultural isolation was accompanied by striking differences between the south and the north racially, geographically and climatically. It seems probable that the swing of the Sudanese political party in power towards independence from Egypt increased rather than diminished the fears in the south domination. The South had been contemptuously overridden.

The teaching of Arabic was established in all schools to enable southerners to catch up with north in 1950s above the elementary level, and some eighty teachers had been trained to give oral Arabic lessons in elementary and village schools.⁴ These steps were taken by the Minister of Education in Khartoum. These were the part of the measures calculated to promote a common outlook and common feeling of citizenship between North and South⁵

1 *Ibid*, p. 3.

2 Woodward, Peter, *Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism*, London, 1979, p 14.

3 O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret War in the Sudan*, p 35.

4 UNP/ SCR/ 17.A.1, *Education Expansion*.

5 Saifi Yazul S. Omer, "Some Obstacles to Peace and Conflict Resolution in Sudan": *News letter* vol. 6 No 3, 1982, pp 156-176

1 *Ibid*, p. 157.

2 UNP/ SCR/ 5.A.1/3 *History Notes and Instructions*.

3 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 365.

4 Duncan, *The Sudan*, p 231.

5 Fabunmi, *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, p 13.

By the end of 1950, relations between Egypt and Britain were growing steadily more strained. In the speech from the throne in the Egypt parliament premier Nahas Pasha had declared its determination to achieve Egyptian national aspiration evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil and unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown¹.

In August 1951 the British Government switched to a new track: a proposal to invite Egypt to join in an allied Middle East Command consisting of Britain, France, Italy, Turkey and America. Negotiations went on between these governments in this direction, but early in September the Egyptian Foreign Minister officially told the British Ambassador in Cairo that he would have to make a statement to parliament before the end of the parliamentary session in October, and he let it be known that this statement would have to include an undertaking to abrogate the 1936 Treaty and 1953 agreements if he had nothing to present to parliament in this way of concrete agreement with British. He wanted also acceptance of the Sovereignty of King Farouq over the Sudan. Britain simply could not agree to this. To do so, however, carefully hedge about with words such as symbolic sovereignty would have had a disastrous effect in the Sudan and on a far bigger scale than after the Sidky-Bevin attempt to deal with this in 1946.

Any such agreement would have been a betrayal of the Sudanese.² The Sudanese were upset by the speech from the throne in the Egyptian parliament, which included a passage claiming Egypt and the Sudan to be one country. They had passed through a very restless year of growing political consciousness in the north; of fear of being sold out in bargaining between Britain and Egypt over the defence issue of the Suez Canal, and of impatience at the lack of any definite move forward by the Sudan Government.

The British government, on October 1951, reiterated the two fundamental principles of their policy towards the Sudan—namely that they would agree to no change in the status of the Sudan without consultation with the Sudanese and that they would maintain the right of the Sudanese freely to choose their ultimate status³. The British government also declared that they would give

their "fullest support"⁴ to the Governor-General in continuing to administer the government of the Sudan in accordance with the Condominium Agreements of 1899 and in his aim of assisting the Sudanese in the attainment of self-government at the earliest possible moment.¹

Elections for New Parliament

In March 1951 an Anglo-Sudanese constitution amendment commission was established to advise the Governor-General on the stages to be taken to grant self Government to the Sudan. In 1952 a Legislative Assembly with considerable power was elected in the Sudan. "The ensuing calm was abruptly shattered in August 1952 by the ever more destructive statements of Egyptian politicians and the obvious inability of British and Egypt to achieve agreement about anything and particularly about the Sudanese²". An Anglo-Sudanese Commission recommended the creation of a parliament, which would control internal affairs. The British government, who also agreed with the Egyptian in 1953 that the Governor-General's powers could be reduced and that full Independence should come by 1956, accepted this. All parties expressed their insistence that self-determination should come not later than the end of 1953. The party campaigning for union with Egypt won the elections for this new parliament, but it soon became clear that only a small minority of people were in fact in favour of union. The 1953 elections formed no basis on (because southern Sudanese were not represented) which an organized political movement devoted to southern interest could be built. The fluid and insubstantial nature of the political loyalties of the new members of parliament was reflected in frequent changes of loyalty over the parliamentary devotion. Once some southerners arrived in Khartoum inevitable dominated parliamentary votes and loyalties before and after independence, then the south's political interests could be and were subjected to the overriding discerns of the northern political elite's. The Southern Liberal Party had been founded shortly after the 1953 elections³. The southern Sudanese had every strong role to play in the Sudanese politics. The three southern provinces were obviously resentful,⁴ of the way they had not been consulted, either by the Northern parties or by her Majesty's government in the

1 Duncan, *The Sudan*, p 232.

2 Bahr al Ghazal / SCR/ 1.C Administrative Policy for Southern Sudan 1930-1956.

3 Marlowe, John, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953*. London, 1954, p 6.

4 Duncan, *The Sudan*, p 234.

1 Bahr al Ghazal / SCR/ 1.C Administrative Policy for Southern Sudan 1930-1956.

2 *Ibid*, p 1.

3 UNP/ 5.A.3/1 History Notes and Instructions.

4 Abel Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonored*, p 20.

various steps of negotiations with the Egyptians leading up to the 1953 agreement. The Egyptians were afraid that were going to control overt matters affecting the south, and complained in particular that there was no southern member of the Governor-General's Commission. They feared that the Sudan had been abandoned to Egypt, that her Majesty's government was not prepared to fight either for British or Sudanese interests in the Sudan and that their own administration were in the same mood.¹ In short, Southern Sudanese lacking guidance and leadership and their morale was shaky, and a great many of them must have been very close to be thrown in. No southerner had been invited to take part in the discussions which the northern political groups had held with the Egyptian government prior to 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. By the terms of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement with Britain in 1953 Egypt accepted this Assembly for a period of three years on condition that the Governor-General's powers were reduced. The elections at the end of 1953 were preceded by a vigorous propaganda campaign by Egypt, with the result that the party wanting union with Egypt won. This seemed a great-success for Nasser, but during the next three years Egypt failed to maintain its popularity in the Sudan because called for Sudan to be for the Sudanese, which became independent in 1956.² British rule only lasted for seven years longer until the end of 1953 when Sudan became self-government.

Over the period between 1953 and 1958 the political dynamics of self-determination and Independence impregnated adversely on Southern Sudan. The most critical factors stemmed from the south severe under development and southern experience of political organization isolation. Lacking coherent political organization through which Southern interests could be articulated and defended the views of southerners could early be disregarded by the northern political aristocracy.

The Sudanese have the choice between independence and some form of allegiance to Egypt. They had chosen independence and they would enter some form of amicable³. In spite of the threats which Her Majesty's Government,

Egypt had to accept as a result of the Historical accident by which the Sudan is legally a condominium and in

order to maintain happy relations with Egypt, it still appears that there is Sudan for the Sudanese.

Some of the benefits conferred upon them by half a century of the British rule.¹

On 9 January 1954, self-government began in the Sudan, followed by increasing Sudanization of the Administration. General Nagib, the Egyptian Prime Minister and President, was a Sudanese hero. He was born in Sudan, and educated at Gordon College. He was an Arab nationalist; he talked the language of Arab socialism-which was the anti-colonial language of the Sudan too, the general Naguib regime signalled that it was willing to allow the Sudanese to choose their own future. In 1954, all British and Egyptians in important posts were Sudanized. British control was gone except for the Governor-General. Educated southerners grew suspicious of Northern politicians, exacerbated by events since 1954, and had found expressions in their support for the granting of Federal status to the south. But in 1954, by heeding the warnings from Southern members of the ruling party in parliament, by taking into account aspirations by demonstrating the unity of a nation by including all of its participants. The government of Ismail Al-Azhari, by specific action visible to all southerners, could have taken a decisive step unimpeded by the weight of history, elevated by the option of a new beginning in the Sudan, and with the abilities of men untrammelled by any cosmic forces beyond their control, to include the Southern Sudanese in the government of the new nation. It failed to do, and the price of that failure was paid in war. The agreement of the major parties to consider federal status had led to the Southern members of parliament (MPs) support for the declaration of Independence in 1955.² It had been recognized all along that present Sudanese parliament that was empowered to decide the Sudan's position was passed.

The south felt that the British Government has sold them out. This was because the hard truth must have by now been becoming clear to the southerners.

The elements in the Political Assembly of forces were first the mass of the tribe people who knew nothing of any political issues but would in general follow blindly whatever they were told to do by their immediate chiefs. Secondly the chiefs themselves who were as ignorant in general as their followers but were amenable to

1 EP/SCR/1.A.5.

2 Cornwell, *World History in the Twentieth Century*, p 212.

3 Bechtold, Peter, *Politics in the Sudan*, New York, 1976, p 23.

1 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 420.

2 Werner at al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 450.

Government authority so long as they were sure that it really was the authority to who they were responsible and that it was firm and enduring.

In other areas rivalry with their colleagues might make individual chief succumb²⁰ to Egyptian or pro-Egyptian blandishment.²

The Attainment of Independence

As Independence began to appear on the horizon, the new generation of Northern Sudanese politician saw the need to promote the unity of the different parts of the Sudan. This could be achieved, they believed, through a policy of Arabicizing and Islamizing the country.

Arabic taught as the official Language of the Country and the People must be converted to Islam. The Southern Sudanese rejected this. This is the National Unionist Party's policy and the rest of the military rulers. Unfortunately, this threw Sudan into serious disunity.

Politically, the Nile is therefore the positive of a link between Egypt and the Sudan. The international aspects, such as Egyptian claims to the Nile and Middle East strategy were unknown to any of the inhabitants. But educated and uneducated alike saw, in any withdrawal of British influence, at the worst exploitation and the state of being forced to work for others and having no freedom and at the best the neglect accorded to a non-remunerative area inhabited by inferior races.

The more clearly and widely this was borne in on them, the more they would resist any such outcome.³ There are physical, economic, racial and religious links between Egypt and the Sudan which make any form of constitutional or political association either desirable or necessary.

Physical contiguity, a common religion and racial affinities are not normally considered for political association between two countries. It is true that Cairo is the religious and cultural centre of the Middle Eastern Islam.

The southern educated class and tribal chiefs were at one in opposing Sudanization of the southern administrative posts by the northerners²¹; the one class because they saw themselves blocked for promotion, and the other because

they feared the unsympathetic administration and return to the treatment of the south by the north of the pre-British era². Southerners had been making petitions and opposing rapid Sudanization, and early self-determination.³

The greatest danger to the south in the future lies not in a collapse of administration following the British departure or in any ruthless exploitation by northern administrators or capitalists but rather in plain neglect by northern government fundamentally uninterested hard-pressed for the money, which the south must have. It would be a pity if just when the earlier neglect by the British administration (admittedly due to lack of funds) was being so admirably remedied, the south was allowed again to relapse into its old state.⁴ Far from Southerners being given priority in the south or gaining post in the higher ranks of the central government, southerners benefited little from Sudanization. They got four posts only⁵. In one stroke, it confirmed in the minds of the southern Sudanese every suspicion, real or imaginary, about the intentions of the Northerners. In one stroke, it demonstrated the unimportance to Northern Sudanese of southern opinion in matters affecting their own land.

In one stroke, it proved beyond all the talk, the insensitivity of the northerners to southern aspiration. In one stroke, it convinced many southerners that indeed they were henceforth to be treated as inferior. Gregoria Deng Kir summed up the prevailing feeling that favoured the announcement of the committee: "The results of Sudanization have come with a very disappointing result four Assistant District Commissioners and two Mamurs.

Well as it appears, it means our fellow Northerners want to colonise us for another hundred years."¹ Once it was decided that on independence the Sudan should be unitary state, central government policy towards the south was clarified: firstly, every effort must be made to educate more southerners so that the south could take its proper place, whether in parliament or in government. Secondly, the government schools were to be built and staffed with northerners. Thirdly, use of Arabic was to be encouraged and tough in all schools, even missionary ones etc. Funds were to be devoted to the setting up of network of local government on line similar to those

20 *Ibid*, p, 200.

2 Johnson, *The British Document on the end of Empire*, p 9.

3 *Ibid*, p 40.

21 Johnson, *The British Documents on the end of Empire*, p 10.

2 *Ibid*, p. 363.

3 *Ibid*, p 369.

4 *Ibid*, p 368.

5 Werner et al, *Op-cit*, p 365.

1 Johnson., *The British Documents on the end of Empire*, p 263.

already functioning in the north. Certainly the plans were well advanced to set up council in the district of Upper Nile Province, with budget provision and scratch staff, to start in 1955. The condominium government came to an end before anything could come to pass.

The 1955 Mutiny

On August 18 1955 No. 2, company of Sudanese soldiers in Torit immediately broke formation, rushed to the arms depot, seized the rifles and ammunition and proceeded to run through Torit, methodically Northerners, officers, merchants, women and children. The only Northern troops in Equatoria were a Company of the Haggana guarding the airport at Juba, because of them the only secure base left in Equatoria through the Sudan government could fly in troops to crush the mutineers.² Unfortunately, the people of the South were sacrificed by the English Government for political reasons. This could be seen after only seven months of self-government in Khartoum where, in August 1955, they were burst forth the first rebellion of the blacks against the Northern Sudanese who, for centuries, had afflicted them with the slave trade. The rebellion was put down, but many Arabs had been killed and many more would be if they had not been hidden or helped by the missionaries who were at personal risk in doing.³ By August 31 northern troops had regained control throughout the Southern Sudan and the mutineers had either fled into the forests or surrendered. The rising was not now solely or even principally a mutiny of two troops of S.D.F., but was a rising of the whole population of Equatoria, West Bank, and at least partly of Bahr-al-Ghazal.

Hearing news of the whole process of Sudanese independence civil unrest in western Equatoria started at Yambio and the workers in small industrial complex in Nzara, occurred in July ¹. On 6th August evidence was uncovered of a plot of meeting among southern soldiers based at Torit the headquarters of the Equatorial Corps Battalion.² In the southern Sudan, northern officers were in charge of the equatorial corps. The Equatorial Corps Battalion put under their leadership, but there were also a number of southern officers as well. They were juniors to the northern officers. The Equatorial Corps felt

themselves the last power of defence to save the southern Sudan³. The troops rebelled in Torit 1955. There were killings, so the mutiny of the southern corps spread through the south like grass fires before the rains. The northern Sudanese were systematically sought out and killed in such areas as Katere, Kapoeta, Negichot, Terrekeka, Yei, Loka, Lainya, Maridi, Yambio and Nzara and all of which are in Equatoria province. The killings of Northerners' was started by Sudan Defence Force and continued by civilian population who had also done the looting and burning. Police in some cases had protected Northerners in prison though some of these had been handed over to mobs for killing. In some places many Southerners had joined themselves in. In no place was there any semblance of the former Authority, all civilian army units, with military and police, were together a "Southern Army" though apparently without any central control.⁴ Southern troops had committed atrocities against Northerners and the provincial commissioner thought that at least 500 and quite possibly considerably more lives had been lost (including southerners that had been killed). The official fatalities were 261 northerners and 75 southerners were killed in the disturbances, which followed. Southerners remained rural to the debate over the independence arrangement during 1955, except when their votes were required in parliament. Such attention as the major northern political groups did give to southern Sudan. Furthermore was the southern Sudanese motivated by short-term political interest and often had destructive consequences. Nasser's policy towards the Sudan has had mixed success.⁵

Independence

On January 1, 1956, a proud new nation declared an independent republic. Ismail Al-Azhari became the Prime Minister. At the time the flags of Great British and Egypt were lowered down. The Northern political groups set to undo the disintegrative effects of condominium policy: cancelling the Southern Command of the Sudan force (now transformed into the Sudanese Armed forces).¹

2 Southern Sudan disturbances, August 1955: The Report of the Commission of Enquiry, October 1956 Mccorquedal, Khartoum, p 10.

3 *Ibid*, p 13.

1 Jackson H.C, *The Fighting Sudanese*, London, 1954, p 8.

2 Saad el Din Fawzi, *The Labour Movement in the Sudan 1941-1955*, London, 1957, p 8.

3 Jackson, H.C, *op-cit*, p 3.

4 Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 450.

5 UNP/ SCR/ 5.A.1/3 *History Notes and Instructions*.

1 Johnson, *The British Documents on the end of Empire*, p 457.

The Southern political elites sought the adoption of a constitutional framework, which would give some protection to the south's particularistic interests increasingly. This took the form of demands for a federal arrangement. The support of Southern members of parliament (MPs) was given only after the House of Representative had resolved on 19 December 1955 that the claims of the Southern members of parliament for a federal government for the three southern provinces be given full consideration by the Parliament.²

The findings indicate that the colonial regime fought against the development of the southern Sudan by denying the region the opportunity to exploit its natural resources. Their philosophy was based on the assertion that the southern region is poor and unworthy of any economic investment. The civil conflicts between the central government and the southern Sudan have negative impact on the Sudan economy such as crops, livestock and lives of people were lost. The emphasis lately placed on unifying the country, the moves towards Independence and self-government, and the northern clamour for the departure of the British were causes of the South mistrust to the north. Among tribal elements and many of the more educated men there was deep suspicion of any rapid move towards the Independence which might for them spell harlotry. The tribesmen, in particular, were bewildered by the local talk of another government coming to them, which this time would be "an *effendi* government from Khartoum."³ Relations between the northern and southern personnel on the whole and on the surface remained good. Although there had been some trouble in a few schools due to the North-South antipathy, but there were reasons for thinking that such good relations as did exist were largely owing to British influence, and until that were removed the picture would be very different. The southerners would

probably then find him up against social pressures, which it would be well nigh impossible to resist, and which would seriously impede his development along indigenous lines. One wants to conclude that the political developments in the southern Sudan history 1940-1956 have been dominated by the high politics of Egypt, Britain and northern Sudan, but southern Sudan had little to contribute to these political developments. From 1940, no southerner had gone beyond intermediate level. The graduates Congress raised the northern Sudan political activity up since 1938. The graduates were fairly educated Sudanese of government officials.¹ The Second World War economically weakened Great Britain. She could not risk another war burden and expense. She was exhausted.

A rebellion, in Torit 1955, had a negative impact on the southern Sudan because many innocent northern Sudanese and southern Sudanese were killed. It forced many to flee to the neighbouring countries and intensified the guerrilla war. And where political unity was imposed by force rather than by an evolutionary process of nation building, the loyalty of citizens to governing institution is more in doubts, especially in the context of economic instability. This is the case of Sudan history and their political developments since up to the present time.² The Sudanese had independence from the British Government. The new republic of the Sudan immediately met with problems, which were both avoided and created, by British control. For the sake of stability the British had followed a policy of isolating the south from the north. A civil war between them began even before independence. The Southerners could agree to be together with the northerners but northerners themselves or some of them tend to impose Arabicization on southerners which they considered to be culturally unfair to them.

² *Ibid*, p 458.

³ Johnson, *The British documents on the end of Empire*, p 260.

¹ Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers. The southern Sudan 1898-1918*, p 214.

² Bahr al Ghazal / SCR/ 1.C Administrative Policy for Southern Sudan 1930-1956.

Negotiation, Election and Independence 1953-1956

Despite the appointment of southern members to the legislative assembly, the creation of southern province councils, the expansion of education and the first attempts at internal economic development in the south, which followed, by 1950 there had been little noticeable impact on southern and northern attitudes. They looked down upon each other. A southern political party, organized in 1951 and established formally in 1953, contested the 22 southern constituencies. A number of independent candidates of different motivations and sympathies also stood for elections. It has been reported that northern acceptance of southerners on equal terms was still based on Arabicization.¹ As a result, the northern members had given up the post of minister for the south in the new government, but had accepted definite safeguards for the south. These safeguards were buried in the Governor-General's reserve powers. He could veto the decision on the appointment of a council of ministers. He was responsible over all the southern provinces and the public service. The safeguards proposed for the south comprised the appointment of two southern ministers and a direct veto for his Excellency the Governor-General on matters concerning the south.² Politicians claimed that freedom would bring a new day for the south³.

As the Khatmiyya and pro-unionist parties had boycotted the Assembly, their views were not directly represented, but the Sudan government had secured their participation in a Constitutional Amendment Commission which contributed to the last draft of the statute. Thus, in its last form, the statute did represent a compromise between all the chief political groups within the Sudan, as brokered by the British members of the Sudan government.

In 1952 a British economic survey team authorized by a Development Committee reported that given the money, the technical know-how and the experts, the southern Sudan could easily become one of the richest countries in Africa⁴. Indeed, the region has tremendous potential. In 1952-53, there were crucial negotiations, which took place in Egypt². The northerners, Egyptians and British debated these negotiations. The southerners did not take part in

negotiations. All there were to be blamed especially northerners because they did not persuade British and Egyptian to include southerners in Cairo negotiations. The Anglo -Egyptian Agreement of 1953 overran southerners.

In January 1953 the four main political parties of the Northern Sudan- the Umma (independence), the National Party (Pro-Egyptian) the Socialist Republicans and the Watan (National Party, pro-independence on a republican basis) - signed a mutual agreement in the presence of the Egyptian emissary (Major Salah Selim).

The same year had brought irreversible changes to the Sudan³. The Umma Party continued to press the British government on several occasions to renounce self-government, re-establish direct control and declare Sudanese independence⁴. Therefore, the elections took place in the end of 1953. The result was that on first January 1954, UNP obtained 51 seats out of 97 and Umma 22 seats. The results of the elections reflected the strong anti-colonial feeling in the Sudan, and were recognition of the role of the NUP in the struggle for independence. Southern politicians elected to the constituent assembly in 1953 were soon scattered, joining northern parties because of their personal gains. They had no programme of their own, but there was a growing feeling of being betrayed by northern Sudanese politicians and left out by the British. As a result, the three southerners placed on drafting the constitution as members of the committee.

By February 1953, Egypt, Britain and the main northern Sudanese parties met in Egypt and had agreed to self-determination, for the Sudan and then would go on the road of self-determination in three years. This signed agreement gave the Sudan the opportunity to move towards self-determination that came about through constitutional negotiation¹.

The Umma Party and the National Unionist Party (NUP) called for the development of an Islamic parliamentary republic as early as 1953 based on the *Shari'a* as its main source of legislation. They called for a more fundamental function for Islam than prevailed under the colonial era. Among the Muslims who objected to the idea of an Islamic

¹ Douglass H. Johnson, *British Documents on the end of Empire*, p. IXI

² Marlowe, John, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1953*, London, 1954, p 36.

³ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p. 366

⁴ Mohammed Hashim Awad; 'The Southern Sudan; Planning for National Integration' SNR. LV Khartoum 1974, PP. 90-102

² Abdel Majid Abdin, "Some General Aspects of the Arabisation of the Sudan" SNR vol. 40, 1959, pp 115-120.

³ UNP/ SCR/ 1.A General Administrative

⁴ Douglass, H. Johnson, Op-cit, p 24.

¹ *Ibid*, p 35.

constitution were the anti-imperialists front, (a forerunner of the Communist Party) and the republic brothers (an intellectual pressure group).² The constitutional Amendment commission meetings were private. It was boycotted by the Ashigga and the Khatmiya but supported by Umma. It was composed of 13 Sudanese and chaired by a British expert. Its discussion was inevitably disclosed and the position of the parties was well known. The Umma was insistent as the National Front that the commission must be dominated by educated Northerner. The Umma party and the National Unionist Party called for the development of an Islamic parliamentary republic based on the *Shari'a* as its main source of legislation. They called for a more fundamental function for Islam than that prevailed under the colonial era.

Al-Azhari, chairman of the NUP expressed in 1954 a strong view that the political attitudes of tribal leaders, especially in the west and south, were influenced by British administrators and that political difference when the British went the case remained unsettled. Rapid Sudanization was clearly going to be a high priority. In 1954, all British and Egyptian officials were Sudanized. But he also showed an unwillingness to allow union with Egypt to become domination. He referred to the alliance with Egypt as tactical in order to remove the British: the old idea of unity was dead as a political force³.

Relations between British officials and the Sudan government deteriorated throughout much of 1954. By the time, the drafting committee was contemplating Sudanizing the technical department's bureau had already concluded that for the sake of British's future relations with the Sudan the sooner Sudanization was completed the better relation should be maintained between the British and the Sudanese. The southern political feelings and military action against the north began to show up at the end of 1954. Southern Sudanese had very little experience in modern politics¹.

Al-Azhari wanted to remove the British from the country in the direction of elections. The Nile valley alliance with Egypt was just as tactical policy. Al-Azhari split in 1954 the southern opposition by nominating a candidate who has failed in election, member of NUP, Siricio Iro, obtaining southern support in the vote.

The Sudan's first constitutional problem was averted rather than resolved. Some British officials asserted that Sudan ought to be divided into two nations. The British

government had sacrificed the southern Sudanese for political bargaining².

In 1954, Sayed Buth Diu, a Nuer and leader of the liberals who formed Southern political view with Stansilous Paysam and Abdul Rahman Sule called for the meeting in Juba. Many Southerners joined Southern political party and rapidly expanded and in 1953, it became known as the Southern Party. It was supported for the reason that the South would be able to campaign in the forthcoming elections. The Southern Party changed its name to the Liberal Party in 1954, in an attempt to gain northern members but it was not successful and so it changed its title to the Southern Liberal Party), in a letter addressed to the constitutional amendment commission said that the real safeguards for the south are some sort of federal relationship within the Sudanese nation³. He realised that this could not come about for some years⁴. In the meantime, the only safeguards could satisfy the southerners were that the British element in the Sudan government should remain in a position to ensure that the north did not acquire political and economic domination over the south. Southern Sudanese were to discuss what type of the constitutions the country should have. Southerners argued and insisted on a federal constitution, which was thought by them to be proper system of governance. Northerners as early as in the past years refused it and insisted on an Islamic constitution since the majority of the populations were Muslims. They rejected a federal constitution because they thought it was unfit and ruled it out the issue of Islamic constitution. In the autumn of 1954 Buth Diu, the most influential leader of the Liberal Party tried to organize in the 1947 Juba southern conference in Juba in order to discuss the future of the whole Sudan and the future of the south on Federal system.

Al-Azhari's response was to announce minor alterations in southern pay scales and promotions. The conference of Juba by southerners proclaimed the south's right to its own self-determination, and stated complete independence of the south was the only acceptable alternative to federation with the north. Failing that, southerners wished to have new elections to a constituent's assembly before 1954 and the Umma, Al-Azhari and the pro-Egyptians had advocated different views at different times. Al-Azhari was at first resistant to the idea of the plebiscite in 1955, but in July, Sayyid al-Mirghani lent his support to the idea, even if it

² Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 208.

³ Douglass H. Johnson, *British Documents on the end of Empire*, p IXXV11.

¹ Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 416.

² Gina Barsella et al, *Struggling to be Heard, the Christian voice in Independent Sudan, 1956-1996*, Nairobi-Kenya, 1998, p 6.

³ Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 215.

⁴ Douglass H. Johnson, *British Documents on the end of Empire*, p IXXV11.

meant asking the Egyptians to agree on amendment of the self-government¹

As Collins puts it "on October 25, 1954, southerners noticed that the shadows of day had dissolved into African night²". The British had gone; the political crisis in the south had been growing since the announcement of the Sudanization plans in 1954³.

The National Unionist Party (NUP) maintained a majority in parliament in part by winning southern members to their sides. Southerner voting as a block had the potential to make the difference between a government majority and a government defeat. The NUP and Major Salah Salim, the Egyptian officer in charge of Sudan Affairs, had made a number of promises of preferential treatment for southerners in Sudanization. Southerners became even more vocal in April 1955, when several southern members of the NUP, prior to leaving the party denounced their own government's southern policy and came out in favour of federation. It has been reported that the Egyptians were trying to bribe southern MPs in order to support a constitutional link with Egypt. Even Siricio Iro, who had been placed on the Governor-General's commission as an NUP man, left the party and was identified as Egypt's main agent in the Sudan. A self-determination motion was debated in the House of Representatives on 16th August in which the possibility of a plebiscite was mentioned, and both houses of parliament passed the resolution unanimously. The two Sayyids (Abdal Rahman al Mahdi and Ali Mirghan) publicly supported the call for a plebiscite and Britain's new ambassador to Cairo was authorized to inform Salah Salim that Britain would accept a plebiscite if the majority of Sudanese so wished¹. In the South, events were forcing themselves on the attention of Khartoum, Cairo and London². The mutiny was symptomatic of the major internal political problem of the Sudan i.e. the relationship between the north and the south; which could be settled only by the Sudanese themselves and would require a fundamental reappraise by the north of its attitude toward the south.

William Luce, the Constitutional Affairs Advisor to the Governor-General, did not declare a constitutional emergency but declared a state of emergency in the three southern provinces under the Sudan Defence Ordinance, thus allowing Al-Azhari's government to deal with the

emergency without reference to the Governor-General's commission or the Condominium. Bahr al Ghazal remained tense, largely because of the northern governor, Daud Abdal Al Latif who handed over the administration to southerners and left on the steamer (*Dal*). At Malakal, the Nuba Mountains police maintained a tense peace until the arrival of a company of troops from Khartoum. A Company of Haggana was to guard the airport at Juba. They were the only northern troops in Equatoria. It was because of them that the only secure base was left in Equatoria through which the Sudan government could fly in troops. The government army entered Torit with only a little opposition³. Most rebels had fled; the remainders were instructed by the government to surrender their arms and to return to work. They surrendered their arms and consequently they were arrested. They admitted their guilt when questioned. Many of them accused the other as usual. Many were found guilty and taken out in small groups and executed. Others who were guilty were imprisoned in the north.⁴.

Collins, R.O., says that the mutiny "stunned the northern Sudanese who were impatient for independence". The government reaction was quite harsh against the mutiny soldiers⁵. The inquiry of the disturbances in the southern Sudan was set up and named as Cotran Commission,

a Syrian high court judge¹. However, the Cotran report had little impact on the way that the mutiny was perceived as the making of the British officials to separate the south from the north. How did they perceive it? Independent Sudan faced the crucial work of forcing an effective basis for national unity and successive government, with varying degrees of force has attempted to establish this unity of the country through Islamization and Arabicization, and the south in particular. Arabic language was made as compulsory and also Islam used as official religion of the Sudan. The British had made or created the Closed District Ordinance to bar out each other. This could be regarded as negative impact between the south and the north because there was no consideration for the other side. At the root of the anxiety, when educated southerners expressed their views before independence that self-government of Sudan would not result in self-determination meant the transfer of administrative personnel to northern Sudanese officials. Although the transition from British to Sudanese administration in southern Sudan had been marred by

¹ Douglass, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 10.

² Collins, *Shadows in the Grass* p 445.

³ Douglass, *op-cit*, p 12.

¹Douglass H. Johnson, *British Documents on the end of Empire* p. IXXXIII

² *Ibid*, p 19.

³ Jackson H.C, *The Fighting Sudanese*, London, 1954, p 14.

⁴ Douglass H. Johnson, *op. cit* p. IXXXII.

⁵ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p. 368 .

¹ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan During August 1955*, Khartoum, 1956.

political inept administrative blunders, and extraordinary insensitivity shown in the virtual exclusion of southerners from positions vacated by the departing British officials, the decision of the council of ministers to have southerners as assistant governors and administrators in provinces and districts had been passed and implemented. The post of assistant governor was the only approved and maintained at that time. This was the fundamental cause of the disturbances. The southern Sudanese had difficulty in adjusting to the modern politics of the emerging Sudan². The northerner was still an object of fear and hostility³. The discriminatory policies of the colonial government restricted intercourse between the two Sudanese prevented neither the north nor the south from understanding the changes undergone during British government. During the condominium government, people only enhanced the suspicion, real or imaginary⁴. During 1955-1972, southern Sudanese got help from the Uganda army led by Idi Amin⁵.

The house of parliament on 19th December and the Senate passed the notion, but a date to independence (1st January 1956) was not decided until 22 December. In this, the way was opened for the Sudan to become independent without bloodshed or disaster but with haste, which might well cause legal and administrative chaos.

The First Democracy 1956-1958

The new republic was recognized by Egypt, Britain, and USA and it became a member of Arabs League and other members of the United Nations. The northern Sudanese rejoiced at the achievement and celebration of the independence alone, but the southern Sudanese did not rejoice at it¹. In the course of 1956 the Council of Ministers decided to bring more southerners into province and district administration, notably by the creation of assistant government commissioners, which were reserved for southern officials². The nationalists who were deeply affected by western culture and political ideas founded the republic. They sought to control the administration, which had been established under condominium rule. They professed the attachment to parliamentary system. The power was shifted or removed from British to Sudanese themselves on the appointed day. Resentment against

colonial rule was carried out through political parties. After independence, plans were laid out for accelerating the social and economic development of the south as the best guarantee for national unity and integration, but unfortunately all constructive efforts came to a stand still when the region became engulfed in civil strife. Al-Azhari advocated the unity of the Sudan with respect for freedom of religion and human right for every Sudanese citizen. It was only with great difficulties that Azhari was able to maintain his position as Prime Minister after independence. The target of Al-Azhari government policy was to ensure the unity of the Sudan, though conscious of the problem of the south³. NUP wanted a powerful executive presidency, directly elected. In such an electoral contest Azhari had an excellent chance of success⁴. Al-Azhari's government suffered defeat on 18th January 1956 in the Lower House on a budget vote, but the next day was maintained in office when he won a confidence motion. At the end of the month three ministers resigned and Al-Azhari was forced to form a coalition government. The new cabinet, sworn in on 12th February 1956, included Mirghani Hamza and Muhammad Nur Al-Din as well as two prominent Umma politicians, Abdallah Khalil the former leader of the legislative assembly and Ibrahim Ahmed¹. On 3rd July 1956 Abdallah Khalil, Secretary General of the Umma, was elected Prime Minister over Azhari by a vote of 60 to 32.

On the 7th July a new coalition cabinet, including prominent ex-National Unionist Party (NUP) members of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Al-Azhari government had been defeated. After independence it became official policy not only to allow but also to encourage such cross-cultural contact, but because of political conflicts among the parties it could not work.²

The southern Sudanese and radical northerners treated the southern problem as a tactical weapon conflicts for the supporting members³. It is full of intrigues and tricks. Any northern Sudanese party had never seriously except the Communist Party taken the southern Sudanese demand for the federal system in the assembly. It was just considered as a talking point, which would eventually be given a quiet burial opinion. In the Umma, and the People's Democratic Party coalition, and the People's Democratic Party in

² Collins, *The Waters of the Nile, Hydro-politics and Jonglei Canal 1900-1988*, Clarendon Press Oxford 1990, P 102.

³ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan during August 1955, Khartoum, 1956*.

⁴ *Africa Report, November, 1961, P 21*.

⁵ P. Woodward, *Uganda and Southern Sudan: Peripheral Politics and Neighbouring Relations*, London, James Curry, 1988, pp 224-238.

¹ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, P 365.

² Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, P 353.

³ Woodward, Peter, *Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism*, London, 1979, p 12.

⁴ Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, P 361.

¹ Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, P 140.

² Francis Mading Deng, *The Dinka and their Songs*, Oxford University Press, 1973, P 28,

³ Bechtold, Peter, *Politics in the Sudan*, New York, 1976, p 5.

particular was no less hostile to federation than Azhari had been. A committee of 43 was set in 1956 to prepare a draft constitution⁴. A memorandum addressed in early 1956, to the constitution Assembly by Sheikh Hasan Muddathir, the head of the Muslim division of the judiciary. He argued that: in an Islamic country like the Sudan, the social organization of which has been built upon Arab customs and Islamic ways⁵, the majority are Muslims, it is essential that the general principles of the constitution of such a country should be derived from the principles of Islam ... and in accordance with Islamic ideals, out of which such a community has been shaped.⁶ Indeed most of the northern political parties presented different proposals for an Islamic constitution. Among the Muslims who objected to the idea of an Islamic constitution were the Anti-imperialists front and the Republican Brothers.

The results of the first scientific census of the Sudan, announced in January 1957, put the population at 10,200,000. On this basis parliamentary constituencies were redrawn and their number was increased from 97 to 173 in preparation for elections which, were scheduled for 1958. The Sudan's first elections since then instituted in 1958 were held on April 26, when voters went to polls to choose out of 1,580 candidate representatives to sit on 94 municipal councils.

The Government of Abdallah Khalil

In February 1957 the government of Abdallah Khalil had announced its intention of nationalising the missionary schools and these were integrated into a national education system¹. The missions were accused of provoking and encouraging the mutiny, and even of supplying arms.²

The second key measure in the direction came 1957 (In addition to 1948) with the nationalisation of all missionary school in the south, thus achieving their removal from missionary control. This development appeared to catch all the missions by surprise. In general the Protestant mission acquiesced without much protest and stressed their eagerness to support the government.

For their co-operative spirit the minister of education commended them³.

By 1957, Ziad Arbab, the minister of education, had emphasised in his speeches that all concerned parties had fully been consulted and that the policy had been adopted after full consideration of the wish and opinion of the Sudanese people, especially those in the south⁴. The same curriculum of education in one country should be the same. This is more reasonable than separate curriculum. The consultation of the Southern opinion was appropriately stated by the minister. On 13th February 1957 the church mission representatives met the minister in Khartoum to hear minister of education's decisions and discuss their implications. Ziad Arbab, minister of education, was courteous but quite uncompromising. He gave thanks to the missionaries for their good and devoted work in education since the beginning of the century and assured them that his decision did not in anyway imply that the mission system of education was underrated. He also reminded the missionaries that freedom of conscience and right to profess any religion were entrenched in the drafting committee of the constitution. But he made it clear that he expected speedy and co-operative compliance with his decision. The take over of the village and elementary schools and of the vernacular teacher training centres with effect from 1st April 1957. The take over within one or two years of three mission intermediate schools is left for the time being to missionaries¹. Because the minister admitted that was virtually impossible to find trained Sudanese elementary schoolmistresses, either northern or southern in the south².

On 18th June 1957, Ziad Arbab, the minister of education, addressed in parliament on the nationalisation of the southern schools, where he had made lavish promises of higher posts in education for southern Sudanese³. In fact, the take over of the southern education between 1957 and 1959, like administrative Sudanization some four years earlier, was largely a process of northernization⁴.

Missionaries problems of post-elementary institutions were invariably northernised, rather than southernised and the key posts in education administration (the assistant director and his staff, the province education officers) continued to be held almost, exclusively by northern Sudanese. The impact of northern Sudanese administrators in the south led

⁴ Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, P 342.

⁵ Muddathir Abdel Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, Oxford, 1969, p 20.

⁶ John Hundertom, *The Lotuho and the Verona Fathers*, Uppsalia 1990, P 191.

¹ Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 24

² Mohammed Omer Bashir, "Ethnicity, Regionalism and National Cohesion in the Sudan" *SNR*. Vol 60-61, 1978-1980, pp. 1-85.

³ Philosophical Society of the Sudan, "Annual Report, 1957-1958", *SNR* vol. 39, 1958, p 109.

⁴ *Ibid*. p 86.

¹ Bashir Mohammed Said, *The Sudan, Crossroads of Africa*, London 1965, pp 190-198.

² *Ibid*, p 195.

³ Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, P 36.

⁴ O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret War in Sudan*, Faber and Faber, 1977, P 48.

to a number of unsatisfactory stop gap expectations such as proper system and proper development

The appointment to schools of vernacular-trained, as opposed to primary trained, southern schoolmistresses, and the posting to girl schools of northern Sudanese male teachers were unwanted. Northern Sudanese headmasters often replaced eventually missionary headmistresses of girl's boarding schools. This was at best a questionable expediency; and matters were improved by the rising proportion of male to female teachers in girls' schools especially with the progressive elimination of missionary schoolmistresses from late 1962⁵.

Government's Coalition.

Since 1956 no government had been strong enough; because of lack of parliamentary majority, all were coalition governments. The Sudanese governments were faced by internal conflicts. These governments were marred by the Westminster model. The main reasons for their failure had been partly because the personality cult obtruded so much, and partly because some of the prominent leaders, such as Al-Azhari and Khalil. The Umma and the PDP formed a temporary coalition. Both of them voted against Azhari who lost his former coalition majority. As a result Khalil was voted for and became the Prime Minister in 1956-1958. The Northern Sudanese too wanted to have the same model of government with a presidential one with the president as in America-having full executive authority¹.

In the southern Sudan there was a military occupation by northern Muslim soldiers, government by Arabic speaking administrators. The objectives of this party were the recognition of English and Christianity equally with Arabic and Islam, the establishment of an independent southern army, and a separate southern programme of economic development. To maintain his position premier Abdallah Khalil relied upon the support of the People's Democratic Party, which stood firmly against a federal solution. In December 1957 it was announced that the constitutional committee had given the southern claim for federation very serious consideration, and found that it would not work in the Sudan². In 1957 Izbone Mondri constituted the southern federation party. This party was to vote in opposition of election with the National Unionist Party. The founder of this was a graduate of the University of Khartoum, southern member of the national assembly.

The national assembly was dissolved on the 30th June 1957 to prepare for elections, which were held from the 27th February to 9th March 1958. The southern Sudanese problem scarcely attracted their attention, although both Saturnino Lohure and Elia Lupe, Equatorians in 1958 of the federal party in the constituent assembly, openly campaigned for complete autonomy for the southern Sudan.

The Sudan under Military Regime 1958-1964

By 1958, the coalition government the Umma and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) were running into very heavy weather. In the February 1958 elections Azhari's National Unionist Party had obtained more votes than any other party, and although the National Unionist Party (NUP) won 44 seats to the Umma party's won 63, Azhari's continuing electoral popularity was an evil omen for so inherently unstable a coalition. "The politics of Abdallah Khalil, the Umma Prime Minister of the coalition, were too constructive and too pro western for a country still in the grip of post-independence euphoria"¹. A sharp slump in both the price and yield of Sudan cotton faced Abdallah Khalil with the alternatives of leaving much of the government's planned development programme of seeking foreign aid on a massive scale. He was bitterly attacked, not only by Azhari and the National Unionist Party but, by elements of the People's Democratic Party, for his willingness to accept American and British aid. General Abboud overthrew the civilian coalition government in November 1958 in a bloodless coup and ruled through the supreme council of the armed forces until 1964 when he was forced to renounce power in favour of civilians². Only 17 members of the two political parties were arrested. They were the anti imperialist front and the trade union federation; their leaders were arrested and were regarded as communist motivated. A part from this, there were no other arrests and not trials of politicians³. There was no disturbance or disruption of normal life. Premier Abdallah Khalil and members of his government were awakened early and given letters dismissing them from their posts. The army had assumed power to end corruption and chaos of the preceding politicians. This was announced over the radio to the Sudanese people. A state of emergency was declared. The constitution was suspended, and the national assembly and all political parties were dissolved. The supreme council was dismissed which had head of state power before this coup. The supreme council was replaced by the supreme council of the armed forces, headed by General Ibrahim Abboud. The president of the supreme

⁵ Ministry of Education, *Revised Ten Year Plan, 1949-1956*, Khartoum W.D.

¹ Muddathir Abdel Rahim, *Op-cit*, p 25.

² Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, P 342.

¹ Mansour Khalid, *Op-cit*, p 20.

² *Africa Report* 1973, p 160.

³ Abdall Magid Abdin, "Some General Aspect of the Arabization of the Sudan" *SNR vol. 40*, 1959, p 30.

council for the armed forces, general Abboud, would appoint other members of the council. His standing forces were the creations of the colonial powers in the evolution towards independence. They did not participate directly, although the impact of demobilised soldiers on individuals made the growth, not by the military as corporate group resentment against colonial role. This was channelled through political military uprisings party, not through direct military intervention. It aimed at unseating civilian governments and replacing them with ruling councils drawn largely from the army¹.

On the 18th November 1958 the cabinet was formed, led by Ibrahim Abboud, consisting of seven officers and five civilians, all non-party men. The only southerner was Santino Deng, who was minister of animal resources, a job he had held under Premier Abdallah Khalil. Ibrahim Abboud said that he had taken over the country to fight deteriorating democracy. Surely the Sudan had swung from one extreme to the other from democracy to military dictatorship that hardened quickly, the excuse being that a strong government was needed to negotiate with Egypt.

Abboud's Policy Towards the South

Abboud's policy for more integration between the north and the south was based on Arabic and Islam. The Sudanese nationalism is still at the rear of the caravan of progress. The attention is hereby paid to the rise of southern nationalism by electing southern members to the constituent assembly. Meanwhile, the southern Sudanese discontent with the northern Muslims administration was deepening, and there were increasing incidents involving the mutineers lurking in the forests and the government soldiers who were seeking them out. As yet the southern rebels were few in number and they lacked cohesion, organization and central direction, their scarce firearms were the old British rifles and guns they had taken with them when they had deserted. The people in the southern Sudan could be said to identify themselves even vaguely with the rebels. The Khartoum government labelled them as outlaws². They were receiving weapons from some quarters. The Sudanese army razed down 700 huts as punishment for sheltering rebels in Yei. Some looked upon this as the first sign of the population attempting to form the sea which the fish, the guerrilla fighter, needs in which to swim, but it is far more likely that the people had been forced to harbour the rebels at gun-point³.

The Abboud regime took stronger steps. The gradual progress of Arabicization and Islamization, to which the

policies of the condominium had served as a partial barrier, were to be hastened through aggressive action. It stepped up the policy of national integration as the only way to promote unity; it embraced cancelling cultural practices that impend cultural uniformity and encouraged the spread of Islamic education and the promotion of Arabic as a national language. Six intermediate Islamic institutes were opened, mosques were constructed and subsidised, missions were prohibited from opening new schools, and the day of rest changed from Sunday to Friday.

The implementation of this policy took two forms: (a) Accelerating the process of Islamization and Arabization; (b) Threatening the activities of missionaries, nationalisation of missionary school, and expulsion of missionaries from the Sudan and the adoption of Friday as the day of rest¹.

As missionary activities had been seen in condominium days, as part of the southern policy designed to promote a separate development of southern society, especially southern intellectuals, as a thinly veiled political provocation viewed their limitation. The Abboud government in turn blamed the missionaries for arousing southern hostility towards the government, deadlock on the question of the status and powers of the presidency.

Finally southern representatives decided to stand against the constitution and walked out of National Constituent Assembly on June 16th 1958. The southerners claim to regional autonomy was referred to the sub – committee of the constitution assembly that was drafting a permanent constitution. The sub-committee decided against it.²

Fr. Saturnino Lohure, a member of parliament, the Sudanese priest, the spokesman of the southern Sudanese Federal Party that was established in 1954 and graduate of the Catholic University of Rome and insisted on federal system. They had made it clear the southerners sought a federal union with the north, and not separation if the northern Sudan persisted in the policy of political, social and economic means of the south. This party soon won the loyalty of many younger educated southerners impatient with hesitation and ambiguities of the southern liberals.

The southern Sudanese demands were the recognition of both Christianity and Islam as state-religions and both English and Arabic as the official languages. They requested that the southern Sudan should have a separate southern civil service and its own educational system to be crowned by a southern university.

¹ Claude E., Welch, *Soldier and state in Africa*, 3, pp, 305-22.

² Muddathir Abdel Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p 16.

³ O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret War in the Sudan*, p 51.

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *The Role of Religion*, p 212.

² F. Pierli et al, *Faith in Sudan No. 5*, p 22.

Ezboni Mondri Gwanza, a Moru by tribe, argued the transfer of the whole Sudan from the Arab world to the African.¹ It had been so successful that Stanislaus Paysama was again able to constitute all southern members of the National Assembly into a southern party for voting purposes. The president of the Southern party was initially Saturnino Lohure, a priest, and the Secretary General was Luigi Adwok. Three southern ministers were appointed to the new Abdallah Khalil government, Lohure, Adwok and Mondri. Ezboni Mondri was sentenced to imprisonment for incitement and both Saturnino Lohure and Adwok resigned.²

Once the constitutional committee had rejected the separation and independence of the south, there was a possibility of federal system opened in December 1957. The southern liberal party began to make serious contact with the African as opposed to the Arab northern peoples in the northern Sudan, of which there were about three million included Nuba, Fur and so on to encourage them, to demand the right, to manage their own affairs.³

The Impact of the Military Regime 1958-1964

In August 1958, the Beja congress insisted that premier Abdallah Khalil Should try to visit them to discuss the federal demand, while similar proposals were put forward by other groups in his quest for popularity and power. That gave some vague degree of support to the idea of federation.⁴

The southern Sudanese were allowed 46 seats out of 173 in the elections of February 1958. Of these some 40 were won by southerners mostly supported the party's census demand for federal constitution. They were of all official members of the federal party. They had missed only 6 seats out of 46 that went to the Umma Party.

From the beginning, of southern political movements that started in 1958, against the northern Sudanese political parties, *Muslims* had been among the prominent leaders of the southern Sudan like Abdel Rahman Sule, a Bari and others. These Muslims were among the extremist in military wing of Anyanya movement¹. When Ibrahim Abboud took over however, the change of government did not have any immediate impact in the Southern Provinces, like the parliamentary regime². The new military government of General Abboud faced not only by the economic policies of the previous regime but also dissident

groups within the army itself. Within a year General Abboud resolved both problems. The six years of military regime did not have a specific programme to allay the deep fears of the Southerners.

General Ibrahim Abboud's regime survived four attempted counter-coups by dissident army factions. He has abolished the Sudan's several rival political parties by forced and established discreet but firm authoritarian rule which permits little public disagreement with its politics, while clearing the major obstacles to amicable relations with Egyptian agreement, over the Nile waters. The military government signed the Nile water agreement with the U.A.R. On 8th November 1959, this agreement ended the dispute between Egypt and Sudan. Historically, the Egyptians did most of the slave trading. And therefore Egyptians were then regarded with such dislike on this account as their northern Sudanese puppets of many years ago. Secondly, they had given this advantage³. The Egyptians were well able to fan the historical scenes with relative impunity and thereby contrived to wreck the efforts of a new and innocent generation of northern administrators' trying⁴. On the 5th march 1959, a new supreme council of ten members headed by Abboud was constituted. It included Brigadier Shanan, Brigadier Moheiddin Ahmed Abdallah and the other Brigadier who was in charge of the west central command, Magboul al-Amin, who were pro-Egyptians and were regarded as Arab nationalists.⁵ Ahmed Abd al al-Wahhab was included too in the government. Brigadier Abdal Wahab was dismissed because he was considered as pro-western and the three Brigadiers, Shanan, Moheiddin Ahmed Abdallah and Magboul al-Amin, became ministers in Abboud's government. These changes were officially put down to differences between senior army officers over purely internal matters. It was in fact simply a matter of the divisions of the posts on the night of the 21st May 1959 when a unit of soldiers from Eastern Command began moving with four armoured vehicles on Khartoum. The coup had misfired right from the beginning, when the officer in charge of transport refused to join in and allow his vehicles to be used to the troops. Army opposition to Abboud has hardly any effect on the south. Sensing failure, Brigadier Abd-al Rahim Shanan, one of the senior plotters, rushed out in an attempt to stop the soldiers who had began matching on foot, but he failed to make contact with them.

¹ *Ibid*, p 25.

² O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret War in the Sudan*, p 46.

³ *Ibid*. p 47.

⁴ *Ibid*, p 43.

¹ Francis Mading Deng, *The Dinka and their Songs*, p 28.

² Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Role of Religion in Conflict Between North and South" *Studies in Sudnaese History*, p 214.

³ Philosophical Society of the Sudan. "Annual Report 1959-1960", *SNR Vol. 41*, 1960, p 118.

⁴ Douglass H. Johnson, *The root causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 30 .

⁵ O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret War in the Sudan*, p 55.

By this time president Abboud had been alerted as to what was going on.

In 1960, 20 former political leaders joined forces to urge a return to civilian government and the drawing up of a new constitution.¹ By 1960 the military government was unchanged, the threat of counter-revolution had disappeared, and the Sudan would have appeared in a model of authoritarian progressive despotism. After the dissolution of parliament, the military regime sought to quell southern dissent by the bonds of Sudanese nationalism; expressed in Arabic language, Arab culture and the Arab past fused with the traditions on the Sudanese history and the deep emotions of Sudanese Islam. The majority of southern political leaders remained in the open opposition to the northern Sudan, although there were frequent arrests².

In early December 1960 it was discovered that the government was mounting an operation to seize and detain all southern political leaders. On Christmas day, the intention was to get rid of the political movement that wanted independence or federation by trying to show the threat scenting danger. The southern Sudanese leaders went underground and calmly spilled away into exile. Thus beginning that escalated into large-scale migrations of southern Sudanese refugees into adjacent Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and the Central Africa Republic, which grew in volume as fear was generated by Abboud government's reprisal policy. Convinced that the missionaries were simply trouble making, the government issued further restrictions on them and their work. He was encouraged in this belief because the Sudanese Christian association supported the southern Sudanese refugees, especially those in Uganda. They were backed by foreign church organization.

The political leaders requested that the military regime should hand over the government to civilians, and a new constitution should be drawn up. This was answered, and in July 1961 many of the signatories including two former Prime Ministers Azhari and Abdallah Khalil were arrested and sent to detention in the south.

The death in October 1961 of Sayyid Siddig al-Mahdi, leaders of the powerful Ansar sect (estimated. 1,300, members)¹ and the country's most constituted name civilian critic rule would seem to reinforce the army's position for the time being. Sayyid Al Hadi Al Mahdi, the new Imam

of the Ansar, has not therefore been active in politics and is not likely to challenge the government while still consolidating his position among the Ansar.

The foreign policy of the Sudan is one of conservative Neutralism, which if practised meant non-alignment with either of the major intra-African political groupings, and acceptance of economic assistance from both the west and the Soviet Bloc. In 1961 General Abboud had paid visits to both Moscow and Washington².

By 1961 several incidents took place in the southern Sudan, some of which involved the rebels, but others the majority concerned old style tribal disturbances and competition. Abboud believed that the force would solve the matter, and he met all signs of disorder (Civil war, strikes) in the southern Sudan with stern and often-savage reprisals.

The activities of the Christian Missionaries

On the 15th may 1962 the Missionary Societies Act required missionaries to obtain license from the Sudan government within six months and they were forbidden to proselytise, except under restrictions. The enactment of the 1962 missionaries' Societies Act provoked resistance and a series of student strikes, which was followed by unrest in the countryside.

The 1962 Act created a wide protest locally and abroad¹. The Government maintained that the missionaries organisations had exceeded the limits of their sacred mission: they instigated Southerners against the government, encouraged them to break the law and exploited religion to impart hatred, fear and animosity in the minds of Southerners against Northerners.

In February 1962 distinguished southern Sudanese leaders constituted Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) at Kinshasa (then Leopoldville) in Zaire (then the Belgian Congo and now DRC). Joseph Oduho was the president and its vice president was Marko Rume and its Secretary General was William Deng, with Aggrey Jaden as its Assistant Secretary.

General Saturnino Lohure was active in its affairs and he could have been the real leader. He assumed the title of patron. The policy of Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) was to obtain complete independence for the southern Sudan.²

The Beginnings of Armed Struggle in the Southern Sudan

The military government of General Abboud followed a policy of Arabicization and Islamization in the south, focusing on

¹ Grima Nagash, "Sudanese politics" *African Today* Vol. 27, 1980, pp 55-56.

² Gino Barsella, Op-cit, p 24.

¹ Warburg, Gabriel, *Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, the Case of Sudan*, London, 1978, p 42.

² Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 367.

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Role of Religion in Conflict Between North and South" *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 215.

² Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 368.

education³. There was a programme of school building, financed by USAID⁴. Mission schools were transferred to government control, and Arabic was progressively introduced as the medium of instruction [English remained the medium of instruction secondary schools even in Northern Sudan]. Conversion to Islam was encouraged, especially among students. With the appearance of the Anyanya guerrilla army in 1963 the civil war had flared up once more. During that year and 1964 the security situation and the educational situation alike continued to deteriorate.

A guerrilla force was formed in the forests, together with the general disturbance 1961 and 1962, and the consequences reprisals, caused pupils in southern schools, now government controlled, to stay away, in case they might become targets for government actions. In Bahr al Ghazal, the local government was certainly weak in the schools. But it seems that even as late as 1962 some missionaries access to schools were still inactive¹. The Guerrilla movement was established 1963. It was a loosely knit guerrilla army and had external military support, arming themselves mainly by theft from the police outposts, the occasional ambush of army patrols or through the defection of southern police or soldiers². It derived its name from a poison type of snake in Madi and from snake and rotten beans. The rebels had its nucleus veterans of the 1955 rebellion who had avoided capture by taking to the bush. In August the outlaws announced its existence as a guerrilla movement which denied the possibility of a merely political solution, whether organized from inside or outside the Sudan and believed that only the use of force will bring a decision³. They recruited mainly from refugees of their manpower. They began operations on the Sudan frontiers in 1963. In 1963, Dominic Murewal, a member of SACDNU and Dinka, was released from a Sudanese prison. He replaced Marko Rume, an Equatorian in the movement as the vice president of SACDNU. Joseph Oduho, the president openly disclaimed the use of force or any connection with the rebels lurking in the southern forests.⁴ The organization provided information for the press and sent petitions to the UN and the organization of Africa unity (OAU). These Organisations urged them to support the southern Sudan in its struggle against the northern Sudan. It would have liked both the UN and OAU to intervene in the southern Sudan, but neither organization responded. It provided, however, evidence to the world at large of events in the southern Sudan, and spoke for growing number of southern Sudanese refugees who, as security in the southern Sudan

broke down, had left to neighbouring countries. The schools never functioned properly again before they were all finally closed in 1964. In that year, the Anyanya attempted and only very narrowly failed to capture Wau, which was to have been the signal for a general insurrection⁵. Bernadino Mou Mou was the leader of this army. The government army repulsed them. Immediately after this attack or incident all missionaries working in the southern Sudan were expelled from the Sudan.

Guerrilla activity continued. On March 1964 President Ibrahim Abboud opened the second session of the Sudan's new Central Council in Khartoum. Both the president and the ministers of interior confirmed that the situation was deteriorating in the three southern provinces, particularly Bahr al Ghazal¹. On February 22nd, the Sudanese government announced that a military tribunal of Bahr al Ghazal province had begun the trial of the third batch of southerners and foreigners accused of participation in "a terrorist plot to take over Wall Defence", organized by the outlaws SANU.² The activities of Christian missionaries were placed under increasing restrictions, until all in the south were expelled in 1964. Ironically conversions to Christianity increased dramatically once the churches were subjected to this government assault.³ During this time there had been only a military campaign against the few 1955 mutineers who remained hiding in the bush, but the army began to burn villages in the late 1960s. Such repressive activities, especially those aimed at educated southern Sudanese, increased opposition to the government. This was met by further repressive action, including arrest and torture of civilians. In 1960-2 a number of senior political figures [including Fr. *Saturnino* Lohure, Aggrey Jaden, Joseph Oduho and William Deng went into exile. The Federal politicians sought to establish alliances with politicians from other underdeveloped regions of the Sudan, in both the East and the West and a greater number of students. Southerners left for the bush and neighbouring countries where they joined the remaining mutineers from both the exile political movement and the core of the guerrilla army. The exile movement eventually calls itself the Sudan African Nationalist Union [SANU] in emulation of the east African Nationalist Parties. The guerrillas became known colloquially by the vernacular name of a type of poison Anyanya. It is from this time rather than 1955 mutiny that one can date the true beginning of the Sudan's first civil war.⁴

³ *Ibid*, p. 365.

⁴ Douglass H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of the Sudan's Civil Wars*. p 30.

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Role of Religion in Conflict Between North and South" *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 215.

² Doughass, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 31.

³ Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan*, p 369.

⁴ O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret war in the Sudan*, p 54.

⁵ Deborah Scroggins, *Emma's War, Love, Betrayal and Death in the Sudan*, Harper Collins, Great Britain, 2003, p 45.

¹ *Ibid*, p. 42.

² *Africa Report*, May 1964

³ John Hunderstom, *The Lotuho and the Verona fathers, Uppsalia*, 1990, p 191.

⁴ Douglass H. Johnson, *op-cit*, p 31.

The intensification of the Southern Sudanese armed struggle 1964-1972:

The years between 1964 and 1972 can be seen as the most striking years in the modern history of both the Sudanese State and the Sudanese church. The abrupt decision for removal of the missionaries, followed by the eruption of a full-scale and a bloody civil war, mark a watershed in Sudan history. Growing tensions between north and south over issues of national unity or as perceived in the south, over neo-colonialism, economic, religious and political oppression, reached a decisive and defining climax during these years. The escalating tension was resolved in the direction of conflict and confrontation.¹ These years not only represented the apex of several decades of dispute and debate, they had also defined how Sudanese, in both north and south, had seen the national Sudanese problem and the different options of solving it. The years 1964 – 1972 have controlled the shape of subsequent Sudanese history.

The Expulsion of the Missionary Societies, 1964: Impact and Aftermath

The Sudan government announced in 1962 that all foreign missionaries serving in the southern provinces would be expelled from the country because of their hostile activity to the unity of the country. Once the military government had deviated from the peaceful historical socio-cultural pattern of spreading Islam to which the Sudan had been accustomed, the clash of cultures became violent and uncompromising. The course of peaceful Islamization involved free interaction of culture, persuasion and consent. The inexperienced military government put itself into an armed conflict with a very experienced and strong foe: the church². The conflict was henceforth shifted from Khartoum to the south and slowly it acquired an international dimension. The decision involves some 300 clergymen, including 272 Roman Catholic and 28 Protestants, the ministry of interior emphasised that the ouster of the missionaries would not in any way affect.

"The strict harsh policy adopted by the dictatorship, the tough stand of the rebels and the church and the ensuing brutalities created an irreparable atmosphere of bitterness and mistrust between the two sides. It was already too late; when by August 1964 the military Junta realised the folly of its policy and appointed a commission to study the causes

of distrust and recommend means of dealing with it", said Yusuf Fadl Hasan¹.

This affirmed that the government would help the churches to carry out their holy mission and will offer financial help to train Sudanese priests and clergymen to fill the posts thitherto help by foreigners.²

The Sudanese government stressed that they would give freedom to practice religious activities and sacred customs in the country. They would encourage the Sudanese priests to be trained by giving them financial help so that they replace the foreigners. A judicious appraisal of the proceeding event reveals that the violent repressive policy adopted by the military government was counter productive. On the other hand, followers of indigenous African beliefs and some Muslims, who supported the rebels against the government, were encouraged to embrace Christianity.³

In February 1964, the government issued a decree in Khartoum ordering the expulsion of all missionaries from southern Sudan. The expulsion did achieve another government aim: the removal of outsiders from the south who may report on the repression and the violence taking place there⁴. On 8 March 1964, all missionaries left the Southern Sudan. With the expulsion of the missionaries, the government believed that they had cut away the major support of the Sudanese churches. By

On March 19, 1964 the first extradition agreement between neighboring states was signed in Kampala, Uganda. The agreement provides for the exchange of convicted criminals "with the exception of political ones".⁵ A big transit camp was established in 1964 by the Anyanya in western Bahr Al Ghazal at a spot known as "Ngo Sulugu". The Anyanya rebels received their military training here. After training they were sent to Nyangara and Bagadi in Zaire. Thus basic training in western Equatoria and Bahr Al Ghazal was done in the same places. In 1964-65, well-organized system of recruitment was established along with a civil administration in rural areas, which fell under Anyanya control.¹

August 1964, the government realized the Folly of its policy between north and south and to recommend means of altering it². Northern Sudanese Political Parties

¹ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 385.

² Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Sudanese Revolution of October 1964" *Journal of African History*, pp 491-506.

¹ *Ibid*, p 410.

² *Ibid*, p 507.

³ *Ibid*, pp 492-507.

⁴ O. Branchesi, 1965-1966. "The Sudan: Conspiracy for destruction". *World Mission* 15. Winter: 8.21.

⁵ *Africa Report*, May 1964.

¹ UNP/ SCR/ 1.A *Public Administration* 10th June 1958.

² Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Studies in Sudanese History*, p 210.

confidently expected that Christianity in southern Sudan would now wither away slowly with the advent of military rule. The Southerners were prevented from expressing their political aspirations. In a forum convened at the University of Khartoum on 5 September, 1964 Dr. Hassan Al Turabi stated that the problem of the south was closely associated with the constitutional set up in the country and could not be tackled other than by democratic means. At that time, Dr. Hassan Al Turabi was a member of the university staff and a known Muslim Brother. He admitted that the problem of the southern Sudan could be tackled only by democratic means because it was related to the constitution.

In September 1964, a commission of inquiry was appointed by the government so as to investigate causes of the southern unrest and to propose solutions. This commission invited public discussion of the southern problem. Citizens were invited to express their views freely on this matter without fear.³ The students union of the University of Khartoum, long a center of opposition to the government, concluded in the meeting that no solution was possible so long as the military government remained in power. The ministry of education prohibited further meetings. The October revolution brought down the government of General Abboud and was succeeded by Sir Khatim Khalifa, civilian government. This move released a great wave of public debate and disquiet. However, the events in the southern Sudan had their impact on the northern Sudan as well.

Some northern Sudanese elite's as a matter of fact agreed with this constructive argument that there was no stability, no justice and no equality in the country. Their root causes should be got rid of to regain stability, justice and equality in the country.⁴

Riots and Demonstrations in Khartoum 1964

At 8:30 PM on 21 October 1964, the University students assembled in a square within the university precinct, intending to discuss further the southern issue. There they found themselves encircled by police, who ordered them to disperse¹. On their refusal to move, tear gas, was used. The students retaliated by throwing stones, bricks, and empty bottles, and shouting anti-government slogans. Then the police opened fire, killed one student, Ahmed Al Qurashi, wounding a considerable number of others.

This was the first time that the students as a distinct group had been subjected to physical intimidation. The death of

the student was the occasion for the outbreak of demonstrations. With this action the military regime had gone too far.² This was in effect the beginning of a civil strife, which was taken up by other professionals.

Al Qurashi's funeral procession was an anti-government demonstration of the first magnitude. This demonstration was joined by tens of thousands of citizens³. Furthermore, at the time most of the army was stationed in the south. This was highly speeded up and there was lack of mutual trust among the officers. As a result of this mounting pressure, president Abboud and his colleagues began to give way. At 8:30 PM on Monday 26 October, President Abboud broadcasted to the nation the dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Council of Ministers. The news met with great rejoicing; with this achievement the popular upheaval had attained its first success. The people's hopes were now fixed on negotiations aimed at liquidating the military rule.

October Revolution and its Impact

Abboud was overthrown in October, 1964 by the popular uprising in Khartoum and other provinces.⁴ This was a popular government that came to power after the coup. A democratic government followed this. This civilian government which was a temporary government held elections only in the north in April 1965. Civilian governments followed in swift succession. The government did not improve the situation. So did the massive exodus of refugees, many of whom were ultimately to join the resistance. In October 1964, the schools were closed on the grounds of security. These were schools of Bahr al Ghazal and Equatoria. This year was the period of the general security, which accompanied the fall of the military government of Abboud. However, this order was defied, and in the course of police attempts to disperse meeting students, one student was shot and others badly wounded. On the next day a funeral procession of some 30,000 people quickly bore demonstration and riots that the police could not control. There was an incident of killing some 200 demonstrators. The soldiers opened fire on them. This lent urgency to the discussions and heightened popular feelings against the army.

On 26th October the supreme council and the cabinet were announced dissolved. Negotiations for formation of a new government began between the army and the professional and united fronts. The two fronts agreed to form a transitional government, which was announced. On 30

³ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Sudanese Revolution of October 1964" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 14 No 2, pp 409-509.

⁴ Ahmed Ibrahim al-Tahir *Op-cit*, p 20.

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Studies in Sudanese History*, p. 112.

² Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 45.

³ Salah el-Din el-Zein el-Tayeb, *The Students Movement in the Sudan 1940-1970*, Khartoum, 1971, p 13.

⁴ Al Ayyam, No 4347, 28 October 1964.

October 1964 a transitional government, embracing all shades of political opinion, was inaugurated. The revolution had achieved its immediate objectives with speed and remarkably little bloodshed.

The Transitional Government of Sir al Khatim al Khalifa

General Abboud capitulated and handed over the government to a transitional civilian government led by Sir Khatim al-Khalifa who was a civil servant unaffiliated with a political party.¹ The short period of 1956 to 1964 has a tremendous role in Sudanese history. The independence of the country was achieved but the northern Sudanese alone enjoyed it. The southern Sudanese did not rejoice at the celebration of independence. All civilian governments failed because of the southern problem. The northern political parties [some] were hostile to the southern Sudanese demand for a federal status in 1950s, although it was agreed upon at least. The military government was repressive in its rule on the southern Sudanese. The government used Arabization and Islamization as instruments for national unity.

Sir Al Khatim Al Khalifa appointed as Prime Minister, well received in the south was familiar with the problems and many southerners knew him. He was an educationalist who had many years of experience in the southern Sudan. Although he associated himself with the military government's educational policies of which the south disapproved, he was nevertheless respected and expected to be sympathetic. Sir al Khatim al Khalifa reaffirmed the concept that force was no solution to the vital human problem, which has so many facets, social, economic, and cultural.²

As a matter of fact, no solution could be found by the use of force Sir Al Khatim was the first leader to acknowledge that dimension of the conflict. He went further and appealed to the nation saying "let us establish confidence in southerners, accept southern intellectuals as the leaders of the south." As an educationalist he appealed to educated elements in and out of the country to assure southern intellectuals that they were no longer tools of northern politics. As a result, he appointed Clement Mboro, Minister of Interior and Ezboni Mondri Minister of Communications to the cabinet and Sayed Luigi Adwok to the Supreme council. The post of minister of the interior was one of the most crucial and powerful in the government. Clement Mboro was at the time the representative of SANU inside,

the political arm of southern resistance which became the Southern National Front.¹

Southern Resistance was engineered by the Southern Front Executive Committee.² Hilary Paul Logali joined the government as the minister in the cabinet and at a later date, Gordon Muortat, after Ezboni resigned at the end of March 1965. For the time the south had people of its own choice in the government, individual merit was the basis of selection.

The relation of the southern Sudanese political leaders outside was not immediately clear to the dramatic changes in the country. As a consequence in November 1964, Abel Alier, Darius Beshir and Lubari Ramba were sent to Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to acquaint politicians outside and ordinary refugees with the changes that had taken place and to ascertain their action.

Father Saturnino Lahure was in Nairobi and expressed considerable reservations about what the new government could do to correct the mistakes of the past, the making of civilian political situation in Khartoum and were only magnified during the military government.

Northern political and military leaders dishonored the federal pledge. He also expressed doubts of the safety of politicians and refugees returning home to the euphoria of the political change. He was emphatically pessimistic about future improvement of relations between the north and the south. This was what was told to the delegation of Abel Alier, Darius Beshir and Lubari Ramba.³

Aggrey Jaden and Joseph Oduho were in Kampala by the time the delegation witnessed an intense struggle for the party leadership between Aggrey and Joseph Oduho. Oduho and Saturnino had actually initiated the political parties conference for election of the new president. Its first priority was to amend the constitution to suppress the office of Secretary General. This was a move to throw William Deng out and to discredit his mission in Europe.

William Deng was virtually dismissed before the conference of the SANU in exile was convened though he remained defiant and tended to ignore what both the Fr. Saturnino, patron and the president Joseph Oduho were doing. The constitutional amendment deprived William Deng of an office and subsequent party elections threw him out of the party executive. The outcome of the conference was that Aggrey Jaden was made the president and Joseph Oduho was removed from its presidency.

¹ Collins, *The Waters of the Nile*, p 304.

² Prime Minister's Speech, *Policy of the Caretaker Government on the South* (Minister of Information and Labour Printing Press), 1964, pp 1 - 3.

¹ Salah el-Din el-Zein el-Tayeb, *The Students Movement in the Sudan 1940-1970*, p 10.

² *Ibid*, p 26.

³ *Ibid*, p 27.

On Sunday 6 December 1964, a large number of southerners met at the city Khartoum airport to welcome Clement Mboro home from a tour to southern Sudan. He was trying to strengthen a fragile cease-fire with the Anyanya rebels. His plane was delayed actually by Clement's own decision to make a further visit to Kodok because of trouble there. At the airport, the rumor spread among the multitude that Clement Mboro, the minister of the interior, had been assassinated. The mood of the multitude turned angry. A large crowd of southerners marched into the center of the city, stoning cars and beating up northern Sudanese. Several people were killed about 300 or 400 people were wounded.¹ Many hundreds of thousands of people were wounded both southerners and northerners, even though the riots of 6 and 7 December, 1964 were begun by southerners. The events of those two days had a profound effect on the confidence of southerners living in Khartoum by then. When calm returned to the city, many thousands of them left to return to the southern Sudan, many of them joined the Anyanya.

Sir al Khatim al Khalifa stated that nine southerners, four northerners and one Greek had been killed in these disturbances and over 400 injured.² For the first time the full impact of the southern problem had been felt in the capital itself, recalling the events of black Sunday at the declaration of Friday as the day of rest in the south and Sunday as the working day. This had led to demonstration by the students of Rumbek Secondary School. Further doubts about the possibility of reconciliation, also reinforced the necessity of a settlement. On the 10th December 1964, general amnesty was announced for all southerners that had fled outside the Sudan since then. This amnesty encouraged the Anyanya to come out of the forest. The Prime Minister, Sir Al Khatim Al Khalfa also appealed to the exiles to come back home to work for freedom and equality, and to put aside all racial, religious and political differences. As a sign of good faith, Sir Al Khatim Al Khalifa released 32 southern detainees. On the other hand, Clement Mboro persuaded the Anyanya to observe a cease-fire in the Sudan, but this did not continue for long and was never properly enforced.⁽¹⁾ In some cases Anyanya threatened the merchants and defied the soldiers who were given orders not to shoot except in self-defence. Large number of Southerners left for the South after the December 1964 events in Khartoum when there were serious clashes between Northerners and Southerners and many Southerners lost their lives in these clashes⁽²⁾.

The transitional government set out with genuine purpose of ending the conflict in the southern Sudan, but the Sudanese inexperience and differences among the intelligentsia in both the northern Sudan and southern Sudan frustrated negotiations between their representatives. Only they were to adjourn the conference for 13 days later without any agreement. All Sudanese, Muslims, Christians and others face the same social, economic, educational problems of life. These elements would dispose all Sudanese to share their experiences and seek all together a solution to them. The result of the Round Table Conference was the formation of a 12-man committee that led later to the achievement of the Addis Ababa Agreement. This is because all governments that have succeeded one another, since independence have allowed themselves to be influenced by some of the more negative aspects of fanaticism, like considering Islam as the only one state religion, not granting equal status to Christianity. In practice, apart from the constitution that recognizes the Sudan as a multi-religious country, the Khartoum government treats Islam as the state religion. Sudan, as a whole, should be ruled by freedom of religious beliefs and although Southerners are ignorant and indigenous people who practice Christianity in addition to their traditional African religions.⁽³⁾

There should be no discrimination based on religion, race, language and culture. The Khartoum government policies were aimed at creating one nation. Cease-fire was declared by the October government of Sir Al Khatim Al Khalifa. Many Anyanya personnel visited towns and they were allowed to move about without restrictions, but they (Anyanya) used this period of suspension to recruit and to intimidate those who were collaborating with the government. There was a considerable change in military operations, carrying out the caretaker government's institution. The Government of Sir el Khatim el Khalifa allowed the Anyanya to do as they wished, but in others a harder line was taken and a few shots from the guerrillas suffice to provoke the troops into dismantling huts. It was a period of immense strain for the army in the south, as the Khartoum government was busily denouncing the evils of the former military regime, especially for its handling of the southern of problem.⁽¹⁾

The increase of violence in the south, both on the part of the Anyanya and on the part of the government troops who acted with increasing brutality⁽²⁾, and the events in Khartoum, suggested that dark days were ahead. On the

¹ *Africa Report*, May 1964.

² Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan from Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, p 69.

⁽¹⁾ Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan*: p 27.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid*, p 23.

⁽³⁾ Baroness Cox., *Faith in Sudan No.4* p 74.

⁽¹⁾ O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret War in the Sudan*, p 68.

⁽²⁾ Deborah Scroggins, *Op-cit*, p 30.

more positive, the overthrow of Abboud military regime had opened the way for a more flexible approach to the southern problem⁽³⁾. The Anyanya exerted their activities against the government and was almost capturing Wau town in Bahr El Ghazal.⁽⁴⁾

Meanwhile, the ranks of the Anyanya increased rather than decreased between December 1964 and March 1965. Relations between the southern Sudanese and northern Sudanese always have been antagonistic because of the civil war, although a cease-fire was there. These were nearly at breaking point. There were skirmishes in Khartoum that had buried the honeymoon of October revolution on 6 December 1964.

There were more numbers that had been mentioned by the government, who were killed and injured especially amongst the southerners. The view of Southerners was that the Southern issue was a problem of the Northern Sudanese who wanted to dominate the South culturally and politically. The southern problem was seen by northerners basically an imperialist problem. Attitudes, divisions and hostilities were generated by the policies of the British colonial rulers and perpetuated into the era of independence by the missionaries. Southerners were only at the table to talk and negotiate because; they were the children of the missionaries in culture, language and religion.⁽¹⁾ This meant that northerners found it difficult to listen seriously to southern Sudanese grievance about northern Sudanese colonialism. The economic and political exploitation resulted in the religious and social oppression. The conference was delayed by the political crisis in the north, by an intensification of fighting around Juba, and by a split among southern political leaders. However, the worsening of security in Juba compelled the parties to shift the conference venue to Khartoum. The minister of the interior, Clement Mboro wrote to William Deng and nine southern Sudanese politicians, three from each province, were invited to Khartoum for discussions.

Deepening Conflict in the South 1965 – 1969, The Round Table Conference 1965

It appeared that the southern Sudanese politicians were serious that the Round-Table conference must find a solution to the Southern problem. William Deng proposed to hold a conference which was agreed by Sir el Khatim el Khalifa in January 1965. There were a few political groups from the North and the South which remained outside the government's cabinet. This cabinet did not reflect the real

political weight of the political parties and this was a source of continuous tension and conflict within the cabinet.

The SANU spokesman on the 5th January 1965 had earlier declared that they must use all means to eject the Arabs from the southern Sudan. But the members of the SANU did not remove the Arabs from the southern Sudan nor did southerners have power to do so. Southerners were threatened by use of force as the only alternative the northerners could resort to.⁽²⁾

On 20 January 1965, a three-man committee of (SANU) was constituted. It was held in an atmosphere of emotion and anger on the side of the southerners. Some had come from the south having witnessed torture and killing during the military rule.

On the 18th February 1965, the cabinet resigned; there were a series of abortive attempts to form a new government.

This was the time when the council of state had asked Sir al Khatim al Khalifa to organize a new cabinet and this was achieved on the 23rd February 1965⁽¹⁾. The Minister of state for cabinet affairs announced in the Central Council, the government had decided that the committee charged with drafting a new constitution for the Sudan would not be formed until sometime during the second year of the Central Council in 1965 because of the political chaos.

The Umma Party, NUP and Muslim Brothers now dominated the cabinet. Those who refused to participate were divided up. Nevertheless, the transitional regime pressed a head with its plans to hold elections despite the endless conflict in the southern Sudan elections, which were disputed because of the war. The Southern Sudanese position was greatly weakened by the divisions among themselves. As was to happen over and over again, southern Sudanese divisions prevented any coherent and effective presentation of the southern Sudanese case. This was as important as the deep-seated southern Sudanese mistrust of northern Sudanese sincerity and intentions in preventing any significant outcome from the Round Table Conference.⁽²⁾ The all party Round Table Conference was opened in Khartoum on 16 March 1965 to discuss the southern Sudan problem, but it failed to agree on a formula. It was attended by representatives of all major political parties, of the professionals front, SANU and other leading southerners with observers from Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Algeria, Egypt and Ghana. The conference was chaired by the vice chancellor of Khartoum University, Professor Al Nazir Dafa'allah. The main northern

⁽³⁾ Ibid, p 62.

⁽⁴⁾ Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Tahir, *Musajalat Al-Harb Wa Al-Salam fi Al-Sudan*, 1997, p 20.

⁽¹⁾ Ibid, p 405.

⁽²⁾ O'Ballance, Edgar, *op.cit*, p 69.

⁽¹⁾ O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Secret War in the Sudan*, p 30.

⁽²⁾ Anderson et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 404.

Sudanese parties insisted on a unitary national government. The northern Sudanese parties were mainly the Umma and the People's Democratic Party. The southern Sudanese parties wanted a united southern region, which elected its own leader and had some control over its finances and security. The Northern Sudanese parties were committed to an Islamic state especially the Umma party and Democratic Unionist Party and Muslim Brothers.⁽³⁾ An opening address by the Prime Minister blamed the southern problem on natural geographical and sociological factors and especially the civil colonial policies of the British and hypocritical European missionaries.

The northern Sudanese political parties, mindful of impending elections, avoided on purpose both intransigent insistences on northern supremacy and imaginative concessions to southern demands. They rejected both unitary and federal systems, and proposed a regional government for the south that would effectively devolve control of education, health, commerce, agriculture and internal security to a regional democratic council under an executive committee.

The southern political voice was very divided. In February 1965, William Deng, General Secretary of SANU, split from the main party and returned to Sudan, proposing Federation as an answer to the southern problem. Aggrey Jaden, representing the main body of SANU outside the country, proposed secession as the only answer. Meanwhile other southern politicians in Khartoum under the leadership of Clement Mboro formed the Southern Front, and pressed for a plebiscite in the south to consider the main options ranging from various models of Federation to outright secession. Clement Mboro and William Deng struggled against each other for leadership of the southern political movement inside Sudan. The southern position was greatly weakened by the division among the different southern groups. Southern divisions prevented any coherent and effective presentation of the southern case⁽¹⁾. They were perhaps too eager to confront the old political leaders of traditional and sectarian circles in the north. The reason was that they were holders of University degrees and diplomas. The northern parties agreed to the southern demand of Federation.⁽²⁾

All in all northern Sudanese insistence on the unitary state strengthened suspicion and distrust of the Southern Sudanese, Northern Sudanese political, military and administrative leadership⁽³⁾. In the eyes of the Southern Sudanese, northern Sudanese leaders were, after all, the

same when it came to the issue of the south – north relations. The same is true of the southern Sudanese.

The Southern Front called for self-determination they requested the political parties conference of 1965 to authorize a plebiscite in the south. This gave the south the opportunity to decide whether its people want unconditional unity, local government, federal or secession. The self-determination was the southern longstanding claim. This took place in the Juba conference of 1946 and the motion in constituent Assembly for a federal system at independence debates into historical dates⁽¹⁾. Northern Sudanese political leaders had up to then claimed that the majority of southerners' favored unconditional unity and only a handful wanted federation, then considered synonymous with secession. Northern Sudanese parties quickly branded the Southern Front as separatist. The secretariat of the conference did everything possible to avoid any reference to the Southern Front keynote address for secession and self-determination.

(SANU) in 1965 under Aggrey Jaden called for separation. His address concluded that it was in the interests of both parties to separate. The northern Sudanese political leaders had strongly reacted to Aggrey's address. The SANU of William Deng were calling between separation and federation. He concluded his position on a different system.

In an interview with the Middle East News Agency on February 2 William Deng SANU said that the three major southern political groups were in the final stages of setting up a single unified political organization. He expressed hope that a second Round Table Conference, tentatively scheduled for April, would result in peaceful settlement of outstanding issues between north and south and said that "all southerners, in and outside of the Sudan, had agreed to abide by the finding of the April conference.

On February 13, the government itemized plans for reconstruction of the south, including the holding elections in all southern constituencies before the rainy season. The conference stipulated that:

- (a) The situation in the south had much improved:, though traces of mutiny still existed in the some places;
- (b) Southern chiefs were cooperating with the authorities to ease the situation,
- (c) The civil service was beginning to function, bridges and roads were under repair, hospital and schools were being opened,

⁽³⁾ Elias Nyamlell, *op-cit*, p 167.

⁽¹⁾ Douglass, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 40.

⁽²⁾ Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Tahir, *Musajalat Al-Harb Wa Al-Salam Fi Al-Sudan*, 1997, p 20.

⁽³⁾ *Ibid*, p 167.

⁽¹⁾ Collins, *Shadows in the Grass*, p 415.

- (d) The government intended to facilitate the work of Christian missionaries as well as Islamic teachers;
- (e) Southern police would be paid on an equal basis to northern police
- (f) Mahmoud Reehan, a rebel leader recently captured by security forces, had revealed details of foreign intervention in the rebel operations and testified to the ignorance of the rebels concerning the government amnesty offer. The state of insecurity in the south meant that the 1965 elections were held in the north only. They could not hold elections in the South because of the Anyanya rebels and the state of emergency in the South that was not lifted by the Government.

SANU and Southern Liberation Front representatives issued a joint communiqué in Khartoum on February 22:

- (a) Calling for elections in the south for 60 constituent's assembly seats.
- (b) Challenging the validity of the credentials of the 21 members of the constituent assembly and
- (c) Demanding that the Sudan be organized as a non-denominational rather than Islamic state.⁽¹⁾

Northern Sudanese leaders of the government expressed a desire to reach a settlement which would allow social and economic development of the south, equality of citizenship and the establishment of a system of local government⁽²⁾. They demanded that use of force by the northern Sudanese army in the south should also be condemned.⁽³⁾

This was coupled with a lack of committed and unified leadership on both sides also contributed to the failure of the conference. A twelve-man committee was appointed to continue the work of the Round Table Conference, the political solution had altered radically. Elections had been held, the transitional government of Sir Al Khatim had stepped down and been replaced by the more forceful civilian government of Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub.

On 1st April 1965 the People's Democratic Party and communists agreed to hold the seats reserved for them. They were hoping for calling off elections. The transitional Council of Ministers and the Supreme Commission had resolved in April that elections would not be conducted in the south due to the difficult security situation there.⁽¹⁾ There were reports of Ethiopian farmers moving forty-five

miles inside the Sudan with their tractors. There were protests from the Sudan and the problem into the south remained unsolved.

Prime Minister Mahjoub arrived in Juba on April to begin the seven-day tour of the south. Reporting his finding in the May 5 radio broadcast, the Prime Minister (Mahjoub) said: "My recent visit to the south enabled me to witness the success of our efforts to stability and indicated that the rebels did not represent the real south."⁽²⁾

He said that did not intend to convene another Round Table Conference at this time, but would continue to hold consultations with all political leaders. Northerners and southerners alike, until the details of a plan are generally agreed, then a conference would be held. Premier Mahjoub proposed in an April 20 speech at Juba the establishment of regional system of administration as a political solution "not only for the south but for all the nine provinces of the Sudan."⁽³⁾

In a subsequent BBC interview, he summarized the characteristics of the proposal, by which each province would choose its own regional council and executive body. The councils would be in charge of the exercise of regional affairs (health services below hospital level, agriculture, and education up to the intermediate level, local administration, and local trade, in accordance with the wishes of the people). The central government would be in charge of foreign affairs, defense, finance, economic, planning, higher education and specialized hospitalization. It would also exercise supervision over the regional government: Mahjoub said he believed such a system would solve the problem of the south without destroying the unity of the country.⁽⁴⁾

The 1965 election brought to power coalition between the Umma party and the National Unionists Party. The People's Democratic Party had boycotted the election and had no share in the coalition government. The Sudan Communist Party took 10 of 15 graduate seats while the Islamic Charter front got 5 seats. Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub was elected Prime Minister and Ismail Al Azhari became permanent chairman of the Supreme Council. These two men were representing the Umma party and the National Unionist Party respectively.

The transitional constitution was amended to accommodate the National Unionist Party leader.⁽¹⁾ At this particular

⁽¹⁾ *Africa Report*, April 1966

⁽²⁾ Collins, *The Waters of the Nile*, p 200.

⁽³⁾ *Ibid*, p 30.

⁽¹⁾ Deborah Scroggins, *Emma's War, Love, Betrayal and Death in the Sudan*, p 126.

⁽²⁾ Abel Alier, *op-cit*, p 31.

⁽³⁾ *Africa Report*, June 1966.

⁽⁴⁾ *Ibid*, p 63.

⁽¹⁾ Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, *op.cit*, p 149.

juncture remarkable changes took place on the fighting front. The army reduced its military operations and in response the Anyanya also brought their operations to a standstill. Armed Anyanya soldiers were seen moving freely in towns and villages.⁽²⁾

Between October 1964 and June 1965 some signs of the situation in the southern Sudan have returned to normal. Schools were reopened. Rumbek secondary was reopened in Eastern Sudan (Kassala) in the academic year 1964 – 65, Juba commercial secondary school was reopened in Khartoum. Southern civil servants were transferred back from the northern Sudan to the southern Sudan where they were murdered and dumped in the river.⁽³⁾ The ruthless merciless violence of mid-June-July 1965 resulted in a large – scale exodus from the towns as well.

Most of the population of eastern Equatoria went into exile in Uganda. There was mass killing in Juba, the population of Juba fell from around 40,000⁽⁴⁾ to about 4,000 as the surviving population fled interior to Uganda. The other central administrative towns of the south, Wau and Malakal and other center, like Yei, Yambio, Maridi and Tambura became eventually only garrison towns with small civilian population possibly 350,000 Southern Sudanese were living in exile in surrounding countries as a result of the repression of 1960 – 1965.

The Army Suppression of the South

The army in its composition as it stood in 1965 was the only tool in the hands of the north for suppression of the south. The reaction of the Southern Sudanese was a rebellion against the government. The Southerners called for the complete separation between state and religion - Islam. Southern Front presented a scheme base of self-determination for the South. This was rejected by the Northern political parties. The Northern political opinion was unanimously against separation. In 1965/6 northern Sudanese political leaders believed that any attempt to reorganize the army on the bases of integration might provoke a military coup d'etat.

In June 1965, the Constituent Assembly passed a unanimous resolution authorizing the coalition government to restore law and order. In Sudan, the southern Sudanese elites were not the main obstacles to peace, but the Sudan government was an obstacle to peace because of its application of force on the south. The introduction of Islamic constitution would deprive some citizens of their basic political and civil rights. It was to search for a

political solution to the problem of the south appear no more than bad air joke⁽¹⁾. The argument favoring an Islamic constitution was that the majority of the people of the north are Muslims. The twelve-man committee began its work. The twelve-man committee reached its decision and recommendations by consensus. This was a positive experience.

The political parties conference of 1965 achieved some success. It made northerners see the magnitude of the genuine grievances of the southerners.

The government of Mahjoub had reached an agreement with Ethiopia. The aim was to explain the government's efforts in solving the southern problem, to convince the adjacent neighbors not to assist the rebels and to reach agreements on the return of refugees. The governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda gave their assurances that they would not allow the refugees and politicians to engage in subversive activities⁽²⁾.

The government of Mahjoub in its conduct of Southern Affairs appeared to have learned little from the failures of its military predecessor. He wanted wide southern representation in his government. He gave the three ministerial seats to the southerners. These seats were claimed by Southern Front and SANU of William Deng. These parties both claimed to speak solely for the south. SANU took two seats out of three represented by Andrew Wieu and Alfred Wol. Mahjoub appointed Buth Diu of the Liberal party for the third seat. As a result of the appointment of Buth Diu, Wieu and Wol resigned as they alleged that Diu had no following in the south. Diu was therefore the only southern minister in the Mahjoub's government for several months. There were two violent incidents in the southern Sudan that took place. From July – August 1965, it was a declaration of war not only against the Anyanya but even more so against the local but unarmed southern intelligentsia resident in the southern Sudan. The following months were the most terrible that southern Sudan experienced during the first Sudanese civil war.

Prime Minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub on February 22, 1966 attacked a World Council of Churches decision made on February 17 in Geneva that they would consult the All Africa Council of Churches on a step to alleviate the sufferings of Christians in southern Sudan.

Mahjoub described the southern problem as neither element of racial discrimination nor religious in origin, but rather a leftover from colonial rule. He expressed confidence that

⁽²⁾ Ep/ SCR/ 14.A.3 *British Recommendations about Administration*

⁽³⁾ Werner et al, *The History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 Years*, p 405.

⁽⁴⁾ Ibid, p 365.

⁽¹⁾ Douglass, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 20.

⁽²⁾ Mohammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: from Conflict to Peace*, p 28.

the forthcoming elections of a full quota of southern members to the Constituent Assembly would be a major step toward ending the struggle. On February 22 a Sudanese envoy departed from Khartoum to Addis Ababa to convey to the OAU secretariat the government's continued opposition to discussion of the situation in the south by organization of African Union (OAU).⁽¹⁾

Guerilla warfare forced the rural population to choose between moving into the main towns where the central government authority was still maintained or to join the ranks of the rebels living in the bush or to take refuge in neighboring countries. The Mahjoub government increased military activities in the southern Sudan, which caused more bloodshed⁽²⁾. From 1965 to 1969 the war in south was fought with growing ferocity while Khartoum coalition governments rose and fell with increasing rapidity. The first substantial massacres of southern civilians took place during the period of the first Umma government in 1965. The activities of the Anyanya could do nothing. They almost came to a standstill, while inside the Sudan Mahjoub's government became extremely harsh with civilians and the Anyanya to the extent of almost paralyzing the activities of the rebels.⁽³⁾

From January 1966 to August 1967 there was a kind of chaos in the political leadership of the Anyanya movement. Southerners were very much disillusioned with the divisions and conflicts among their political leaders. Both SANU and Southern Front alternately boycotted and contested the succession of election held in the south.

The Southern Front led (by Clement Mboro and Abel Alier) had reputation of being more radical than William Deng SANU, but this was less a matter of the policies the two parties advocated as it was the more not compromised approached the Southern Front took concerning election and participating in government. The Southern Front drew its membership from all three southern provinces. Many of its members were also in touch with the Anyanya and forwarded them with supplies.

By early 1966, serious disputes arose between Aggrey Jaden and Joseph Oduho. Finally Joseph Oduho broke off from SANU and formed the Azania liberation front (ALF). In a Paris interview with Agency France-Presse on April 29, the Secretary General of the Azania Liberation Front, ALF. Joseph Oduho, said that his organization would not accept "anything short of independence" for the south.⁽¹⁾ Joseph Oduho was calling for full independence for the

south and anything less than that he would not accept. He characterized as "Puppets" all southern groups willing to cooperate with the central government, because Khartoum, not with standing its declared policy, was working for 'Arab unification' i.e. One country ... one religion ... and one language. He said ALF was determined "to fight to the end," Aggrey Jaden and his party then changed the name of their party to Sudan African Liberation Front (SALF).

Conflicting views were held on the decision of William Deng. However, most southerners saw it as surrender to the northerners. Disunity in Anyanya political leadership was an issue of great concern by southern politicians in 1966.

The southern Sudanese students union in exile played an active role in reuniting the different factions of the political leadership in exile. They held a series of meetings with the southern politicians ⁽²⁾

From, early 1967 onwards, the movements established medical schools in the base camps. They built schools, chapels and dispensaries in each area as their efforts to render services for civilians. The movement started building schools in late 1967. The educational services systems, was well-founded in Equatoria province.

These schools were on British System Arithmetic, Geography, English, Hygiene and vernacular were taught. With lack of funds, the movements pushed ahead with its educational programmes supervised closely by commissioners of education appointed for each region.

A New York Times dispatch from Dar al-Salam on June 3rd 1966 said the provisional government had asked Tanzania President Julius Nyerere and other African leaders to intervene in the Sudanese civil war, citing parallels with the situation in Nigeria.⁽¹⁾

Sadiq al Mahdi who as the Prime Minister appointed to his cabinet Arop Yor Ayik and Jervase Yak as ministers. Buth Diu was removed from the cabinet, Arop Yor and Jervase Yak were both civil servants, and their appointments were seen as an appeasement of SANU and the moderates. In 1967 Sadiq al Mahdi was defeated and Mahjoub had to come back again to the power. The representatives of the Southern Front and a new faction of SANU led by Alfred Wol occupied his cabinet. Father Saturnino Lohure was killed in January 1967 near the Uganda border and in May 1968 William Deng was ambushed with six associates and killed. Those who killed William Deng and his associates

⁽¹⁾UNP/ SCR/ 1.A.2 Sudanization Report.

⁽²⁾ Mohammed Omer Beshir, *op.cit.* p. 20.

⁽³⁾ Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, *op.cit.* p 190.

⁽¹⁾ *Africa Report*, June 1966.

⁽²⁾ Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p 158.

⁽¹⁾ UNP/ SCR/ 1.A General Administrative Policy and Province Army, 7th October 1959.

were likely suspected as a government patrol in the Bahr Al Ghazal.

The three statements issued in the name of Aggrey Jaden as provisional president and Gordon Mustat Mayen as provisional Foreign Minister, appealed to the world press to send representatives. In order to view the situation in the southern Sudan at first hand, they condemned incursions by Sudanese armed forces into Uganda. They suggested that the southern political leader William Deng was killed by Sudanese armed forces.⁽²⁾ In Khartoum, the situation was confused by the deaths of two distinguished southern Sudanese leaders such as (Saturnino Lohure and William Deng).

The government confirmed on May 9 that William Deng, leader of Sudan African National Union, had been assassinated in Rumbek, Bahr Al Ghazal province, during the first week of May. The SANU secretariat sent a letter to the supreme council denying that Anyanya rebels had ambushed Deng's party and accusing unnamed politicians of conspiracy to kill him.⁽³⁾

After William Deng's death both SANU and the Southern Front joined forces with other independents in the constituent Assembly. They argued for devolutionary powers to regional governments. They were against the adoption of an Islamic constitution. Sadiq's Government was not a strong coalition and when finally voted down on both issues, the representatives of the two southern parties, led by Abel Alier, walked out of the Assembly.

Police used tear gas to break up demonstrations by southern youth at the SANU youth center in Khartoum because of the death of William Deng⁽¹⁾. On May 11, the Ministry of Interior dispatched a team of investigators to Bahr Al Ghazal to examine further the circumstances of Deng's murder⁽²⁾.

In February 1968, parliament was sent home. In April 1968, elections for a new parliament were held. SANU gained 15 seats, the Southern Front 10 seats and the Nile Unity Party, led by the Philemon Majok, the police sergeant, one seat. Mahjoub made a new coalition government, which was, composed of the Democratic Unionist Party, the Umma (of Al Hadi Al Mahdi's faction) and the Southern Front Clement Mboro and Hilary Paul Logali were representatives of the Southern Front in the Mahjoub's cabinet. In 1968 the northern Sudanese parties

had high demand for an Islamic constitution. Even Ismail Al Azhari and Mohammed Ahmed Mahjoub were impelled to support the demand, although these leaders always had long been looking for a secular state. Southern representatives passed strenuously for a secular constitution but were in vain. The basis of the unity of the Sudan was now at stake.

Government steps among the worst areas heavily affected Aweil in Bahr Al Ghazal there were less than 343 incidents of murdering in 1968. In Upper Nile Province Kodok, Nasir, Bor and Pochala were the worst districts. In these areas a lot of atrocities took place. However conditions in the area had improved to the extent that the army unit there was withdrawn.⁽³⁾ The Southern Front boycotted the 1968 election on the basis that the atmosphere was not conducive to elections.

The Umma and National Unionist Parties advocated elections to be carried out in the north but not in the south. Only eleven remained as representatives of the southern Sudan. This marked the end of the dialogue between the northern and southern Sudanese politicians. Following these events the Southern Front withdrew from the cabinet. Southern member of the constitution draft committee walked out in protest in December 1968.

The Way to Settlement, 1969-1971

By 1969 the civil war had spread to all three southern provinces. Some Southern Sudanese in exile movement received foreign aids from Israel, Ethiopia and Uganda are external church groups and foreign governments had always been Funding the Anyanya⁽¹⁾. It was largely through Israel's support that Joseph Lagu, a former army lieutenant, was able to pull together the movement from 1965 to 1969⁽²⁾.

The chief northern Sudanese groups (including the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party) insisted on a Unitary National Government. The southern Sudanese parties wanted a united southern region, which elected its own leader and had some control over its finances and security. The Umma, and Muslim Brothers were committed to an Islamic state. Southern Sudanese delegates became clear that the Muslim majority in the constituent assembly would not accept southern Sudanese objections for secular Constitution⁽³⁾. Shortly after walking out of the Assembly of southern representatives, on 25 May 1969, a coup was

⁽²⁾ *Africa Report*, June 1968, p 32.

⁽³⁾ CS/ SCR/ 57.C.2/4 *Report on Equatoria 1952-1954*.

⁽¹⁾ Mohammed Omer Beshir, *op.cit.* p 26.

⁽²⁾ UNP/ SCR/ 1.A *Public Administration 10th June 1958*.

⁽³⁾ Mohammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: from Conflict to Peace*, p 38.

⁽¹⁾ Mohammed Omer Beshir, *from conflict to peace*, p. 30.

⁽²⁾ *Africa Report*, October 1968.

⁽³⁾ Mohammed Hashim Awad: "The Southern Sudan: Planning for National Integration" *SNR Lv.* Khartoum 1974, pp 120-182.

staged by a combination of Free Officers in the Army, Communists and Socialists. They were led by Colonel Jaafar Nimairi.

Prime Minister Babiker Awadallah was forth right about the link between the takeover in May and the October revolution. Both statements blamed the traditional and sectarian based political parties in destroying the October revolution. The October revolution was to be revived and placed in the care of the free officers, the movement of army officers, which launched the coup.

The May Revolution and New Possibility for Peace 1969 – 1972

The army officers were frustrated by a situation, which had abandoned the country and was dominated by sterile sectarian political parties. There was no constitution and the economy was stagnant. The southern issue was unresolved.

Nimairi banned all political parties and followed the political and economic example of Nasser in his politics. But there was always present a strong Marxist element reflected in an extensive nationalization and they had closer relations with the Eastern Bloc. Nimairi's key accomplishment had been to bring to an end the 16 years civil war between the Muslim, Arab dominated north and the ethnically and religiously different south.

On 9th June 1969 President Jaafar Mohammed Nimairi announced his government policy toward the south⁽¹⁾. The declaration recognized the existence of the southern problem, cultural and historical differences between the north and the south, the right of the southern Sudanese people to develop their own culture and tradition and to develop the regional autonomy within a united Sudan. The declaration paved the way for the conclusion of Addis Ababa Accord in 1972.⁽²⁾ Nimairi announced a four-point programme for the southern Sudan. These points included an amnesty, social, economic and cultural assistance. A minister for Southern Affairs was appointed for the training and placement of southerners in responsible administrative positions. He enunciated his belief in the unity of the Sudan, but granted regional self-government for the southern Sudan. What was to be called the "forgotten war" in the southern Sudan is now in danger of becoming a forgotten peace.⁽³⁾ For a world filled with local and regional wars, it would be worthwhile to have a bit more attention

paid to the Sudan. That revolution had put into effect the long standing position of the Sudanese Communist Party that the south should be an autonomous region with local self-rule.⁽⁴⁾

The 9th of June declaration putting regional authority into effect. This was one of the first acts of the new regime. Nevertheless the May revolution supported a Quasi-Islamic constitution with the Sharia as the main source of legislation.

The constitution, which was adopted in 1973 reads,; Islamic law and custom shall be the main sources of legislation, whereas personal matters of non-Muslims shall be governed by the personal laws. Under the article 16 of the constitution, Islam, Christianity, traditional African beliefs and other religions are equally protected.

Political Development in the Northern Sudan

The group which took power on 25 May 1969 was itself an unstable coalition of radical factions. It immediately demonstrated a different approach to the war in the south by announcing that the conflict would be solved by political means⁽⁵⁾.

A southern Sudanese communist, Joseph Garang, was appointed as the new minister for Southern Affairs. Clement Mboro of the Southern Front was imprisoned (on charges of corruption), but Abel Alier (also of the Southern Front) was included in the new cabinet.⁽¹⁾ There was a confused response by southern exiles to the June 1969 declaration. Joseph Garang was unable to persuade the most influential southern leaders to negotiate. There was also a jockeying for position within the revolutionary council. The result was that throughout 1970 and much of 1971 there was an intensification of fighting in the southern Sudan. Then, in July 1971 the communist members of the council tried to push Nimairi aside in their own coup. This coup failed after three days, Nimairi returned to power, and a massive purge of communists took place. Joseph Garang was executed along with other leading communists. Abel Alier replaced him as minister for Southern Affairs. Nimairi, who was opposed by the traditional parties, now lacked the support of one of the main factions, which brought him to power by Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party and National Islamic front. He needed a new ally to keep him in power because he lost popularity in the North. This gave him an added incentive to reach an

⁽¹⁾ *Africa Report*, pp 74 – 75

⁽²⁾ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Role of Religion in the North-South Conflict, with Special Reference to Islam" *Studies in Sudanese History*, Sudek Limited, Khartoum, 2003, p 116.

⁽³⁾ John Voll, "Southern Sudan, Conflict and Settlement" *Africa Today* vol. 22, No 1, Jan – March 1975, P 110

⁽⁴⁾ Carolyn Fluehr Lobban, "Sharia Law in the Sudan, History and Trends since Independence" *Africa Today* vol. 28. No 2 1982, pp 56-70.

⁽⁵⁾ John Voll, "Southern Sudan, Conflict and Settlement" *Africa Today* vol. 22, No 1, Jan – March 1975, P 113.

⁽¹⁾ Douglass, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 36.

accommodation with the south. Abel Alier, a lawyer by profession had been involved throughout the 1960s in drawing up a comprehensive plan for regional autonomy for the south. He was better placed than Joseph Garang. The new willingness of the government to negotiate was paralleled by a new ability of the southern guerrilla movement to negotiate with one voice. Public support by the government had evaporated; there was little protest against the seizure of power by a group of major officers, headed by Jaafar Mohammed Nimaïri. The new government represented a new direction in Sudanese politics. Politics in the Sudan has a strong personal flavor so to speak. It is like the rest of the Arab countries, friendships and relationships cut across party divides commitments to friends and relatives dilute commitments to issues and ideologies. This was true of the Communist Party as well as the traditional parties.⁽²⁾ The traditionalist forces in the country were the main enemies of Nimaïri when he first came to power. These enemies were by his own admission the Ansar and Khatmiya. These were the two greater religious sects as well as the Muslim Brothers and their ideological quarrels with the traditional forces, not Nimaïri. His was political, rather than ideological.

Political Development in the South Sudan

The position of Southern Sudanese guerrilla movement improved dramatically after 1969. There were bases that should either be domesticated or destroyed. Major arms deliveries to the Anyanya started in 1969 from Israel. Israel was the only country in the world known to have openly given military support to the Anyanya. This was because she was fighting with the Arab countries, so she wanted to engage the Sudan with its internal civil war. In reality Israel had every motive to back the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The Sudan Government's more militant support of Arab cause after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war meant that not only did the Ethiopian government become more sympathetic to the southern guerrillas (because of the Sudan support for Eritrean Secessionists), but Israel, too, became interested in the Sudan's civil war⁽¹⁾.

With the overthrow of Obote in Uganda in 1970, a much friendlier Idi Amin came to power. He not only came from the ambiguous border region between the Sudan and Uganda, but he had already recruited many southern Sudanese into Uganda Army, and was also, at that time, a willing client of the Israelis. The guerrillas were thus

secured a regular supply of arms, plus access to modern training.

Joseph Lagu was Israel's main beneficiary and using their supplies he persuaded a number of provincial Anyanya Commanders to join him throughout 1970. He thus engineered a series of internal coups, which left the old exile politicians without military constituency. In January 1971 he formed the Southern Sudan Liberation Front (later renamed the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement) under the Command of his much expanded Anyanya Armed Forces.

The unified command, with a secure supply of weapons, not only subordinated the fraction politicians to the military wing, but also began to show greater military strength and activity in engagements outside Equatoria. Not all the officers of this rejuvenated Anyanya army⁽²⁾ were enthusiastic about negotiating with the government. When the government accepted the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement's demands to recognize it as an equal negotiating partner, and to meet in a neutral African country (in this case Ethiopia) the conditions for negotiation appeared to be far better than they had ever been before.

David Martin explained Israel aid as follows: "Israel aid did not back the southern Sudan on moral or ideological grounds. It was simply a means of stabbing the Arabs in their backs, by backing the Anyanya and thereby tying down a large section of Sudan's army."⁽¹⁾

Israel was able to neutralize effectively the possibility of Sudanese military involvement in the Middle East zone. On two occasions, Israeli officers were seen inside the southern Sudan with Anyanya and airdrops of equipment were made regularly by Israel planes flying into guerrilla areas across Ethiopia and Uganda.⁽²⁾ This encompassed all the factions, in July 1970 in eastern Equatoria, Colonel Joseph Lagu was the commander of the Anyanya. He challenged major general Emilio Taffeng's authority of Anyanya movement. These were southern organizations of the movement. Joseph Lagu's was destined to be the last and most effective organization of the succession of southern revolutionary organization.

The Nile provision government of the Anyanya was disbanded and Joseph Lagu concentrated leadership of the Anyanya on in his Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. By 1971 it was evident that the renewed attempts by the government to reach a military solution in the south was fading in light of the Anyanya's determined resistance. The

⁽²⁾ Mansour Khalid, *Nimaïri and the Revolution of Dismay*, London, 1985, p 15.

⁽¹⁾ Douglass, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 36.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid*, p 37.

⁽¹⁾ Woodward, P. 1988, *Uganda and Southern Sudan: Peripheral Politics and Neighboring Relations*, p 35.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid*, p. 33.

history of the southern Sudanese conflict had since its outbreak been continued on the course of national politics in Khartoum. It was only after the July coup that president Nimeiri turned away from that policy and appreciated that it was pointless to squander the meagre resources neither side could win.

Representatives from the northern Sudan and southern Sudan had in fact been conducting secret negotiations since May 1971 through the good offices of the World Council of Churches. Concomitant discussions were also opened with some dissident southern elements living in self-exile in Britain. Ambassador Abdin Ismail, Professor Mohammed Omer Beshir and Barbara Hag, cultural attaché, played a distinguished role in that exercise.

The government sought to convince the southern Sudanese that they were prepared to settle for some degree of regional self-rule. A detailed law defining the constitutional position of the southern Sudan within a united Sudan was passed. This went a great way to convincing the southern Sudanese that the new government meant business.⁽¹⁾ In return the Ishombe government could have used the Anyanya. It did not do this, though it gave moral support to the movement. Kampala, the capital of Uganda, was the seat of the political wing of the Anyanya movement.⁽²⁾

Opposition to Nimeiri

In March 1970 Nimeiri launched a massive military strike against forces of the Mahdist. Ansar sect gathered on Aba Island in the White Nile.⁽³⁾ Opposition, in March 1970 confronted Nimeiri, a Mahdist rebelling on Aba Island was put down. Three incidents occurred in 1970. In March an armed clash, leaving many dead, occurred between the army and the Ansars in Omdurman. In May another clash took place in Gezira between the same forces, and the two communist members of the revolutionary command council (RCC) and another leftist were at odds, with their colleagues.

Natale Olwak Akolawin (of the Southern Front in Khatoum) points to the importance of events creating bitterness, the southern Sudanese had asked for safeguards at the 1947 conference, but, it is said they were embittered because article 100 (one hundred) dealing with these safeguards, was annulled at the Cairo conference in 1953. The southern leaders feared domination by the north, the

impact of the military regime 1958 – 1964 and the Round Table Conference.

The Muslim Brothers on the right, the communist on the left and the Ansar lurking in the rear challenged Nimeiri. There were numerous conspiracies to overthrow his government, culminating in an open clash with the Ansar in March 1970 in which the Imam Al Hadi was killed with many followers.

Nimeiri barely survived an attempted coup by a section of the army, which had communist support. And even more serious attempt to overthrow the government was staged, when disaffected army officers, supported by the Sudan Communist Party, seized power for three days before Nimeiri's followers in the army were able to recapture control and restore his authority⁽¹⁾

Terrible retribution was exacted on the Communist Party afterwards from which it has never recovered. In the elections that followed, Nimeiri was able to gain a massive vote of confidence and for a six-year term of the office as president. He recognized the need for some kind of self-determination. He created a ministry of Southern Affairs. Abel Alier was Secretary General of the Southern Front. Secret meetings with southern leaders in exile led to a conference in Addis Ababa in February 1972⁽²⁾. At the end of the 1971 Nimeiri was elected President of the revolutionary council for six years that was dissolved and the Sudan Socialist Union set up. He undertook to uphold and abide by the will of the people.

From the beginning Nimeiri was able to bring fresh thinking to the problem of the south. There was also a greater change in foreign policy reflected in the improvement of relations with the west and the conservative Arab countries and the role played by Emperor, Haile Sellaisie, all of which helped solve the seventeen years old southern problem. The solution of the southern Sudan issue made it easy to fill the constitutional position, a constitution was promulgated in 1973. The change of foreign policy paved the door for massive foreign aid and economic investment, which helped finance an ambitious development programme.⁽³⁾

Bona Malwal argues that Nimeiri alignment with the south resulted in the Addis Ababa agreement while his alignment with the Islamists in the north resulted in the division of the south. The success of the May revolution was, therefore,

⁽¹⁾ Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p 216.

⁽²⁾ Mathew Obur Ayang's, *Personal Interview*. He was the secretary of the movement. Interview was conducted by Daniel Thabo on 18/8/2001 in his office at international friendship house.

⁽³⁾ Deborah Scroggins, *Emma's Wars, Love, Betrayal and Death in the Sudan*, p 60.

⁽¹⁾ Mansour Khalid, *Nimeiri and the Revolution of the Dismay*, p 27.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid*, p 24.

⁽³⁾ *Ibid*, p 27.

contrasted with their active involvement in the downfall of the Abboud government, as well as the disappointment of the Sudanese people with the government of the parties. These are lessons of history to which president Nimeiri should not turn a blind eye.⁽⁴⁾

The civilian cabinet of Nimeiri was formed on 26th May comprising over twenty ministers. Seven members of the Communist Party, two others were so-called fellow travelers; three members of the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the rest were an independent technocrat, avowedly a political.

The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement had the representatives that made an agreement. On 3rd March the Addis Ababa accord became the Regional Self-Government Act for the southern provinces and on the 12th cease-fire was declared in the south.

The Addis Ababa Agreement February – March 1972

This Addis Ababa Agreement, negotiated in February 1972 between the government and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, not only brought peace to the Sudan, but, as unique resolution to civil war never before achieved in post colonial Africa, brought great international acclaim to the nation and its leaders. Within eleven years it was repudiated by two of its principal beneficiaries: Nimeiri and Lagu. Before its demise most southern Sudanese saw it as a failure. Many outside observers (and many northern Sudanese as well) have misjudged the political climate of the south by thinking that the second civil war can be brought to an end by a return to the 1972 Agreement's provisions for regional autonomy.

After secret negotiation in Addis Ababa with the Anyanya rebels, an agreement was reached on 7 February. This effect gave for south virtual autonomy within a United Sudan. An important provision was that the people's armed forces in the south would consist of a national force called the southern command composed of 12,000 officers and men of whom 6,000 shall be citizens of the region and the other 6,000 from outside the region.⁽¹⁾ The solution of 1972 of the civil war, which raged in the Sudan for 17 years, resulted in a new era of relations between it to historically antagonistic peoples. Essentially the African Arab conflict in the Sudan is a reach of the southern Sudanese secessionist movement.⁽²⁾

Negotiations were proposed with a united Sudan as the one precondition. Many exiled southerners were unhappy

about abandoning the goal of Independence, and there was a clear difference of understanding between the government and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement delegations about regional autonomy then proposed for negotiation. To the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement autonomy meant Federation, and they came armed with a proposal for a full Federal structure. In the end they were offered, and finally accepted, something far less in what became the Southern Regional government.

At the beginning of negotiation it was proposed that the two delegation form into political, economic and security sub-committees to draft the relevant proposals under each heading for inclusion in the final agreement. The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement requested that no economic sub-committee to be formed, since its delegation was too small to be sub-divided into three. The result was that the political sub-committee reached rapid agreement on the terms of the establishment of the regional government, and the security sub-committee was able eventually to provide a basis for ending the fighting and absorbing the guerrilla forces into the national army and other security sub-committee branches. There was no separate discussion of the economic powers of the new regional government, or of national development policy as it applied to the south⁽¹⁾.

The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement delegation initially proposed that the whole country be divided into a northern and southern region, with a single Federal Government in which both regions participated. They argued that without a Federal System, the central government would in practice be a northern government, rather than a national one, and they felt it was vitally important to define the sort of country they were going to have by defining the government structure⁽²⁾. Mansor Khalid, then a member of the government's delegation, ended any further discussion of Federal States for the north by insisting that they could not impose Regionalism on the north when they had not asked for it. The question then became one of defining what powers should be reserved for the central and regional governments. The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement was anxious to define clearly and in detail the powers and limitations of the central government, leaving all remaining powers to the regional government. In the end the negotiations centered on defining the qualified autonomy of the regional government. Ratification and implementation of the agreement took place on 27 March 1972. Abel Alier was later named President of the High Executive Council (HEC). The first

⁽⁴⁾ *Ibid*, p 28.

⁽¹⁾ Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p 173.

⁽²⁾ Mohammed Hashim Awad: "The Southern Sudan. Planning for National Integration" *SNR LV Khartoum*, 1974, pp 126-142.

⁽¹⁾ Douglass, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p 39.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid*, p 35.

regional assembly of sixty members was elected in November 1973.⁽³⁾

The constitution recognized a strong executive presidency for the nation as a whole and appeared to safeguard the agreement by requiring the holding of a referendum in the south before any amendment to it could be made.

The regional government created by the Addis Ababa Agreement consisted of a Regional Assembly which was empowered to elect and remove the President of the High Executive Council, subject to the confirmation of the President of the Republic. The Regional Assembly could also vote to request the President of the Republic to exempt the southern region from any national legislation it considered detrimental to regional interests. Islamic Parties have opposed Nimairi's peace agreement with the south on the ground that it gave what agreement called the south's noble spiritual beliefs and Christianity equal place with Islam in Sudan's constitution.

They also thought the agreement gave the south too much autonomy. They had mounted three armed uprisings against Nimairi in 1970, 1975 and 1977, the last two with the backing of Libya⁽¹⁾. The Islamic politicians pressed Nimairi to make Sudanese law until now customary, Islamic and western law conform to Sharia or Islamic law. In their view, the purpose of a Muslim government was to enforce Sharia. Southerners bitterly resisted any proposal to make Sharia the source of all the country's legislation.

The Establishment of Regional Authority 1973

On 27th Feb-March 1973, the Addis Ababa agreement granting the southern Sudan self-government was ratified. Thus ended the 17 years old civil wars and began the hard fight for the reconstruction of the war devastated south. The prolonged strife had caused serious social and economic dislocation and development had to start almost from scratch. High Executive Council was sworn in April. Although there was opposition in the north to both Nimairi anti-communist policies and reconciliation with the south, he has success in handing over the control of Southern Affairs to southerners and in convincing former guerillas to lay down their arms and to join the Sudanese army⁽²⁾.

A gradual integration of forces was to occur under the auspices of a joint military commission of three senior officers from each side. The credit or the settlement of

regional autonomy for the south goes mainly to Nimairi, some what reluctantly to the mediating role of Haile Selassie. From the start, the regional government was beset by the ethnic and personal competitions of its leaders. This was inevitably fraught with danger, and was implemented remarkably well, owing in part to continuing efforts of Joseph Lagu. In 1976 and in 1977 there were mutinous incidents at Wau and Akobo as well as Juba respectively. These were exceptional political development that was less harmonious. Abel Alier had gradually lost support as the social and economic benefits expected from the settlement were slow to materialize, corruption was widely perceived, and an evident Dinka dominance was resented.⁽¹⁾

Elections of 1978 led to Abel Alier's resignation as president of the Hight Executive Council (HEC) and brought into the regional assembly many of his most vociferous opponents, including Joseph Oduho, Benjamin Bol and Clement Mboro. Lagu became president of the HEC, with Samuel Aru Bol as vice president. This set the stage for a power struggle in which Lagu, to retain his position, was forced to make important concessions to the allies of the ousted Alier.

Corruption scandals further weakened the regime, and in February 1980 Nimairi stepped in, dissolved the regional assembly and dismissed Lagu. Elections were held in April and following a show down between Alier and Aru Bol, Alier retained the presidency of the HEC. Thus in the early 1980s, southern politicians were unable or unwilling to put regional interests above their own presented an opening for renewed intervention from Khartoum. Nimairi had proposed to re-divide the south into three separate regions⁽²⁾. As such, Lagu and various Equatorians had warmly supported this proposal. But the regional assembly rejected this idea in March 1981.

In October 1981, Nimairi dissolved the assembly, dismissed Alier, and appointed an officer, Gismalla Abdallah Rassas, to head an interim government while a referendum on re-division was prepared. Opponents of the proposal were jailed. But in February 1982, Nimairi cancelled the referendum, calling instead for new elections. These resulted in no clear majority, and after a series of elaborate and cynical maneuver the divisions emerged triumphant and Joseph James Tembura, an Azande, was elected president of the HEC. In June 1983 Nimairi

⁽³⁾ Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p 71.

⁽¹⁾ Deborah Scroggins, *Emma's War, Love, Betrayal and Death in the Sudan*, Great Britian, Harper, Collins, 2003, p 37.

⁽²⁾ Woodward, P. 1988, *Uganda and Southern Sudan: Peripheral Politics and Neighboring Relations*, p 35.

⁽¹⁾ Woodward, P: "Uganda and Southern Sudan Peripheral and Politics and Neighboring Relations" H.B. Hansen (Eds). *Uganda now. Between Decay and Development: 220 – 238*, London, James Carry.

⁽²⁾ Deborah Scroggins, *Emma's Wars, Love, Betrayal and Death in the Sudan*, p 78.

unilaterally decreed the division of the south into three regions corresponding to the old provinces.

P. Woodward treats northern Uganda and southern Sudan as peripheral areas with common ethnic ties. During 1955 – 1972, southern Sudan got help from the Uganda army led by Idi Amin.

After the Addis Ababa agreement many Anyanya were recruited into the Uganda army, and the fall of Amin brought many Ugandans to southern Sudan.

The period between 1964 to 1972 has positive and negative impacts on southern Sudanese history: the expulsion of the missionaries in 1964 and intensification of the civil war. It is very important time because a southerner – Clement Mboro was appointed a minister for the interior. Sir al Khatim al Khalifa was highly respected by southerners.

D.A. Wenyin concludes that the contribution of southern Sudanese people in the search for the peace and permanent constitution is very great and that it seems that it is the north that has been seeking to separate from the south. Some northerners are very difficult to understand the changing situation in the society. The year 1965 brought about the Round Table Conference, which ended in deadlock between the southern Sudanese politicians and northern Sudanese politicians. Its achievement was the formation of a twelve-man committee to form a constitutional consideration. The negative side was that many southerners were killed and survivors fled into the neighboring countries⁽¹⁾. The coup of 1971 made Joseph Garang to be replaced by Abel Alier. The secret meetings with southern Sudanese leaders in exile led to a conference in Addis Ababa in February 1972. Cease-fire was announced in the south on 12 February 1972. The army was integrated later and a self-governing regional assembly was constituted with Abel Alier as the chairman of the division of the southern Sudan was the key to the survival and continuation of national integrity. Besides, the Addis Ababa agreement stipulated that 20% of the grants of post-secondary and university education within the Sudan and 30% outside the country should be allotted to southerners.⁽²⁾

Ahmed Ibrahim Al Tahir ²² recently confessed that undoubtedly these ideas of lack of stability, justice and equality seemed to be logical because no body refused to accept the point that the southern Sudan was underdeveloped in the fields of education and social services. The conference achieved the establishment of twelve-man committee to seek a practical political solution

acceptable to both the southern Sudanese and northern Sudanese.

And as it has remained throughout the subsequent period of uneasy peace (1972-1983), and the return to civil war in 1983 to the present day. Almost all-Sudanese administrations since independence have followed a policy of enforcing Islam and Arab culture on the south.²³

The imposition of the Sharia Law in September 1983 (now known as the September laws), followed soon after the dissolution of the Southern Regional Government, and took place immediately before a pro-Sharia demonstrations planned by the Muslim Brothers.

The Southern problem was and is still a burning issue in the Sudanese politics and there is a need for peace and genuine system of Government. There is need for restoration of the stability. A stable society carries on within the framework of common map of perception, belief and identity. Societies do indeed differ from one another in the degree of their specialization's and on how they encourage these. All societies necessarily make arrangements for the sharing of wealth, power and other values. Social systems within a culture have vital functions for the survival of the group. The southern people have the basic right to decide freely and should feel responsible.

⁽¹⁾ Deborah Scroggins, *Emma's Wars, Love, Betrayal and Death in the Sudan*, p 224.

⁽²⁾ *Africa Report*, June 1968.

²² Ahmed Ibrahim al Tahir, *Musajalat al Harb, wa salam fi Sudan*, 1998, 1419 A.H

²³ Daly, *Imperial Sudan*, p 412

Conclusion

Sudan, north and south, is a complex society in the sense of race, cultures and uneven socio-economic development. Throughout its historical stages, Sudan was not ruled directly by the British and Egyptians as they played a big role in Sudanese politics. Each was concerned with its own strategic objective that is the control of the Nile waters. To achieve their objectives the colonial rulers relied only on the tribal institutions or sectarian rulers. The British became the real rulers putting more emphasis on law and order and not on development.

Sudan has sustained impact of civilization on northern and Central Africa as a result of its geographical position in Nile Valley. The southern Sudan had been largely unaffected by the succession of early states in the north. It was only Egyptian power which was able to penetrate beyond these into the Upper Nile Basin, bring its wake European, Egyptian and northern Sudanese merchants and adventurers for the commercial exploitation of the south. There was a convergence of military and commercial networks in the exploitation of the south. Both the government and the commercial companies had their own armies drawn from a mixture of free men and slaves. Southerners have not made the same progress towards civilization as the northern Sudanese. Furthermore, owing to the scanty resources of the Sudan government; it has not been possible until lately to find the money necessary to push ahead with the educational and economic development of three southern provinces. The southern Sudan has very little in common with northern Sudan in terms of culture and physical environment. Contacts were difficult as communication was carried out on foot over wide and wild territory.

Evidence has shown and the people were suspicious of one another. This has resulted in the devastation and colonization of the region especially Bahr al Ghazal. Historically the Egyptian officials did most of the slave trading but employed northern Sudanese to do the work in the south. This resulted in dislike of northern Sudanese who were puppets of the Egyptian Government.

Southern Sudanese chiefs acted as the middlemen during the Turco-Egyptian period or as agents of the ivory and slave trading merchants. For this reason, some of the native chiefs have contributed negatively to the devastation of trade as the middlemen. So the native chiefs instead of being agents of change became agents of destruction.

The zoning system was forced on the Sudan Government in 1903. For long time after 1898 the southerners were suspicious of the north and had such memories of the slave trade that it was essential to keep them apart, but this policy of separation seems to have gone on too long.

The Sudan Government wanted to eliminate Islamic influence in the south through Christian missionaries. On the other hand, pacification was the order of the day in the southern Sudan. This was resisted by southerners until 1930. The southern tribes did not just submit but also the British had lost their lives too. Their resistance was mostly felt in Cairo, London and Khartoum but had little influence on the British Government. The evidence suggests that this congeries of southern pagan tribes had independently defended themselves without unifying their efforts against invaders. The southern Sudanese had substantial suffering, which they inflicted on these invaders in response to their aggression.

In the southern Sudan, it had taken sometime for colonial powers to establish good order and fair administration. The British administrators now regarded it as their duty to concern themselves solely with administration and check everything political, whether internal or external. Their aim was to govern the Sudan justly, to keep it quiet and make it prosperous and their task ended.

"British Official tried to restore order and snuff out potential rebellions with insufficient provincial police and troops"². Moreover, changes in British administrative personnel brought new rulers at a time of uncertainty and insecurity. As soon as one district was restored to order, fighting seemed to erupt in another, but it was never coordinated or unified against the British rule. What preserved British administration in the southern Sudan during the First World War was the inherent disunity among the disparate people of the Southern Sudan. This same disunity permits the Sudan government today to maintain its presence amidst similar discontent and disorder. Social, economic and political development of the people concerned was slow. Ignorance, prejudice and customs have accounted for much backwardness of the south. Consequently, the local British officers were expected above all to maintain order, collect taxes and build a few roads.

After the restoration of law and order, mainly Greeks and northern Sudanese who followed the British occupation forces south carried out trade in the southern Sudan. Army

² EP/ SCR/ 1.C1.

forces were seconded in the service of the Anglo-Egyptian Government.

Missionary activity is one of the factors working for change. Mission work is influenced by the character and culture of the native people, as well as by the new conditions of life created by the European invasion and the spread of European institutions and ideas.

Missions have intensively contributed to the modern transformation of southern Sudan, and have become a cultural factor in the evolution of the southern Sudanese man which cannot be ignored. The avowed aim of missionary work is to give the African a life power, which is able to remake not only individuals but also tribes and peoples as a whole.

The British colonizers wanted to achieve power and prestige and to import raw materials. Christianity strengthened the political and economic gains of the British colonizers perhaps to maintain their power prestige.

The Christian and Islamic religions have imposed themselves on African cultures and bore the same destructive purpose to traditional African Religions

On language policy, the colonial powers decided that since there was no common language in the Southern Sudan, English should be the official language. The colonial administrators were dead against Arabic. Arabic was viewed as language that the northerners would use to dominate the south culturally and politically. The English wanted to protect the southerners by imposing English as the official language. As a result, the first-civilian officers posted to Mongalla in 1929 were proficient in English. In this respect, the administration was occasionally frozen in the image of the incumbent. The evidence suggests that the southern district commissioners continued to be independent individuals because his conditions demanded it.

In 1930, the southern policy had been introduced as a separate development. The object was to discourage Arabic and Muslim influence in the south. This is now regarded as a negative impact and evidence suggests that it had encouraged the British colonial, cultural and political domination. The evidence has proved that northern Sudanese had no power at the time to resist this attitude.

By 1930, southern society did work on lineage heads, rainmakers, land chiefs and so on. Colonial recognition of customary law that was a function of a policy of indirect rule whereby, in principle, local chiefs were continued in office, with some restrictions on their authority and certain added responsibilities. The population at large has no idea of the powers of customary chiefs as simply accorded to them by the regime, which can take them away. Also the

British administrators lack manpower; as a result they resorted to various forms of indirect rule.

In the southern Sudan, the people believe almost in traditional religion some all-powerful deity was seen as normal. As a result, Christian religion had been incorporated in and many people were converted into it. People could not be converted to Islam because the colonial rulers and missionary enterprise were fighting very hard to prevent the influence of Arabic and Islam in any forms. But despite these efforts, Islam slowly also penetrated into the southern region especially Bahr al Ghazal.

The British had provided education enough to meet the impact of the northern Sudan by a widespread system of elementary schools. As a result, northern Sudanese are now better off than the majority of African peoples. The policy on education was vicious. Education was left in the hands of missionary bodies. Missionary society was crippled by lack of funds and inferior teaching staff. They had taken educational work in primary schools with very low standard. Although those missionaries were persuasive, they lacked the necessary resources to keep education running. It was only Italians who were the main employees in schools. Education helped them with the main motive of evangelism. By 1937, evidence has shown that the colonial British rulers committed themselves to an educational policy. Evidence has indicated that the British administrators in the Southern Sudan have neglected education. Statistics indicates that no southerners had gone beyond intermediate schools.

The southern Sudanese went in 1940 to the northern Sudan in search of work and education. In this situation, the British colonial rulers could be blamed because they had failed to establish government schools as well as local trade. But the evidence has asserted that there were no educated Southern Sudanese teachers. Northern Sudanese teachers if any were prevented by Southern policy to serve in the Southern Sudan. In 1945, the evidence has proved that the Southern Sudan could stand on her own feet through education.

In 1939-1945, Sudan government used money and manpower for military purposes. After 1939-1945, few could suggest economically profitable fields for investment in the southern Sudan. The British defects were that they neglected the southern Sudan economically. The Second World War had brought outside world and international concerns ever closer. As a result, the Second World War was the most devastating war in history. The evidences have shown that the Southern Sudan continued for a long time as a condominium or as a sort of colony of the northern Sudanese politicians, Egyptians and British.

In this situation, a change of policy was or is seen by some historian as selling out innocent southerners to the northern Sudanese politicians. In this sense, the suspicions had taken root.

The Sudanese attended the 1947 Juba Conference from the north and south that were with uneven qualifications and experiences in such matters. The local chiefs and junior officials who have not reached beyond intermediate level to face graduates-lawyers and doctors from the north. In this situation, local chiefs and government officials of low ranks in the southern Sudan could not balance arguments with the northern Sudanese graduates. These graduates were aware of the Sudanese politics than the rural officials and chiefs of the south. The evidences have shown that the southerners were changing their minds and decisions from time to time for personal advantages. For this reason, the evidence has revealed that the northern Sudanese politicians had made some homework. They had used money to keep silence the local chiefs. The evidence has shown that Robertson had already decided on the reversal of southern policy before conference. What took place was window dressing or curtain.

By 1948, there were only 13 representatives of the southern Sudan in the legislative Assembly. In this sense, the northern Sudan politicians in the legislative Assembly had taken a lion's share. This has added to suspicions and mistrust as well as sense of cultured and political domination.

By February 1953, there was an agreement between Egypt and Britain whose representatives have signed an agreement with northern Sudanese except for southern Sudan. The three partners had agreed on self-determination in three years for the Sudan. Independence came too soon. They made a rush for it. As a result, the seeds of suspicions and distrust was started and resulted in selling out. By the end of 1953, the election took place. Many southerners had swiftly deserted the liberal party for northern Sudanese parties because of promises and gifts. By the time, these southerners were living in poverty and some wanted to gain economically. In this situation, the evidence has suggested that they were very poor and could accept anything given to them for personal advantage. The decision was taken to prepare a future unitary state in 1953. The evidence has proved that the progress made between parties and self-government was far from what was needed.

In 1954, all British and Egyptians in important posts were Sudanised. British control was gone except for the Governor-General. The evidence suggests that the Governor-General had made a statement that the Sudanese would see their cases that was interpreted by the historian to mean the case between the north and the south. In this situation, the British had deepened down and sown the

seeds of hatred, mistrust and lack of confidence between the north and the south. The results of the Sudanization commission announced after the election were a severe disappointment, as northerners were appointed to all the senior position in the south. Most political active southerners saw this as the beginning of northern colonization of the south. In October 1954, the southern Sudanese leaders convened their own conference in Juba to discuss the political solution of the Sudan as a whole and political future of the south within the Sudan.

On 18th August 1955, the mutiny broke out in Torit. The evidence suggests that the main reasons were linked with the attempts to transfer soldier of the Equatoria Corps to Khartoum. In this sense, some historians regarded it as the negative impact on the side of the southern Sudanese. The evidence has asserted that the mutiny was a result of the deception of the northern Sudanese. It has also evidenced that an element of the British influence and Egyptian influence was there.

The evidence has asserted that the British colonial rulers were handling crucial issue through diplomatic way. Also on the side of northern Sudanese, the southern command 1955-1973 was almost manned by citizens from outside the southern Sudan. The evidence has proved that southerners were prevented to enter the army. The evidence has proved beyond doubt that the British colonial rulers depended on the tribal institution as a way of indirect rule. The European powers saw that resistance to their exploitation would be less effective if the colonized people were kept divided.

Al-Azhari success in presiding over the transfer of power was seen a victory, even decisive one, over the two Sayyids. The British colonial administrators had transferred their power to the northern Sudanese rulers intact. Findings have shown that the southern educated classes and tribal chiefs opposed rapid Sudanization and to early self-determination because they saw themselves blocked for promotion and their fear for the unsympathetic administration and a return to the bad treatment of the south by the north of pre-British era. In 1956, Sudan became independent from the colonial rule. But through all of these events the current of the traditional politics ran strong, committed nationalist were dangerously few. The Sudan's problems remained. The Sudanese government faced the same problems, which were avoided and created by the British control. Al Azhari was the first Prime Minister of the independent Sudan. In February 1956, he was forced to enter a coalition and in July Al-Azhari was swept from the office by a combination of Khatimiya and Umma sect. This was a parliamentary government in the Sudan. The Sudanization process was completed with uneven distribution of posts. This had a negative impact on power sharing and was interpreted as cultural and political domination. Southerners benefited so

little from the Sudanization process that hostilities and bad faith became the consequences of north-south relations.

Abboud's taking over of power in 1958 and the imposition of Arabization, Islamization and Nationalization left negative memories on the psyche of the southern Sudanese. Civilian rule was restored in 1964. The October Revolution of 1964 was welcomed by all sectors of Sudanese society. This led to the appointment of one southern Sudanese to the key position of Minister of the Interior. This was a positive contribution of the Revolution to the north-south relations. There were also two incidents in southern towns of Juba and Wau as cause of 1965 refugee influx to Uganda and Zaire. The evidence has proved that conversion of chiefs and children to Islam mainly characteristic of Equatoria because some of the people are submissive because of fear. This has been interpreted as a negative impact. One thinks that conversion should be free choice of an individual chief.

At the Round Table Conference (March 1965), attended by representatives of all Sudanese parties, some tentative solution was reached to eliminate the misgivings of the south in united Sudan.

In 1965 a twelve-man committee was formed as a result of the Round Table Conference. The evidence suggests that the Addis Ababa Agreement was partly a result of the Round Table Conference. "October 1966, however marked the beginning of a vigorous drive for an Islamic constitution. It was chiefly through the clamour of the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) as a pressure group that the demand for an Islamic constitution acquired focal position in the deliberations of the newly convened national committee to establish constitution and in the agenda of the mainstream parties such as the Umma and the DUP"¹. The evidence has indicated that the second parliamentary government had learned little from the first. As a result it was toppled by a coup in May 1969.

In May 1969 the army took over the government under the leadership of Numeiri. The finding has evidenced that pressures from Ansar and communists had compelled Numeiri to constitute the southern affairs and Abel Alier was appointed to replace Joseph Garang, the former member of communist party. The evidence has claimed that Numeiri had recognized the historical and cultural differences between the north and south and the tenet that the unity of the country must be built upon these objective realities... within a united socialist Sudan (SSU). Sudan as a whole should believe as Arab and African, Islamic and Christian and animist, black and brown. This had been named as the new Sudanese African policy. The country

can no more be purely African than completely Arab. The evidence suggests that too much politics creeping into the local government and the regional system might not work ultimately in the interests of the provinces. The Finding has proved that the religious factions regarded Addis Ababa Agreement as a sell out to the south, violation of national and a treat to the centrality of Islam in nation life. One thinks that was a negative thinking because peace is vital to nation building. The evidences have shown that almost all-Sudanese administrators since independence had followed a policy of enforcing Islam and Arabic culture in the south. As put by Rode Anderson Christol Greene "And where political unity was imposed by force rather than an evolutionary process of nation-building, the loyalty of citizens to governing institutions is more in doubt, especially in the context of economic instability". The best is the decentralisation.

The role of the religious teachers was to maintain peace and order. All human aspirations could best be achieved under a condition of peace and order. Peace meant the expense of close administration. The holy men were part of the political set-up but independent in their own capacity. Growing tensions between north and south over issues of national unity or as perceived in the south, over neo-colonial and economic, religious and political oppression, reached a decisive and defining the climax during 1964-1972. The years 1964-72 have controlled the shape of the subsequent Sudanese history. The impact on rural southern citizens was to encourage them to seek baptism in large numbers than ever. This was because of the intensification of the war. One believes that the role of religious teachers was to have freedom of Christianization and Islamization as free Sudanese citizens. Evidence has indicated that the signing of Addis Ababa Accord was a positive impact on both south and north and due to relative peace.

The expected results according to some historians are decolonization; equal sharing of power and wealth; the making of the proper constitution and clear political strategies; freedom of expression and religion; encouragement of the local languages in writing and use in the mass media; decentralisation of the administration; proper maintenance of peace and order, open dialogue with transparency, secular education and finally proper use of economic and human resources.

There is room for a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue. This implies that northern Sudanese and southern Sudanese have room for dialogue.

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, Op-cit, p 119.

Glossary

Alim (Pl. ulama)	=	Learned one, especially of Islam.
Aman	=	Clemency, assurance for protection immunity
Ansar	=	Followers of the Mahdi
Araki	=	Sudanese distilled liquor
Bwoc mac	=	Treasury in Fashoda under the Reth
Bey	=	Governor or title of the Turkish period
Bazinger	=	Slave Soldiers of Turkish origin
Bahr al Ghazal	=	Gazzelle River
Bahr al Jabal	=	The White Nile
Bog Barons	=	Former members of the Sudan political service dominated by the British upper-middle class where, mostly officers
Dal	=	Steamer
Dura	=	Millet (Sorghum vulgare)
Dongolawi	=	Men of Dongola or person from Dongola Region
Dar	=	Land, homeland
Emir	=	Literary Prince, Commander
Effendi	=	Formerly an honorific for a professional, an educated man, later any one educated (Turkish origin)
Faki	=	A holy man or religious teacher
Hajj	=	A pilgrimage
Imam	=	Leader, title denoting the leader of prayers in a mosque.
Jabal	=	Hill, mountain
Jallaba	=	Peddler, petty trader
Jihad	=	Religious war
Khalifa	=	Successor, lieutenant
Khalwa	=	Place seclusion, denotes both a sufi retreat and a quranic school
Khor	=	Stream or the river tributary
Kuttab	=	A school
Kisra	=	Piece of bread, a Sudanese bread made of sorghum
A missio Sui Juris	=	Self-governing mission under the name of Kodok.
Mahdi	=	The divinely-guided one, expected by many Muslims to restore Islam and to herald the end of time.
Ma'had	=	Islamic institute
Ma'mur	=	A district official
Mudir	=	Governor of province
Mek	=	King
Muhajir	=	Immigrant, migrant
Nazir	=	Leader of a tribe
Qadi	=	A judge or magistrate
Qism	=	A division, a district
Three Rs	=	Writing, reading and arithmetic
Reth	=	The King of the Shilluk
Tiit	=	Dinka diviners
Turuk	=	Turks, later denoting Egyptians, Europeans, Northern Sudanese in southern Sudanese usage. Turuk is a slang word in Sudanese Arabic
Sudd	=	Barrier of accumulated vegetation; term denoting the region of swamps between Bor and Lake No. on the Upper Nile
Shari'a	=	Islamic Law
Shaykh	=	Tribal or religious chief
Sayyid	=	Formally a religious title of respect, now roughly the equivalent of Mr.
Umda	=	Headman or a quarter of a group of villages
Wakil	=	Agent or deputy

APENDIX ONE

A list of Southern Governors 1902-1955

These lists of southern military and civilian governors are so useful and relevant to the study of the impact of Change Agents. They were agents of change in the southern Sudan during the Condominium period. Consequently these periods in which these administrators governed in the southern Sudan are within the scope of my research work. They have attended several meetings and conferences of which they wrote their reports.

Governors of Upper Nile Province

1900-1902	Major W. Hayes Sadler
1902-1906	Major Mathews, G.E
1906-1910	Struve, K.C.P
1910-1916	Sir Arthur Huddleston
1916-1919	Pawson, A.G
1919 - 1927	Willis, C.A
1927-1928	Lee, J.M
1928-1930	Platts, G.S
1930 - 1953	Kingken
1953-1955	Winder, J.

Governors of Bahr al-Ghazal Province

1902-1905	Major W.H. Boulnois Bey
1905-1908	Sutherland Bey
1908-1909	Lieutenant Colonel R.V. Saville
1910-1917	Colonel R.M Fielden
1910-1932	Major P.M Lurken
1912-1930	Viscount Hawarden
1912-1917	Major C.C Northcote
1913-1918	Brock R.G.C
1917-1920	Wheatley, M.J.W
1919-1927	Captain Routh, H.C.E
1920- 1932	Kidd, H.F
1932-1947	Captain Owen, Deputy Governor
1947-1955	Daud Abdal al-Latif

Governors of Mongalla and Equatoria Provinces

1906-1908	Captain Augus Cameroon
1908 - 1918	Captain Owen
1918-1919	Captain Pollen, W.M.H
1919-1920	Major Stigand, C.H
1920-1924	Woodland, V.R
1924-1931	Mayward, P.G.W
1931-1937	Martin Parr
1937-1940	Skeet C.H.L
1930-1947	Mardwood B.V
1947-1953	Strine, A.W
1953-1955	Balfour, F.C

Major Events:

The Sudan's Road to Independence

1945	End of World War Two
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1947	Juba Conference. South Sudan to proceed with North Sudan political development.
1948	Legislative Assembly
1952	Naguib Nasser Revolution in Egypt,

Election of 1953

Name	House of Representative	Senate	Total
NUP	50	21 elected + 10 nominated	31
Umma	23	4 elected + 4 nominated	8
Southern Party	9	3 elected + 3 nominated	6
Socialists	-	-	-
Independents (Including 7 Southern Independent	<u>12</u> 4 All	97	50

1953 February -Egypt and Britain agree on self-government and self-determination for Sudan.

November-December National elections.

1954 Ismail Axxhari the first Prime Minister.

1955 Torit mutiny. Mutiny of the Equatoria corps.

APENDIX TWO

Key Events of Sudanization

1956	Independence of the Sudan
1957	Government takes over mission schools
1958	The rise of Southern Nationalism Frs Paulino Doggale and Saturnino Lohure elected to constituent Assembly. November - Abboud Coup - Army rule.
1960	Friday law changes day of rest in South from Sunday
1962	Missionary societies Act
1963	Anya nya emerges
1964	Expulsion of the missionaries. October Revolution takes place
1965	The round table conference
1969	Numeiry Coup-Army rule
1972 March	Ratification of the Addis Ababa peace Agreement
1972 22 nd April	Provisional Government set up in Juba

APENDIX THREE

Gorvernor - Generals in the Sudan 1898 - 1955

1898 - 1899	Horatio Herbert (Lord Kitchener
1899 - 1916	Sir Francis Reginald Wingate
1917 - 1924	Sir Lee Stack
1924 - 1926	Sir Geoffirey Archer
1926 - 1933	Sir John Maffey (later Lord Rugby)
1933 - 1940	Sir Stewart Symes
1940 - 1947	Sir Hubert Huddleston
1947 - 1955	Sir Robert Howe
1955 - 1956	Sir Alexander Knox Helm

APENDIX FOUR

List of Civil secretaries

1899-1926	Fitton Bey
1926 - 1933	Mac Michael, civil secretary
1934 - 1939	Sir Angus Gillan, civil secretary
1939 - 1945	Sir Douglas Newbold, civil secretary
1945 - 1953	Sir James Robertson, civil secretary

APENDIX FIVE

Heads of Government of the independent Sudan, 1956 - 1989

1956 9 th Jan - Jul 1956	Ismail Azhari
1956 Jul - Nov 1958	Abdallah Khalil
1958 Nov - Oct 1964	Ibrahim Abboud
1964 Oct - May 1965	Sir Al Khatim Al Khalifa
1965 May - Jul 1966	Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub
1966 Jul - May 1967	Sadiq Al Mahdi
1967 May - May 1969	Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub
1969 May - Oct 1969	Babiker Awadallah
1969 May - Apr 1985	Jaafar Al Numeiry
1985 Apr - May 1986	Abd al Rahman Suwar al Dahab
1986 May - June 1989	Sadiq Al Mahdi
1989 June	Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir

APENDIX SIX

Members of Commissions

1951 - 1952	Constitutional Commission, Chairman Mr. Justice Stanley - Baker Southern Sudanese member, Buth Diu, a Nuer from Upper Nile who attended the Juba conference of 1947. In December al -Azhari used the cabinet crisis to promote two southenn ministers without portfolio Dak Dei and Santino Deng Teng to be ministers of mechanical transport and minister of stores and supplies respectively, in an effort to appease southern opinion and provide opportunities for patronage.
1953	Mixed Electoral Commission Chairman (India) Sukumar Sea Southern Sudanese member Gordon Bulli, a sub-ma'mur and reportedly the only southerner the government found suitable. The agreement specified membership as two Sudanese jointly chosen by the co-domini, and one Egyptian, one Briton, and one Pakistani chosen by their respective governments
1953 - 1955	Governor - General's Advisory commission Chairman (Pakistan) main Ziauddin
1954	Sudanization committee was appointed. In that committee. No Southern Sudanese member
1954 - 1955	Southern Sudanese member Siricio Iro. Several southern politicians, including Gordon Ayoum of NUP Siricio Iro on the governor General's commission began with Egyptian backing openly to preach causes of southern participation with Egypt and for postponement of the foreign troop evacuation until southern demands were met. Sudanese governors warned al-Azhari of increasing Egyptian activities, centring on irrigation officials at Malakal and Juba, which was designed to impress the NUP with Egypt's ability to make trouble,. Salah Salam began to argue that sudanization had left a vacuum in the region which could be file only by Egypt, in the interest of province. When knox Helm visited in May 1955, northern official were candidly alarmed by Egyptian activities, which continued shamelessly despite their attempts maintain order.

APENDIX SEVEN: -

Research Questions

1. What changes have been brought?
2. How is the impact of change experienced?
3. What general guideline does the impact of change studied provides to the southern Sudan?
4. What development projects have been implemented?
5. How were these agents of change perceived by the Sudanese communities?
6. What change happened between the condominium and the Sudan government?
7. What are the main changes of the impact of the condominium government?

Answering Research Questions

- The Condominium government brought European civilization and Christianity and superimposed their culture that is religion, and language on Southern Sudanese. The main influence of Christianity came in the subsequent strategic influence its converts achieved through the educational qualifications, and their role in administration and politics in the late condominium and Agents early independence periods. They brought major benefits such as peace and domestic security, the reduction of famine and diseases and introduction of education, medicine and technical knowledge.
- The impact of change was experienced by very tedious work and obstructions to the government policy. The government's main aim was to maintain inter-tribal peace and security. However these military administrators defeated the southern peoples because they wanted to restore order and domestic security.
- The impact of change studied provides general guideline to the Southern Sudanese a change in resistance attitudes for conciliation and advancement depending on pacification, now peace is the end of advance
- The development projects that had been implemented were small experiments begun by the Inspectors for the welfare of their people such as Azande cotton scheme, Nzara etc.
- The Condominium and National Governments were perceived as elements of destruction to southern Sudanese tribal customs, cultures, societies, history and institutions.
- The main changes of the impact of condominium were in education, medicine, religion and agricultural projects.
- There was no change that took place between the condominium and the Sudanese governments in cultural and political domination. There was a neo-colonization where violence was also applicable. The military governments were major challenges than the civilian government in the northern Sudanese towards the southern Sudan. British administrators were foreigners and intruders and the Sudanese administrators were the home rulers.

This research also tries to answer research questions.

Data analysis and discussion were presented in conclusion, where very interesting result were come to. The most important of these is that there was cultural and political domination by the condominium government and the Sudanese governments. Both of them brought civilized cultures to those African peoples by imposition

Appendix VIII

Definition of the Impact of change:

The impact of change is an encounter between the British military forces and the Southern Sudanese reaction to these forces, which eventually led to the transformation of Southern Sudanese Societies.

The impact of foreign influence generally was caused by peaceful means or military-oriented operations conducted or induced by foreigners who were the agents of change. What follows was a devastating era, loss of properties, shortage of food, famine and diseases and a great loss of human life. The first impact after the military operation was the establishment of a stable, secure administration in the Southern Sudan.

The Impact agents were education, language, mission and medical care, agriculture and so on to preach the word of the gospel. The result of these agents was awareness and enlightenment, acceptance and recognition of the government policy. Impact casts change in people's lives, brought about by a given action or actions. Social impact is defined as a significant improvement or deterioration to people's well being or a significant in an aspect of community concern. Negative impacts are less obvious. External forces of

change effect social systems, other explore internal forces as courses of impacts – for example, altercations of perception or aspiration. Sometimes the focus is social, sometimes more socio-economic or socio-cultural and socio-political. The southern Sudanese have gained valuable experience and confidence in the process, and they fought much more effectively for their wishes to be heeded-a positive impact or outcome.

Africa had its own culture before the arrival of Islam and Christianity. They had imposed on Africa, Islam and Arab culture, Christian and Western European culture, rites, music and art. We acquire knowledge and civilization by borrowing and adaptations from and initiating models from abroad. The principle of keeping the African culture pure and genuine is shallow, false and denied by history.

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Mongalla Province

Most of the data is kept in the files in National Record Office (NRO). They were written by Governors and administrators. They contain the records of the provincial headquarters, an extremely valuable and varied collection. The Mongalla records provide information on the many facets of provincial administration and are indispensable to any historian of the southern Sudan of the contemporary period. Mongalla Province Summary is a series of reports and statistics compiled by L. F. Nalder, former Governor of Mongalla Province, for use of administrative offices in the province. It contains many historical references to the Mahdists in Equatoria.

Christian missionary's archives

Collections pertaining to Christian missionary's archives in the southern Sudan are plentiful. They are kept in National Record Office. Without these records any analysis of mission work in the southern Sudan would be of little value. Mission questions and rivalries are dealt with a great detail in the provincial records of the Bahr el-Ghazal, Mongalla and Upper Nile provinces.

Bahr el-Ghazal Province contains the collections of the provincial headquarters of Bahr el-Ghazal province. The files constitute a collection essential to the history of southern Sudan.

Upper Nile Province contains the records of the provincial headquarters of Upper Nile province. These files are important because they constitute a collection essential to the history of southern Sudan.

Unpublished confidential Reports:

These were reports prepared by Egyptian Military Intelligence Department in the 19th and 20th centuries. They constitute an entire Summary of all activity in each province of the Sudan and frequently include important documents, letters, and papers.

A set of these papers was kept in the archives of the Civil Secretary, Khartoum, during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. When the Sudan attained its Independence, the reports were transferred to the archives of the Sudan, where, however, they continued to carry the designation, "Civil Secretary's archives".

Intelligence Report, Egypt, Nos 1 - 59, Civil Secretary's Achieves, Khartoum.

Sudan Intelligence Reports, Nos 60-101, Civil Secretary's Archives, Khartoum.

Civil Secretary (Civsec) contains the records of the civil secretary's office, Khartoum, and deposited in the central archives.

The Sudan Intelligence Reports, which cover province by province and district by district, are available in the archives of the Sudan Government in NRO. The sections pertaining to the southern Sudan included in the Sudan Intelligence Report were derived from monthly intelligence reports submitted by the inspectors from each district to the assistant Director of the Intelligence.

Civsec /SCR/ 60 – A –1 –11 slavery in the Sudan. The file contains adequate data on slavery and useful for research in slavery and slave trade.

Mongalla file/ No Class 1, box 9, piece 60- is about events in Upper Nile Province: Chronological Alphabetical Index to Sudan Intelligence 1894 to the end of 1936 is an outstanding Report for a study of the Southern Sudan but is short of the time after 1936. It contains valuable information on events in Upper Nile Province. Unfortunately, it does not contain the more recent scholarly contribution to the literature on the Southern Sudan after 1936.

Mongalla File No/ 1.A.1 is about General Administrative Policy-General Rulings 1910-1928. The file is useful because it contains valuable information concerning the policy of the condominium rule. It is useful for the study of southern Sudan and its administrators. Mongalla File No/ 56.A is about Religion-questions of policy. The file is relevant because it contains valuable

information concerning questions of policy in general. An outstanding for study of the role and impact of Christian and Islamic teachers.

Bahr al-Ghazal File No/ 17.A.1 is about the Missionary Education 1930-1956. The File is relevant because it contains valuable information on Christian Missions and education during the condominium Government, and it is relevant to the study of the Southern Sudan.

Bahr al-Ghazal File No/ 60.A1 is about Slavery 1923-1934. It contains relevant data on slavery during Anglo-Egyptian rule. This is essential to the study of the impact of trade on the history of southern Sudan.

Bahr al-Ghazal File No/ 1-c. administrative policy for southern Sudan 1930-1956. The file contains adequate data for the study, though limited to 1930-1956.

E.P/ File No/ 17A is about William's Report of 1936. Who was the Director of Education by that time. The file contains valuable information about the education of southern Sudan.

E.P/No/ 64.A.2. Is about Trade: Board of Economics. The file is suitable because it contains more information on trade and useful for the study of the history of southern Sudan.

E.P/ File No/ 17.A.2 is about educational problems of the Sudan. The file is relevant and useful for study of education in general. This explains a comprehensive analysis of information presented by the selected files that will set the research data on the clear grounds.

Archives of the Foreign Minister, Brussels:

File A. F. 1-40, Lado. Although this file contains few references to the Mahdists, it furnished valuable information on Leopold's Policy in the Upper Nile.

Reports:

The main aim of the researcher is to introduce the sources to the readers and to evaluate them. Civil secretaries, administrators, governors, inspectors, missionaries and financial secretaries wrote these Reports. The degree of their objectivity is to provide the government policy and the progress of their work. The Sudan Notes and Records, Journal contains some useful materials. These sources are mainly archival. So it is very difficult to give a short critical for each.

Titles of the Files related to the following topics are mentioned below.

a) Education

Bahr al Ghazal / SCR / 17-A-1 mission and Education 1928 – 1956.

EP /SCR/ 17-J-2 Education in Southern Sudan. Advisory councils.

EP /SCR/ 17-A-3 William Report 1936.

EP /SCR/ 17-A-2 Educational problems of the Sudan.

Revised plan for education in the Southern Provinces

Ministry of Education, Revised ten years plan, 1949 – 1956, Khartoum N.D.

Civsec /SCR/ 17 – A – 2/6 Education in Southern Sudan.

UNP /SCR/ 17-D-4 Education Expansion

UNP /SCR/ 17-J-2 Education policy

b) Slavery

Bahr al Ghazal /SCR / 62-A. Slavery.

Bahr al Ghazal / SCR / 60-A-1 Slavery 1923 – 1934.

Civsec /SCR/ 60 – A – 1 – 11 slavery in the Sudan

c) Trade

Bahr al Ghazal /SCR / 64 – B. Trade and cattle

Bahr al Ghazal / SCR / 64-D-1 Trade – Hide and skins 1927 – 1956.

EP /SCR/ 64-A-2 Trade: Board of economics.

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d) Administration

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Sudan intelligence reports

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I conducted personal interviews with the following persons at the conversational level. This was one of the tools I used as a research design. Although some of these did not appear in the footnotes, it does mean that not useful but I am quite certain that their knowledge was so dear to my research study:

1. Kwanyireth Luigi Adwok, 2001.

Luigi Adwok was a southern politician who was the secretary general of the southern Bloc ,member of the southern Front and representative on the Supreme Council, southern minister and one of three southern Governors appointed during the reign of Numeiry .Among a five-man council of sovereignty which was formed on the 3rd December 1964 by Sir al Khatim al Khalifa. He was the only one southerner. On the Supreme Council, he had threatened to resign during the previous month unless the government produced a satisfactory explanation of the killing of several people and the burning of houses in his home village in the south. Elections were held in the south, beginning on the 8th march 1967.Kwanyireth Luigi contested as one of the three independents.

2. Mathew Obur Ayang, 2001

He was one of the prominent southern politicians in exile. He also led the student groups in the exile ; the speaker of the Regional Assembly and editor -in- chief of he New Horizon. He backed Samuel Aru of elections to the third Regional Assembly which was over at the end of May 1980and also was the chairman of the southern Sudan coordination council in 1986

3. Acwill Lwal Jok, 2004

He entered Doleib Hill Elementary School in 1942 .He was admitted in Teachers Training College in 1951.He became teacher in 1953.He is about 77 years old. He is well up in the history of the southern Sudan and had seriously suffered in the event of the south.

4. Philip yona, 2002.

an old teacher of Rumbek secondary school .He taught in al Ahlia University as a teacher for English Language ;he was the head of English Department and the acting Dean .At the present day, the minister in the Government of the southern Sudan.

5. Late Professor Arop Yor, 2000.

He was originally civil servant and appointed by al Sadiq al Mahdi as the Minister.This appointment was as an appeasement of SANU and the moderates He was appointed to the National Constitution Commission .He was the Dean of students and chairman of the shilluk Language Council.

6. H.E.Abel Alier,2000

Wal Kuai was a protestant Lawyer and a Dinka from Bor He was appointed as vice-president .and Minister for Southern Affairs He succeeded the executed Joseph Garang. Abel was president of the High Executive Council. southern Region 1975..

7. Rev. Ezekiel Kutjok,2004.

The Chairman of the Shilluk Language Council and once was the leader of the Shilluk translation team He was the secretary General of the Sudan Council of Churches He is now moderator of Doleib Hill Presbytery.

8. Mathew Othow Deng,2002.

An Engineer by the nature of his work. He was the Director General of transport and communications in the southern Region ,Juba. He was the Deputy Governor of the Upper Nile Province and the Deputy Chairman of the Shilluk Language Council. He is a member of the Engineering Consultancy based at Khartoum. and also an elder in the Presbyterian Church.


9. Simon Yor Kur,1999

The late Simon was the Radio Broadcaster in Omdurman and Southern Region, Juba. He was politically active and was among those who got arrested in 1958 at Atar Intermediate School .He retired on a pension.

10. James Bol Kalmal,2003

He is now a Lawyer .He had been working as a civil servant in Tobacco Company in the Southern Sudan. He retired from his business and joined political arena He was designated Governor of the Upper Nile Region.


Map 1



The Sudan: Physical and Tribal.

Source: Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*.


Map 2



The Funj dominions and neighbouring territories

Source: Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*.

Map 3



The Mahdist State:

Source: Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*.

Map 4




The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1942-1955

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1942-55.

Source: Daly, *Imperial Sudan*.


Map 5



The Modern Sudan:

Source: Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*


Map 6



Southern Sudan: Principal Tribes.


Source: Holt and Daly, *A History of the Sudan*.

Map 7



The Southern Sudan


Source: Mohammed Omer Beshir, *Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*.



The Southern Sudan

Source: Mohammed Omer Beshir, *Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*.

Map 9



Mission Spheres of Influence in the Southern Sudan.

Source: Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*.

Dedication

This book is written in memory of my late father, Yanyo Ding, whose great deeds in Panyidway territory continue to earn us respect in the eyes of Akugo community. He is personality cult which inspired me to put his name down to record for posterity. I owe him respect and identification for founding for us after many of his father's brothers and relatives were taken the Mahdist slave traders. I also dedicate this book to him for taking me to school Oweci in 1961 and wrote my name as Thabo Nyibong Ding. Also my great mother, Nyayik Nyiyom Acath-dheg has to be honoured for her excellent character that gave my father being proud among the community.

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I am indebted to Dr. Samson Samuel Wassara, Professor of Political Science, University of Juba. He edited preface of this book with wonderful expressions of key words to the History of South Sudan. This book is outlined for the use by scholars, students and general readers in South Sudan, Africa and the world at large. This work could not have been done well without the support of different institutions and scores of people.

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Also I would like to acknowledge whoever has contributed in one way or other in typing the manuscripts. Their contributions are honoured and respected.

Published by: Dr. Daniel Thabo Nyibong

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About the Author: Dr. Daniel Thabo Nyibong.

The author was born in 1956 in Akugo Village West of Doleib Hill in Panyidway Payam. His father was a farmer. He obtained Bachelor of Arts in History and Geography from the University of Juba 1986. Master Degree in History, Faculty of Education, University of Khartoum 1993 and Ph.D. Degree in History at the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum-2005. He joined teaching profession as a primary teacher in 1976 and upgraded himself gradually. He joined University of Juba in 1994 and appointed Head Department of History. He was also appointed as the Deputy Dean, College of Education and became the Acting Dean and finally appointed as the Dean of the College of Education up to the present day. He was appointed as the state minister of education, gender and social welfare, Fashoda State/Kodok on 12th February 2016.

He was also appointed as the SPLM State Secretary of Fashoda State/Kodok on 11th January 2017 and relieved on 20th November 2017. Cde Dr. Daniel Thabo Nyibong appointed as Adviser for Peace and Reconciliation in Central Upper Nile State on 24th March 2017 and relieved from the position on 27th October 2017. He has been active in politics since 1980s becoming Secretary for Information University of Juba Southern Student Association (JUSSA). Since 1996 he has been Secretary General of Collo Language Council. He is a member of Sudan Historical Society and member of Board and Senate. Currently, he is a member of National Liberation Council – SPLM and Dean, College of Education, University of Juba. He published the following books:

- 1- "The History of the Collo People".
- 2- "A Short History of the Northern Luo".
- 3- He contributed in writing "a Concise History of South Sudan", first edition, Fountain publisher, Kampala 2010.